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Earnings persistence, value relevance, and 
earnings timeliness: The Case of Thailand 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims to investigate the enhancement of accounting quality in 
Thailand after adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in its 
domestic accounting system.  The accounting quality consists of three properties 
of earnings– earnings persistence, value relevance and earnings timeliness.  This 
research examines the improvement of accounting quality after the IFRS adoption 
in Thailand by expanding the conditioning institutional factor to include the 
magnitude of book-tax differences.  In addition, the relationship between the Thai 
accounting quality and firm governance systems is investigated.   
 
The results reveal that the accounting quality, including earnings persistence and 
value relevance, has been improved after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.  The 
earnings timeliness is observed in Thai firms, but it has been declined after the 
IFRS adoption.  The results also indicate that the improvement of accounting 
quality after the IFRS adoption in Thailand is varied according to the magnitude 
of book-tax differences.  This research finds that the firm governance system is 
related to the improvement of accounting quality in Thai settings.  This research 
concludes that the adoption of IFRS has generally improved accounting quality in 
Thailand.  The book-tax difference contains significant information about 
accounting quality in Thai settings.  And, the firm governance system plays an 
important role in accounting quality after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.      
 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the prior written consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Without question, financial reporting plays a multiple role in the business world.  
For instance, it not only represents corporate financial and/or non-financial 
information required by any legislative regulators which firms have to deal with, 
but also can be used as a medium to communicate between the firm and related 
parties, i.e. creditors, investors and analysts.  Financial information shown on the 
corporate report is thus of interest to stakeholders and can affect the user who 
relies on that information.  Back in 1968, Ball and Brown (1968) attempted to 
discover the association between accounting numbers and share returns; the 
essential role of financial reporting has occupied a great deal of researchers’ 
attention to investigate whether financial reporting provides useful information for 
stakeholders in terms of decision making and predictability.  Specifically, as 
reported by a growing amount of accounting literature in the area of financial 
reporting, recent research studies around the world have focused on and been 
aware of the quality of accounting information disclosed on the corporate 
financial report.1  Generally speaking, financial information users have expected 
to receive a certain level quality of information to achieve their objectives that 
vary according to the group of users.  In the meantime, business competition is a 
major constraint for the firm to disclose all their information to the public.  This 
ambivalence between information generators (business entities) and users can 
distort the information quality in general, as suggested by the economic theory 
that information asymmetry between firms – as insiders, and users – as outsiders, 
exists in the real world (Spence 1973).  Nevertheless, there is a structural 
mechanism initiated to mitigate the information gap between a firm’s insiders and 
outsiders, i.e. corporate governance systems (Dechow and Schrand 2004, pg.102).   
                                               
1 Among others, for example, Ding, Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2007) employed cross-country 
data to compare the use of domestic accounting standards and international accounting standards 
in 30 countries.  Prather-Kinsey (2006) investigated accounting information for firms in South 
Africa and Mexico. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examined the quality of financial reporting in UK 
firms. Habib (2004) studied accounting information quality in Japanese firms. 
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Thai Accounting Framework defines fundamental qualitative characteristics in 
four categories, including understandability, relevance, reliability, and 
comparability.  From the accounting empirical and anecdotal evidence, accounting 
information providing such benefits as the ability to incorporate economic 
consequences, relevancy or predictability to information users is considered as 
useful or good quality.  Consistent with the fundamental qualitative characteristics 
in the Thai accounting framework and growing literature, this thesis aims at 
investigating accounting information quality by interpreting ‘quality’ of 
accounting information in three well-known forms, including the persistence of 
accounting summary numbers (to estimate the reliability), relevancy (to estimate 
the relevance) and timeliness.  More details about these forms of quality will be 
explained later. 
 
This thesis depicts that the accounting regime is an important parameter affecting 
the quality of accounting information.  In a particular accounting environment, i.e. 
Thailand, accounting information quality can be affected by significant factors – 
accounting rules and other influencing factors.  Accounting rules are viewed as 
the direct descriptor on accounting information quality whilst such necessary 
factors, other than accounting rules, as laws, the market regulator and structure, 
politics, information quality monitoring mechanism and errors, are considered as 
indirect parameters.  To prepare financial reporting, firms are required to follow 
procedures stated by accounting rules.  Broadly speaking, accounting rules consist 
of two main components: on the one hand, mandatory rules specifying accounting 
procedures the firm must follow, i.e. firms must identify depreciable vs. non-
depreciable assets, and on the other leaving the choice to the firm, otherwise 
termed the voluntary aspect, i.e. the appropriate depreciation method is subject to 
the firm’s discretion.  Accounting rules formally indicated in accounting standards 
eventually play an important role for corporate financial reporting preparations.  
Since financial information quality can be analysed by examining corporate 
reported information presented on the firm’s financial reporting which is prepared 
according to accounting rules in each country, changes in accounting standards 
ultimately affect the result of reported accounting numbers, leading to the direct 
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alteration of the quality of accounting information.  This argument is supported by 
Ding et al. (2007), who suggest that financial reporting quality is determined by 
accounting standards.  Additionally, firms can employ the voluntary component in 
the accounting standard in either a pessimistic sense – to garble their financial 
information – or an optimistic sense – to incorporate their true economic 
consequences.   
 
As well-documented by previous research studies, accounting standards as 
compulsory requirements of financial reporting can immensely influence the 
corporate accounting information when accounting standards have substantially 
been changed.2  And, indirect parameters, such as laws (i.e. common vs. civil 
laws), politics (i.e. politic-connected vs. non-politic- connected firms), monitoring 
mechanisms (i.e. independence audit committee or audit committee components), 
market rules (i.e. regulations of the Stock Exchange), the market economic 
structure (i.e. well-developed market vs. emerging market) and errors (fraud vs. 
management/human errors) can cause difference of accounting information 
quality across firms and countries.3 Accordingly, this thesis chooses to explore 
accounting information quality in Thailand because Thailand has developed 
accounting-related policies to improve Thai accounting information quality.   
 
This thesis examines the improvement of accounting information quality in 
general characteristics.  However, to be more specific, accounting information 
quality is investigated after the reform of accounting standards in Thailand.  As 
aforementioned, indirect parameters substantially influence the accounting 
                                               
2 Several prior works have examined the value-relevance of accounting reforms in various 
countries, i.e. Czech Republic (Hellstrom 2006), South Africa and Mexico (Prather-Kinsey 2006), 
Poland (Gornik-Tomaszewski 2001) and Spain (Giner and Rees 1999).  Other than the accounting 
reform, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) found that the change in accounting policies is positively 
associated with the reduction in analyst prediction errors. 
3 i.e. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000). Ding et al. (2007) suggested that accounting systems in 
countries could be improved not only by accounting standards but also the development of 
economic functions, i.e. the financial market.  Nevertheless, Leuz (2003) added the empirical 
evidence about different accounting policies applied in the identical economic functions by 
concluding from German new market evidence that International Accounting Standards (IASs) and 
US GAAP provide no different quality that information asymmetry and market liquidity across 
firms were not significantly affected by using different accounting policies. 
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information quality.  According to the existing literature, one major factor 
influencing accounting quality is the corporate governance system (Dechow and 
Schrand 2004, pg.102).  As shown in Figure 1.1, prior empirical research has 
discovered the effect of either accounting policies or institutional factors on the 
quality of accounting information.  Point A indicates that prior studies examine 
the relationship between accounting quality and accounting policy.  Point B shows 
the prior research investigating the relationship between institutional factors, i.e. 
corporate governance, and accounting quality.  Point C indicates the research 
studies that estimate the relationship among accounting policy, institutional 
factors, and accounting quality.  More details about why this thesis investigates 
accounting quality in Thailand will be explained later.  This chapter presents 
statement of the research problem in section 1.2 and statement of the general 
hypothesis in section 1.3.  Motivation of the study and contribution to the 
knowledge are explained in section 1.4 and 1.5, respectively.  The last section is 
the structure of the study. 
 
Figure 1.1 Factors Influencing Accounting Information Quality  
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
A: Research studied by Hellström (2006), Prather-Kinsey (2006), Yang, Ronhrbach and Chen 
(2005), Leuz (2003), Chen, Chen and Su (2001), Gornik-Tomaszewski and Jermakowicz (2001), 
Bao and Chow (1999), and Giner and Rees (1999) 
 
B: Research studied by Davis-Friday, Eng and Lin (2006), Ballas and Hevas (2005), Bushman, 
Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004), Ball, Robin and Wu (2003), Ely and Pownall (2002), Arce and 
Mora (2002), Bartov, Goldberg and Kim (2001a), Fan and Wong (2002), Jung and Kwon (2002), 
Vafeas (2000), and Graham, King and Bailes (2000) 
 
C: Research studied by Ahmed and Duellman (2007); Ding et al. (2007) and Bushman et al. 
(2004)  
Indirect Parameter 
i.e. Capital Market 
Policy 
Accounting 
Information Quality 
Direct Parameter 
Accounting 
Policy 
A
C
B
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
It is clear that Thailand was devastated by the 1997 financial economic crisis after 
the floatation of the Thai Baht on 2nd July 1997. Massive economic shocks had 
severely attacked private firms.  The main reason for the collapse of the Thai 
economy was the scale of foreign debt (Graham et al., 2000).  Thailand, thus, had 
to join the financial rehabilitation programme of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  One essential part of the financial rehabilitation was to improve Thai 
accounting standards.  Before the 1997 financial crisis, Thai firms had been using 
the Thai Accounting Standard (TAS) published by The Institute of Certified 
Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT).  On 4th May 2000, the Thai 
government enacted a new accounting law, the Accounting Act 2000, to regulate 
all firms in the country.  According to the Accounting Act, on 28th December 
2000, 21 out of 31 accounting standards were abolished and superseded by 19 
new accounting standards.  For the fiscal year ended 2000, there were 29 
accounting standards in use and in 2005 three accounting standards were in force 
for the fiscal year ended 2005.  As a result, the total of 32 accounting standards 
are currently in effect at the fiscal year ended 2006.  Thai Accounting Standards 
had been substantially amended by the accounting body and legitimately used by 
the firm to increase the international quality of accounting information and 
practice in Thai business.  Most new Thai accounting standards converge with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) published by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) into Thai accounting system.  Thai 
accounting reform started from the fiscal year ended 2000 as from that point Thai 
firms had to employ new accounting standards.  It should be noted that the use of 
new accounting standards is compulsory for all listed firms in Thailand. 
 
For listed firms’ accounting procedures, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
has regulated listed firms to follow TAS.  Since currently the business transaction 
is more complicated and share trading has been exposed to foreign investors 
leading to the increasing need for accounting information, especially in terms of 
quality, TAS did not cover those complicated business transactions.  SET 
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therefore enacts the regulation that when no Thai accounting guidelines can be 
applied for any issues, the listed firm must employ accounting guidelines 
published by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), respectively.  In 
consequence, the listed firm employs TAS as a minimum requirement for its 
accounting procedures.   SET later enforced high penalties for firms not preparing 
their accounts in line with accounting guidelines, starting from the financial year 
ended 1997.  As a result, before 1997 Thai firms had employed TAS for their 
accounting system.  Thai fundamental accounting principles have been reformed 
due to IFRS-harmonised new accounting standards since 2000.  Nevertheless, the 
regulation of using IFRS or US GAAP for some transactions which are not 
covered by the new TAS has still been in force.  From 1997 until now, IFRS or 
US general accepted accounting principles have been applied for corporate 
financial reporting when the new TAS does not cover any particular transactions.   
 
Other than accounting reform, another progressive development encouraging 
business information quality in Thailand is that SET has required all listed firms 
to constitute an audit committee to improve corporate governance in Thailand 
since 2nd July 1999.  However, corporate governance in Thailand was firstly 
introduced in 1993 by requiring listed firms to establish at least two independent 
directors on the board (Connelly and Limpaphayom, 2004).  Thus, from 1999, 
listed firms have been required to organise both an audit committee and 
independent directors.  This crucial responsibility of Thai firms should principally 
stimulate the quality of financial reporting in Thailand as one binding duty of the 
audit committee is to provide quality financial reporting. 
 
In conclusion, financial reporting in Thailand, presently, should be ameliorated by 
two ingredients: accounting standards and corporate governance through the audit 
committee.  This analysis, hence, has been attracted by at least two reasons: 1) the 
first constituent brings this research to focus on the quality of accounting 
information as predominantly investigated by prior research studies for the case of 
 
 
Chapter I                                                                                                 Introduction 
 
8 
 
accounting reform and 2) the other element of interest is the effect of corporate 
governance system that attempts to reinforce the improvement of accounting 
information usefulness.  Figure 1.2 presents the events of accounting reform and 
new corporate governance policy.         
 
Figure 1.2 Accounting regime and corporate governance 
      Y1993  Y1997            Y1999           Y2000       Y2005 Y2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TAS – Thai Accounting Standards 
 IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards 
 ICAAT – Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand 
 FAP – Federation of Accounting Professions 
 
As Thailand has reformed its accounting standards, accounting information, 
therefore, should be of higher quality compared to the past.  This thesis attempts to 
study the quality of accounting information in Thailand because there were 
significant changes in the accounting system.   The principal research problem of 
this thesis is to investigate:  
 
Principal research problem 
 
“whether the quality of accounting information is altered in the 
Thai accounting regime and capital market environments 
between pre- and post-adoption of accounting standards.”  
 
As described earlier, indirect parameters are essential factors affecting the quality 
of accounting information.  From the principal research question, whether or not 
the alteration of accounting information after changes in accounting standards is 
observed, the change in accounting standards probably will not be the only factor 
TAS New TAS + IFRS or US GAAP 
Audit committees + Independent Directors            Independent DirectorsCapital Market 
Policy: Corporate 
governance 
Accounting 
Regime 
FAP Accounting body:  ICAAT 
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inducing the alteration.  It is of interest to determine whether the indirect 
parameter induces the change in accounting quality in Thailand.  Following prior 
research, this thesis considers that among other factors, firm governance 
mechanism is a major candidate in terms of encouraging the quality of 
accounting information.  Therefore, this thesis proposes another research question 
to support the investigation of the principal research question:  
 
Supporting research question 
 
“whether the firm governance system affects the quality of accounting 
 information in Thailand.”  
 
The link between the principal research problem and supporting research question 
is due to the fact that the improvement of accounting quality during IFRS post-
adoptions can be varied among firms.  Thus, this thesis proposes that the variation 
of the enhancement of accounting quality among firms is potentially induced by 
the variation of firms’ governance systems. 
 
To respond the principal research problem, this thesis divides the analysis into 
two parts for each attribute of accounting quality.  The first part relates to the 
investigation of the alteration of accounting quality during accounting reforms.  
The second part of this study is to examine the effect of firm governance on the 
quality of accounting information.  As suggested by Ding et al. (2007), not only 
accounting standards but also economic functions are significant for the 
development of accounting systems; the combination of both parts provides 
additional evidence to the accounting literature in emerging market countries.  
The next four sections (1.2.1–1.2.4) introduce the main areas of analysis to 
respond to the research problem and its supporting question.    
 
1.2.1 Accounting Quality 
Prior studies focus on the analysis of earnings, as a summary accounting measure, 
when determining accounting quality (among others, Sloan 1996; Dechow and 
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Dichev 2002; Barth, Landsman and Lang 2008).  In general, earnings are of high 
quality if they can represent current firm economic performance or can be used by 
analysts to predict future performance of the firm (Dechow and Schrand 2004).  
Following prior literature, the study of earnings quality can be found in three main 
areas, including earnings persistence, value relevance and earnings timeliness.   
 
Earnings persistence is a form of accounting quality.  Earnings are of high quality 
when they are persistent.  This is due to the fact that when earnings are of high 
persistence, they can be used as a predictor for the future performance of the firm.  
A downside of earnings persistence is the possibility that earnings can be 
manipulated by the firm.  The value relevance analysis is the study of the 
relationship between the market value and accounting numbers, indicating that the 
higher the relationship, the higher the value relevance of accounting numbers.  In 
consequence, higher value relevance represents higher earnings quality.  One 
problem for the value relevance analysis relates to the empirical model used for 
the analysis because the model/method is open-ended.  Earnings timeliness 
investigates whether accounting numbers can capture economic consequences in a 
timely fashion.  Earnings are of higher quality if they can capture economic events 
in a timelier fashion.  A major problem for earnings timeliness is that it is difficult 
to find a measure for economic consequences.4 Furthermore, the three types of 
earnings quality can be viewed in terms of accounting-based or market-based 
analyses.  Earnings persistence is categorised as accounting-based analysis whilst 
value relevance is classified as market-based analysis.  For earnings timeliness, it 
can be viewed in terms of either market-based or accounting-based (through 
accrual information) analysis.  Hence, this thesis attempts to investigate those 
three perspectives of earnings quality.  
 
1.2.2 Accounting Quality and New Accounting Standards  
For decades, Thailand has developed its own accounting standards to proxy 
underlying economic events.  Before coming into force, new accounting standards 
                                               
4 It should be noted that earnings timeliness is divided into conditional and unconditional 
timeliness of earnings.  More details will be explained in relating chapters. 
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established by the accounting standards setter (ICAAT) must receive the approval 
of the Board of Supervision of Auditing Practices (BSAP) under the Ministry of 
Commerce.  Accounting standards setting in Thailand is therefore under public 
(government supervision) rather than private enforcement (accountants and 
auditing professions oversee themselves).  Due to the financial crisis in Thailand, 
an outcome of the massive shock is the government’s decision to not only reform 
the accounting standards formulated on IFRS and US GAAP to meet higher 
quality of accounting information but also reorganise the accounting standard 
establisher.5   
 
In terms of accounting quality, the principal research problem has been built upon 
three key previous works.  Graham et al. (2000), Ball et al. (2003) and Davis-
Friday et al. (2006) attempted to explain the quality of accounting information in 
Thailand.  They investigate earnings quality for Thai firms in terms of value 
relevance and timeliness.  Despite establishing its own accounting standards, Ball 
et al. (2003) commented that reported earnings in Thailand had conformed closely 
to tax-based accounting income because of being under a government mandate 
even though there were substantial forces from the IASC and moderate influences 
from UK accounting (Ball et al. 2003, pg.240).  Ball et al. (2003) argued further 
that tax-based accounting information (precisely, income) in Thailand causes Thai 
accounting information to be less sensitive to changes of economic consequences 
(i.e. market value changes).  They concluded that among emerging markets, 
including Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, Thailand had the lowest 
information transparency, representing the lowest quality of accounting 
information during the testing period between 1984 and 1996.  Because Ball et al. 
(2003) did not include in their samples when Thailand experienced the financial 
crisis of 1997, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) documented that during the period of the 
1997 economy downturn; the value-relevance of earnings information in Thailand 
                                               
5 On 29th January 2005, the Federation of Accounting Professions (FAP) was officially formed and 
took over both the duty and authority of ICAAT and BSAP, transferring from public to private 
enforcement of accounting standards settings.  Consequently, new accounting standards generally 
should bring higher quality of accounting information in Thailand. 
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from 1996 to 1997 had decreased and there was significant association between 
book value and market value of the firm as this finding was also observed in the 
well-developed market (i.e. US).  Furthermore, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) 
categorised the Thailand accounting system as an IFRS-based accounting, not a 
tax-based accounting income system.  In addition to the study by Davis-Friday et 
al. (2006), Graham et al. (2000) indicated the Thai accounting information was 
value-relevant during the period 1992 – 1998.   
 
Ball et al. (2003) summarised that earnings in Thai firms cannot capture economic 
events in a timely fashion.  Three explanations account for these counterintuitive 
results:  
1) Even though Thai accounting rules are closely based on tax code, the 
market is able to value this information, especially when economic 
circumstances has considerably altered6,  
2) As postulated by the prior empirical work that lower sensitive 
accounting information based on tax-based accounting income does 
not timely reflect underlying economic performances during normal 
economic circumstances7, if Thai dormant accounting information is 
able to incorporate economic consequences8, the accounting number 
will probably be obscured and it draws further investigation (for 
example, the Thai accounting system is not based on tax purposes but 
on well-structured accounting systems – i.e. the IFRS-based system), 
or  
3) The Thai market perceives the torpid accounting information and 
interprets it differently from what has been done by the investor in 
well-developed markets.   
 
                                               
6 Davis-Friday et al. (2006) and Graham et al. (2000) evidenced the value-relevant book value and 
earnings in Thailand during the economy distress. 
7 Ball et al. (2003) argued that the Thai accounting system before the Thai economic crisis (during 
the period 1984 to 1996) was less sensitive in capturing economic change. 
8 In their conclusions, Graham et al. (2000) argued that Thai accounting information had value 
relevance during their testing period between 1992 and 1998.  Davis-Friday et al. (2006) 
supported their findings.  
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This thesis investigates the improvement of accounting quality in Thailand in two 
aspects.  First, the persistence of earnings is analysed.  The persistence of earnings 
is a study of earnings predictability.  Previously, Thailand had been used the rule-
based accounting system, that Thai firms were not required to perform forecasting 
measurements, i.e. expected future cash flows.  The Thai accounting standard 
setter claims that the new accounting standard as the principle-based accounting 
system provides more reliable accounting information relative to the old 
accounting standard.  Second, this thesis analyses the value relevance of 
accounting information.  The accounting information is considered to be useful 
when users (i.e. investors) can use it for decision making.  In terms of the capital 
market investment, share prices reflect the market’s expection on firm’s net cash 
flows.  When implementing the new accounting standard in Thailand, accounting 
information should be more useful because it reflects more firms’ true 
performance that is expected by the market.  In addition to the earnings 
persistence and value relevance, this thesis investigates the existence of earnings 
timeliness in financial statements that is an additional quality that the new 
accounting standard prefers the firm to employ.  More details are explained in 
related chapters.             
 
This thesis expands the investigation of the earnings persistence in Thailand by 
including an institutional factor in the analysis.9  In addition to the persistence of 
earnings, Graham et al. (2000) and Davis-Friday et al. (2006) investigated the 
variation of the left-hand side whether reported earnings were capitalised by share 
prices; accounting information quality is a function of market value as dependent 
variable and accounting numbers – book value and earnings as independent 
variables.  However, this thesis basically assumes that the economy remains 
unchanged but the accounting system has been altered.  The analysis of 
accounting quality in this study, in turn, deals with the change in accounting 
standards for book value and earnings calculations rather than the effect of 
                                               
9 Pincus, Rajgopal and Venkatachal (2007) investigate accrual anomaly in 21 countries, including 
Thailand during 1994–2002.  The published research about earnings persistence as a part of 
accrual anomaly analysis in Thailand can be found in their work. 
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economic downturns.  Since IFRS-convergence is anticipated to improve the 
quality of accounting information, IFRS should be fully embedded in the Thai 
accounting regime.  The value relevance analysis in this thesis also includes the 
institutional factor in the investigation.  Finally, this thesis investigates the 
timeliness of earnings by using different existing regression models and 
incorporates the institutional factor in the investigation.  The institutional factor 
used in this study is the difference between book income and taxable income (or 
book-tax differences).  More details will be explained in section 1.2.4.  Figure 1.3 
depicts the main research analysis (Part I). 
 
1.2.3 Accounting Quality and Firm Governance 
Accounting standards alone are not sufficient conditions to be used for the 
estimation of accounting information quality in terms of the ability in reflecting 
economic income or losses (this quality is known as earnings timeliness) (Ball et 
al. 2003).  This argument should be applied to the other two earnings attributes of 
quality – earnings persistence and value relevance.  This thesis investigates further 
about influencing factors other than accounting standards affecting accounting 
information quality by analysing the relationship between accounting quality and 
firm governance systems.   
 
Figure 1.3 Research focus (Part I): Accounting quality and accounting regime 
Before 
       Period        1998        Y1998            Y2000         Y2005             Y2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TAS – Thai Accounting Standards; FAP – Federation of Accounting Professions; IFRS – International Financial Reporting 
Standards; ICAAT – Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand 
TAS  New TAS + IFRS or US GAAP 
Accounting 
Standard 
FAP ICAAT Accounting 
Body 
Research 
Focus - Part I 
 
The improvement of accounting information quality is anticipated 
during IFRS post-adoption in Thailand. 
Accounting 
Regime Tax-based system GAAP-based system 
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A considerable amount of empirical research studies have explored the role of 
corporate governance on accounting information quality in terms of accounting 
information value-relevance and earnings timeliness.10 Because the corporate 
governance in itself does not directly affect accounting numbers which are proxies 
of underlying economic contents, this study views ‘corporate governance’ as an 
indirect parameter fostering financial information quality overall.  Nevertheless, 
one distinctive duty of the audit committee in Thai firms is for the accuracy and 
sufficiency of information presented on financial reporting.11 
 
One example of the relationship between corporate governance systems and 
accounting quality is the connection between corporate governance and firm 
valuation process (the value relevance).  The connection between corporate 
governance and firm valuation process can be found through accounting 
reliability.12  As one of three committees is the financial reporting expert, this 
audit committee’s expertise and responsibility discourage the firm’s manager to 
manipulate accounting information, i.e. reported earnings.13  Thus, if corporate 
governance through audit committees can reduce the degree of accounting 
information manipulation, the accounting number should be more reliable.14   
                                               
10 For example, Goncharov, Werner and Zimmermann (2006) examined the value relevance of 
corporate governance on firm valuation process.  Fan and Wong (2002) and Jung and Kwon 
(2002) studied the role of ownership structure affecting earnings.  Vafeas (2000) examined the 
effect of board structure on earnings.  Ahmed and Duellman (2007) study the relationship between 
earnings timeliness and corporate governance systems.  
11 Qualifications and Duties of Audit Committees, Notification of Stock Exchange of Thailand No. 
1, 1999. 
12 This thesis views reliability in a general sense as unconditional accounting conservatism, i.e. 
income/expense recognition or increase/decrease of asset values are to be performed according to 
the condition indicated in the accounting principles.  Whelan and McNamara (2004) documented 
that when earnings are unreliable, the value relevance will shift from earnings to book value 
information; when book values are unreliable, the value relevance will shift from book value to 
earnings information.     
13 For example, the corporate governance system enforces firms to write-off assets if all conditions 
indicated in the accounting principles are met.   
14 It is unavoidable to question whether or not the reliability of accounting information is 
problematic and should be determined before estimating the effect of audit committee on 
accounting information quality (specifically the value relevance).  It is due to the fact that the audit 
committee and the information quality is not directly connected.  Bao and Bao (2004, pg. 1526) 
quoted the argument of Dechow and Skinner (2000) that earnings management causes 
management incentive which finally is linked to the firm’s share price.  A significant effect of 
earnings management on financial reporting has not been found in prior literature (Bao and Bao 
2004) because with reference to the efficient market hypothesis earnings management is not 
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Incidentally, as with the notion that Thai accounting information is sluggish due 
to the close link to income tax laws, the injection of corporate governance policy 
may not fully impact on accounting numbers unless the accounting measurement 
method has served for the demand of users, i.e. investors, creditors or analysts.  
On the other hand, if the Thai accounting system is an IFRS-based system, the 
corporate governance policy will be one fostering mechanism for accounting 
information quality prepared for public purposes, i.e. investment in the capital 
market.  Even though Thai financial reporting is more likely to be based on tax 
rules, the second part of this study is to investigate whether the firm governance 
system, i.e. audit committee, impacts on accounting information quality in Thai 
settings.  This is motivated by Dechow and Schrand (2004, pg.102) who argue 
that the corporate governance system encourages the value relevance of 
accounting information.  In addition to the value relevance analysis, this thesis 
applies this notion to the analysis of earnings persistence and earnings timeliness. 
 
In sum, this thesis attempts to find a relationship between accounting quality and 
firm governance systems.  If the relationship is observed, the firm governance 
system will be one factor inducing the variation in accounting quality in Thai 
settings.  In other words, the analysis in part I attempt to investigate the 
enhancement of accounting information quality during IFRS post-adoption 
periods relative to pre-adoption periods.  If findings report variations in the 
improvement of accounting information quality among firms, this thesis considers 
that such variations are potentially induced by the firm governance system.  
                                                                                                                                
important when there is full disclosure and small cost/effort to access the information of 
management incentive (Dechow and Skinner 2000 quoted in Bao and Bao 2004, footnote 4, 
pg.1526).  It infers that the market will be able to fully capture accounting information reliability.  
Particularly, in the long run, this thesis considers that the market will be able to price differently 
between firms with and without earnings manipulation.  For these reasons, the existing empirical 
research with regard to the value relevance investigation (among others, i.e. Goncharov et al. 2006 
and Vafeas 2000) has directly incorporated corporate governance components into the value-
relevance fundamental analysis in a long-window period by estimating the interaction-effect of 
earnings and corporate governance factors on the firm’s share price or return.  Such existing 
research did not investigate the reliability before examining the value relevance of accounting 
information.  Therefore, based on the existing study this thesis directly investigates the 
relationship between accounting quality (earnings persistence, value relevance and earnings 
timeliness) and corporate governance systems. 
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Consequently, Figure 1.4 depicts the analysis (Part II) to support the principal 
research problem (Part I). 
 
Figure 1.4 Research focus (Part II): Accounting quality and firm governance 
       Before  
                    1999  Y1999            Y2000    Y2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.4 The Use of Book-Tax Differences  
In general, accounting income is classified as income calculated from accounting 
standards.  Accounting income will be adjusted to agree with tax rules for income 
tax calculations.  Accounting income (or reported earnings) is, thus, different from 
taxable income.  The difference between book income and taxable income is 
defined as book-tax differences.  The larger book-tax difference indicates the 
higher deviation between book income and taxable income, implying that GAAP 
rules are more likely to be employed for financial reporting relative to tax rules. 
 
As described by prior research, Thailand is considered as a tax-based accounting 
income system.  It indicates that Thai firms are more likely to use tax rules for 
financial reporting preparations relative to GAAP rules.  One potential 
consequence from using the tax-based accounting income system is a lower 
quality of accounting information generated by the firm because accounting 
information is to serve government policy (tax collections) rather than the capital 
market.   
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Another argument is about cost associated from the difference between book 
income and taxable income.  Firms in the tax-based accounting income 
environment probably tend to reduce costs incurred from re-stating accounting 
income prepared by GAAP to taxable income for tax payments.  Cost reductions 
would be beneficial for investors.   
 
It should be noted that tax rules are more restrictive than GAAP rules, i.e. 
penalties involved for the violation of tax rules.  Accounting income prepared by 
tax rules should be more persistent relative to accounting income prepared by 
GAAP when setting everything else constant.  Therefore, the tax-based 
accounting income system induces a predictability of accounting information.   
 
According to above views and arguments, it is problematic for inferences to be 
made from the difference in book income and taxable income.  This study views 
that IFRS-convergence alters the Thai accounting regime.  If Thai firms are more 
likely to employ IFRS for financial reporting, the Thai accounting regime should 
be transitioned from a tax-based to a GAAP-based accounting income system.  To 
observe the transition of accounting regime for Thai settings, this thesis proposes 
the use of book-tax differences.     
  
In addition to the accounting regime transition, this study aims at investigating the 
quality of accounting in Thailand.  Because the prior literature suggests that the 
GAAP-based accounting income system facilitates a higher quality of accounting 
information relative to the tax-based accounting income system, the transitioning 
of the accounting regime to the GAAP-based system should induce a better 
quality of accounting information in Thailand as a consequence.  The book-tax 
difference is employed to evaluate the variation of accounting quality among Thai 
firms.  Even though IFRS has been adopted, some firms probably still employ tax 
rules for their financial statements.  The book-tax differences, brings this 
empirical investigation to a firm-level analysis.  The rationale of the use of book-
tax difference is to determine the incentive of the firm.  The book income and 
taxable income in Thailand are calculated by using a same basis which is the 
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accrual basis.  Thus, the book income and taxable income should be moved in the 
same direction.  The gap between the book-tax difference has been driven by the 
temporary difference and/or permanent difference.  Although the book and taxable 
income are caluculated by the accrual basis, the rule for taxable income 
calculation is more restricted than accounting standards.  New accounting 
standards based on the principle-based accounting system allow firms to have 
more opportunities to do accounting dicretions.  Thus, if holding the taxable 
income constant, firms who intend to manage book income by increasing the book 
income, the gap between book income and taxable income will be larger.  On the 
other hand, the gap between book income and taxable income will be smaller if 
firms intend to decrease their book income.  However, this thesis argues that it is 
less likely for firms to decrease their book income.  It is due to the fact that book 
income is likely to be low because of the accounting conservatism.  At the other 
point of view, if holding book income constant, firms who have aggressive tax 
activities are more likely to have low taxable income.  Then, the book-tax 
difference for this case will be larger.  By these reasons, this thesis employs the 
book-tax difference to proxy firms’ incentives.  This thesis will incorporate book-
tax differences into the analysis of all three perspectives of accounting quality 
(earnings persistence, value relevance and earnings timeliness).  Because the 
relationship between book-tax differences and each attribute of accounting quality 
is different, more explanations will be presented in related chapters. 
 
1.3 Statement of the General Hypothesis 
This section explains the development of three general hypotheses to respond to 
the principal research problem.  More specific hypotheses for each perspective of 
accounting quality will be elaborated in particular chapters.  This thesis defines 
accounting quality as earnings persistence, value relevance and earnings 
timeliness; this is consistent with a large number of prior studies.  Accounting 
information is a proxy to represent unobservable underlying economic constructs.  
Information users demand useful economic constructs for their decision making or 
relevancy before considering what and how a proxy of economic constructs is 
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determined (Maines and Wahlen 2006).  Maines and Wahlen (2006) suggest that 
accounting information relevance stimulates measurement and reporting 
reliability.  However, they further argue that information reliability is an essential 
but not adequate characteristic for the efficient use of applicative information.  
Because of the different perspectives of reliability and relevancy, it is 
controversial to differentiate as to whether reliability or relevancy is more 
important.   
 
According to the statement of the Chairman of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee of Foundation Trustees (IASC Foundation Annual report 
2006, pg.4), IFRS convergence brings high quality standards to countries that 
adopt them.  This statement implies that the adoption of IFRS should provide 
better quality accounting information.  Although more than 100 countries around 
the world have adopted IFRS in their accounting systems,15 there are only a few 
research studies which examine the transition of accounting standards.  As a 
principles-based accounting system, IFRS allows firms to use their discretion.  
However, Dechow and Schrand (2004, pg.102) suggest that IFRS encourages 
value relevance.  Most prior studies investigate the improvement of accounting 
quality after IFRS-adoption through analysis of value relevance.  The results of 
these studies, however, are mixed and inconclusive (i.e. Prather-Kinsey 2006; 
Barth et al. 2008).   
 
In this study, I address whether accounting quality is enhanced when converging 
the domestic accounting system to international accounting standards.  I employ 
Thai data for the analysis as it has adopted IFRS for several years and now these 
new accounting standards should be fully implemented.  Analysing a single 
country minimises the variation of market environment (Leuz 2003).  In addition, 
although they use the same set of accounting standards, accounting quality can be 
varied across countries due to the dispersion of domestic investors (Alford et al. 
1993).  Graham et al. (2000) find that the value relevance of Thai book values and 
                                               
15 Report of the Chairman of the IASC Foundation Trustees, International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation Annual Report 2006, pg.2. 
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earnings declined during the financial crisis.  However, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) 
report that the value relevance of earnings declined but the value relevance of 
book values increased during the financial crisis.  Prior studies suggest that Thai 
accounting information is value-relevant and the value relevance of the Thai 
accounting summary measures reflects economic consequences.  It is 
controversial whether IFRS brings a higher quality of earnings than domestic 
accounting standards due to country-specific factors (Barth et al. 2008).  
Nevertheless, based on Barth et al. (2008), I have an ex ante prediction that 
earnings quality is enhanced after the accounting system change.  As a result, the 
first general hypothesis in an alternative form is as follows:  
 
General hypothesis 1  
Accounting quality is enhanced after IFRS adoption. 
 
Prior research provides evidence of accounting quality in different accounting 
regimes (Alford et al. 1993; Ali and Hwang 2000).  Existing studies suggest that 
accounting information in code law countries is less sensitive to economic income 
and loss, implying a lower accounting quality (Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Ball 
et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2008).  For example, Ball et al. (2003) argue that 
code law system countries are more likely to employ tax-based accounting 
systems that have a low ability to capture economic outcomes.  Burgstahler, Hail 
and Leuz (2006) show that the number of firms in countries using tax rules for 
financial reporting purposes engaged in earnings management is greater than that 
in countries which use GAAP-based income.  As a result, earnings 
informativeness is lower for countries where firms have large book-tax 
conformity.   
 
In terms of the relationship between book income and taxable income, Guenther, 
Maydew and Nutter (1997) argue that it is difficult for firms to employ different 
accounting methods to increase taxable income or tax deductions, without 
increasing revenues or expenses in financial statements.  For example, the 
estimated expense of warranty claims can be expenses in financial reporting, but it 
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cannot be a tax deduction unless economic performance has occurred.  The 
condition in references to economic performance is sufficient, but not necessary 
for financial statement purposes (Guenther et al. 1997).  In addition, high book-
tax conformity violates stock exchange rules and increases potential costs, i.e. 
high tax payment and information loss (Hanlon, Laplante and Shelvin 2005; 
Hanlon, Maydew and Shevlin 2008).  Guenther et al. (1997) argue that the book-
tax difference occurs because of the underlying different incentives between 
financial and tax accounting.  Accounting conservatism attempts to detect firms 
which understate expenses or overstate revenues; on the other hand, tax rules 
detect understated revenue and overstated expense.  Mills (1998) reports that 
Internal Revenue Service audit adjustments increase as book-tax differences 
increase.  This implies that book income information reflects tax activity.   
 
Due to the different law and tax policies, firms in the tax-based accounting system 
may employ accounting standards in different ways from firms in the GAAP-
based accounting system.  The adoption of IFRS in tax-based accounting 
environments versus a GAAP-based accounting system possibly affects 
accounting quality differently (Ali and Hwang 2000).  In GAAP-based accounting 
income systems, at the level of a given firm’s performance, reported earnings can 
be varied through different accounting treatments used.  The book-tax difference 
in GAAP-based accounting income system has twofold: i) assuming that all firms 
had used the same tax strategy, at the level of a given firm’s performance, book-
tax differences in GAAP-based accounting income systems reflect the 
management’s intention of using accounting standards and ii) on the other hand, 
assuming that all firms had used the same accounting treatment, at the level of a 
given firm’s performance, the difference of book income and taxable income 
reflects the level of aggressiveness in tax activities.  In tax-based accounting 
income system, at the level of a given firm’s performance and tax strategy, firms 
are more likely to use tax rules for reported earnings.  However, it is possible that 
tax rules do not cover all accounting transactions; book-tax differences still exist. 
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In this thesis, I investigate accounting quality in Thai firms by partitioning firms 
according to the magnitude of book-tax differences between the pre- and post-
adoption period.  I use book-tax differences to distinguish firms’ incentives in two 
areas; the use of accruals and tax activity.  All else being constant, the argument is 
that new accounting standards implemented in the Thai tax-based accounting 
system will enlarge the difference between book income and taxable income due 
to the increasing opportunity to use discretionary accruals (Dechow and Schrand 
2004, pg.113-114).  However, the larger book-tax difference during post-adoption 
periods may be generated by aggressive tax planning.  When comparing between 
earnings manipulation and tax activity in Thai settings, there is a higher variation 
in engagement in managing accruals among firms because aggressive tax planning 
is limited by law enforcement and tax audit and adjustment (Mills 1998).   
 
In addition, I employ book-tax differences to construct firm portfolios because: i) 
the study of accounting quality and accounting system transition has not 
investigated the change in patterns of book-tax differences when the accounting 
system has been changed, and ii) in a tax-based accounting income system, IFRS 
adoption results in larger book-tax differences, at an unchanged level of tax 
activity.  The larger book-tax difference reflects either the implication of 
principles-based accounting or management’s incentives in the area of accruals, if 
tax activity is held constant.  However, it should be noted that smaller book-tax 
differences in the post-adoption period are not free from management discretions.  
New principles-based accounting standards allow firms to have more opportunity 
to perform more accruals.  It will be problematic if the management is likely to 
perform opportunistic or informative earnings management to increase, decrease 
or smooth reported earnings.  For example, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) suggest 
that informative earnings management is observed through income smoothing.   
 
Based all above arguments, the second general hypothesis in an alternative form is 
as follows: 
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  General hypothesis 2  
Accounting quality is varied according to the magnitude of book-
tax differences. 
 
Accounting quality is also influenced by the indirect parameter as 
aforementioned.  Based on the general hypothesis 2, if the variation in accounting 
quality among firms is observed, this thesis proposes that a firm’s governance 
system is a potential factor inducing the variation in accounting quality.  
Therefore, this leads to the third general hypothesis stating in an alternative form. 
 
  General hypothesis 3  
There is an association between accounting quality and firm 
governance systems, influencing the variation in accounting quality 
among firms. 
 
It should be noted that the analysis is divided into three perspectives of accounting 
quality.  More detailed explanations about the development of hypotheses for each 
perspective, including earnings persistence, value relevance and earnings 
timeliness, are introduced in chapter 4 (H.4.1 – 4.3), 5 (H.5.1 – 5.3) and 6 (H.6.1 – 
6.2), respectively.  It also should be noted that general hypotheses 1 and 2 are to 
respond to the principal research problem whereas general hypothesis 3 is to 
respond to the supporting research question.   
 
A summary of all research questions and alternative hypotheses is presented as 
follows: 
 
Principal research problem 
“whether the quality of accounting information is altered in Thai accounting 
regime and capital market environments between pre- and post-adoption 
accounting standards.”  
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General hypothesis 1  
Accounting quality is enhanced after IFRS adoption.16 
Hypothesis 4.1 (H.4.1): 
Earnings are of higher persistence after the adoption of IFRS in 
Thailand. 
Hypothesis 5.1 (H.5.1): 
The value relevance of accounting summary measures is enhanced 
after the adoption of IFRS in Thailand. 
 
General hypothesis 2  
Accounting quality is varied according to the magnitude of book-tax differences. 
Hypothesis 4.2 (H.4.2): 
When comparing between pre- and post-adoption periods, earnings 
persistence is related to book-tax differences 
Hypothesis 5.2 (H.5.2): 
When comparing between pre- and post-adoption periods, the 
value relevance is related to book-tax differences. 
Hypothesis 6.1 (H.6.1): 
Earnings timeliness is more pronounced when Thai listed firms 
exhibit larger book-tax differences. 
 
Supporting research question 
“whether the firm governance system affects the accounting information quality 
in Thailand.”  
 
                                               
16 It should be noted that general hypothesis 1 is applied to the analysis of earnings persistence and 
value relevance but not the timeliness of earnings.  It is due to the fact that the earnings persistence 
and the earnings timeliness have an opposite perspective.  In particular, the earnings timeliness 
will be less likely for firms with higher persistence of earnings relative to firms with lower 
persistence of earnings.  Therefore, if the alternative hypothesis 4.1 is not rejected, the earnings 
timeliness will be less likely after the adoption of IFRS in Thailand.    
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General hypothesis 3 
There is an association between accounting quality and firm governance systems, 
influencing the variation in accounting quality among firms. 
Hypothesis 4.3 (H.4.3): 
Earnings persistence varies according to the firm governance  
system in Thailand. 
Hypothesis 5.3 (H.5.3): 
 The value relevance varies according to the firm governance  
system in Thailand. 
Hypothesis 6.2 (H.6.2): 
  There is a positive association between firm-specific conservatism  
measures and book-tax differences in Thai settings. 
 
1.4 Motivation of the Study 
First of all, the motivation for this study is to investigate whether accounting 
quality is generally improved by new accounting standards in Thailand by 
expanding it to include an institutional factor – the magnitude of book-tax 
differences.  Thailand, as a rule-based accounting income country, has changed its 
accounting system by adopting International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) since 2000.  These accounting standards should now be fully embedded.   
 
In the Accounting Act. (2000), it clearly states in the footnote of the Act that 
accounting principles and practices in Thailand were out of date and did not 
support the change in economic circumstances.  Therefore, Thai accounting 
system must be updated.  By these reasons, this thesis attempts to examine 
whether accounting quality has been enhanced after IFRS adoption in Thailand by 
focusing on a long-window period.  This thesis investigates the improvement of 
accounting quality in two main aspects – the persistence of earnings and the value 
relevance of accounting information.  In addition to the analysis of improvement 
of accounting quality, this thesis investigates the existence of earnings timeliness 
in Thai settings.   
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Next, it should be noted that prior studies had explored accounting quality in a 
single market (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Leuz 2003).  This research focuses on 
the improvement of accounting quality in the Thai accounting system due to at 
least four reasons.  Firstly, as IFRS are expected to be applied for all countries, 
firm specific and institutional factors, i.e. business culture and system, economic 
circumstances and the tax system vary and can influence the effectiveness of IFRS 
implementation in the country.  In addition, the effects of these factors are not 
easily identified on the implementation of IFRS in domestic countries.  Focusing 
on accounting quality in one market can minimise the variations of market 
incentive and economic environment.  Secondly, it is of interest to investigate the 
IFRS adoption in the country where their financial reporting is greatly influenced 
by the domestic tax system.  This allows me to explore the pattern of the 
accounting income system when it has been moved from the tax-based to GAAP-
based accounting income system.  Thirdly, firms must absorb costs incurred by 
the adjustment process in terms of tax payments calculated from GAAP-based 
financial statements.  If Thai firms are likely to avoid high costs incurred from the 
adjustment for tax payments, they will be more likely to keep employing the tax-
based accounting income system.  If Thai firms are to keep using their tax-based 
accounting income system, the significant enhancement of accounting quality 
after IFRS adoption should be less likely.  The change in pattern of accounting 
income system provides an overview picture of the use of IFRS in Thailand.  
Lastly, because Thai firms’ financial reporting is largely based on income tax 
rules, the investigation of Thai firms’ accounting quality allows this thesis to 
estimate the deviation between book income and taxable income (or book-tax 
differences) and use the alteration in book-tax differences as proxy to obtain more 
insightful information about the discretion of firms’ insiders.  This is due to the 
fact that new accounting standards still allow for firms’ discretion, and a prior 
study suggests that the magnitude of book-tax differences reflects accounting 
quality (Hanlon 2005).   
 
In addition to applying the use of book-tax differences in the study of accounting 
quality in Thai settings, this thesis proposes that the firm governance system plays 
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an important role in terms of inducing the quality of accounting information in 
Thailand.  This is motivated by the prior study (Dechow and Schrand 2004) as 
aforementioned.  
 
Lastly, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study investigating the 
enhancement of accounting quality after IFRS adoptions in Thailand by 
expanding the conditioning institutional factor to include the magnitude of book-
tax differences.  This thesis considers that the magnitude of book-tax differences 
is a useful proxy when estimating the development of accounting systems in Thai 
settings because: i) this thesis uses the magnitude of book-tax differences to 
observe the Thai accounting system whether it has been transitioned from the tax-
based to GAAP-based accounting income system; and ii) new Thai accounting 
standards as principles-based systems are likely to provide room for more 
accounting discretion relative to old accounting standards as rule-based systems. 
The scale of book-tax differences should reflect such discretion. 
 
1.5 Contributions to the Knowledge 
This research investigates accounting quality in the Thai accounting regime.  
Accounting quality is defined by three long-window perspectives, including the 
persistence of earnings, the value relevance of accounting information and the 
timeliness of earnings information.  Exiting studies evidence the change in 
accounting quality after IFRS adoptions in different countries.  The main 
contribution of this study is to add existing published literature that has been silent 
on the analysis of accounting quality in Thailand.  In particular, this thesis 
contributes to the knowledge in different aspects as follows. 
 
Firstly, this research adds to the literature in terms of accounting quality in 
Thailand, on which prior research has been silent.  A number of research studies 
have examined accounting quality in developed countries (i.e. Barth et al. 2008).  
However, existing published research has been silent on investigating earnings 
persistence and timeliness in Thai capital market. 
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Secondly, this research analyses accounting quality after the accounting change in 
Thailand.  Prior research studies investigate the value relevance of Thai 
accounting information during financial crisis in Thailand.  Theoretically, those 
research studies conjecture that accounting information reflects the change in 
economic circumstances.  In particular, the left-hand side of the value relevance 
analysis (market value of the firm) is assumed to be substantially altered.  
However, this thesis focuses on the change in the Thai accounting system 
(earnings and book value information has been changed) and attempts to examine 
whether Thai accounting information prepared by new accounting standards are 
useful to the market.  Specifically, in terms of the value relevance analysis, this 
thesis examines whether the market responds to the change in Thai accounting 
information prepared by new accounting standards.     
 
Thirdly, this thesis observes the change in Thai accounting regime during IFRS 
post-adoption.  This observation is essential for accounting standard setters in 
Thailand.  Even though IFRS has been adopted in a tax-based accounting income 
system, a firm’s incentive to employ tax rules for financial reporting may exist.  
Any attempts performed by accounting standard setters to adopt IFRS in Thailand 
are meaningless if it appears that Thai firms still employ tax rules for financial 
statements.      
 
Next, this thesis employs the book-tax difference to determine the transition of the 
Thai accounting regime and the change in Thai accounting quality during IFRS 
adoptions.  The book-tax difference has been employed to examine accounting 
quality in only US firms, but this thesis employs the book-tax difference to 
investigate accounting quality in non-US firms.  Additionally, the published 
literature has been silent on incorporating book-tax differences to the analysis of 
earnings timeliness in Thai settings. 
 
In addition to examination of the improvement of accounting quality in Thai 
firms, this research investigates whether firm governance systems induce the 
variation in accounting quality among Thai firms.  This investigation adds to 
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existing literature and suggests that indirect parameters are not futile but rather 
that they are necessary tools to encourage the use of accounting standards, then 
leading to the enhancement of accounting quality in Thailand. 
 
Lastly, balanced-panel data are employed for the analysis of earnings persistence 
and value relevance for Thai settings.  A number of prior studies have employed 
firm-year observations.  It should provide more powerful inference for the study 
of accounting quality when using a longitudinal dataset.     
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into six chapters: 
 
Chapter 2  
The background of the Thai accounting regime and capital market is introduced in 
chapter 2.  It describes IFRS adoption in Thailand and the accounting-related 
policy of the Thai capital market.      
 
Chapter 3 
The theoretical framework for each perspective of accounting quality is explained 
in chapter 3.  In addition to the theoretical framework, this chapter discusses the 
existing literature.  The review of literature relates to the persistence of earnings, 
the value relevance of accounting information, the timeliness of earnings, the use 
of book-tax difference and the study of accounting quality in different settings of 
firm governance systems.    
 
Chapters 4 
Chapter 4 presents an investigation of earnings persistence.  Specific hypotheses 
are explained and developed.  The panel dataset has been used for the main 
investigation.  However, all firm-year observations are applied to support the 
main analysis.  In addition, the association between earnings persistence and firm 
governance factors are examined.     
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Chapters 5 
Chapter 5 presents an investigation of the value relevance of earnings and book 
value.  Like Chapter 4, detailed hypotheses are elaborated.  The main analysis 
employs the longitudinal dataset during 1995 – 2004.  All firm-year observations 
are applied for the robust check.  This chapter also presents the association 
between the value relevance and firm governance factors.     
 
Chapters 6 
The study of earnings timeliness is presented in Chapter 6.  More detailed 
hypotheses are identified.  Firm-year observations are examined in different 
models.  The investigation of unconditional earnings conservatism and firm 
governance factors is presented in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 7 
The last chapter is the conclusion of the study.  It discusses findings from the 
study, recommendations and suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter 2 
Thai Accounting Environments 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This study aims at understanding accounting information quality and the 
accounting regime when there are changes in the Thai accounting system and the 
association between corporate governance and accounting information in 
Thailand.  This chapter elaborates the development of the accounting system in 
Thailand to provide the background information about the Thai accounting 
system.  Thailand has been using accounting laws since 1962.  The change in 
accounting laws causes several impacts on accounting environments in Thailand, 
i.e. accounting standard reforms, accounting body reorganisations, and accounting 
professions and education.  This chapter focuses only on the discussion about the 
impact of accounting laws on changes in accounting information quality in 
Thailand.  In addition to the Thai accounting system, this chapter covers the Thai 
capital market and its accounting-related regulations.  In particular, the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) is the other regulator whose rules, i.e. corporate 
governance policy, also affect accounting quality.  This chapter is organised by an 
exploration about accounting laws presented in section 2.2.  It moves on to the 
Thai accounting body (section 2.3), Stock Exchange of Thailand (section 2.4), and 
Thai accounting standards (section 2.5).  A discussion of the Thai accounting 
system is presented in section 2.6 and the last section, 2.7, is the chapter 
summary.           
 
2.2 Thai Accounting Laws 
The history of Thai accounting laws in Thai language is provided by Federation of 
Accounting Professions (FAP).17  In 1937 (2480 B.E), the first Thai accounting 
law was drafted by a pioneer, Luang Dhamri-isranuwat, to promote Thai 
accounting professions to be legally acknowledged and supported by the Thai 
Government as with other professional bodies in the country.  However, the 
                                               
17 http://www.fap.or.th/fap/?q=node/21 [accessed 18th October 2007] 
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number of Thai accountants who were members of the Thai accounting body at 
that time was rather small.  The first necessary mission thus was to increase the 
number of Thai accountants; therefore, the accounting education had been 
provoked rather than attempting to establish the accounting law during that time.  
This led to the suspension of the first draft until 1962 (2505 B.E).  During the 
period without an accounting law to regulate the Thai accounting profession, in 
1948 (2491 B.E) Thai accountants had gathered and formed themselves as the 
Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT), a self-
regulated organisation.  The ICAAT was mainly regulating accounting practices 
and issuing Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) after the Auditor Act 1962 was 
promulgated. 
 
In 1962 (2505 B.E), the Thai Congress sanctioned the first accounting profession 
law which was officially known as the “Auditor Act – 1962 (2505 B.E).”  
Regarding the Auditor Act, the new government entity known as the Board of 
Supervision of Auditing Practices (BSAP) was established to formally regulate 
accounting practices in Thailand.  Several main duties of BSAP were auditor 
license authorisation and accounting practice promotion as well as ICAAT 
supervision.  ICAAT was consequently under the mandate of BSAP.  Publishing 
the Thai Accounting Standards (TAS) under the authorisation of BSAP was the 
major responsibility of ICAAT.  After the long term use of the Auditor Act, there 
were several attempts to revise the 1962 Act to update complex business 
transactions, since the economic and business situation had significantly changed 
over time. Until 2004 (2547 B.E), the long-term effort, primarily because of many 
changes in new Thai government, was ultimately successful by authorising the 
Accounting Professions Act 2004 (2547 B.E) promulgated officially on 23rd 
October 2004, leading to the withdrawal of the Auditor Act 1962.  An additional 
result, according to the Accounting Professions Act 2004, was the discontinuation 
of ICAAT.     
 
Nevertheless, the foremost purpose of the Accounting Professions Act (previously 
the Auditor Act) has been to promote and regulate auditors, i.e. certifying 
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financial statements rather than accounting practitioners, i.e. book-keeping.  In 
1972 (2515 B.E) the Revolution council released the Notification of the 
Revolutionary Council No. 285 (1972, 2515 B.E) to regulate book-keeping for 
companies in Thailand, for instance, which transactions must be journalised and 
what details must be shown in accounting records.  Thus, since 1972, there were 
two accounting Acts in effect: one was responsible for auditing professions and 
the other regulated accounting services.  In 1997, Thailand had deteriorated after 
the financial bubble burst, resulting later in the collapse of the Thai economy.  
The Thai Government decided to improve the accounting system by authorising a 
new accounting Act, namely the Accounting Act 2000 (2543 B.E), and finally 
terminated the Notification of the Revolutionary Council No. 285.  In sum, there 
are now two accounting laws in effect, which are the Accounting Act 2000 and 
the Accounting Professions Act 2004.  Table 2.1 presents the summary of the 
development of accounting laws and accounting bodies in Thailand.  
 
Table 2.1 Accounting Laws and Accounting Body Development in Thailand 
 
Year 1937 Year 1948 Year 1962 Year 1972 Year 2000 Year 2004 
Provocation of 
Accounting 
Education 
Establishment of 
ICAAT 
Auditor Act and 
Establishment of 
BSAP 
Notification of 
the Revolutionary 
Council No. 285 
Accounting Act 
(In Force) 
Accounting 
Professions Act 
(In Force) 
   1997 
Financial Crisis 
Withdrawal of 
Notification of 
the Revolutionary 
Council No.285  
Discontinuation of 
ICAAT and 
withdrawal of 
Auditor Act  
 
Note: ICAAT = Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand  
BSAP = Board of Supervision of Auditing Practices  
 
2.3 Thai Accounting Body 
In 1948, the Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT) 
was officially established, principally to encourage accounting practices and issue 
as well as revise accounting standards.  After ICAAT had been run for more than 
fifty years, it was discontinued and, in 2005, the Federation of Accounting 
Professions (FAP), a new juristic body, assumed the responsibilities from its 
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former body (ICAAT) under the authority of the Accounting Professions Act 
2004.  FAP is committed to18 
 Maintaining the international level of accounting profession standards, 
qualities and ethics 
 Regulating auditors and accountants to perform accounting services in 
accordance with accounting profession standards and laws 
 Promoting education and training and provide consultation for accounting 
practitioners and issue accounting practical guidelines  
 Coordinating with international organisations for the exchange of 
accounting knowledge and experience, and promote the role of FAP to 
regional and international recognition 
 Encouraging the development and use of financial reporting to improve 
reliability and transparency and promote good governance 
 Participating in the prescription of laws and regulations relating to the 
accounting professions 
 Improving harmonisation and cooperation to maintain the accounting 
professions, and 
 Promoting good governance in the Federation of Accounting Professions      
In addition, the Act constitutes the independent accounting standard board which 
has responsibilities for setting exposure draft and Thai Accounting Standards.  
Those standards must be authorised by the BSAP before coming into force, 
however.19 Further information about FAP can be found on the website 
http://www.fap.or.th.  
 
2.4 Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
Details in English about the establishment of the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) can be found on the website http://www.set.or.th.  This thesis focuses only 
                                               
18 Federation of Accounting Professions, Missions. [online] Available from: 
http://www.fap.or.th/about/index.php?id=2 [accessed 18th October 2007] 
19 Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (2007), Implementation of the IOSCO 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation: Principle 16. [online] Available from: 
http://www.sec.or.th/sec/iosco/Content_0000000755.jsp?categoryID=CAT0000014&lang=th 
[accessed 18th October 2007] 
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on the important SET rules affecting Thai accounting renders of the firm where 
their shares are publicly traded in the capital market. 
 
First of all, the Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-
1971, 2510 B.E – 2514 B.E) instituted for the first time a systematic security 
market in order to mobilise additional funds to support industry and national 
economic development.  SET, established in 1974 by the Securities Exchange of 
Thailand Act 1974 (2517 B.E), set out official securities trade in Thailand since 
30th April 1975.  Becoming a dynamic stock exchange in 1992, a supervisory 
authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was organised in 
conformity with the new law – the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA) 1992 
(2535 B.E).  This movement has encouraged the Thai capital market into a further 
step by separating the capital market supervised by SEC from the money market 
which had until then been under the responsibilities of Bank of Thailand (BOT).  
With respect to SEA-1992, the Thai capital market has been developed by 
partitioning the market into a primary market for the initial public offering (IPO) 
securities and a secondary market where both are under the oversight of SEC.  
SET has divided the securities trading board into a main board and a foreign board 
since 1987.  The foreign board is primarily for foreign investors who would like 
to have their names registered on company’s shares that they hold.  Foreign 
investors can hold shares traded on the foreign board only.  Trading on the foreign 
board provides privileges for foreign investors who are limited by Thai 
commercial laws to hold only a certain percentage of shares in Thai firms, i.e. 
right to buy new shares offerings and receive dividends.  Above all, foreign 
investors are able to trade securities on the main board but only through their 
brokers who will hold shares on their behalf; and, as regards trading on the main 
board, they are not entitled to receive those privileges.  On 21st June 1999, SEC 
initially operated a new securities market – the Market for Alternative Investment 
(MAI) to support and strengthen as well as mobilise additional capital for small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Thailand.  The website of MAI for more 
details is http://www.mai.or.th.  MAI also has both main and foreign boards.   
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Consequently, Thailand has run two securities markets – SET and MAI since 
1999.   
 
In 1993, corporate governance was formally instigated to listed firms by requiring 
the appointment of two independent directors.  The corporate governance was 
reformed in 1999, that SEC has required all listed companies on both trading 
markets constituting at least three members on the audit committee in accordance 
with the Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed Companies, which was 
initially enacted in the same year.  Therefore, since 1999 firms with shares trading 
on the Thai stock market have organised corporate governance including at least 
three members of the audit committee and two independent directors.  Table 2.2 
shows summary information about Thai capital market development. 
 
Table 2.2 Thai Capital Market Development 
Thai Capital Market 
Supervisory Entity: Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) 
 Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) 
Market for Alternative Investment 
(MAI) 
Securities trade 
commencing year 1975 1999 
Trading boards Main board and Foreign board Foreign board commencing in 1987 
Good governance 
enacting year 1993 and 1999 1993 and 1999 
 
 
Requirements for 
the listed company  
Shareholder equity fully paid at least 
Thai Baht (THB) 300 Million  
     (~£4.3 Million) 
-   At least 1,000 minor shareholders 
-   At least three audit committees 
-   Accounting Standards required 
-  Shareholder equity fully paid at 
least  Thai Baht (THB) 20 Million 
(~£290,000) 
-  At least 300 minor shareholders 
-  At least three audit committees 
-  Accounting Standards required 
 
2.5 Thai Accounting Standard (TAS) 
After establishing ICAAT in 1948, Thailand published accounting standards for 
business entities performing in the country.  Before 2004, Thai Accounting 
Standards (TAS) were published by ICAAT under BSAP mandates.  Although 
FAP has undertaken the duties of ICAAT since 2004, the accounting standards 
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must still be authorised by BSAP as a government entity before officially being in 
force.  However, BSAP does not have duty about the content in Thai accounting 
standards. 
 
Thailand modified TAS many times to meet the change in economic and business 
events.  Nevertheless, those changes did not considerably reform the Thai 
accounting system until Thailand had been massively shocked by the burst of the 
Thai economic bubble in 1997.  The collapse of the economy in 1997 accelerated 
to ameliorate TAS a few years later.  Following the financial crisis, the 
Accounting Act 2000 was promulgated, and by the authorisation of the Act, on 
26th December 2000 the Notification of BSAP No. 42/2000 was announced, to 
declare what TAS must be applied for Thai firms.  Before 1997, there were 31 
accounting standards being used.  The Notification indicated the withdrawal of 21 
accounting standards with the remaining ten accounting standards being retained, 
including TAS No. 7, 11, 14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, and 31.  With reference to its 
announcement, BSAP announced 19 new accounting standards from 1st January 
2000, including TAS No. 32–49 and the Accounting Framework.  In 2005, 
another three new accounting standards were in enforcement.  By the fiscal year 
ended 2006, there were 32 accounting standards in use.  This considerable 
amendment of accounting standards has been reckoned as the first substantial 
accounting reform in Thailand since 1948.  As clearly expressed in the 
Accounting Act 2000, this accounting reform is to initiate the quality of 
accounting information in Thai businesses.  Since the new TAS mostly complied 
with selective International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)20 published by 
IASC to suit Thai business, this implies that the reform has submitted accounting 
information quality for international recognition.   
 
Although TAS is applied for all firms in Thailand, in its Notification No. 10/1998 
(2541 B.E) and Policy Statement on Code of Best Practices of Directors of Listed 
Companies, SEC has regulated and specified accounting standards especially for 
                                               
20 IFRS, during that period, was formerly named International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
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firms listed on the stock exchange by stating that in the event of no Thai 
accounting guidelines covering the existing issue, IFRS or US GAAP can be 
employed, respectively.  This is due to the fact that TAS does not cover some 
other complicated transactions, i.e. accounting for income tax.  Listed firms in 
Thailand must employ accounting guidelines published by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), respectively.  This regulation, with penalties, has 
been strictly in effect since the company financial year ended 1997.  In 
consequence, the publicly traded firm in Thailand utilises TAS as a minimum 
requirement for its accounting procedures and SEC rules have also been 
compulsory.  A tabular summary presenting a comparison of TAS and IFRS is 
presented in Appendix 1.   
 
In conclusion, FAP is currently recognised as an authority organisation for 
accounting practices in Thailand.  However, SET also regulates the accounting 
rule for publicly share trading firms.  Therefore, listed firms have to perform 
accounting procedures in conformity with both organisations.  It should be noted 
that TAS is considered as a basis standard for all firms doing business in 
Thailand.   
 
2.6 Discussion of the Thai Accounting System 
Most empirical studies in international accounting policy (i.e. among others, Ball, 
Kothari and Robin 2000; Bartov et al. 2001a; Arce and Mora 2002) have argued 
about the difference between code law and common law regime and their effect 
on accounting information.  For example, Ball et al. (2000) reported that in more 
than 40,000 firm-year samples for the period 1985–1995, on average, timely and 
conservative accounting incomes in code law countries, including France, 
Germany and Japan, were significantly less than those in common law countries, 
including Australia, Canada, the US and the UK.  They argue that political group, 
payout policy through dividends, manager’s discretion and tax system are factors 
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leading to the less timely and less conservative accounting income in code law 
countries.   
 
However, recently IFRS has been harmonised in many countries around the 
world, including Thailand as a code law and tax-based accounting income 
country.  This adoption should provide and encourage better quality accounting 
information.  However, even though IFRS has been harmonised in domestic 
accounting systems, this thesis considers that IFRS adoption is a part of many 
influencing factors stimulating accounting information quality in IFRS-adopted 
countries, i.e. ownership structure (i.e. Fan and Wong 2002; Jung and Kwon 
2002; Hovey, Li and Naughton 2003 and Wang 2006) and corporate governance 
mechanism (i.e. Beekes et al. 2004; Bushman et al. 2004; and Goncharov et al. 
2006).  It is essentially of interest to investigate whether their empirical inference 
(i.e. Barth et al. 2008) can be applied to Thai settings.   
 
One major point considered by this thesis is the institutional problem in Thai 
settings.  As Thailand has long been a tax-based accounting income system, Thai 
firms have used tax rules for reporting their financial statements (Ball et al. 2000).  
A priori conjecture views the Thai accounting regime as a tax-based accounting 
income system because of the structure of its accounting standard settings.  If 
accounting income is based on tax purposes, accounting income is likely to be less 
sensitive to economic reality.  Nevertheless, IFRS adoption in Thailand is to 
promote accounting information quality.  Thus, the IFRS adoption should help to 
bring about a better quality of accounting income in Thai firms.  If this is the case, 
Thailand’s accounting regime should move to a well-developed accounting 
system after the IFRS adoption.   
 
Regardless of presenting true economic outcomes on their financial statements, 
firms are unlikely to change their accounting policies as long as those policies are 
allowed by accounting standards because of the potential cost incurred from the 
change.  On the other hand, firms are likely to employ GAAP rules rather than tax 
rules probably because of the demand from market, i.e. creditors or domestic and 
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foreign investors, or the intention to present the true value of the firm.  Thus, it is 
of interest to explore whether the Thai accounting system has actually been 
reformed.  Much of prior research (i.e. Ball et al. 2000 and Barth et al. 2008) 
investigates the improvement of accounting quality by comparing pre- and post-
IFRS adoption or studying in international contexts.  Even though this thesis 
examines the general enhancement of accounting quality in a single emerging 
market, namely Thailand, it is not only to examine the change in accounting 
quality during IFRS post-adoption in Thailand but attempts to investigate whether 
the change in accounting quality during IFRS post-adoption is varied according to 
firms’ incentives as well.  This thesis employs the book-tax difference as a proxy 
of firm’s incentives.  This attempt should provide better understanding about 
IFRS adoption and the use of IFRS in Thailand.              
 
2.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter explains the Thai accounting system and its capital market 
environment.  Thailand has recently adopted the international accounting standard 
for its business.  This adoption attempts to promote a quality of accounting 
information in Thailand.  Not only has the accounting system been reformed but 
also Thai security markets have reinforced the attempt to improve accounting 
information quality in Thailand by regulating the use of accounting standards and 
the constitution of audit committees in publicly held firms.  This thesis is 
interested in exploring whether accounting information quality in Thailand has 
been improved after these several endeavours or whether Thailand only uses these 
activities as labels.  On the contrary, if an improvement in accounting information 
quality in Thailand has not been observed, one can argue that IFRS adoption may 
not be suitable for some particular countries, especially countries that have been 
using tax rules for financial reporting purposes for a long time, i.e. Thailand. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises two main parts: the theoretical framework and the review 
of existing literature.  In part I (section 3.2), the theoretical framework is divided 
into five sections.  The first three sections (section 3.2.1 – 3.2.3) describe related 
approaches of three earnings properties, consisting of earnings persistence, the 
value relevance (or accounting valuation) and the timeliness of earnings.  In 
addition to earnings properties, the explanation of book-tax differences (section 
3.3.4) and firm governance system (section 3.3.5) are presented.  The first part of 
this chapter provides background about earnings quality, the book-tax difference 
and corporate governance.  The second part of this chapter presents the review of 
related literature (section 3.3).  Consistent with part I, the related research for 
earnings persistence, the value relevance and earnings timeliness is presented in 
sections 3.3.1 – 3.3.3, respectively.  Sections 3.3.4 – 3.3.5 present prior study of 
book-tax differences and firm governance system, respectively.  The last section 
(section 3.4) is a chapter summary.            
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The first part of this chapter explains existing theoretical approaches used in prior 
literature.  This thesis divides accounting quality in three categories: earnings 
persistence, value relevance and earnings timeliness.  Among three aspects of 
accounting quality, much prior research performs analysis of value relevance and 
earnings timeliness.  Even though earnings persistence has been explored in 
accounting research for decades, the theoretical explanation of earning persistence 
is still debated in various aspects, i.e. the determinant of earnings persistence.  
Among three earnings qualities, the value relevance analysis has been widely used 
by prior research when investigating the change in accounting systems.  The most 
influential approach for value relevance analysis has been explained and presented 
by Ohlson (1997).  However, the debate on the usefulness of accounting 
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information to explain firm values has been an ongoing process.  The third 
property of earnings quality, earnings timeliness or accounting conservatism, has 
been extensively explored in the literature.  A number of accounting research 
studies about earnings timeliness were published after Basu (1997) defined 
conditional accounting conservatism as the different recognition of bad news and 
good news and used stock returns to proxy economic consequences.  Much of 
following research has employed his approach for the study of conditional 
accounting conservatism.  In addition to those three accounting qualities, this 
section explains the use of book-tax differences and the theoretical approach of 
the firm governance system.   
 
3.2.1 Theory of Earnings Persistence: The Predictive Approach 
One property of earnings that is widely debated among accounting research 
studies is the persistence of earnings.  Generally speaking, the persistence of 
earnings (summary measures) reflects the quality of accounting.  In terms of 
analysts’ forecast ability, higher persistence of earnings induces higher 
predictability of earnings because forecasting errors should be reduced according 
to the persistence of earnings.  A recent study (Dichev and Tang 2009) suggests 
that knowledge about the predictability of earnings is still debated.   
 
The earnings persistence estimation performed in this thesis is to measure the 
predictability of current earnings information on future earnings; the theory 
applied to this analysis is known as the predictive approach (Riahi-Belkaoui 2000, 
pg.332).21  For financial statement preparations, there are alternative accounting 
methods that firms are allowed to employ.  To reduce the difficulty of evaluating 
those alternative accounting methods, the predictive approach is utilised to 
differentiate accounting choice by investigating the predictability of particular 
accounting methods.  The predictive approach is to measure the prediction ability 
of accounting methods due to the fact that accounting information must facilitate 
                                               
21 The predictive approach described throughout this section is based on Riahi-Belkaoui (2000, 
pg.332-333) and italics are from the original. 
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the decision-making of the user.  Riahi-Belkaoui (2000, pg.332) suggests that two 
criteria should be considered.  First, the model employed by the user is descriptive 
rather than normative.  Therefore, it is difficult to identify and define all the 
decision models. The second is about the absence of a criterion for the choice of 
relevant information.   
 
With regard to the predictive approach, prior accounting studies have attempted to 
measure whether earnings are persistent by using several methods, including a 
time-series analysis, fundamental analysis and economic determinants.            
 
3.2.1.1 A Time-Series Analysis  
A time-series analysis is a method of prediction of economic events and examines 
temporal statistical dependencies in a data set (Riahi-Belkaoui 2000, pg.333).     
Freeman, Ohlson and Penman (1982) suggest that changes in earnings cannot be 
predicted, meaning that future earnings can either decline or increase.  Accounting 
researchers attempt to predict future earnings by using a time-series model.  A 
time-series analysis suggests that “an estimate of the expected earnings of firms is 
based on the past earnings series” (Foster 1977).  The specified model used to 
estimate future earnings is (Sloan 1996): 
 
   Earningst   = β0 + β1Earningst – 1 + εt  (3.1)       
 
3.2.1.2 Fundamental Analysis  
The knowledge about fundamental analysis in this section is based on the view 
expressed by Penman (1992).  Valuation has been extensively explored in the 
literature.  The classical approach to value a firm is that the present value is a 
function of future expected dividends.  Firms’ payoffs must be predicted to 
determine the present value.  Thus, price relies on future dividends but observed 
dividends do not inform as to price (Penman 1992).  In addition, dividend policy 
is independent from firm value according to the Miller and Modigliani dividend 
irrelevancy proposition.  Penman (1992) considers that dividend payout is the 
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event which occurs after closing accounting summary measures, earnings and 
book value.  Therefore, earnings and book value must be summarised before the 
payout policy comes into action.  Therefore, the prediction of future earnings 
(book value) is essential for the present value estimation.  There are two 
approaches to price the firms, consisting of pricing current earnings and pricing 
book value.  First, pricing current earnings suggests that accounting earnings are 
not value attributes but information about value attributes (future dividends) 
(Penman 1992).  Pricing current earnings is derived as: 
 
   Pt + dt  =    фXt          (3.2) 
 
where ф is a price/earnings (PE) ratio; P is share price; d is dividend and X 
is earnings.  Second, pricing book value is derived as: 
 
   Pt =  Bt     (3.3) 
 
where B is book value. 
 
Thus, fundamental analysis suggests that we must know what future earnings and 
book value will be next year/in the future.  Empirical evidence shows a significant 
relationship between future earnings and fundamental signals, including 
inventory, gross margin, effective tax rate, earnings quality, and labour force 
(Abarbanell and Bushee 1997).        
 
3.2.1.3 Economic Determinants 
According to economic theory, a set of relatively constant, i.e. firm-specific 
characteristics, induces firms’ earnings generating process in a persistent basis 
(Baginski, Lorek, Willinger and Branson 1999).  Lev (1983) argues that a random 
walk hypothesis reports the persistence of earnings ‘on average’.  When the 
persistence of earnings in an individual firm is identified, the behaviour of such 
earnings persistence differs from the on average random walk process.  He further 
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argues that stability of earnings was found when employing cross-sectional 
rankings of book rate of return (ROE).  This considerable stability of earnings 
process is due to economic determinants (Lev 1983).  If accounting techniques 
affect firms’ earnings generating process, the effect will be examined by the 
parameter estimated in a time series model (Watts 1972 quoted in Lev 1983).  In a 
similar vein, if the impact of economic factors is found in firms’ earnings 
generating process, the explicit relationship between economic factors and 
earnings generating process must be identified.22 At least four observable 
economic factors are commonly used and identified (Baginski et al. 1999), that 
these economic traits induce the persistence of earnings, including firm size, 
product-type, barriers-to-entry and capital intensity.        
     
In conclusion, the persistence of earnings is to predict future earnings, facilitating 
decision-making to the user.  A time-series analysis is to measure the property of 
earnings at an average level whilst the economic determinants approach attempts 
to identify the property of earnings at an individual firm level. 
 
3.2.2 Theory of Accounting Valuation  
The website of The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),23 an 
independent, privately-funded accounting standard-setter, states that the principal 
objectives of IASB are “to develop a single set of high quality, understandable, 
enforceable and globally accepted international financial reporting standards 
(IFRSs) through its standard-setting body, the IASB; to promote the use and 
rigorous application of those standards; to take account of the financial reporting 
needs of emerging economies and small and medium-sized entities (SMEs); and 
to bring about convergence of national accounting standards and IFRSs to high 
quality solutions.”  During the past decade, many countries have adopted their 
                                               
22“for example, that a change in depreciation method is generally associated with a change in 
capital intensity (e.g., a large investment in fixed assets leads managers to a switch from straight-
line to the accelerated depreciation method). If the degree of capital intensity affects the time-
series properties of earnings, it would be erroneous to attribute an observed change in the 
earnings time-series model to the switch in depreciation method.”  (Quoted from the original, Lev 
1983). 
23  http://www.iasb.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm. [online access 2 January 2010]. 
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accounting system in alignment with IFRS.  This convergence have essentially 
attracted global academic researchers’ attention to explore whether the IFRS-
harmonisation brings better quality of accounting measures to explain underlying 
economic constructs in their countries.  The IFRS adoption has been growing all 
around the world, i.e. Europe (Spain, Czech Republic, Poland and UK), North 
America (Mexico), Africa (South Africa), and Asia (Thailand).   
 
In case of accounting reforms or accounting changes, one competent theory 
widely used in academic empirical research is the fundamental analysis.  In 
accounting-based analysis, the fundamental analysis refers to the study of firm 
valuation process.  According to Kothari (2001, pg.109), “it (fundamental 
analysis) aids our understanding of the determinants of value, which facilitates 
investment decisions and valuation of non-publicly traded securities” 
(parentheses not in original). A branch of fundamental analysis in accounting-
based research is valuation analysis.  Broadly speaking, valuation theory holds to 
the determination of intrinsic value of share prices compared to current share 
price.  The valuation analysis is mainly the study of whether information is useful 
or value-relevant.  In particular, value-relevance research investigates the relation 
between market value as dependent variable and a set of accounting measures 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001).  An accounting measure is identified as “value 
relevant” if it is significantly associated with the dependent variable (Beaver 
2002).  Kothari (2001, pg.173) proposes that the theory is required to support the 
value relevance analysis.  Consistent with Kothari’s argument, Holthausen and 
Watts (2001) argue that the value-relevance analysis lacks descriptive theory to 
draw inferences for accounting standard settings but they conclude that two 
theories are inferred from the value-relevance study: direct valuation theory and 
inputs-to-valuation theory.  The next two sections (3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2) are 
devoted to the explanation of these theories based on the work of Holthausen and 
Watts (2001).   
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As criticised in prior theoretical literature, the value relevance study is considered 
as descriptive statistics without a reasonable conceptual explanation.  For 
example, Verrecchia (1998, quoted in Lee, 1999) argued that a valuation study is 
“a very simple idea…with no economic context.”  Nevertheless, like other 
research areas, value-relevance study, a long-history investigation, is controversial 
(Beaver 2002).  In his presidential lecture, given at the 2001 American 
Accounting Association Annual Meeting, Beaver (2002) contributed to the value-
relevance literature about the conceptual explanation of value-relevance research.  
In this speech, Beaver said that the theoretical description about value-relevance 
research consists of the combination of valuation model and contextual 
accounting arguments.  The valuation and contextual accounting argument is 
described in section 3.2.2.3. 
 
In sum, the accounting valuation theory includes three theories: direct valuation 
theory, input-to-valuation theory and the valuation and contextual accounting 
argument.  The valuation model is elaborated in section 3.2.2.4. 
 
3.2.2.1 Direct Valuation Theory 
Direct valuation theory refers to either the investigation of the association 
between share market value changes or levels and earnings or book values of 
equity or measurement of share market value changes or levels by using 
accounting earnings and book values of equity.  The theory contains two features: 
i) the association approach and ii) the measurement approach (Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001 footnote 4).  These approaches have absolutely different concerns.  
The association approach refers to the usefulness of accounting measures and the 
relevant statistics of this approach is the R2. The measurement approach focuses 
on the accuracy of accounting numbers and the relevant statistics is the coefficient 
of accounting information relative to its predicted value.  
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3.2.2.2 Input-to-Valuation Theory 
Input-to-valuation theory suggests that accounting plays as an information 
provider, supporting input-information to investors in the firm valuation process.  
In other words, input-to-valuation theory is a selection process to facilitate a 
decision of what accounting measure or potential accounting number among 
existing alternatives provides better results in valuing firms.  An incremental 
association study is an example which is based on an input-to-valuation theory.    
 
3.2.2.3 The Valuation and Contextual Accounting Argument 
Beaver (2002) suggests that although lacking a general theory of accounting to 
explain accounting-based valuation research, valuation models plus contextual 
accounting arguments can be used for the explanation of the conceptual 
foundation of value-relevance study, i.e. the contextual accounting argument of 
the economic substance (asset vs. obligation) of pension contracts between 
employers and employees that its interpretation depends on the benefit plan, or the 
contextual accounting argument of the use of fair value vs. historical costs in the 
prediction process.  The valuation model performs by discriminating price when a 
different argument is used.   
 
3.2.2.4 Valuation Models  
This section summarises valuation models normally employed by researchers to 
provide background knowledge in terms of value relevance analyses.  This 
attempts to provide theoretical background in the form of econometric rather than 
descriptive explanations. 
   
The formula of valuation models being presented in this section is based on prior 
literature, including Beaver (2002), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Kothari 
(2001), Lee (1999), Lippitt and Mastracchio (1993) and Penman (2006).  The 
most pervasively known and understandable valuation model is the dividend-
discounted model (DDM).  Another valuation model with a similar concept of 
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DDM is a discounted cash flow valuation model (DCF).  Several transformations 
have been made to DDM.  Products of DDM include the earnings capitalisation 
model (Fama and Miller 1972, quoted in Kothari 2001) and the residual income 
valuation model (Ohlson 1995, quoted in Lee 1999).  Most valuation models are 
based on DDM because of their essentially identical assumptions, basically 
consisting of: i) growth rate and ii) long time horizon.  These qualities require the 
“best guess” for implementing the models.   
 
Discounted Dividend Model (DDM) 
Discounted dividend model is rather straightforward in calculating the value of 
companies.  It estimates the value of firms by discounting the firm’s dividend in 
perpetuity.  Two features must be determined to calculate the value of companies: 
forecast of dividend and discount rate.  The descriptive formula is: 
    
 Firm value = Expected future dividend discounted by the discount rate 
 
The descriptive formula is presented in mathematical form: 
 
  P0 =         +      +  + …  (3.4) 
 
 where P0 is share price at time 0, 
  d* is expected future dividend at time 1,2,3,…, and 
r   is a discount rate at time 1,2,3,… 
 
Gordon (1962, quoted in Kothari 2001) simplified DDM by adding a growth rate.  
Assuming the discount rate (r) is fixed over time and the dividend growth (g) is at 
the constant rate g < r, then 
   
  Pt =        (3.5) 
    
 where Pt is share price at time t, 
d*1
 
r1 r2 
d*2 d*3 
r3 
 (d*t+1) 
(r – g) 
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  d*t 
 is expected future dividend at time t, 
r  is a discount rate (the required rate of returns), and 
g is a growth rate. 
 
Discounted Cash Flow Valuation Model (DCF) 
Similar notions of DDM are applied to derive a discounted cash flow valuation 
model.  However, rather than using expected future dividend to determine firm 
value, accounting cash flow is used instead.  This model, therefore, embeds 
accounting policy through cash flow calculation.  The present value of cash flow 
in perpetuity is used to determine firm value and calculated by: 
    
Pt =        (3.6) 
    
  CF* = Cash flow from operations – Cash investment 
where Pt is share price at time t, 
  CF*t is expected cash flow at time t, 
r is a discount rate (weight average cost of capital)
24, and 
g is a growth rate. 
 
Earnings Capitalisation Model (ECM) 
Earnings capitalization model (ECM) determines firm values by dividing the 
adjusted accounting earnings by a capitalisation factor.  Like DDM and DCF that 
dividend and cash flow continue indefinitely, ECM assumes that the earnings are 
continuing value, relating to long time horizon.  A difficult task for this model is 
the estimation of a capitalisation factor (Pratt, 1989 quoted in Lippitt and 
Mastracchio 1993) and this becomes problematic.  Nevertheless, a capitalisation 
factor can be obtained from the market or built up from a computation of risk free 
rate and risk premium to derive an appropriate rate (Lippitt and Mastracchio 
                                               
24 The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) should be employed as the discount rate for this 
case.  It is due to the fact that cash flows include both debt and equity; cost of debt and cost of 
equity are appropreate factors.  In terms of discounted dividend model (DDM), the discount rate is 
the rate required by investors because intvertors expect to receive dividend paid by the firm. 
(r – g) 
 (CF*t+1) 
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  a 
 a 
1993).  Lippitt and Mastracchio (1993) documented that the accounting earnings 
used for the calculation in this model are adjusted for the item that reduces 
unrealistic numbers, i.e. non-recurring item such as depreciation.  The formula of 
ECM is: 
 
V  =         (3.7) 
 
 where V is firm value estimate, 
  ER is adjusted earnings, and 
  I is a capitalisation factor. 
 
Residual Income Model (RIM) 
Lee (1999, pg.415, footnote 4) documented that the residual income model was an 
early study of financial economists, for instance, Preinreich (1938) and Edwards 
and Bell (1961).  However, the model has recently received enormous attention 
from both academics and investment houses after Ohlson (1995, quoted in Kothari 
2001) revived the model by incorporating rigorously impressive assumptions.  
The residual income model is a valuation model that estimates the value of the 
company by calculating from capital and all the present value of future wealth-
creating activities (Lee 1999).  Lee (1999) noted that future wealth-creating 
activities (or future wealth values) are also known as ‘residual income (or 
abnormal earnings),’ the difference amount between earnings and its cost of 
capital in the period.  To derive the equation form: 
 
 Firm value  = Capital + Present value of all future wealth values 
   = Capital + Present value of all residual income 
          (3.8) 
Based on Ohlson (1995), 
  χt = χt – (re *bt–1)     (3.9) 
    
 where χt is residual income at time t,  
ER 
I 
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χt is earnings at time t,  
re is the cost of equity capital, and 
bt–1    is book value (or capital) at time t–1.    
 
RIM in a version different from the predated one defines that the value of the 
company is a function of current book value and the discounted present value of 
future abnormal accounting earnings (Kothari 2001, pg.176).  Ohlson (1995, 
quoted in Kothari 2001) has imposed appealing components to the earlier version 
of the residual income model and this modified model is often known as the 
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (Lee 1999).  Lee (1999) noted that the EBO 
model persuasively triggers the study of the association between accounting 
measures and firm value.  However, the model does not incorporate accounting 
features (or financial reporting) in the equation (because the model still relies on 
future expected value of abnormal accounting earnings).  Lee (1999) noted that 
EBO is equivalent to the combination of dividend-discounting model and the 
clean surplus relation (CSR).  Lee (1999, pg.416, footnote 5) documented that 
“Clean surplus accounting requires that all gains and losses affecting book value 
are also included in earnings; that is, the change in book value from period to 
period is equal to earnings minus net dividends (bt = bt–1 + NIt  – dt).”  The EBO 
equations can be derived as follows: 
 
Dividend-Discounting Model in reduced form: 
 
    Pt =         Σ      (3.10) 
 
Clear Surplus Relations define as: 
  bt  =   bt–1 + χt – dt    (3.11) 
 
Rewritten equation (3.11), then 
 
dt  =   bt–1 + χt  – bt    (3.12) 
Et (dt+i) 
(1 + re)
i i = 1
∞ 
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 a 
 
Et (χt +i) 
Substitute dt in (3.10), then     
    
    Pt =          Σ      (3.13) 
 
Rewritten equation (3.13), then 
  
    Pt = bt + Σ      
 
(3.14) 
The last term in equation (3.14) is assumed to be zero as it is diminishing; then 
deriving equations (3.15) or (3.16)      
 
    Pt = bt + Σ       (3.15) 
 
 
    Pt = bt + Σ       (3.16) 
 
Substitute equation (3.9) to (3.15), then 
 
                                                                        
    Pt = bt + Σ       (3.17) 
 
  
 where   Pt is share price for period t,  
dt  is dividend for period t,  
bt  is book value for period t,  
    Et[.] is expectation based on information available for period t,   
       χt+1 is residual income at time t+1,  
        re is the cost of equity capital assuming constant through  
 time, and 
ROEt+i is the after-tax return on book equity at time t+1.   
Et (χt +i – (re *Bt+i–1)) 
(1 + re)
i i = 1 
∞ 
Et ((ROEt+i – re)*Bt+i–1) 
(1 + re)
i i = 1 
∞ 
Et (bt+i–1 + χt +i – bt+i) 
(1 + re)
i i = 1 
∞ 
∞ 
Et (bt+∞) 
(1 + re)∞ 
Et (χt +i – (re *Bt+i–1)) 
(1 + re)
i i = 1 
(1 + re)
i i = 1 
∞ 
a
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 a  a 
Equation (3.17) is using forecasts abnormal earnings, that this feature is 
theoretically not different from the dividend-discounting model in terms of using 
the best guess to estimate the forecasts.  Ohlson (1995, quoted in Lee 1999) thus 
developed the model by formulising two assumptions: i) imposing a time-series 
structure on the abnormal earnings, and ii) introducing information other than 
abnormal earnings (or other information or non-accounting information).   
 
The time-series abnormal earnings and non-accounting information process are 
specified an autoregressive process with one lag (AR1) or modified AR(1).  
Kothari (2001) noted that the autoregressive process in abnormal earnings has the 
economic intuition that “competition will sooner or later erode above-normal 
returns (i.e., positive abnormal earnings) or firms experiencing below-normal 
rates of returns eventually exit.”  And, the other information represents a rich set 
of implications, formalising the notion that prices do not only reflect the 
transaction-based, historical-cost earnings but also other information (Kothari 
2001).   
 
These specifications simplify the Ohlson valuation model to estimate firm value 
by using current-period accounting measures due to the autoregressive process 
instead of using future expected value (Lee 1999).  This imposing method 
introduced by Ohlson (1995, quoted in Lee 1999) is known as “linear information 
dynamics” (LID).  An appealing feature in the EBO model is that it relaxes 
forecasts of abnormal earnings that can be obtained from any process (Kothari 
2001) that is more direct, i.e. analysts’ forecasts of earnings, rather than 
computing from the discounted present value of earnings or cash flow (Lee 1999).  
LID maps accounting measures to valuation model.  The autoregressive process of 
earnings and other information is defined as follows (Dechow et al. 1999): 
 
    χt+1 = ωχt  + Vt + ε1, t+1    (3.18)  
 Vt+1 = γVt + ε2, t+1     (3.19) 
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  a 
where       χt is the abnormal earnings (or residual income) at time t, 
Vt is other information, 
ε is unpredictable mean zero error term, and 
γ and ω are persistence parameters. 
 
According to Lee (1999), equations (3.18) and (3.19) are model’s assumptions, 
not propositions.  Testing the assumptions of linear information dynamics may be 
fruitless because one does not obtain much benefit from rejecting the assumptions 
(Kothari 2001).  In addition, these assumptions logically follow the basics of 
economic definitions (Lee 1999).  The variables in equations (3.12) and (3.13) are 
specified as an autoregressive process with one lag (AR1) or modified AR(1).  γ 
and ω are both imposed to be non-negative and less than 1.  Lee (1999) noted that 
with this process, we can determine the firm value by using current period 
accounting measures rather than forecasts of the value.   
 
According to the model, LID assumes that accounting methods are unbiased, 
meaning that there is no effect of accounting choice on firm value estimation.  
Kothari (2001) elaborated that different accounting method will be reflected in 
accounting current book value and earnings and future expected earnings.  Kothari 
(2001) explained this limitation issue as: i) the model, like DDM, is not useful for 
the purpose of financial reporting, ii) analysts’ forecasts also use accounting 
choice for their abnormal earnings estimation,25 and iii) if future abnormal 
earnings are viewed as economic rents,26 accounting choice will become 
important.   
 
                                               
25 This thesis considers that accounting choice has already been embedded in analysts’ forecasts 
that result in forecasted earnings, therefore accounting choice affects the valuation process in the 
form of forecasted earnings.     
26 Schoemaker (1990, pg.1179) documented that “To Pareto and Marshall (economic) rents 
referred to the difference between a resource’s payments in its best and second best use (see 
Alchian 1988; Rumelt 1987).” (italics not in original) According to the accounting perspective, 
economic rents refer to the use of different accounting treatments to provide different 
consequences, i.e. the pooling of interest method vs. the purchase method for a merger (Kothari 
2001). 
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The residual income model in equation (3.17) plus LID assumptions in equation 
(3.18) and (3.19) can derive:    
 
Pt = bt + α1χt + α2Vt    (3.20) 
 
where α1  = ω/(1 + re – ω)      
  α2  = (1 + re)/(1 + re – ω)(1 + re – γ)    
 
From the above equations, RIM has been derived from dividend-discounting 
model.  However, accounting information is embedded to dividend-discounting 
model only through clean surplus relations (equation 3.11). Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995 and 1996, quoted in Lee 1999) have modified LID and allowed “current 
book value to provide information about future residual income.”  In the modified 
LID, assets are separated into the net operating assets and net financial assets of 
the firm.  This allows the role of conservative accounting on valuation model (Lee 
1999).  For example, book value can be defined as cash balance in the firm and 
earnings are non-cash balance excluding dividend; the usefulness of accrual 
accounting can be estimated which results from clean surplus relations (Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan 1999).  In addition, other information or Vt can be imposed to 
be zero (Stober 1999) if one is concerned only with accounting measures and firm 
valuation relationship or it is rather difficult to be estimated (see Dechow et al. 
1999 to the estimation of Vt).     
 
Price Level and Return Regressions 
In the value relevance study, many research studies have used price level model 
and/or return regression for their analysis and the models have been adopted and 
designed in several versions to fit the research question (i.e. among others Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman 1998; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; and Collins, Maydew 
and Weiss 1997).  Lee (1999) noted that those empirical studies often credited 
Ohlson (1995) for implementing these models.  Price level and return regressions 
are often employed for panel data in the analysis. They are defined as follows, 
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respectively: 
      Pit = αo + α1 bit + α2 xit + εit             (3.21) 
Rtit = αo + α1 bit + α2 xit + εit    (3.22) 
 
 where   Pit is share price of firm i, for period t,  
Rtit is share return of firm i, for period t, 
bit   is the reported book value of firm i, for period t,  
xit is the reported earnings of firm i, for period t, and  
εit is unpredictable mean zero disturbance term. 
 
From equation 3.21 and 3.22, the parameter, α2, is also known as earnings 
response coefficient (ERC).27   
 
To distinguish the use of price level and return (first difference) models, Beaver 
(2002) suggested that when the research design is to estimate what accounting 
measures are reflected in firm value, price level will be appropriate.  However, 
return regressions are used to determine the change in firm value over a specific 
time period; time is of importance when using return model.  The value relevance 
models, price level and return regressions, are often employed to estimate share 
mispricing when accounting policy has been changed (or when accounting 
treatments are different) by comparing the explanatory power of the model before 
and after the change in accounting policy (or comparing the difference of 
explanatory power between alternative accounting methods) (see Holthausen and 
Watts 2001; Kothari 2001).  Other than using book value and earnings as 
independent variables, some research papers include other information as 
regressors (i.e. Martinez 2003; Ely and Pownall 2002; and Dontoh, 
Radhakrishnan and Ronen 2004).   
 
                                               
27 Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997, pg.45, footnote 8) noted that price level regression was 
adopted from Ohlson (1995) model by taking out the discounting earnings term (1 + rit)/rit from the 
original model, according to Maydew’s (1993) finding that “allowing discount rates to vary 
across firms does not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model.”  (Italics from 
original, quoted from Collins et al. 1997, footnote 8). 
 
 
Chapter III                                           Theoretical framework and literature review 
 
 
 62
Kothari (2001) documents that accounting-based valuation model is derived from 
dividend-discounting model which is attributed to Williams (1938, quoted in 
Kothari 2001).  The basic theory of dividend-discounting model applies to the 
market value of the firm to equal the present value of expected future dividend-
discounted at risk-adjusted expected rate of return (Kothari 2001).  As financial 
statements principally serve investment purposes (Barth et al. 2001, quoted in 
Holthausen and Watts 2001),28 researchers have long been searching if accounting 
data are relevant for equity investment.  Penman (1992, quoted in Lee 1999) 
triggered market-based research to consider the fundamental analysis while most 
empirical research papers focused on information flows in the capital market, i.e. 
empirical testing in the area of efficient market hypothesis. Mounting of value 
relevance analyses can be observed after a parsimonious model, Ohlson (1995) 
and Feltham-Ohlson (1995) residual income model (Kothari 2001, pg.175). Lee 
(1991) documents that RIM is already determined as a standard technique in many 
investment firms after four years of RIM being presented (see also O’Hanlon and 
Peasnell 2002).  This thesis considers that the valuation analysis has recently 
caught stakeholders’ attention because of: i) easily to implement model and ii) 
understandable models with rigorous assumptions. 
 
In conclusion, the value relevance analysis attempts to investigate the relevancy of 
accounting information.  Even though there is no accounting theory supporting the 
valuation process, the valuation method is useful for the investigation of 
accounting changes.  One issue about the valuation process is that the valuation 
model is open-ended, i.e. other information being incorporated into the equation 
3.20 is subject to information users. 
 
3.2.3 Theory of Earnings Timeliness 
The relevance and reliability are limited by timeliness.  If firms have waited to 
gather all information before presenting to the public, such information is 
                                               
28 Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that there are several users of financial statements other than 
equity investors that accounting standard setting has to be concerned with.   
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probably very reliable but not relevant.  On the other hand, if firms present 
information to the public without sufficient information, the reliability of such 
information may be reduced.  Timeliness is one attribute of accounting measures 
(Watts 2003a). Ball et al. (2000) define timeliness of accounting income as the 
ability of earnings to incorporate returns which occurred in the same period.  
Timely financial reporting can be thought of as timely accounting recognition 
presented on financial statements. Accounting recognition of firms’ future 
changes has two general ideas: deferred and timely recognition (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005a).  Accounting recognition is viewed as ‘conservative’ when 
firms recognise losses in more timely manner than gains.  A prominent work of 
Basu (1997) views accounting conservatism as “capturing accountant’s tendency 
to require a higher degree of verification for recognising good news than bad 
news in financial statements”. A consequence of accounting conservatism is “the 
systematic undervaluation of the entity’s net assets (equity) relative to their 
economic value” (Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan. 2007).29   
 
Conservatism can be defined as: conditional or unconditional (Beaver and Ryan 
2004).  Beaver and Ryan (2004) detail the definition of conditional and 
unconditional conservatism as follows: 
 
Unconditional conservatism   
Unconditional conservatism (or ex ante or news independent) refers to aspects of 
the accounting process that are determined at the inception of assets and 
liabilities yield expected unrecorded goodwill, i.e. accelerated depreciation.  A 
primary motivation for unconditional conservatism is the difficulty of valuing 
certain economic assets and liabilities.30  
 
Conditional conservatism  
Conditional conservatism (or ex post or news dependent) means that book values 
are written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up 
                                               
29 Italics in original. 
30 Italics in original. 
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under favourable circumstances, with the latter being the conservative behaviour, 
i.e. lower cost or market value of accounting for inventory and impairment 
accounting for long-lived tangible and intangible assets.  A primary motivation 
for conditional conservatism is to counterbalance managers’ perceived incentives 
to report upward-biased accounting numbers when adverse events have 
occurred.31  
 
3.2.3.1 Contracting Theory 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that no theory has been derived to explain 
asymmetric timeliness. However, Watts (2003a) has attempted to explain 
accounting conservatism in a formal way by proposing ‘contracting theory’.  
Contracting theory argues that a number of economic reasons generate 
conservatism. Conservatism is caused by following reasons (Holthausen and 
Watts 2004; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007): 
1. Debt and management contract purposes: conservatism defers income 
recognition to ensure that firms’ resources are allotted appropriately to 
parties according to the precedence of claims.  For instance, the 
recognition of income could induce a higher dividend payment, generating 
the wealth transfer from lenders to shareholders. Earnings-based 
compensation to management is deferred to be recognised until the 
management performance is captured by earnings.  Conservatism reduces 
the incentive of management to overstate earnings for their own benefit.   
2. Litigation costs and regulator pressures: earnings or assets overstatement 
can cause a lawsuit compared to understatement of those components.  
However, greater costs for the overstatement of earnings and net assets are 
borne by accounting regulators (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007), i.e. the 
lack of revaluation method of fixed assets in accounting standards (Watts 
2003). 
3. Book income and corporate income taxes: higher reported income could 
cause higher income tax. Thus, conservatism through deferred income 
                                               
31 Italics in original. 
 
 
Chapter III                                           Theoretical framework and literature review 
 
 
 65
recognition may be used to lower the present value of taxes. Conservatism 
may encourage the use of tax accounting method for financial reporting 
purposes.32  
 
In light of the assumption of the efficient market, the information asymmetry 
approach can be used for explaining accounting timeliness.  Information 
asymmetry between firms and the market generates a demand for an income 
component (Ball et al. 2000).  Ball et al. (2000) argue that “accounting income 
thus incorporates only the subset of available value-relevant information that is 
independently observable, whereas economic income incorporates information 
that is not independent of managers, such as plans and forecasts.” 
 
3.2.3.2 Earnings Timeliness Models 
Market-based model 
Beaver et al. (1980, quoted in Kothari 2001) derive that “the information set 
reflected in prices is richer than that in contemporaneous accounting earnings.”  
Kothari (2001) further explains that share returns reflect the present value of 
future net cash flows expected by the market.  Accrual processes used for earnings 
determination incorporate the information captured by price changes with 
multiple-period lags up to four years (Basu 1997).  This notion infers share prices 
leading earnings.  Ball et al. (2000) derive a linear specification accounting 
income-determination model by hypothesising that accounting income is a 
function of economic income: 
 
Yit =  (∆Vit, ∆Vit–1, ∆Vit–2, ∆Vit–3, …, Vit)   (3.23) 
 
                  where Y denotes accounting income and ∆V denotes economic 
income.  If ∆V is independent over time, then it is simplified to: 
 
                                               
32 Guenther et al. (1997) investigate this issue and provide evidence of using the tax accounting 
method for financial reporting purposes (Quoted from Holthausen and Watts 2001). 
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Yit = gj (∆Vit, ŋit)      (3.24) 
 
where ŋit is disturbance term incorporating lagged changes in market 
value (∆Vit–1, ∆Vit–2, ∆Vit–3, …).  After dividing model (3.24) with opening 
market value (Vit–1), then earnings yield (NIit ≡ Yit/Vit–1) and annual rate of return 
(Rit ≡ ∆Vit/Vit–1) are obtained. Then, a linear model is (Ball et al. 2000):  
 
   NIit = α1 + α2Rit + ζit     (3.25) 
 
Model (3.25) is reverse regression because the leading variable is treated as 
explanatory variable and the lagging variable is treated as dependent variable.  
OLS standard errors and test statistics are better specified for the reverse 
regression (Beaver et al. 1980, quoted in Basu 1997). 
 
Basu (1997) provides an explanation of asymmetric earnings timeliness.  The 
recognition of gains (good news) requires a higher degree of verification; a 
portion of current good news is recognised this period and the remainder will be 
recognised in future periods.  In contrast, current bad news is more likely to be 
fully recognised in the current period.  Thus, earnings is predicted to be more 
strongly associated with concurrent negative unexpected returns, proxying for 
‘bad news’, than positive unexpected returns, which proxy for ‘good news’ (Basu 
1997).  
 
From model (3.25), to specify the negative returns-earnings association, model 
(3.25) is modified to: 
 
NIit = β0 + β1RDit + β2Rit + β3Rit*RDit + εit   (3.26) 
 
where RDit is a dummy variable; = 1 if Rit < 0, = 0 otherwise.   
For bad news recognition, R2 and slope coefficient is higher than those for good 
news recognition. 
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Accruals-based model 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) argue that when there is new information, the 
current and future period cash flows will be revised in the current period.   This 
implies that the current period revision in current and expected future cash flows 
is positively correlated.  They further argue that “timely gain and loss recognition 
is based on expected not realised cash flows, and therefore is accomplished 
through accruals.” The accruals-based asymmetric model arises because 
economic gains occur when they are realised whilst economic losses are 
recognised on a timely fashion as unrealised transactions against income.  
Therefore, the positive correlation between cash flows and accruals is more 
pronounced in the case of economic losses relative to economic gains.  The model 
is operationalised in the following way: 
 
ACit = β0 + β1DCFit + β2CFit + β3DCFit*CFit + εit   (3.27) 
where  ACit is accruals;  
CFit is cash flows from operation; and  
DCFit is a dummy variable; = 1 if CFit < 0, = 0 otherwise.   
 
Mean reverting model 
The property of earnings persistence differs from that of earnings timeliness (Basu 
1997).  If earnings information persists, it will not be likely to capture economic 
outcome on a timely basis.  Basu (1997) explains that negative earnings are 
transitory.  Based on earnings timeliness, negative earnings are more likely to 
reverse in the next period of time.  Based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005), the 
model is performed as follows. 
 
∆NIit/TAit-1  =  α0 + α1 Dit+ γ0 ∆NI it-1/TA it-2 + γ1 Dit * ∆NI it-1/TA it-2 + εit     
          (3.28) 
where  ∆NIit is change in net income;  
TAit is total assets; and  
Dit is a dummy variable; = 1 if  ∆NI it-1 < 0, = 0 otherwise.   
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3.2.3.3 Firm-Specific Measurement of Accounting Conservatism  
Base on Givoly and Hayn (2002), there are several measures for firm-specific 
accounting conservatism.  Firm-specific measurement of accounting conservatism 
is also known as unconditional accounting conservatism.  First, the accumulation 
of net negative accruals over time is an indication of conservatism.  Because 
accruals tend to reverse in future periods, the consistence of negative accruals 
over several periods indicates firms’ conservatism.  Second, earnings asymmetric 
timeliness suggests that economic losses are recognised timelier than economic 
gains.  Therefore, the measure of unconditional conservatism can be identified by 
a negatively skewed earnings distribution.  Third, the recognition of anticipated 
losses induces an increase in variability of the earnings series.  Thus, the 
variability of the earnings distribution is an indication of conservatism.  A final 
measurement of unconditional accounting conservatism is the ratio of markets 
value divided by book values (market-to-book ratio).  The ratio indicates that 
relative under- or overstatement of assets (and liabilities) captured by the market 
compared to book.  The higher ratio indicates more conservatism, understating 
assets and overstating liabilities.33         
 
In conclusion, earnings timeliness is one property of accounting quality.  It is still 
arguable that the existing literature has attempted to search for a proxy to measure 
the earnings timeliness.  Givoly et al. (2007) suggest that information 
environment is an influencing factor for the timeliness of earnings.     
 
3.2.4 Book-Tax Differences 
Book-tax differences (BT) are defined as the deviation between book-income 
(earnings) and taxable income.  Book income is calculated according to GAAP 
whilst taxable income is computed based on tax codes.  For Thailand, both book 
                                               
33 It should be noted that in terms of finance, the market-to-book ratio can be interpreted as growth 
of the firm.  When the market expectation of the company value is greater than the company’s 
book value (i.e. if the ratio is greater than 1), this means that the maket anticipates the good future 
of such company.  In terms of accounting reserch, however, the market-to-book ratio for this case 
is used as proxy for unconditional conservatism rather than growth and the larger ratio indicates 
the higher conservatism. 
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and taxable income are prepared by using an accrual basis.  Nonetheless, there are 
tax exemptions inducing the book-tax difference in Thailand, i.e. depreciation 
methods or allowance account for bad debt.  The book-tax difference can be 
divided into two categories, permanent and temporary difference.   
 
Permanent differences are reflected in current differences between book and 
taxable income and the difference will not be deferred to or recovered in future 
periods.  For example, Thai tax rules allow firms to depreciate the value of 
executive cars as taxable expenses (through depreciation expenses) when the cost 
of each car is not greater than one million Thai baths (~£18,200).  The greater 
amount of £18,200 is non-tax deductible expenses.  Therefore, this transaction 
generates permanent book-tax differences, that book income is lower than taxable 
income, all else being constant.  Another example of permanent difference is the 
reserve account, e.g. an allowance account for bad debt.  For Thailand, the 
allowance account for bad debt is realised as expenses against book income in the 
current period but it is a non-taxable expense.     
 
Temporary differences are incurred according to the timing difference, that book 
income and taxable income recognise an accounting transaction in different 
periods of time.  The temporary difference can be divided as a deferred tax asset 
or deferred tax liability.  The deferred tax asset will be used as taxable expenses 
whilst the deferred tax liability will be realised as taxable income in future 
periods.  For example, in Thailand, bad debt expense is realised as expenses 
against book income in current profit and loss statements.  Nonetheless, the 
amount of bad debt is used to consider whether the bad debt will be used as 
taxable expenses in the current period.  For the low amount of bad debt,34 bad 
debt will be realised as taxable expenses when the dispute of bad debt is filed 
before the court as a prima facie case.  For the high amount of bad debt, there 
must be a verdict from the court against debtors; this event is known as a deferred 
                                               
34 It should be noted that for Thailand, the rule for bad debt for financial firms differs from that for 
non-financial firms (see Thai Tax Code: Ministerial Regulations No. 186 (1991 (2534 B.E)). 
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tax asset.  Deferred tax assets also include the event that firms realise revenue as 
taxable income in the current period but defer the recognition of revenue as book 
income to future periods.  Thus, deferred tax assets induce the lower book income 
relative to taxable income in the current period.   
 
For a deferred tax liability, firms defer the expense recognition in their book 
accounts to future periods but capitalise expenses as taxable expenses in the 
current period.  For example, in Thailand, tax rules allow firms to depreciate fixed 
assets, e.g. machine and equipment, over at least five accounting periods.  
However, firms depreciate those fixed assets over ten accounting periods in their 
book accounts but five accounting periods for tax calculations.  In addition to 
expenses recognitions, firms defer the recognition of taxable income but realise 
revenue in their current book income.  With all else being constant, the deferred 
tax liability, thus, induces the lower taxable income relative to book income.    
             
 The connection between book-tax differences and accounting quality 
In terms of the relationship between accounting quality and book-tax differences, 
temporary differences play a more important role relative to permanent 
differences.  Accounting discretions rendered by firms’ insiders against restrictive 
tax rules induce more timing (temporary) differences in book income and taxable 
income relative to permanent differences.  In terms of the relation between book 
income and taxable income, Guenther et al. (1997) argue that it is unlikely for 
firms to use different accounting methods to increase revenues or tax deductions 
for tax purposes without increasing revenues or expenses in financial statements.  
For example, the estimated expense of warranty claims can be expenses in 
financial reporting but cannot be tax deductible unless economic performance has 
occurred.  The condition in reference to economic performance is sufficient but 
not necessary for financial statement purposes (Guenther et al. 1997). Guenther et 
al. (1997) further argue that the book-tax difference incurs because of the 
underlying different incentive between financial and tax accounting.  
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Accounting conservatism discourages firms to understate expenses or overstate 
revenues whilst for the government income, the tax rules detect understating 
revenue and overstating expense. Mills (1998) supports empirical evidence on this 
argument by reporting that Internal Revenue Service audit adjustments increase as 
book-tax differences increase. This implies that book income reflects tax activity.  
This thesis considers that the book-tax difference can be employed to differentiate 
incentives of a firm’s insiders.  
 
However, the use of GAAP can be subject to management discretion and tax 
rules, i.e. measurement methods, are more concrete than GAAP.  The stringent 
condition of tax rules creates timing book-tax differences (Hanlon 2005). 
Regardless of the ability to capture economic consequences, the use of more 
restrictive/less subjective rules, or tax rules, should report small changes in 
earnings from this period to the next period.  Because of this small alteration, 
using tax rules for financial reporting purposes facilitates the accounting numbers 
predictability, i.e. higher earnings persistence improves predictability.  Hanlon 
(2005) summarises that firms with large book-tax differences have lower 
accounting quality in terms of earnings persistence than firms with small book-tax 
differences.  However, it is a trade-off when conforming between book and 
taxable income. When using tax rules for financial statement purposes, Hanlon et 
al. (2005) report a 50 per cent loss in the explanatory power of reported earnings. 
Book-tax conformity incurs tax costs, i.e. audit adjustment and tax examination, 
and non-tax (financial reporting) costs, i.e. debt covenant violation (Mills and 
Newberry 2001). Mills and Newberry (2001) report the evidence that between 
public and private firms, public firms have generally higher non-tax costs that 
result in larger book-tax gap.   
 
Nevertheless, the use of book-tax differences as proxy of firm’ incentives is 
problematic because book-tax differences can either exemplify discretion in 
reported income or tax activities (Ayers, Jiang and Laplante 2009; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2007). Guenther et al. (1997) find that firms defer income 
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recognition in their financial statements when they are required to use the accrual 
method for tax purposes. That finding suggests the impact of management 
intention on financial reporting. Desai and Dharmapala (2007) suggest that the 
magnitude of book-tax differences is a signal of overall tax planning ability. 
Ayers et al. (2009) find that the information content of book income is not 
different between high tax planning firms and other firms but the information 
content of tax income is lower in high tax planning firms than in other firms.  In 
addition, they report that compared to book income information, tax income 
information in low earnings quality firms has higher ability to explain firm 
performance than that in high earnings quality firms.   
 
Those studies suggest that large book-tax differences can be derived from either 
over-reported earnings or aggressive tax planning activity.  In addition, Calegari 
(2000) finds that firms with relatively high book-tax conformity increase debt 
ratios and minimise income-increasing accruals to achieve tax management and 
firms with relatively low book-tax conformity employ discretionary accruals by 
increasing income to accomplish financial reporting purposes (i.e. to avoid debt 
covenant violation). Mills and Newberry (2001) argue that small book-tax 
difference may be derived from the incentive to report higher book income 
resulting in increasing tax income because firms are perhaps willing to forfeit tax 
dollars.  The use of income-increasing accounting practice results in both higher 
book and taxable income. If this is the case, Mills and Newberry (2001) suggest 
that it is difficult to find predicted results. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the market is able to use book-tax differences to 
determine incentives of a firm’s insiders.  However, the information contained in 
book-tax differences must be interpreted with caution.  The larger (or smaller) 
magnitude of book-tax differences does not necessarily imply that earnings are of 
low (high) quality because those scales of book-tax differences are sensitive to a 
firm’s discretions. 
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3.2.5 Firm Governance System 
For the firm governance mechanism, agency theory is a prominent theory that a 
large number of research studies have utilised.  The firm governance system is a 
monitoring mechanism organised by the firm to mitigate potential problems, i.e. 
conflict of interests.  This section presents descriptive explanations about agency 
theory and discussion of agency problems and accounting quality.     
 
3.2.5.1 Agency Theory 
In a well-known work of theory of the firm and agency costs by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), they propose that agency problems occur in a relationship 
between two parties.  One party is defined as an agent and the other is a principal.  
Agency problems occur when a principal delegates some decision making 
authority to an agent.  Agency theory suggests that decisions made by an agent 
may not maximise both agents’ and principals’ interests; instead of that managers 
are likely to act in their self-interest.  To secure the principals’ interests, principals 
may have to bear some costs to be certain that an agent will not be likely to take 
more benefits from the company or harm the principals’ welfare.   
 
The agency theory is formed because the authors view a company as a 
culmination of complex contractual relationships.  Stakeholders in a company, 
e.g. managers, shareholders, or creditors, have their own objectives that may not 
be the same.  For instance, with all being equal, company’s managers in a highly 
profitable company are more likely to maximise their own benefits by taking 
company resources whilst shareholders expect managers to pay more dividends.  
If managers have tended to pay more dividends, creditors are not likely to agree 
with this policy because creditors would like to be certain that managers and 
shareholders do not consume all company’s assets and leave nothing for claims at 
the end.  To balance all objectives in a company is also complicated.  Due to the 
conflict of interests, the authors suggest that a possible means of balancing 
objectives of all parties is contracts.  In a company, there are varieties of conflict 
domains (Quiry, Dallocchio, Le Fur and Salvi 2005, pg.647), such as managers 
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and shareholders, the management and employees, or creditors and shareholders.  
Each domain uses contracts to mitigate conflicts and risk, leading to contractual 
relationships between parties.  Consequently, a company is a nexus of contracts.  
For example, the relationship between managers – as agents and shareholders – as 
principals can be under employment contracts while the relationship between 
managers – as agents and creditors or bondholders – as principals can be bound by 
debt contracts.  However, contracting incurs costs known as agency costs.   
 
Agency costs 
Agency costs are incurred from the attempt to alleviate agency problems.  These 
costs are higher in a company with severe agency problems.  More severe agency 
problems can be found in a company with large free cash flow (Jensen 1986).  
This is because managers may use large free cash flow and waste it in various 
activities rather than paying it to shareholders.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
indicate that agency costs consist of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual 
loss.   
 
Monitoring costs 
Monitoring costs include an agent’s compensation, any legal fees which relate to 
the employment contract, audit fees, budgeting, or even operating rules, etc.  
Monitoring costs paid to agents aim to respond to agents’ interests, to improve 
agents’ performances, or to reduce agents’ decisions which would harm the 
principals’ interests.  Monitoring costs are usually set up in the first instance by 
principals and principals bear the costs.  However, the costs can be adjusted later 
in some cases depending on the contract.  For example, if managers as agents 
have low performance, this will lead to the decrease in their remunerations.  In 
this circumstance, agents bear the costs instead.  Thus, monitoring costs are borne 
by either agents or principals depending on situations.  Monitoring costs should 
have negative relation with agents’ remunerations.  For example, if principals 
have to pay more monitoring costs to control agents’ behaviour, compensation 
paid to agents may be reduced.  In addition, agents with different reputations will 
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not be rewarded at the same levels.  Principals may have to pay high monitoring 
costs for agents with less or bad reputation because they are not certain that the 
agents will be able to make high profits; or such agents may utilise large resources 
from the firm.  As a result, rewards are decreased when monitoring costs increase.   
Another example is a relationship between managers as agents and bondholders as 
principals.  In this case, managers act on behalf of shareholders.  Managers and 
bondholders are bound by a debt contract.  In general, risk incurs immediately 
after lending.  To protect risk, bondholders can increase the interest rate or adjust 
the term of loans.  Risk occurs when bondholders feel that managers try to 
transfer wealth to shareholders, e.g. paying high dividends, or try to exploit assets 
in place and leave nothing to bondholders, e.g. selling property.  
 
Bonding costs 
One duty of managers as agents is that they should balance both shareholders’ and 
bondholders’ interests.  To do so, managers must set up schemes to show that they 
are acting for both interests.  Costs incurred from setting up this system are called 
bonding costs.  Bonding costs can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary, e.g. time and 
effort.  Bonding costs relate to costs of any actions set by agents to guarantee 
principals that they act in principals’ best interests.  The cost incurred from 
accounting information disclosure is an example of bonding costs.  Bonding costs 
are borne by agents.  Agents disclose financial information to show that decisions 
are made on behalf of principals’ interests.  If accounting information shows that 
managers maximise shareholders’ interests, shareholders are expected to reward 
managers.  Thus, agents not only bear bonding costs but also can receive benefits 
from the costs.  Agents incur bonding costs only when they find that these costs 
reduce the monitoring costs they bear.  They will stop incurring bonding costs 
when the net increment wealth which they generate equals the perquisites given 
up, or in other words when the marginal increase in the bonding costs equals the 
marginal reduction in the monitoring costs (Godfrey, Hodgson and Holmes 2000, 
pg.320).   
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Residual loss 
Although monitoring and bonding costs aim to mitigate agency problems, they 
cannot reduce agency costs to zero.  Residual loss occurs because the agency 
problems cannot be completely managed by the contract in every detail.  The left-
over costs from the attempt to diminish agency problems are the residual loss.  
For example, managers waste company’s resources in a way that shareholders 
may not agree with, e.g. lavishing electric power or other utilities; the contract 
probably does not include these concerns.   
 
3.2.5.2 Agency Problems and Accounting Quality  
The agency theory provides several ways to lessen agency costs.  First, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that if managers hold shares in a company, conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders will decline.  For an exaggerated 
example, if managers hold 100 per cent of shares in a company, this should reduce 
agency costs to zero, all else being constant.  To obtain a high percentage 
shareholding, managers may have to use all personal properties or borrow debt to 
acquire all shares.  Accordingly, even though managers can own all shares in a 
company, doing so is not costless, especially in a large company.  In terms of 
accounting quality, higher managerial ownership could reduce the quality of 
accounting information probably because of less demand from the market (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury 2008).  Rather than deterring the quality of accounting 
information, an alternative explanation is that accounting information of the firm 
with high managerial ownership should reflect the true value of the firm because 
of less pressure from the market and less conflict of interest.35 According to 
portfolio theory, risk or managers’ wealth is not diversified due to investing in 
only one company.  Crutchely and Hansen (1989) suggest that managers will 
require an increase in remunerations to compensate for poor diversification.  
Shareholders may want to hold a certain number of shares for economies of scale 
or reducing agency costs.  If shareholders want to hold a large number of shares to 
reduce agency costs, they would be confronted with poor diversification and high 
                                               
35 See Wang (2006) about the discussion of market demand and ownership structure. 
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costs.  Therefore, they may reduce shareholding size and accept some agency 
costs.  In some cases, managers do not hold shares in a company but they have a 
good relationship with shareholders.  Agency problems in this case may not be 
rigorous.  As a result, it is difficult to determine whether accounting quality varies 
positively or negatively with these agency problems. 
 
Second, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) suggest that debt 
financing can reduce over-investment.  Instead of wasting cash in non-profitable 
ways, a company with high free cash flow can finance more debt and use free 
cash flow to pay interest.  Therefore, rather than paying cash back to shareholders, 
managers are bound to pay creditors interest from debt financing.  One obvious 
benefit from debt financing is that interest expenses are a taxable deduction whilst 
dividends are not tax deductible.  An important function of shareholders is to 
monitor managers issuing more debt.  If managers issue more debt, agency 
problems between managers and shareholders can be reduced.  However, debt 
financing will probably raise agency problems between shareholders and 
bondholders instead.  In the case of debt borrowing, managers as agents act on 
behalf of shareholders.  The conflict of interests between shareholders and 
bondholders will also generate agency costs.  Shareholders may be more likely to 
invest in high risk projects or to dilute properties that will harm bondholders’ 
asset securities.  Shareholders can take any high risk projects because they have 
limited liabilities equal to the unpaid amount of shares held.  To manage the risk, 
bondholders may adjust contracts by increasing interest or making the term of 
loans shorter.  Another problem about the use of debt financing is that debt 
financing is associated with bankruptcy costs.  If a company generates high debt, 
there is potential for a company to go bankrupt.  For all these reasons, using debt 
financing to reduce agency costs is not costless.  In addition, it can be viewed that 
an agency cost of equity (managers and shareholders) is shifted to an agency cost 
of debt (shareholders and bondholders).  In terms of accounting quality, debt 
financing may require firms to disclose sufficient information.  In addition, 
bondholders may be able to access inside information better than outside 
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shareholders.  The demand from debt financing, thus, induces higher accounting 
quality.  On the other hand, firms may retain to disclose sufficient information 
requested by debt financing, i.e. in case of firms going bankrupt.       
 
To alleviate agency costs, Easterbrook (1984) suggests that paying higher cash 
dividend will reduce agency costs.  If a company has high profits and sufficient 
funds from operations, it can pay high cash dividends.  The opposite is also true in 
a company with low profits and insufficient funds.  If a company is not able to 
generate high profits but intends to pay high dividends, it must obtain funds from 
other sources, e.g. selling assets, borrowing or issuing new equities.  Crutchely 
and Hansen (1989) suggest an interesting view that paying high dividends can 
reduce agency costs because of the chance that a company will have to raise funds 
from external sources, by issuing more shares, increases.  When the number of 
shares increases, a company will be overseen by external organisations, e.g. stock 
exchange, banks, or large investors.  This watchdog would bring managers to act 
in line with shareholders.  Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995) document that 
according to Rozeff’s work, a company will try to reduce agency costs by a new 
set of costs, binding managers to act in the outside investors’ interests.  Dividend 
payment is considered as bonding cost.  This means that if managers are forced to 
employ external funds for the dividend payment, agency costs must be reduced 
and new information must be revealed to secure the new funding.  Easterbrook 
(1984) argues that dividend payment leads to third-party audit, e.g. the market or 
leverage buyout (Brealy, Myers and Allen 2005, pg.871), which motivates 
managers to reveal information and reduce agency costs.  One reason is that if 
companies have had dividend payment lower than the level expected from the 
market, other investors may force out managers by taking some action, e.g. taking 
over.  In addition, shareholders may bear the cost of external funds in relation to 
benefits they receive from dividend payment.  For instance, a company with 100 
per cent of equity in its capital structure should have a severe agency problem 
between managers and shareholders.  If the company changes the proportion of its 
capital structure by adding some debt, bondholders will take a role as principals 
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who could help shareholders.  However, shareholders bear the cost of issuing debt 
since the company must use some cash flow for interest payment rather than using 
it all in dividends. 
 
The “third party watchdog” plays an important role to mitigate agency costs.  
Firms’ insiders are forced by the market to provide useful information.  
Accounting disclosure is one means for firms’ insiders to communicate with the 
third party.  The requirement of accounting disclosure is based on the degree of 
agency costs.  The requirement of high quality of accounting disclosure is not 
costless.  For instance, if managers’ remunerations are tied up with firm 
performances, managers are more likely to report information to increase their 
benefits; high compensation to managers must be paid to obtain good quality of 
accounting disclosure.   
 
For above discussions, there are several factors influencing firms’ insiders to 
reveal useful information.  One of those factors is a corporate governance system.  
Even though a corporate governance system is not a direct tool used for financial 
statement preparation, the corporate governance system requires firms’ insiders to 
reveal a certain type of information to the public. Therefore, a strong corporate 
governance system is more likely to induce firms providing a good quality of 
accounting disclosure relative to a weak corporate governance system.  Existing 
evidence suggests that firm governance systems relate to accounting quality, 
among others Bushman et al. (2004), Beekes et al. (2004) and Lara, Osma and 
Penalva (2007).  
 
In conclusion, agency theory suggests that conflict of interest is a major factor, 
leading to agency problems or moral hazards.   Agency problems can be reduced 
by bearing some agency costs.  Agency costs are borne by agents or principals 
depending on the situation.  Several ways to reduce agency problems are costly, 
especially in large companies.  Accounting disclosure is another channel to 
alleviate agency costs.  Firm governance systems are essential to induce firms 
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providing a good quality of accounting information.  However, it is difficult to 
predict whether accounting quality through accounting information disclosure 
positively or negatively varies with the monitoring mechanism.     
 
All the above discussions have explained accounting theories and approaches 
relating to three perspectives of accounting quality, including earnings 
persistence, the value relevance of accounting information and the timeliness of 
earnings.  In addition, it explains the importance of book-tax differences and firm 
governance mechanism and its agency problems.  In addition to the descriptive 
explanations, the previous sections have explicated the model employed by the 
existing literature to examine accounting quality.  The next section will discuss 
the review from existing accounting research.  
 
3.3 Literature Review 
This part of the chapter presents reviews from existing literature.  The literature 
review is divided into five sections.  The first three sections present a summary of 
three earnings properties and discussion gathered from the literature review.  The 
next two sections summarise the literature about book-tax differences and firm 
governance relating to those three properties of earnings.  It should be noted that 
the conventional statistic level, if any, through the literature review, is 
acknowledged unless specified. 
 
3.3.1 Prior Study of Earnings Persistence 
A time series property of earnings 
Dichev and Tang (2009) investigate the association between earnings volatility 
and earnings predictability.  Earnings predictability is estimated through a time 
series property of earnings, indicating that more earnings persistence, the higher 
earnings predictability.  They hypothesise that earnings volatility is negatively 
associated with earnings predictability.  They construct deciles rank of firms 
according to the volatility of earnings, accruals, earnings, and the volatility of 
cash flows.  Then, deciles 1 and 10 form quintile 5 (extreme volatility), deciles 2 
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and 9 form quintile 4, and so on.  By using a random walk model, findings report 
that the earnings persistence is lower for quintile 5 and higher for quintile 1, 
supporting the hypothesis.  They also estimate the earnings persistence and 
earnings volatility over a long horizon period of time.  Findings suggest that the 
persistence coefficient of earnings is deteriorated over the 5-year prediction 
horizon.  In addition, the quicker deterioration of earnings persistence is observed 
over the 5-year prediction horizon for the highest earnings volatility firms relative 
to the lowest earnings volatility firms.      
 
Sloan (1996) argues that a random walk model that regresses current earnings on 
past earnings weights cash flows and accruals component in earnings attributes 
equally.  Thus, earnings are decomposed to cash flows and accruals in a random 
walk model to investigate the predictability of cash flows and accruals on future 
earnings.  By regressing future earnings on current cash flows and accruals, 
findings suggest that the persistence of earnings attributable to the accrual is 
smaller than the persistence of earnings performance attributable to the cash flow.  
In his research, further investigation is to determine whether the different 
properties of the accruals and cash flows components of earnings are captured in 
the stock price.  By using Mishkin method, the market prices the accrual higher 
than the cash flow whilst the persistence of earnings performance attributable to 
the accrual is lower than the persistence of earnings performance attributable to 
the cash flow.  The author concludes that the market fails to anticipate the higher 
(lower) persistence of earnings performance attributable to the cash flow (accrual) 
until that information affects future earnings.   
 
Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2003) extend Sloan’s work by investigating 
whether the lower persistence of accruals is driven from the profitability or 
growth in accruals.  They propose that ‘growth’ is a factor inducing the lower 
persistence in accruals.  They argue that “diminishing marginal returns on 
investments arise when firms exploit their most profitable investment 
opportunities before undertaking less profitable investments.  Alternatively, 
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increasing marginal returns on divestment arise when firms divest their least 
profitable investments.”  Both scenarios refer to diminishing marginal returns.  
They suggest that based on diminishing marginal returns and conservative 
accounting, firms investing more in net operating assets during year t will 
experience lower one-year-ahead ROA relative to other firms, ceteris paribus 
(Fairfield et al. 2003).  They regress one-year-ahead ROA on the one-year growth 
in net operating assets (GrNOA) and current ROA.  By using the dataset 30-year 
period, they find that the relationship between one-year-ahead ROA and GrNOA 
is significantly negative, suggesting that accounting conservatism and diminishing 
marginal returns deteriorate the one-year-ahead ROA on the new investment.  
However, comparing between current and long-term net operating asset growth, 
they predict that accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets have 
equivalent incremental relations with one-year future ROA after controlling for 
current ROA.  They regress the one-year-ahead ROA on the one-year long-term 
net operating asset growth (GrLTNOA), accruals and current ROA.  Their 
findings support theirs prediction that the negative relationship between 
GrLTNOA and the one-year-ahead ROA and the negative relationship between 
accruals and the one-year-ahead ROA are found and they are not statistically 
different. 
 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2006) argue that other than growth 
component as proposed by Fairfield et al. (2003), accrual estimation error 
(accounting distortion) is an important factor inducing the lower persistence of 
accruals.  They decompose accruals into ‘growth’ and other (or so-called 
efficiency distortions).  They regress the one-year-ahead ROA on accruals and 
current ROA.  Consistent with Sloan (1996) and Fairfield et al. (2003), the 
relationship between the one-year-ahead ROA and accruals is significantly 
negative.  They decompose accruals to sales growth, changes in efficiency 
(changes in net operating asset turnover ratio divided by net operating asset 
turnover ratio) and the interaction between sales growth and changes in efficiency 
(sales growth multiplied by change in efficiency).  They find that the relationship 
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between growth and the one-year-ahead ROA is negative.  Also, the relationship 
between efficiency and the one-year-ahead ROA is negative.  However, the 
negative coefficient of efficiency component is larger than the negative coefficient 
of growth component.  Another work by Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna 
(2005) suggests that less reliable of accruals leads to low persistence of accruals.  
They decompose accruals into different categories, including total accruals, 
change in working capital, change in current operating assets, change in current 
operating liabilities, change in non-current operating assets, change in non-current 
operating liabilities, change in financial assets, change in financial liabilities, 
change in short term investments, and change in long term investments.  They 
regress the one-year-ahead ROA on accruals and accrual components and suggest 
that the low reliability of accruals induces the low persistence of accruals.     
 
Dechow, Richardson and Sloan (2008) examine the persistence of earnings 
performance attributable to cash flows, extending the work of Sloan (1996).  The 
cash component of earnings is decomposed to changes in the annual cash and 
short-term investment balance, net cash distributions to equity holders (dividends 
and repurchases less equity issuances), net non-interest cash distributions to debt 
holders (debt repayments less debt issuances) and the sum of net cash 
distributions to shareholders and net non-interest cash distributions to debt 
holders.  Their findings are consistent with the results reported by Sloan (1996) 
that the persistence of earnings performance attributable to accruals is smaller 
than the persistence of earnings performance attributable to free cash flows.  In 
addition, the persistence of the sum of net cash distributions to shareholders and 
net non-interest cash distributions to debt holders is larger than the persistence of 
changes in annual cash and short-term investment balance.  As predicted by the 
authors, the persistence of net cash distributions to equity holders is larger than 
the persistence of net non-interest cash distributions to debt holders.  This is 
consistent with a priori expectation that firms are more likely to maintain cash 
distributions to equity holders unless there is a persistence in future cash flows, 
then cash distributions to equity holders will be increased.   
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Earnings persistence and fundamental analysis 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) investigate whether changes in fundamental 
information induce subsequent changes in earnings information.  They regress 
future earnings changes on current earnings changes and fundamental signals.  
They employ fundamental signals based on the work of Lev and Thiagarajan 
(1993).  Fundamental signals are based on change information, including 
inventory, accounts receivable, capital expenditure, gross margin, selling and 
administrative expenses, provision for doubtful receivables, effective tax rate, 
earnings quality (measured by LIFO or FIFO), audit qualification (measured by 
qualified and unqualified audit) and labour force (measured by the ratio of sales 
divided by a number of employees).  The increase in inventory and accounts 
receivable is realised as ‘bad news’ because of difficulties in generating sales, 
inducing the negative relationship between firm values and inventory and 
accounts receivable changes.  A negative relation with returns is expected for 
changes in capital expenditures.  Firm values are negatively related to the decrease 
in the gross margin, the effective tax rate, labour force and the increase in 
administrative costs.  LIFO inventory method is viewed as a positive signal 
because the authors state that relative to FIFO earnings, LIFO earnings are more 
sustainable or closer to economic earnings.  Their findings support a priori 
expectations, suggesting that fundamental information affects earnings property.         
 
Earnings persistence and economic determinants 
An earlier research about the association between economic determinants and 
earnings persistence was performed by Lev (1983).  Lev (1983) investigates a 
time series property of earnings conditional on economic determinants.  The 
research regresses earnings persistence on economic factors as driving forces for 
change.  Economic determinants include product type, competition, firm size, and 
capital intensity.  Product type is divided to durables vs. non-durables and 
services, measured by different industries.  Since the consumption pattern of non-
durables and services is relatively stable compared to durables.  Earnings 
persistence, therefore, is more pronounced for non-durables and services relative 
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to durables.  Barriers-to-entry is used to determine the competition.  Barriers-to-
entry are defined as ‘a cost of producing.’  As noted by the author, existing firms 
are likely to charge prices close to marginal costs to deter further entry.  For 
example, high barriers-to-entry industries consist of crude petroleum, brewers, 
distillers, etc.  Low barriers-to-entry industries consist of mining, construction, 
meat packers, dairy products, etc.  Earnings persistence is more pronounced for 
monopolist firms relative to competitive firms because of the instability of the 
industrial structure and price wars in competitive firms.  Firm size is employed to 
determine firm growth.  Large firms tend to have low growth rate relative to small 
firms, inducing more stability in profitability through time.  Therefore, earnings 
persistence is more pronounced for large firms relative to small firms.  Capital 
intensity is the ratio of depreciation divided by fixed capital charges (i.e. interest 
expenses) to sales.  Smoother earnings series of low capital intensive firms is 
expected relative to high capital intensive firms.  This study uses three different 
earnings for earning persistence estimation, including change in earnings, change 
in return on equity, and change in sales.  Findings reveal that earnings persistence 
is associated with the economic determinant as expected.    
 
Baginski et al. (1999) investigate the relationship between earnings persistence 
and economic determinants for 162 firms with complete data during the period 
1967–1990.  They use five different orders of autoregressive and moving-average 
model to measure persistence coefficients by regressing future earnings on current 
earnings.  Then the obtained coefficient is regressed on economic determinants.  
They propose that earnings persistence is positively related to firm size and 
barriers-to-entry but negatively related to product type and capital intensity.  
Findings support their hypothesis except for firm size.       
 
Freeman et al. (1982) investigate the predictability of book rate of return (the ratio 
of net earnings divided by shareholders’ equity) in future earnings.  They 
hypothesise that book rate of return is a mean reverting process and changes in 
book rate of return correlate with changes in earnings.  The low (high) book rate 
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of return implies that earnings are temporarily depressed (unusually good).  They 
estimate 30 individual firms (time-series) and pooled data during the period 1946–
1977.  Findings support their hypothesis.     
 
Discussion of earnings persistence 
From prior studies, it appears that the persistence of earnings is an important 
property.  Researchers have attempted to identify the determinant of earnings 
persistence by using fundamental analysis, a time-series approach or economic 
determinants.  Although the persistence of earnings induces a predictability of 
earnings, the persistence of earnings is sensitive to earnings manipulation, i.e. 
smoothing earnings.  It is rather difficult to identify whether firms tend to smooth 
theirs earnings or earnings are persistent.  One important point about the study of 
earnings persistence is researchers have attempted to search for the determinant of 
earnings persistence.  Earnings information is not only investigated at the 
integrated level, i.e. annual earnings, but also decomposed to earnings 
components, i.e. cash flow and accruals.  These attempts are to identify factors 
inducing the persistence of earnings information.  It should be noted that even 
though accruals mitigate noise in cash flows (Ball and Shivakumar 2005b), prior 
research finds that the persistence of earnings performance attributable to accruals 
is lower than the persistence of earnings performance attributable to cash flows.  
In summary, at least two criterions can be raised from the study of earnings 
persistence.  The first is about the method used to identify the persistence of 
earnings, i.e. by using the statistical approach or by searching for the determinant 
inducing earnings persistence.  The second is about the subject of the study, i.e. 
aggregated earnings information (annual/quarterly earnings), deflated earnings 
information (book rate of return) or the earnings component (cash flow and 
accruals).   
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3.3.2 Prior Study of the Value Relevance Analysis 
The value relevance analysis uses financial data to determine the market value of 
the firm.  There is a question as to whether or not the information set provided by 
financial statements is useful, as it is generally known that forecast data are far 
more complex beyond the ability of current GAAP to hold.  In general, share price 
reflects a richer data set than accounting numbers.  For example, share price 
reflects future profit of the firm while earnings account for only historical data in 
accordance with accrual basis.  Thus, there is delay reflecting on earnings.  
Kothari (2001, pg.172) suggests that “unless current accounting rules are 
changed dramatically, it is unlikely that financial statements in themselves will be 
particularly useful or accurate indicators of market value.”  “Change” in this 
statement might be the change in financial reporting concepts.  For instance, 
financial reporting guidelines had changed revenue recognition from matching 
concept to the other concept that could have captured any effect as much as the 
market value does.  In another interpretation, it might be the change in accounting 
guidelines as a whole.  For example, the adoption of new accounting standards 
can change several existing accounting treatments to reflect and capture more 
information than the past.  A growing empirical research papers when accounting 
policy has been reformed should support this Kothari’s statement.  Generally 
speaking, new accounting standards should provide more useful information 
and/or more accuracy than previous standards.  Most empirical papers have 
employed the fundamental analysis through price and/or return model in their 
analysis to explore this conjecture.  This section summarises empirical papers 
about the value relevance of accounting information in terms of accounting policy 
or financial environment changes in many countries and other related empirical 
studies that implement the firm valuation process in their studies.   
 
Accounting Changes Across Countries 
China 
Chinese stock markets, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
have traded both A-share and B-share; A-share is traded by domestic investors 
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while B-share is opened for foreign investors to hold Chinese shares.  Chinese 
firms with B-share issues are required to present their financial reporting 
according to IAS guidelines, while this regulation is not applied to A-share-only 
firms.  Chen, Chen and Su (2001) studied the value relevance of accounting 
information in Chinese firms where both IAS- and Chinese GAAP-based vs. 
Chinese GAAP-only financial reporting was mandated.  By including all 
companies from both stock exchanges during the period 1991–1998, there were 
428 firms representing 2,976 firm-year observations.  They employed both price 
and return regressions to estimate the association between share prices and 
accounting measures, book value and earnings.  The study subdivided the data set 
according to positive/negative earnings, size, earnings persistence (through 
changes in and high vs. low earnings) and liquidity of shares and included 
interaction effects with dummy variable in the regressions rather than running the 
regressions twice in each subgroup.  Overall, their results reported that book value 
and earnings were value-relevant with the explanatory power ranging from 10 to 
61 per cent from before-1995 to 1998.  The market weighted higher value to A-
share financial reporting than A- and B-share financial reporting.  In addition, the 
usefulness of accounting numbers in each subgroup was obtained as expected.  
For instance, the value relevance of earnings was found in positive earnings firms; 
the opposite was also true for loss-making firms.  This thesis considers that an 
additional examination could be performed in their study, i.e. stock exchange 
effect as to the difference in general characteristic of stock exchanges (as stated by 
the authors that different currency is used in two stock exchanges).   
 
Bao and Chow (1999) also estimated the usefulness of book value and earnings in 
B-share firms by regressing B-share price on book value and earnings prepared 
according to Chinese GAAP and IAS separately.  Their results reported that book 
value and earnings prepared according to IAS were value relevant greater than 
those prepared according to Chinese GAAP.  The study of Bao and Chow (1999) 
and Chen et al. (2001) is identical.  However, the later work used A-share price 
data while Bao and Chow (1999) employed B-share price data as dependent 
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variable.  Bao and Chow (1999) reported stronger relation between B-share price 
and IAS-based accounting measures while Chen et al.’s (2001) results of the 
relation between A-share price and IAS-based accounting measures were not 
strongly pronounced.   
 
This thesis considers that the inconsistent findings between two are not surprising 
because foreign investors in B-share price have used IAS-based information, 
therefore higher association should be found comparing the association between 
A-share price and IAS-based information, that domestic investors have not used 
IAS-based information.  This thesis also interprets from these two papers that it is 
crucial that financial reporting users select what information fits their purposes.  
Thus, one essential inference from the papers is that standard settings have to 
think about the group of financial reporting users who are directly affected by 
financial reporting before developing accounting standards. 
 
Rather than using the price model, Haw, Qi and Wu (1999) defined that annual 
share return is a function of changes in annual earnings.  Based on their 1,158 A-
share Chinese firms from both stock exchanges for the period 1994–1997, 
findings showed that earnings were value-relevant for domestic investors.  They 
also estimated a short window period by defining that three-day market-adjusted 
returns around earnings announcements are a function of changes in annual 
earnings.  The result also reported that earnings were value-relevant.  This study, 
however, estimated stock exchange and industry effects and found that the results 
remained unchanged.         
 
In 1998, China had used historical cost method (HCM) for all assets and lower 
cost or market value method (LCM) for a specific class of assets, but A-share 
firms could voluntarily use LCM.  However, since 2000, LCM has been applied 
for all firms and assets.  Yang, Rohrbach and Chen (2005) thus estimated the 
value relevance and reliability of accounting information in terms of LCM 
adoption in China.  The study included all Chinese firms in their data set, making 
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a total of 320 (balanced panel) firms during the period 1998 to 2001.  The study 
applied both a balance sheet approach and an income statement approach in the 
examination.  The balance sheet approach uses book value as independent 
variable regressing on market value of the firm and the income statement 
approach is firm earnings regressing on share returns.   
 
This study not only estimated the value relevance after the adoption of LCM but 
also examined the reliability of accounting measures.  The reliability was 
performed by assuming that reliable accounting measures led to smaller errors in 
the valuation model; the smaller residuals resulted in a more appropriated model 
that was evidenced by the better explanatory power of the model.  This study 
finally compared the explanatory power by applying J test and Cox test.  Both the 
balance sheet and income statement approach evidenced that LCM was not high 
value-relevant in 2001 (10.5 and 11.5 per cent, respectively) compared to that in 
1998 (15.1 per cent and 14.9 per cent, respectively).  In addition, the coefficient 
estimates of the proxy of LCM/HCM differences reported the strongest impact on 
firm values, in 1998, of the voluntary use of LCM, meaning that LCM was more 
value-relevant when firms selected this method.  The results also reported the 
decrease in reliability of using LCM.   
 
In sum, contrary to the authors’ view, the results did not show strong 
improvement of quality in using LCM for Chinese firms.  The confounding results 
could be noise in data as claimed by the authors.  This thesis considers that the 
study does not argue when LCM was coming into force for all firms; the decrease 
in value relevance could come from a reason that no comparison (between LCM 
and HCM firms) can be made by financial reporting users.  In other words, when 
all firms are using the similar accounting method, information users cannot 
distinguish the quality of accounting information between one firm and another.             
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Czech Republic 
Hellström (2006) examined the validity of the value relevance methodology by 
investigating economic transition in the Czech Republic during the period 1994 to 
2001 when the Accounting Act in Czech Republic was amended in January 1998.  
The study designed its research method by comparing results with the value-
relevance benchmark.  The author selected Swedish firms as a value-relevance 
benchmark because of a relatively similar in general characteristics, i.e. 
population and German- and French-influenced accounting system, between two 
countries.  Balanced panel data consisting of 72 non-financial Czech firms were 
grouped by two periods before (1994–1997) and after (1998–2001) the year of the 
Accounting Act amendment, i.e. 1998.  Each group was compared to the 
benchmark that was also separated according to those periods.   
 
To examine the validation of value relevance models, the study employed four 
different such models, including price model, return model, log regression model, 
and hedge portfolio model.36 Results were obtained by R2 comparison in each 
period and revealed that the value relevance of accounting information was 
increased after the Accounting Act amendment. R2 increased by ranging from 2–
12 per cent after the use of the new Accounting Act in 1998.  However, in price 
model, earnings had lost their value relevance by decreasing from 3.36 to 2.43 
while book value had increased its value relevance from 0.19 to 0.32.  This study 
rather differs from other accounting reform studies because the benchmark is 
added, leading to the question of whether or not the benchmark is essential, and 
choosing a benchmark is crucial.  In addition, the sample size is rather small so 
that the study does not report if the sample size can be generalised for the Prague 
Stock Exchange. 
 
Germany 
Jermakowicz, Prather-Kinsey and Wulf (2007) investigate the value relevance of 
accounting information in German firms when adopting IFRS or US GAAP for 
                                               
36 Log regression model is a logarithm price model and hedge portfolio model is earnings return in 
short and long-term periods. 
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the financial reporting process.  They employ DAX-30 companies for this 
investigation.  Based on their questionnaire survey, even though IFRS will be 
fully implemented for consolidated financial statement for German firms in 2005, 
many DAX-30 companies converge to IFRS or US GAAP before 2005, i.e. 10 per 
cent of these firms employ German GAAP in 1997 but the percentage of using 
IFRS or US GAAP increases to 63 per cent in 2004.  This suggests that DAX-30 
companies converge to IFRS or US GAAP in different periods of time before 
IFRS will be in force for all firms.  They employ the firm valuation model to 
determine the value relevance of accounting information by comparing before and 
after IFRS or US GAAP adoption.  Their findings suggest that during the period 
1995–2004, the value relevance of earnings and book value information 
substantially improves from 1.2% to 66.5% after IFRS or US GAAP adoption in 
DAX-30 companies.  They further examine the determinant of IFRS or US GAAP 
adoption in the firm.  They set that the adoption is a function of firm performance, 
size, leverage, ADR listing and an increase in share value during the year.  Their 
results suggest that the adoption is related to leverage, firm size and ADR listing.          
 
Poland 
In Poland, the Accounting Act has been amended in 1990, 1994 and 2000.  The 
study, performed by Gornik-Tomaszewski and Jermakowicz (2001), investigated 
a relation between accounting information and market value during the period 
1996–1998 in Polish firms.  By using balanced panel data, 77 firms taken from all 
industries were included and examined.  The study partitioned the data according 
to industry sector, performance (reported profit) and size (trading board).  Results 
showed adjusted R2 ranging from 60 to 70 per cent, leading to the conclusion that 
there was a relation between share price and accounting information, earnings and 
lagged book values.  In addition, book value provided higher incremental value 
relevance than did earnings, 20 and 11 per cent respectively.   
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South Africa and Mexico 
Prather-Kinsey (2006) proposed good motivation in its research whether or not 
developed-country accounting standards are appropriated for developing 
countries.  This study investigated the value relevance of accounting information 
for South Africa and Mexico.   In South Africa, its accounting policy has adopted 
eleven IAS during the period 1998 to 2000.  The study used 262 firm-year 
observations of all industry sectors in 1998 and 2000 and developed regression 
model that market capitalisation is a function of book value and earnings, that all 
variables were weighted by book value.  The explanatory power in 1998 (93 per 
cent) was higher than in 2000 (79 per cent), meaning that IAS convergence in 
South Africa did not increase but decreased value relevance in IAS-converged 
accounting information.  
 
For Mexico, IAS and US GAAP were adopted during the period 1998–2000.  By 
using the above regression, results revealed that the explanatory power increased 
by 14 per cent from 1998 (71 per cent) and 2000 (85 per cent) in 164 firm-year 
observations.  However, the study applied an additional test to compare adjusted 
R2 by using the Vuong test.  The obtained result showed no statistically significant 
difference in the adjusted R2 between 1998 and 2000.   
 
These findings should encourage accounting standard setters to understand the 
characteristics of countries who are likely to adopt IAS for financial reporting in 
their own country.  In addition, as argued by Holthausen and Watts (2001), 
valuation analysis is unlikely to be useful for standard settings. This thesis 
considers that the study of accounting information value-relevance in South 
Africa and Mexico can respond to their opinion in this regard. 
 
Spain 
Giner and Rees (1999) examined the effect of the Spanish accounting reform to 
investigate whether the quality of accounting information increased.  In 1990, 
“true and fair view” was added to the Spanish accounting system.  They examined 
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735 non-financial Spanish firm-year observations during the period 1986–1995 by 
using price model.  They enhanced the model by incorporating dummy variable 
and dividend policy to examine the interaction-effect during the reform.  Their 
results showed the slight improvement of explanatory power following accounting 
reforms.  In addition, earnings suffered from the decrease in their value relevance 
after the reform (i.e. from 6.33 to 3.72 and incremental value decreased from 15.8 
per cent during the period 1986–1989 to 10 per cent during the period 1990–1995) 
while book value gained higher value relevance (i.e. from 0.18 to 0.72 and 
incremental value increased from 0.9 per cent during the period 1986–1989 to 
11.2 per cent during the period 1990–1995).  This study added other information, 
dividend policy, in the price model and found that dividend policy had higher 
value relevance compared to book values and earnings with the slope coefficient 
ranging from 10 to 14.  Naceur and Goaied (2004) also found more pronounced of 
dividend policy in the valuation process in Tunisia.   
 
Tunisia 
Tunisia is another country that has reformed its accounting and financial market.  
Naceur and Goaied (2004) documented that there have been several accounting 
and financial market reforms in Tunisia since 1989.  Although there were many 
changes in accounting and financial markets, the study examined whether value 
relevance of earnings, book values, dividend policy, debt and capital expenditure 
was improved in general rather than investigating the effect of those changes.  By 
using unbalanced panel data of 30 firms (239 firm-year observations) from all 
industry sectors during the period 1984–1997, they estimated the value relevance 
by hypothesising that share price is a function of book values and earnings.  In 
their enhanced model, they incorporated dividend policy, debt and investment 
(proxy by capital expenditure) as regressors in the model.  The data were also 
subgrouped by market capitalisation and return on equity.  Their findings reported 
that accounting information through book values, earnings and dividends was 
value-relevant.  The slope coefficient of earnings (1.37) was more highly 
pronounced than that of book values (0.157) but dividend policy provided 
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strongest impact on the market value with its slope coefficient 17.55.  This 
dividend policy mispricing found by this study is consistent with Rees’ findings 
that a statistically significant mispricing on dividend policy can be observed in the 
UK market (Rees, 1997).  
 
Barth et al. (2008) estimate whether accounting quality has been improved in 21 
countries that adopt IFRS.  They compare accounting quality between firms 
employ IFRS and firms do not employ IFRS (matched firms) in the same country 
and year during 1994 – 2003, comprising 1,895 firm-year observations for 327 
firms.  A priori prediction is that the accounting quality for IFRS firms is better 
than the accounting quality for non-IFRS firms.  For the value relevance, at first 
stage, they regress share price on industry and country fixed-effect indicator 
variables.  This stage should mitigate the potential problem about the variation in 
industry– and country–specific effects.  Then, they use the residual from the first 
stage as dependent variable.  They regress the residual on book value and net 
income per share.  As expected, the explanatory power (R2) of IFRS firms 
(0.4010) is greater than R2 of non-IFRS firms (0.3016) during IFRS post-adoption 
periods.  The explanatory power of IFRS and non-IFRS firms is not statistically 
different during IFRS pre-adoption periods.  For only IFRS firms, the value 
relevance during IFRS post-adoption periods (0.4010) is greater than IFRS pre-
adoption periods (0.2820). 
 
Impact of Market Environments on the Value Relevance of Accounting 
Information 
Bartov et al. (2001a) investigated the information content of earnings and cash 
flow and estimated whether the usefulness of earnings and cash flow is universal.  
The problem was built on the different characteristics of economic and financial 
markets between Anglo-Saxon countries, including in their study the US, the UK 
and Canada, and non-Anglo-Saxon countries, including Germany and Japan that 
were used in their samples.  The financial market in Anglo-Saxon countries 
weights heavily on the capital market investment or market-oriented countries 
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while creditors, i.e. banks, play a major role in driving the economy for non-
Anglo-Saxon countries.  In addition, taxation systems and stakeholders in those 
countries are also varied.  These various characteristics could result in different 
accounting measures, i.e. the opportunistic use of earnings.  The study selected 
manufacturing and distribution industry firms during the period 1987–1996 from 
those countries, consisting of 710 firms (3,950 firm-year observations) in total.  
By using return regression and comparing the explanatory power by the Vuong 
test, they reported a superior value relevance of earnings over cash flow for the 
US, the UK and Canada but not for Germany and Japan.  However, incremental 
value relevance of earnings was obtained in all countries; cash flow incremental 
value-relevance was observed in all countries except Canada.  These results 
concluded that earnings had no superior value relevance compared to cash flow 
although many empirical research papers found higher importance of accrual 
earnings than cash flow.   
 
Relatively similar to the work of Bartov et al. (2001a), Arce and Mora (2002) 
estimated the value relevance of earnings and book value across European 
countries, including UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland and Spain.  Other than investigating the difference of value relevance 
of accounting information across countries, this study tended to examine whether 
the value relevance of underlying accounting numbers was different between 
market-oriented (UK and the Netherlands) and creditor-oriented countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Spain).  With their price level 
valuation model, they estimated the incremental value relevance and compared the 
explanatory power examined by the Vuong test.  The result from their data set, 
including 22,436 non-financial firm-year observations of those countries 
altogether during the period 1990–1998, did not support the hypothesis that there 
was difference in value relevance of accounting information between common 
law and code law countries.  The value relevance of book value and earnings 
could be observed in Belgium, France and the Netherlands with about 10 to 14 per 
cent of explanatory power.  The value relevance of those accounting numbers was 
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very low, in particular Germany, at 0.5 per cent.  In addition, overall book value 
and earnings provided incremental value-relevant, giving additional information 
to the market.   
 
However, the usefulness of accounting measures, in particular accounting income, 
in Arce and Mora (2002) was very low for the UK (0.8 per cent) and Germany 
(zero per cent) compared to the results (12-16 per cent and 3-4 per cent for the UK 
and Germany, respectively) reported by Bartov et al. (2001a).  These studies 
derived a similar conclusion about lower value relevance in non-Anglo-Saxon 
countries compared to Anglo-Saxon countries.  Nevertheless, this thesis considers 
different findings possibly resulting from: i) price vs. return model may yield 
different results due to larger noise in price data; and ii) there might be industry 
specific effect as shown in the work of Ballas and Hevas (2005) because Bartov et 
al. (2001a) estimated only two sectors while the other study investigated all 
industry sectors. 
   
The above research papers have investigated the value relevance of accounting 
information in cross-country or cross-industry effects.  The following two papers 
that will be discussed next are examining the accounting information value-
relevant when dramatic changes in the economy.  The research papers include 
Graham et al. (2000) and Davis-Friday (2006). 
 
Graham et al. (2000) and Davis-Friday et al. (2006) have studied accounting 
information quality in terms of the value relevance in Asian countries, including 
Thailand.  The first research paper by Graham et al. (2000), to the best of my 
knowledge, is the first paper that straightforwardly tests accounting numbers in 
Thailand.  Graham et al. (2000) estimated whether Thai accounting information 
was value relevant during the 1997 financial crisis, forcing the Thai government 
to devalue its currency.  By examining a Thai quarterly data set from 1992 to the 
first quarter of 1998, they reported both relative and incremental value relevance.  
The study employed quarterly data of accounting earnings and book value which 
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the authors claimed were more volatile than fiscal year-ended data because of 
non-audited vs. audited data.  With reference to price regression, their findings 
reported that share prices can be explained by both book value and accounting 
earnings, although investors put a slightly higher weight to book value (9 per cent) 
than accounting earnings (5 per cent).   
 
The study also focused its investigation on four quarters before and after July 
1997, the period of economic turmoil in Thailand.  Results reported significant 
changes in accounting earnings’ value-relevance in general; the explanatory 
power of earnings decreased from 39 to 16 per cent after the 1997 financial crisis.  
Earning value-relevance was relatively volatile (decreasing 23 per cent) compared 
to book value value-relevance (decreasing 5 per cent).  The authors argued that 
the market expected negative earnings were not continued due to the sign of 
earnings coefficient estimated shift from positive (i.e. 7.02) to negative (i.e. -0.16) 
after the crisis.37  The study also separated the test according to profit- and loss- 
firms before and after the crisis. 
 
However, the study by Graham et al. (2001) did not explain about the intercept 
terms.  Both book value and earnings had less explanatory power to capture share 
price in accordance with the larger intercept term. The intercept term coefficient 
was -5.68 (p-value = 0.2915) before and 10.76 after the crisis while the coefficient 
estimates of book value were 0.93 and 0.84, and those of earnings were 7.02 and –
0.16 before and after the crisis, respectively.  This implies that before the crisis, 
the market relied heavily on individual accounting numbers but after the crisis 
accounting numbers had very much less important roles, as shown on a very 
larger intercept term compared to the past, especially in profit-firms.  But, for 
loss-firms the intercept term was changed from 9.36 to -0.25 (p-value = 0.9628), 
                                               
37 According to Graham et al. (2001), Ohlson model suggests that earnings have value relevance 
according to abnormal return.  For the case of negative earnings, positive signs of the coefficient 
estimate of earning should be obtained before and after the crisis, meaning that the market expects 
that negative earnings are persistence.  Therefore, the sign of valuation coefficient was changed 
from positive to negative before and after the crisis, respectively, implying that negative earnings 
should reverse back to positive earnings after the financial crisis.    
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implying that accounting numbers play an important role after the crisis, i.e. 
investors probably pay attention to liquidity values in negative-earnings firms 
(Graham et al. 2000).  
 
A recent study of Thailand accounting information value-relevance by Davis-
Friday et al. (2006) revealed that the value relevance of book value increased 
while that of earnings decreased between 1996 and 1997.  Their findings are 
consistent with those of Graham et al. (2000).  Barth et al. (1998, quoted in Davis-
Friday et al. 2006) suggested that during the economic downturn, the value 
relevance of book value increases while that of earnings decreases.  These 
findings imply that Thai accounting measures reflect economic consequences, 
especially during the economic deterioration and are supported by the suggestion 
of prior research.  In their study, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) categorised Thailand 
as an IAS-based accounting system and Korea is only one from the other three 
Asian countries in the analysis, including Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, 
where its accounting system is based on tax law.  On the other hand, Ball et al. 
(2003) argued that Thailand is one of the countries where the accounting system 
relies on tax laws.  This disagreement raises an issue of whether the accounting 
regime in Thailand is based on IAS or tax laws.  The review of related literature 
with regard to accounting regime in Thailand will be discussed in the next section 
as this thesis takes the transition of accounting regime to another account that it is 
conceptually different from the value relevance study of accounting information.      
 
The Importance of Other Information in Firm Valuations: Other Implications of 
the Value Relevance Analysis 
As aforementioned, not only accounting measures but also other information is 
reflected on firm values according to the assumption proposed by Ohlson (1995).  
In the earlier sections, accounting changes and market environment effects are 
explored.  This section documents the importance of other information observed 
by empirical studies in terms of the valuation analysis. 
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Firm specific attributes 
Martinez (2003) investigated whether firm-specific attributes, including size, debt 
and life cycle (measured by market-to-book value), were reflected on firm share 
prices by testing the French data set of 918 firm-years observations during the 
period 1994–2001.  The study used share returns as dependent variables and 
accounting numbers as independent variables, including earnings and cash flow.  
In addition, the study adopted the quadratic model by incorporating non-linear 
information as independent variables.  It partitioned the data according to the 
degree of total assets, leverage and market-to-book.  Findings revealed that size, 
debt and maturity/growth significantly affected the firm valuation process, and 
cash flow did not provide additional information beyond earnings.  Additionally, 
non-linear specifications increased the explanatory power of accounting measures.         
 
Rather similar to Martinez (2003) in terms of estimating specific-effects, Ballas 
and Hevas (2005) use in-depth knowledge of economic environment (other than 
accounting information) concerning the reported numbers.  Contributing to prior 
research papers that examined national difference effects on accounting 
information, they investigated micro feature attributes to provide a better 
understanding of specific features affecting the firm valuation process.  The tested 
attributes were regulation and industry effects on the usefulness of earnings and 
book value across European countries, including France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK during the period 1995–2003, including the total of 5,957 
firm-year observations with seven different industries.  They employed price 
regression to determine the association between market value of the firm and 
accounting measures, abnormal income and book value.  By partitioning the data 
set in accordance with specific characteristics, including cross-country and cross-
industry differences, their findings reported the importance of industry differences 
that impacted on earnings and book value.  By constituting the current abnormal 
return as a function of previous abnormal return, they found statistically 
significant earnings persistence in all countries and industries.  In addition, they 
revealed that lagged book value was significantly associated with the current book 
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value.  In their study, they predicted market valued by estimating forecasting 
errors in accordance with industry and country effects.  They included accrual 
effect (net income less operating cash flow) to the price model as other 
information and the result showed an improvement of the explanatory power from 
66 to 70 per cent and 70 to 72 per cent for cross-country and cross-industry data 
sets, respectively.  In addition, the prediction errors were smaller with reference to 
industry.  This implies that industry effect is essential for the value relevance 
analysis in terms of prediction process.     
 
Other research which uses knowledge of economic surroundings (other than 
accounting information) concerning the reported number is the work of Ely and 
Pownall (2002).  Ely and Pownall (2002) studied accounting information quality 
in terms of value-relevance for Japanese firms who are and who are not cross-
listed in the US to determine the effect of stakeholder-related incentive.  The 
Japanese financial market, like other markets in code law countries, depends 
heavily on the bank and creditor system rather than the shareholder system.  The 
authors expected a stronger relation between share price and accounting numbers, 
book value and earnings, in cross-listed firms than non-cross-listed firms because 
the shareholder- or market-oriented environment focuses primarily on firms’ 
performance more than the creditor-oriented system.   
 
The authors matched cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms by using 
industry and revenue.  They analysed and provided insightful descriptive 
characteristics of two different types of these firms, i.e. ownership concentration, 
bank’s roles and the role of foreign institute.  By selecting 23 cross-listed firms 
coupled with 23 matched firms from 1988 to 1996, they reported from price and 
deflated price regressions that the value relevance of earnings and book value was 
higher in cross-listed firms.  In addition, their findings revealed a smaller intercept 
term of non-cross-listed firms, interpreting that earnings and book value in non-
cross-listed firms did not play an important role in explaining share price when 
compared to those in cross-listed firms. 
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This study applies the use of industry and macroeconomic data to determine firm 
value as indicated by Kothari (2001).  These considerations are essential for 
fundamental analysis; Beaver (2002) also suggests that in-depth knowledge of 
accounting institutions and the specific characteristics of accounting measures is 
demanded for value relevance research.  However, this thesis considers that some 
other points may be concerned.  First, matching selection process is crucial when 
it is used to search for a benchmark.  Barber and Lyon (1996) suggested that 
matching firms with industry and pre-event performance (i.e. return on assets or 
many years pre-performance of return on sales) is well-specified rather than using 
industry alone.  And, second, 14 firms were listed on the NASDAQ and another 
nine were listed on the NYSE.  Stock exchange effects might impact the result 
due to differences in stock exchange rules.         
 
Non-financial information 
Dontoh et al. (2004) proposed that the decline of value relevance in US firms 
from 1983 to 2000 could be derived from non-financial information, namely 
trading activity effects.  The study fitted several variables, i.e. analysts’ forecast 
revision, trading and outstanding common shares, trading volume, and cross-
section mean trading volume in many equations.  First, they regressed share prices 
on book value and earnings to obtain the explanatory power.  Then the 
explanatory power was used as dependent variable and regressed on the cross-
section mean trading volume.  The study predicted that if the association between 
share price and accounting numbers were perfect, the declining value relevance 
should be due to non-financial information.  If this is the case, the increasing noise 
in non-financial information raises noise in share prices, leading to declining 
explanatory power.  Therefore, non-financial information should be associated 
with the explanatory power and share price.  Their results supported their 
theoretical predictions that the declining value relevance of book value and 
earnings was associated with non-financial information.  They suggested that 
future value relevance studies should detect this information to make a proper 
inference.        
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Predictability 
Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) noted that one major concern about 
fundamental analysis is whether residual income model, in particular value-to-
price ratio (hereafter V/P) is sensitive to risk proxies in the process of abnormal 
return prediction because prior research found the ability of V/P to predict 
abnormal return but argued that this effect may be due to risk factor omissions.  
They investigated this concern and whether there is temporary market mispricing 
effect in V/P strategy or omitted risk factors drive the predictability of V/P.  Value 
(V) is calculated by book value and the present value of forecasted return on 
equity relying on two periods and V/P is dividing V by share price (P).  By the 
estimated V/P, US data were formed to five quintile portfolios at the end of June 
each year over the 1976–1997 period.   
 
First, the study estimated the mispricing effect of V/P.  The authors postulated 
that “because asset pricing models do not predict forecasted return over short 
window period, if abnormal returns to the V/P strategy are due to omitted risk 
factors, then future abnormal returns should not be concentrated around the 
earnings announcement periods.”  They expected that market mispricing effect is 
observed when abnormal returns that were significantly larger than zero around 
earnings announcement date.  The study estimated the relation between ranking 
quintile of V/P and future return with controlled size effect and compared the 
degree of abnormal return between earnings announcement (3-day abnormal 
returns) and non-announcement (63-day abnormal returns) periods.  Findings 
revealed that V/P strategy was due to mispricing effect.   
 
Second, because prior analyses suggested that the ability of V/P to predict 
abnormal returns was due to omitted risk factor, the study investigated whether 
incorrect measurement or risk factor omission related to the abnormal returns 
predictability of V/P.  The study regressed V/P on several risk factors, including 
systematic (beta) and non-systematic risks (share price variability), market price 
risk, leverage firm risk, financial distress risk, and information environment risks 
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which were proxied by size, number of analysts, variation of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, stability of past return on assets and industry cost of capital.  Another 
three risks were also included: book-to-price ratio, I/B/E/S long-term growth 
predictions and estimated anticipated return.  Next, the study regressed future 
returns on V/P and those risk factors.  If the association is significant after 
controlling the risk factors, then it suggests that omitted risk factors do not drive 
V/P effect.  The study reported significant positive association between V/P and 
future returns although controlling for risks.  This implies that V/P prediction 
ability is not due to omitted risk factors.  Additional calculations for V/P were 
also performed by using another two different formulas according to Dechow et 
al. (1999) and Gode and Mohanram (2001) (quoted in Ali et al. 2003). 
 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) examined whether the adoption of IAS provides 
better earnings predictability in cross-country data, including Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, for the period of 1993 (before and after 1 
January 1993).  They expected that analysts’ earnings forecasts would change 
after the IAS adoption; the predictability of earnings could be either increased or 
decreased after the adoption.  By indexing disclosure requirements and 
measurement methods for each country, they defined forecast errors (the absolute 
value of the difference between analysts’ earnings forecasts and reported 
earnings) are a function of those factors and added number of analysts and market 
value of equity as control variables.  They estimated both in level and change 
models.  Overall, findings reported that earnings forecast errors decreased after 
the adoption, implying less variation in disclosure and measurement methods. 
 
Test of accounting differences 
Zhao (2002) employed a fundamental analysis to estimate the value relevance of 
different accounting methods for research and development (R&D) information 
across four countries, including France, Germany, the UK and the US.  There are 
two alternative accounting methods for R&D – the full cost and the successful 
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cost.  Germany and the US (exclusive of the software company) have used the full 
cost by expensing all R&D costs; this method is considered as conservative 
method.  The other two countries, France and the UK, allow firms to defer and 
amortise successful R&D costs.  The study was concerned with the public report 
of R&D costs and amortisation because this information could be confidential.  
Thus, the study was interested in the incremental value relevance for disclosing 
R&D costs and allocation costs.  By testing the data of four countries for the 
period 1990–1999, the study used the price model and added other information, 
including estimated R&D costs and allocation costs, R&D accounting methods 
and different law systems to the model.  The explanatory power of the association 
between share price and accounting measures, including book value and earnings, 
was increased when R&D cost information was added.  In addition, the allocation 
R&D costs were incremental value-relevant for France and UK samples, not for 
full-cost countries. 
 
Zhao (2002) investigated the value relevance of R&D information across 
countries and industries, meaning that reporting environments, i.e. legal 
regulations, and industry could affect their analysis.  On the other hand, another 
study about successful and full cost methods is the work of Bryant (2003) that 
focuses on only the US oil and gas industry. This reduces the potential problem of 
the market difference and industry effect.  By using price and return regressions, 
Bryant (2003) added the present value of future net cash flows of oil and gas 
reserves as another explanatory variable to the models.  The sample of 112 firms 
for the period 1994–1996 was examined, separated into 64 successful-cost firms 
and 48 full-cost firms.  The study calculated as-if book value and income for each 
sample group.  In particular, for successful-cost (full-cost) firms, their actual book 
value and income is re-constructed to obtain full-costs (successful-costs) as if 
these firms had been using full-cost (successful-cost) method.  This method 
allows the comparison of different accounting methods within the same firm by 
comparing the explanatory power of the regression from actual numbers and from 
as-if numbers.  This approach reduces self-selection bias but share price is 
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assumed to remain unchanged during the testing period.  This assumption can 
reduce the power of the test as well.  The study found that full-cost method has 
superior value relevance to successful method; this finding was inconsistent with 
the past finding where the cross-firm approach was used.  In addition, the study 
found that the higher value relevance of full-cost method was derived from 
earnings rather than book value.              
 
Test of alternative book value and earnings and cash flow information 
Brown and Sivakumar (2003) attempted to investigate whether earnings prepared 
by analysts and firm’s manager had similar properties to reported earnings 
according to GAAP.  They hypothesised that the higher the value relevance, the 
more useful the information.  They defined the value relevance in terms of 
predictive ability of earnings, relative valuation and the information content.  
Based on US data for the period 1989–1997, first, the study obtained earnings 
prepared by analysts and managers and compared them to earnings reported in 
financial statements by evaluating which number provided more accurate 
prediction from the last fourth quarter earnings to the first next quarter earnings.  
By using mean and binomial tests, they reported that reported earnings were less 
value-relevant in terms of predictive ability of next quarter earnings than earnings 
adjusted by managers and analysts.  Second, according to the price model, they 
separated out earnings, independent variables into two figures according to 
analysts and manager’s earnings and reported earnings.  The relative valuation 
analysis supported the first result that reported earnings were lower value-relevant 
compared to the others.  Third, they regressed 3-day and 63-day cumulative 
abnormal returns on changes in alternative earnings.  The result from the third 
method also supported the first one that reported earnings did not play an 
important role in value-relevance compared to the other two earnings. 
 
Abad, Laffarga, Garcia-Borboolla, Larrán, Piãero and Garrod (2000) studied 
whether the value relevance of book value and earnings reported in consolidated 
or parent company reporting were different in Spanish firms.  From 1991, Spain’s 
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accounting system has required publicly held firms to render consolidated 
financial statements under the parent company approach by disclosing relevant 
information in the parent company accounts.38  The study attempted to report 
whether the value relevance was altered when alternative book value and earnings 
were used to estimate firm valuation.  Based on 474 Spanish firm-year 
observations for the period 1991–1997, the study defined annual share price as a 
function of a set of annual book value and earnings information.  Because Spanish 
firms report only minority interests, to compare alternative book value and 
earnings, the study estimated as-if book value and earnings by including self-
constructed goodwill based on available information.  Their results revealed that 
the disclosed information in the parent company accounting was value relevant 
while other information was not value relevant.   
 
Two major drawbacks of this analysis: i) the authors have not cautioned about 
unchanged share price.  Because the study assumed the full entity approach being 
used and performed self-calculated goodwill, then share price could reflect this 
information if this approach had been actually used, resulting in the alteration of 
the existing share price that the authors employed for the whole analysis and ii) 
different from other value relevance studies, this study uses year-end share price.  
In other words, the study did not allow time for share price to capture information.  
It is not clear in the study that using year-end share price can reflect the 
consolidated financial reporting that should be released at least after the fiscal 
year-end date.     
 
Charitou, Clubb and Andreou (2000) investigated the relative value relevance of 
accounting earnings and cash flow in Japanese firms for the period 1985–1993.  
The analysis also estimated the incremental value relevance of cash flow and 
earnings during the period of earnings transition.  Their motivation is derived 
                                               
38 The authors defined three different consolidated financial statements as: “a) the parent company 
approach, which excludes minority interest from the book value of equity of the group, b) the 
entity approach, which includes currently reported minority interest into the book value of equity 
of the group, and c) the full entity approach, which includes the book value of equity of the group 
the minority interest reported plus the estimated minority interest share of purchased goodwill.” 
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from the fact that Japanese business is heavily based on creditor orientation rather 
than the stock market.  In addition, earnings and financial information are not 
important for economic decisions.  Based on 6,662 firm-year observations, they 
found that earnings and cash flow were value-relevant at much the same level as 
found in the US market.  The finding was revealed by different return regressions 
that used annual share returns as dependent variable while the level of and change 
in earnings and cash flow were used as independent variables. They estimated 
earnings persistence by calculating the degree of absolute changes in earnings 
divided by price and ranked the earnings persistence.  Their findings supported 
that during the earnings transition, cash flow had higher incremental value-
relevance than earnings.           
 
Disclosure quality 
Kang and Pang (2005) estimated the quality of disclosure level through its value 
relevance.  High value relevance is high quality of disclosure.  Based on non-US 
firms in 41 countries whose shares were traded on the US stock exchange for the 
period 1993–1999, they employed price model by estimating the association 
between share price in the US and home-country reported accounting numbers, 
including book value and earnings.  The disclosure level was proxied by 
economic development: emerging vs. developed countries.  Findings revealed that 
emerging market countries required more disclosure to obtain more transparency 
and quality of accounting information.   
 
Discussion of Value-Relevance Studies 
It appears that value relevance analysis has been widely used by researchers when 
investigating the change in accounting system.  After exploring empirical studies 
with regard to the value relevance analysis, some conclusions can be made.  First, 
the fundamental analysis can be separated into relative information value-
relevance and incremental information value-relevance.  Mainly, the explanatory 
power or R2 is compared to determine whether or not accounting numbers 
estimated by alternative accounting treatments provide different usefulness levels 
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to the market.  In accounting-based research, the alternative accounting number 
estimation can be derived from accounting treatment differences or accounting 
policy changes.  Value-relevance analysis can be used to determine whether the 
different determination method is useful.  In addition, value-relevance analysis 
can be used to compare the usefulness of accounting information, which is known 
as incremental value analysis.  Although researchers view that the value analysis 
is just a joint test between relevance and reliability (Barth et al. 2001), it is a 
useful tool to distinguish accounting numbers in some magnitude or the impact of 
accounting system changes as a whole in terms of accounting information quality.  
Because the valuation model has been silent on accounting choice, it is a practical 
means for estimating how better different accounting methods can explain 
economic consequences by comparing the explanatory power of each data set.   
 
Second, price and return models have often been utilised in the study of value 
relevance.  These models are understandable and rather practical in terms of 
proxies implemented for the models’ estimation.  For example, rather than using 
forecasted abnormal returns, users can replace reported earnings for the forecasted 
data.  However, each model has drawbacks because the model has a different 
quality and they are interpreted differently, as suggested by Beaver (2002), 
depending on ‘time.’  Return model is suitable for a specific time period.  
Furthermore, Martinez (2003) points to the non-linear relationship when using 
return model.  Future research should take these points into account.    
 
Third, to compare the explanatory power, prior research uses the Voung test for 
the comparison.  Some studies use J-test and Cox-test.  Other than these methods, 
some studies compare the association between the market value and accounting 
information by revising the calculation of the explanatory power with the Cramer 
methodology (Barth et al. 2008; Harris, Lang and Moller 1994). These tools are 
added and provide a stronger support for the inference.   
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Fourth, price and return models are practical and easily to be modified.  As 
performed by many empirical studies, modified regressions provide more 
insightful about the analysis, i.e. adding dividend policy or non-financial 
information.  This helps future research to think about the choice of variables to 
be included.  Since most value relevance studies have investigated the different 
explanatory power between alternative accounting treatments, two or more 
treatments will be compared.  Therefore, the models are straightforward allowing 
the research design to add dummy variables or run the regression twice.  In 
addition, the residual income model can be augmented and applied for 
practitioners.  For instance, O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) derive the theoretical 
link between the residual income model and the economic value added (EVA) 
used by the consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co.39    
 
Finally, it is rather interesting that empirical studies have included financial sector 
in their sample data set, i.e. Naceur and Goaied (2004), when using price 
valuation model.  This might be an exception for the valuation model because 
accounting choice does not affect the model.  Thus, although financial sector has 
different or more complicated accounting method, the valuation model, according 
to its assumption, is not affected by the difference.  Moreover, the special 
characteristics of financial-sector firms can be captured by other information in 
the valuation model assumed to be zero.  Therefore, it is possible to include 
financial-sector firms in the analysis.  However, this thesis considers that although 
the assumption is intuitive, the empirical inference should be interpreted with 
care.  
 
In summary, the study of value relevance of accounting information has 
extensively caught accounting researchers’ attention.  Although there is no 
                                               
39 O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) began with the residual income-based valuation relationship 
(RIVR see pg. 231 which is similar to equation 3.17 presented in this study).  And, they derived 
the residual income book value relationship (RIBR, see Proposition 1 pg. 233).  Then, they derived 
the excess value created (EVC) over multi-period interval from incorporation to time t 
(Proposition 2 for the beginning at time 0 and Proposition 3 for the beginning at some date) by 
combining RIVR and RIBR.   
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theoretical explanation to back up this area of study, it is widely accepted by 
accounting researchers that the study of value relevance facilitates users’ decision 
making.  For example, the user perceives information differently when firms 
employ different accounting methods. 
 
3.3.3 Earnings Timeliness 
The remaining type of accounting quality to be discussed is earnings timeliness.  
This section reviews the existing literature relating to the asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings and the study of firm-specific accounting conservatism.  For the first 
research paper, Ball and Shivakumar (2005a) compare accounting conservatism 
between public and private firms in the UK.  The a priori expectation is that there 
is less demand for financial reporting quality required in private firms relative to 
public firms.  Thus, accounting conservatism is more likely for public firms 
relative to private firms.  In this study, the authors examine accounting 
conservatism by employing market-based model and introducing the use of 
accrual-based model to determine accounting conservatism.  They employ the 
dataset during the period 1990–2000, resulting in 141,649 private and 6,208 
public firm-years.  They determine accounting conservatism by estimating the 
differential mean reversion in earnings changes, suggesting that negative earnings 
changes tend to reverse in the next period whilst positive earnings changes tend to 
persist.  Their findings report that public firms have more accounting 
conservatism relative to private firms.  They use the accrual-based earnings 
timeliness to measure accounting conservatism and their findings are consistent 
with results obtained from the market-based earnings timeliness model.  The 
result is robust when controlling for size, industry and leverage.  This is the first 
study proposing the time-series measurement of earnings timeliness by not 
interpreting bad news as negative stock returns.   
 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) investigate the relation between market-to-book 
and the earnings timeliness measure estimated by Basu’s model.  The motivation 
of this study is driven by a negative relation between the two measures as this 
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association is predominantly documented in the literature Givoly et al. (2007) 
evidence the negative relationship between Basu’s earnings asymmetric timeliness 
and firm-specific accounting conservatism measures).  However, the authors 
argue that at the starting point when equity is issued to the market, the book and 
market value is equal.  Book value records partial gains and delays some gains to 
be accounted in the next period.  However, losses will be fully recognised in the 
current period.  This induces the difference between market value and book value.  
They argue that the positive relation between Basu’s earnings timeliness measure 
and market-to-book should be observed in a long horizon period of time rather 
than in a short or single time period.  Based on 45,664 firm-years during the 
period 1972–1999, they incorporate market-to-book into Basu’s earnings 
timeliness model.  They employ forward and backward accumulated earnings and 
stock returns instead of single-year earnings and stock returns.  The coefficient of 
the integrated variable between backward accumulated returns and the year-end 
market-to-book ratio is positive, suggesting that market-to-book is positively 
correlated to Basu’s earnings timeliness measure.  The result suggests that Basu’s 
earnings asymmetric timeliness model is more powerful when employing 
accumulated earnings and returns for an analysis.        
 
Barth et al. (2008) estimate the good/bad news recognition in 21 countries that 
adopt IFRS.  They compare the good/bad news recognition between firms employ 
IFRS and firms do not employ IFRS (matched firms) in the same country and year 
during 1994 – 2003, comprising 1,895 firm-year observations for 327 firms.  A 
priori prediction is that IFRS-Firms should recognise good/bad news more 
freguently than non-IFRS firms.  They find that during IFRS pre- and post-
adoption periods the good/bad news recognition is not statistically different in 
both IFRS and non-IFRS firms.  In addition, the good/bad news recognition 
during IFRS pre-adoption periods is not statistically different from the good/bad 
news recognition during IFRS post-adoption periods for IFRS firms. 
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Conservatism and auditors 
Krishnan (2007) examines whether earnings conservatism has been improved for 
former clients of Arthur Andersen.  The author hypothesises that earnings 
conservatism should be improved for former clients of Arthur Andersen because 
such firms are more likely to protect their reputation and reduce potential 
litigation risk.  The dataset includes 865 former clients of Arthur Andersen; 91 
clients switched to a non-big-four auditor in 2002.  Based on the market-based 
earnings asymmetric timeliness model, findings suggest that earnings 
conservatism has been improved for former clients of Andersen from 2001 to 
2002.  Particularly, earnings conservatism for former Houston-Based Andersen 
clients has been significantly increased following switching to a big-four auditor 
in 2002.  However, earnings timeliness has not been improved during these two 
periods for former Andersen clients switching to non-big four auditors.  Further 
findings in this paper also suggest that negative earnings changes have been 
generally reversed between those two periods for former Andersen clients; the 
reversal of negative earnings indicates the timeliness of earnings to capture 
economic consequences.  In addition, the author employs accrual-based earnings 
timeliness model to support the main finding.      
 
Conservatism and debt 
Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) investigate the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and debt.  This study is motivated by the question of whether the 
agency costs of debt affect the modification of conservatism in the firm’s financial 
reports.  For example, income escalators are more likely at the high agency costs 
of debt.  Five different firm-specific accounting conservatism measures are 
employed in this study, including market-to-book, the coefficient of the 
interaction of negative returns with returns, the difference between the skewness 
in cash flows and earnings, accumulated non-operating accruals and the sum of 
firm’s rank for each of these five measures.  They regress the lending contract 
modification which is equal to 1 if this contract modification is made, zero 
otherwise, on accounting conservatism measures and other variables, i.e. the 
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maturity of loan, the interest rate spread, loan type, debt rating, ROA, size and 
growth.  The contract modification is required only when a percentage of positive 
net income is added to net worth thresholds.  They also regress the conservatism 
measure on income escalator with other control variables.  Based on the dataset 
during the period 1994–2004 with 2,164 observations, their findings report that 
income escalators positively vary with accounting conservatism, suggesting that 
lenders’ demands for conservatism are satisfied by reporting conservatism and 
conservative contract modifications. 
 
Whilst Beatty et al. (2008) estimate unconditional conservatism and debt, Hsu, 
O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2010) examine conditional conservatism and financial 
distress during the period 1989 – 2005 with 21,513 US firm-year observations.  
They determine financial distress by using two measures – Black-Scholes-Merton 
(BSM) score and the Altman (1968) Z Score.  They employ three piecewise 
regression models, including the market-based model, the negative earnings 
change model and the accrual-based model.  They interact financial distress 
measures through explanatory variables.  They find a positive association between 
conditional conservatism and both of their measures of financial distress.  They 
also note that this positive relationship arises mainly from the accruals component 
of earnings rather than the cash flow component.       
 
Institutional factors and earnings timeliness 
Ball et al. (2003) examine accounting income property in terms of the ability of 
earnings to capture economic consequences in East Asian countries, including 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand during the period 1984–1996.  
Based on Basu’s earnings asymmetric timeliness model, their findings suggest 
that earnings asymmetric timeliness in four Asian countries is lower than that for 
common law countries, including Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA.  They 
also examine accounting income property by evaluating through the persistence of 
earnings changes.  According to Basu (1997), the negative change in earnings is 
viewed as transitory and will be reversed in the next period.  The positive change 
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in earnings is viewed as more permanent relative to the negative change in 
earnings.  The reversion of negative changes in earnings implies asymmetric 
income-conservatism.  The coefficient estimated when regressing changes in 
earnings on negative changes in earnings is, thus, negative.  Their findings 
suggest that among four Asian countries, negative earnings changes in Singapore 
are more transitory than positive earnings changes.  Negative earnings changes for 
four Asian countries relative to common law and code law (Germany, France, and 
Japan) countries are less transitory than positive earnings changes.     
 
Ball et al. (2000) investigate accounting conservatism among 18 countries during 
the period 1985 – 1995.  They compare conditional accounting conservatism 
between common and code law countries in different aspects, including 
accounting regulations, securities law, dividend, cash flows and debt.  Based on 
the market-based earnings asymmetric timeliness model, findings suggest that 
accounting conservatism is higher in common law countries relative to code law 
countries due to greater sensitivity to economic losses.  They suggest that the 
timelier economic loss recognition brings quicker analysts’ attentions and 
facilitates the monitoring mechanism of managers as well as induce necessary 
actions, i.e. binding leverage and dividend restrictions more quickly or monitoring 
bonuses for employees and managers.         
 
Beuselinck and Manigart (2007) investigate earnings timeliness in Belgian 
unquoted companies during the period 1985–1999.  They incorporate an 
institutional factor to determine earnings timeliness by using private equity 
ownership concentration.  They argue that the incentive of private equity investors 
to monitor financial reporting closely is high when those investors hold a small 
proportion of equity in the unquoted company.  Nonetheless, the relationship can 
be positive since private equity investors who hold a large percentage of equity 
influence the company to produce high quality of financial reporting due to the 
reputation of the investors.  Thus, they conjecture that the earnings timeliness for 
private equity backed companies is negatively or positively related to the 
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proportion of equity held by private equity investors.  They incorporate the 
percentage of equity held by the investor in the market-based and accrual-based 
earnings asymmetric timeliness models.  Their findings suggest that earnings 
timeliness is lower when the private investor holds a large percentage of equity 
but higher when the private investor holds a small percentage of equity in the 
unquoted company. 
 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) investigate whether economic institutional factors 
induce differential accounting conservatism among countries. The economy 
institutional factor used in their study includes legal regime, judicial system, 
securities law, political economy and tax regimes.  They separate legal regimes 
according to civil and common law.  The judicial system is obtained from the 
rating of judicial impartiality reported in the Economic Freedom of the World’s 
2002 annual report.  Basically, a strong judicial system induces more accounting 
conservatism.  They use the securities law based on the study of La Porta et al. 
(2003).  They use risk of expropriation assets by the state and state-owned 
enterprises to measure the political economy.  The marginal tax rate is used to 
measure tax regimes.  Based on 38 countries during the period 1992–2001, they 
employ market-based earnings asymmetric timeliness model with incorporating 
the economy institutional factor for main analyses and accrual-based model for 
robustness tests.  Their findings suggest that high quality judicial systems and 
strong securities law induce more ability of earnings to capture bad news.  Low 
risk of expropriation of assets by the state and low state ownership of enterprises 
encourage earnings to recognise bad news in a more timely manner than good 
news.  The speed to recognise bad news is higher for the civil law country with 
high state involvement in the economy relative to low state involvement whilst the 
speed to recognise bad news is lower for common law countries with high state 
involvement in the economy.   
 
Gassen, Fulbier and Sellhorn (2006) incorporate unconditional conservatism and 
income smoothing to investigate earnings conservatism in 23 countries during the 
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period 1990–2003.  They employ market-to-book ratio and 5-year backward 
accumulated accruals to measure unconditional conservatism and the ratio of 5-
year standard deviation of earnings divided by 5-year standard deviation of cash 
flows to measure income smoothing.  They predict that unconditional 
conservatism and income smoothing reduce earnings asymmetric timeliness.  
They find that market-to-book ratio and income smoothing are negatively 
correlated with earnings asymmetric timeliness based on Basu’s model.  However, 
a positive relation between the accumulated accrual and earnings asymmetric 
timeliness is found.  Their analysis investigates accounting conservatism across 
countries, but they do not detect the difference in institutional factors among 
countries, i.e. economic environment.  They only separate the analysis according 
to common law and code law countries.      
 
Jindrichovska and Mcleay (2005) investigate earnings asymmetric timeliness in 
317 Czech Republic firm-years during the period 1993–1999.  Based on Basu’s 
earnings timeliness model, they find that earnings timeliness is less likely for the 
sample firm.  Although they repeat the regression analysis by separating the 
sample firm into bad news and good news, no significant result is observed during 
the sampling period.      
 
Lara and Mora (2004) investigate accounting conservatism in common law and 
code law European countries.  They compare accounting conservatism in the UK 
using common law with that in other countries using code law, including 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.  They 
employ two accounting conservatism measures: book value and earnings 
asymmetry.  They hypothesise that book value or balance sheet conservatism is 
greater for code law countries relative to the UK whilst earnings asymmetric 
timeliness is higher in the UK relative to code law countries.  These opposite 
hypotheses are driven by the different attribute of the market demand, that the UK 
is a market-oriented country whilst the other countries are creditor-oriented 
countries.  They employ the dataset during the period 1987–2000.  Based on 
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valuation model and earnings asymmetric timeliness model incorporating an 
indicator variable to capture the difference in conservatism between UK and the 
code law countries, their findings support the hypotheses.  They suggest that the 
lower balance sheet conservatism in the code law countries is induced by more 
pronounced earnings persistence.  However, they did not compare the persistence 
of earnings between the UK and code law countries. The higher earnings 
asymmetric timeliness in the UK is induced by the demand from the dispersion of 
shareholders.   
 
Lin and Chen (1999) conduct a survey analysis to investigate accounting 
conservatism in China after the conservatism approach has been introduced in 
China after 1993.  Since China has long been historically a socialist economy, 
accounting practices were mostly controlled by the government.  The rejection of 
implementing accounting conservatism may rise.  800 survey questionnaires were 
sent out in 1998 to 150 Chinese firms.  The survey questionnaire was sent to 
general managers or heads of finance and accounting sections and financial 
statement users, including government agencies, bank credit and loan officers, 
security analysts, and audit firms, as well as university professors.  The response 
rate was 26.1%. Findings suggest that most related parties in using financial 
statements support the development of accounting conservatism in China except 
for the government which tends to support the existing accounting system.         
 
Pope and Walker (1999) examine earnings asymmetric timeliness in the US and 
the UK.  Based on Basu’s earnings asymmetric timeliness model, they derive five 
different measures of conservatism, including the ratio of bad/good news 
regression model slope parameters, the ratio of adjusted R2 statistics for bad/good 
news regression models, sensitivity to bad news less sensitivity to good news, 
sensitivity to bad news, and average earnings/(lagged price) bias.  They compare 
the earnings timeliness between US and UK firms during the period 1976–1992.  
They employ two different earnings in their estimation of conservatism, including 
ordinary earnings and earnings after extraordinary items.  They expect that 
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earnings after extraordinary items are more sensitive to bad news if extraordinary 
items are employed to eliminate bad news from ordinary earnings.  Their findings 
suggest that UK firms are more likely to categorise bad news earnings 
components as extraordinary items relative to US firms.  These findings suggest 
that earnings measures are essential for the analysis of relative conservatism in 
different accounting regimes.  Thus, inferences are sensitive to the earnings 
measure.   
 
Raonic, Stuart and Ioannis (2004) investigate earnings timeliness for 492 
European firms during the period 1987–1999, including Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  The data must be available for each firm for at 
least two consecutive years.  To investigate earnings timeliness, they include three 
pieces of information: index of disclosure items in annual report, stock market 
attribute, and legal (enforcement) system.  They employ Basu’s earnings 
asymmetric timeliness model by including the three pieces of information as 
additional independent variables and integrating the three pieces of information in 
the model.  Their findings suggest that earnings timeliness is observed in their 
samples except for France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  They find that 
disclosure and legal system are positively correlated with earnings information.  
When incorporating stock market attribute and legal system in the model, findings 
report that the ability of earnings to capture bad news varies with the stock market 
or legal system.  This research computes a score for the three pieces of 
institutional information, however they do not clearly explain whether the higher 
score reflects more accounting conservatism.  For example, the authors explain 
only that the market index for Germany (score = 5) is least important relative to 
Switzerland (score = 24.8), which is most important.     
 
Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck and Willekens (2007) study earnings timeliness in 
German firms when the German firm can employ either US GAAP or IFRS for 
their financial statements.  They use the sample firm from 2000–2002, including 
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313 observations.  They divide the sample firm into two groups then perform the 
regression analysis.  Based on Basu’s earnings timeliness model, they find 
insignificant results for the model’s coefficient representing earnings timeliness.  
In addition, they use the explanatory power to determine earnings timeliness that 
the higher explanatory power indicates that earnings capture bad news on a timely 
fashion.  They find that IFRS and US GAAP used by the German firms are 
indifferent in terms of the ability of earnings information prepared by those two 
accounting standards to capture economic consequences on a timely basis.      
 
Discussion of earnings timeliness 
From prior studies, the earnings asymmetric timeliness has been widely used in 
existing accounting research.  It appears that the notion of earnings asymmetric 
timeliness differs from the notion of earnings persistence.  Earnings asymmetric 
timeliness delays the recognition of good news; good news will be allocated to 
future periods of time.  It indicates that positive earnings tend to be persistent.  On 
the other hand, earnings asymmetric timeliness recognises bad news in the current 
period but not future periods.  The negative earnings changes tend to reverse in 
future periods of time (Basu 1997).  The market-based earnings asymmetric 
timeliness model based on Basu (1997) is a predominant method widely used by 
researchers.  However, prior studies find that Basu’s earnings asymmetric 
timeliness has a negative relation with firm-specific (unconditional) conservatism, 
i.e. book-to-market ratio.  There is no complete empirical explanation to measure 
accounting conservatism.  Two criteria should be made from the review of the 
literature.  Firstly, it is still problematic about the proxy being used to measure 
accounting conservatism, i.e. the proxy for economic consequences.  Second, 
institutional factors play important roles in the timeliness of earnings, i.e. country 
specific factors.  In addition to those criteria, earnings components are significant 
information sources for the analysis of earnings timeliness.  For example, Hsu, 
O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2010B) report that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
varies when different earnings components are employed.  The explanatory power 
from their estimations (adjusted R2) is ranging from 8.51% to 14.74% when 
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earnings are measured by clean surplus earnings and operating profit, 
respectively.      
 
3.3.4 Book-Tax Differences and Accounting Quality 
This section summarises existing research studies that employ book-tax 
differences to determine accounting information quality of the firm.  Even though 
prior research incorporates firm-specific and institutional factors, i.e. market-to-
book ratio and legal system, to estimate earnings timeliness, it appears that book-
tax differences have not yet been employed by the existing study.  A review of 
literature is presented as follows.    
 
Earnings informativeness and book-tax differences 
Hanlon et al. (2005) estimate about the information loss if financial accounting 
income is conformed to taxable income.  The expectation is that accounting 
income prepared by GAAP (or book income) should have information content 
relative to taxable income because of the different objectives between book 
income and taxable income.  However, the authors suggest that if investors use 
taxable income as a benchmark to evaluate book income, then taxable income will 
have incremental information content.  Based on the data during the period 1983 –
2001, they compare market returns from the change in book income and taxable 
income.  They separate the comparison by using the sign from the change in book 
income and taxable income and the sign and magnitude from the change in book 
and taxable income.  Findings suggest that book income is more useful for 
investors relative to taxable income because book income provides an average 
annual return greater than taxable income.  Next, they compare the relative 
information content by using the explanatory power.  They regress stock returns 
on changes in book income and taxable income separately.  Their findings report 
that book income has higher information content than taxable income.  Last, they 
estimate the incremental information content.  They regress stock returns on book 
income and taxable income.  They find that the coefficient estimate for book 
income and taxable income is .55 and .28, respectively.  This suggests that the 
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market appears to rely more on book income relative to taxable income.  In 
addition, they suggest from the findings that if the same accounting rule is used 
for calculating both book income and taxable income, the information content 
would be loss.  
 
Hanlon et al. (2008) examine a decrease in earnings informativeness if book-tax 
conformity increases.  They use firms that are forced to convert from cash method 
to accrual method for tax calculation and control firms that use accrual method for 
tax calculation during the entire period of the study.  By using the ERC model, 
they set an indicator variable for the converting firm and control firm.  And, an 
indicator variable is introduced to capture the difference in the time period 
between pre- and post-cash and accrual method conversion.  They integrate all 
indicator variables with changes in earnings.  Stock returns are used as a 
dependent variable.  A priori expectation is that information loss should be 
observed at an increase in book-tax conformity.  Their findings suggest that the 
earnings informativeness declines after firms are forced to use accrual method for 
tax purposes, implying that book-tax conformity reduces the value relevance of 
earnings information.  They also match converting firms and control firms by 
using sales growth.  The findings remain consistent. 
 
Ayers et al. (2009) estimate the informativeness of taxable income.  They 
conjecture that taxable income is less informative for high tax-planning firms 
relative to other firms, and taxable income is more informative for firms with 
lower earnings quality relative to book income.  They compare the information 
content of book income and taxable income.  They regress returns on change in 
taxable income and on change in pre-tax book income separately.  They obtain the 
explanatory power from the return-taxable income regression divided by the 
explanatory power from the return-book income regression.  The higher ratio 
suggests that taxable income is more informative than book income.  They define 
high tax-planning firms when those firms have low effective tax rate calculated 
over five-year periods, t – 4 through t.  They define low earnings quality firms by 
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using abnormal accruals – the difference between total accruals and modified 
Jones model normal accruals.  The highest 20 percent of absolute abnormal 
accruals in each year is classified as low earnings quality.  Based on 50,760 firm-
years during 1983–2002, their findings are consistent with their hypotheses.  
Taxable income is more informative for high-tax planning firms relative to other 
firms, and taxable is more informative than book income for low earnings quality 
firms.  They also estimate the incremental explanatory power of taxable income.  
They regress returns on change in pre-tax book income and change in taxable 
income.  The explanatory power from return-book-taxable income regression and 
the explanatory power from return-book regression are compared to determine the 
incremental explanatory power of taxable income.  They find the incremental 
information content of taxble income.  
 
Financial reporting and book-tax differences 
Guenther et al. (1997) investigate a shift of financial reporting preparation when 
firms change from cash method to accrual method according to the change in tax 
rules in 1986.  Before 1986, firms were allowed to use cash method for tax 
purposes.  However, accrual method was enacted for all firms after 1986.  In their 
study, they compare the sample firm that previously used cash method pre-1986 
and accrual method post-1986 and the control firm that has been used accrual 
method since 1986.  Pre-1986, relative to the control firm, the sample firm was 
more likely to accelerate (defer) revenues (expenses) around the fiscal year end 
because taxes were paid when cash was received.  However, during post-1986, the 
incentive of revenue (expenses) acceleration (deferral) should decline when 
accrual method was enacted for tax purposes for the sample firm relative to the 
control firm.  The sample and control firm include 66 firms for each group.  The 
control firm is matched by SIC code.  According to univariate test, the higher ratio 
of accounts receivable divided by accounts payable and the higher ratio of sales 
divided by expenses suggest that the sample firm accelerates revenue recognition 
greater than the control firm.  They employ three ratios as dependent variables, 
including those two ratios and the ratio of cash receipts divided by cash 
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disbursements.  They regress those ratios on the inventory-incentive ratio – the 
ratio of inventory divided by total assets.  Their findings are consistent with the 
result from the univariate test, suggesting that firms are more likely to defer 
income when accrual method is used for tax purposes.  
 
Mills and Newberry (2001) examine tax cost and non-tax cost influencing book-
tax differences between public and private firms.  Tax costs refer to costs 
associated with tax examinations.  Firms that report large book income but low 
taxable income are more likely to have high tax costs, i.e. audit adjustments.  
Non-tax costs refer to costs associated with financial reporting.  Firms that 
conform book income and taxable income to reduce tax costs incurred are more 
likely to confront with non-tax costs, i.e. decreasing in firm value, debt covenant 
violation or managers’ compensation when the compensation is tied with book 
income.  The book-tax conformity occurs due to firms’ tendency to reduce book 
income to conform taxable income.  They investigate the relationship between 
book-tax differences and some factors including profit and loss, debt constraints 
and bonus plan thresholds by using public and private firms.  They conjecture 
that: 1) public firms report higher book income relative to taxable income than 
private firms during profit periods, 2) public firms report higher book losses 
relative to tax losses than private firms, and 3) in the period of profit, the 
relationship between book-tax differences and debt ratio is weaker for public 
firms relative to private firms because public firms are more likely to meet the 
requirement of debt obligations.  Also, they investigate the relationship between 
book-tax differences and bonus plan among public firms only.  Based on 9,187 
firm-years during the period 1981–1996, they regress book-tax differences on 
several variables, i.e. debt, tax credit, industry, bonus threshold and size.  They 
use an indicator variable to separate public and private firms.  Their findings 
suggest that among income (loss) firms, public firms report larger positive 
(negative) book-tax differences than do private firms.  They find a stronger 
relation between book-tax differences and debt in private firms relative to public 
firms.  They expect that managers tend to use income-decreasing procedures when 
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their bonus plans upper or lower bounds are binding, and income-increasing 
procedures when there is no binding for these bonus plans.  Their findings support 
this expectation.  However, the finding is sensitive to the threshold level. 
 
Earnings persistence and book-tax differences 
Hanlon (2005) investigates whether earnings persistence varies according to the 
scale of book-tax differences.  The dataset during the period 1994–2000 is 
partitioned to three groups, including small, large positive and large negative 
book-tax differences.  A priori expectation is that small book-tax difference firm-
years is of higher persistence than large positive and large negative book-tax 
difference firm-years.  By using a random walk model, indicator variables are 
included to estimate the difference between sample groups.  Findings suggest that 
firm-years with large negative and positive book-tax differences have 
considerably less persistent earnings than firm-years with small book-tax 
differences.  The study also decomposes earnings information to cash flows and 
accruals.  Results from the regression of earnings on cash flows and accruals 
support the prior finding that earnings are of lower persistence for firm-years with 
large book-tax differences relative to small book-tax differences.  The study 
further estimates the market expectation on book-tax difference information.  By 
using Mishkin methodology, findings suggest that book-tax differences are used 
by investors to infer lower persistence in accruals for firm-years with large 
positive book-tax differences.  The market overestimates the persistence of 
accruals attributable to earnings performance for firm-years with large negative 
book-tax differences.  The study also examines the relationship between abnormal 
returns and pre-tax accruals.  The relationship between large negative (positive) 
book-tax differences and stock returns is significant (insignificant).  This finding 
supports the result obtained from the Mishkin test that the market perceives 
rationally about large positive book-tax differences but irrationally for relative to 
large negative book-tax differences. 
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Schmidt (2006) investigates the earnings persistence when earnings are 
decomposed into earnings excluding tax changes and tax change component.  
Earnings excluding tax (ATE) changes refer to pre-tax earnings multiplied by (1 – 
effective tax rate).  Tax change component (TCC) refers to pre-tax earnings 
multiplied by change in effective tax rate.  He regresses the one-year-ahead 
earnings on ATE and TCC.  He finds the positive relation between the future 
earnings and TCC, suggesting that tax changes are not transitory.  He extends 
TCC component by decomposing TCC into the initial tax change (quarter 1) 
component of earnings and the revised tax change (quarter 2, 3 and 4) component 
of earnings.  He finds that the relationship between the one-year-ahead earnings 
and the initial tax change is significantly positive.  The persistence between the 
one-year-ahead earnings and the revised tax change component of earnings 
declines as the year progresses.  He concludes that tax change information is not 
transitory, and the initial and revised tax change has differential persistence and 
forecasting implication. 
 
In conclusion, the book-tax difference is a useful means to differentiate the 
incentive of the firm.  However, the book-tax difference must be interpreted with 
caution.  Many research studies in the well-developed market employ book-tax 
differences to identify accounting quality.  However, research studies conducted 
in the emerging market have rarely used book-tax differences as the institutional 
factor.  
 
3.3.5 Firm Governance and Accounting Quality 
This section presents a summary from the existing research in terms of firm 
governance and accounting quality.  It appears that prior research has widely 
explored the effect of firm governance systems on accounting quality.  Prior 
studies have employed various firm governance factors in their analyses, i.e. 
ownership structure or audit committee.  Most studies find that firm governance 
systems play an important role in accounting quality and they cause variation in 
accounting quality among firms.  The review of literature is presented as follows: 
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Value relevance 
Corporate governance system 
Goncharov et al. (2006) investigate whether the value relevance of accounting 
information has improved after changes in corporate governance code in 
Germany.  The first version of corporate governance code in Germany was 
introduced in 2002. It was amended during the period 2002–2006.  They measure 
the deviation of the recommendations given by the code and the actual 
compliance with the code and use the absolute deviation number as a proxy for 
the compliance with corporate governance code.  Based on 122 observations (61 
firms) in 2002 and 2003, they employ the firm valuation model and ERC model 
by including the proxy of the corporate governance code to determine the value 
relevance. In their study, they correct an endogeneity problem by identifying 
factors deriving the compliance with the code.  Then they calculate Inverse Mills 
ratio and include it in the valuation models.  After controlling for the endogeneity 
problem, their findings suggest that the market positively values firms according 
to the degree of compliance with the corporate governance code. 
 
Board structure 
Vafeas (2000) investigates the quality of boards and the quality of firms’ financial 
reports.  The relation between board structure and the informativeness of earnings 
has been debated extensively in the literature.  The author predicts that the 
relationship between stock returns and earnings positively varies according to a 
number of outside directors serving on a firm’s board.  However, the decrease in 
this relationship is observed when the proportion of outside directors on a firm’s 
board increases.  In addition, this study expects a negative relation between the 
value relevance of information and board size for a firm’s board with a moderate 
to large number of members.  The study defines that stock returns are a function 
of earnings information and different board compositions and structures.  Based 
on the dataset during the period 1990–1994 of 307 large firms listed on the Forbes 
compensation survey, findings report no relation between the value relevance of 
earnings information and board compositions.  However, the higher value 
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relevance of earnings information is observed for firms with smaller size of firms’ 
board (five members on a board).         
 
Ownership structure 
Fan and Wong (2002) investigate whether earnings informativeness varies 
according to the ownership structure in East Asia, including Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand during the 
period 1991–1995.  For the ownership structure, they employ ultimate owners and 
cash flow right associated with the ultimate owner (voting and cash flow right is 
set at 50%.).  They predict that earnings informativeness declines with an increase 
in the degree of divergence between the controlling owner’s voting and cash flow 
rights.  They regress the cumulative stock return on the earnings information and 
the integrated variable between earnings and ownership structure.  Their findings 
report a negative relation between stock returns and voting rights but a positive 
relation between stock returns and cash flow rights, suggesting that the higher 
proportion of voting (cash flow) rights deters (improves) earnings 
informativeness.  The finding supports their prediction. 
 
Jung and Kwon (2002) estimate earnings informativeness and the ownership 
structure in Korea.  They define the ownership structure as the largest shareholder 
(managing ownership), institutional shareholding and block-shareholding.  They 
employ return-earnings regressions by regressing stock returns on earnings and 
the integrated variable between earnings and the ownership variables.  Their 
findings report a positive relation between stock returns and those three ownership 
proxies.  The result is robust when including control variables, suggesting that 
agency costs decline when managing ownership increases.  The institutional 
ownership and blockholders induce earnings informativeness. 
 
Timeliness 
Ahmed and Duellman (2007) investigate accounting conservatism and board of 
director characteristics.  For accounting conservatism, they employ firm-specific 
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accounting conservatism measures – accumulative book-to-market and 
accumulative accruals and earnings asymmetric timeliness.  They use five 
different board characteristics, including percentage of insiders, the separation of 
CEO and chairman on the board, board size, number of additional directorships 
held by board members, and outside director ownership.  They expect that a 
strong board induces accounting conservatism.  Thus, the relationship between 
insiders in a board and accounting conservatism is predicted to be negative.  The 
separation of CEO and chairman induces accounting conservatism.  The higher 
outside director ownership induces more accounting conservatism.  However, the 
relationship between accounting conservatism and board size is unclear.  In 
addition, no a priori expectation is set for the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and number of directorships.  After controlling firm characteristics, 
i.e. size, growth and risk, their findings suggest that accounting conservatism 
measured by accumulated book-to-market and accumulated accruals is negatively 
related with the percentage of inside directors on the board but positively related 
with the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by outside directors.  Based on 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) and Basu (1997), they employ 3-year backward 
accumulated earnings for the market-based earnings asymmetric timeliness 
analysis.  Findings support that the higher percentage of insiders on the board 
induces lower accounting conservatism whilst the higher percentage of outside 
director ownership induces more accounting conservatism.            
 
Beekes et al. (2004) incorporate corporate governance system to determine the 
timeliness of earnings in 501 UK firm-years from 1993 to 1995.  Based on Basu’s 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings information to capture news, they find that 
earnings for firms with a large number of outside directors in firms’ board tend to 
capture bad news (through negative stock returns) in a more timely manner than 
earnings for firms with a small number of outside directors on the board.  Their 
findings are consistent when replacing a number of outside directors by the 
proportion of non-executive directors and including control variables.  They 
further partition sample firms according to block ownership, managerial 
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ownership, duality of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and auditor type.  They find 
that non-executive directors induce accounting conservatism with respect to bad 
news recognition although there is a presence of large external block-holder.  
Accounting conservatism is less likely when managers own a large percentage of 
shareholding probably because the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders is less pronounced.  Accounting conservatism is more pronounced 
for firms without CEO duality relative to firms with CEO duality.  Since big-five 
auditors dominate their sample size, by excluding big-five auditees, results remain 
unchanged, i.e. that accounting conservatism is more likely for firms with 
outsiders on firms’ boards.         
 
Bushman et al. (2004) construct earnings timeliness from an average of three 
percentile rank earnings attributes.  The three attributes are measured from the 
speed of bad news recognition by earnings information (estimated from Basu’s 
asymmetric timeliness model), the R2 from Basu’s asymmetric timeliness model, 
and the R2 from earning response coefficient model.  They regress governance 
structures on earnings timeliness and firm characteristics.  The governance 
structure consists of board structure, equity-based incentives of outside 
shareholders, equity-based incentives of inside or outside directors or the 
composition of executive compensation plans.  They have no a priori prediction 
for the relationship between earnings timeliness and board structure because of 
the multiple roles the board performs.  They expect that at the higher complexity 
of firms, earnings timeliness is negatively correlated with equity-based incentives 
of outside shareholders, equity-based incentives of inside and outside directors 
and executive compensation.  Findings support their expectations.  They find no 
relationship between earnings timeliness and board size and the percentage of 
inside directors.   
 
Lara et al. (2007) investigate the effect of board of directors’ characteristics and 
earnings timeliness.  They construct an aggregate index for board of directors by 
using 6-8 different measures, including the proportion of non-executive directors, 
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the proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, number of board meetings, 
audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee, executive committee and 
board size.  A lower value of index reflects a weak governance system, that CEO 
has a high influence over firms’ board.  Based on 193 Spanish firm-years during 
the period 1997–2002, findings suggest that relative to a weak governance system, 
a strong governance system induces the ability of earnings to capture bad news on 
a timely basis for Spanish firms.  They also incorporate a proxy of growth 
opportunity measured by the market to book ratio in the regression.  Findings 
report that earnings timeliness is less likely for high-growth firms with a strong 
corporate governance system.  They explain that high-growth firms are less likely 
to have more stringent governance systems but more likely to have insider-
dominated boards.  They also find that earnings timeliness is more likely when 
using accrual-based earnings timeliness model, supporting their main analysis. 
 
Others 
Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) examine the association between the quality of 
financial information and corporate governance systems.  They define the quality 
of financial information as the accuracy of analyst’s forecast.  The accuracy of 
analyst’s forecast is the difference between the actual and forecasted earnings per 
share.  They hypothesise that the accuracy of analyst’s forecast is more likely in 
better-governed firms since analysts can access better quality firm information.  
They employ four proxies for the corporate governance system, including the 
duality of CEO and the chair of the board, board size, the proportion of 
independent directors on a board, and the proportion of independent directors on 
the audit committee.  They expect that the CEO duality and board size are 
negatively related to the analyst’s accuracy but the proportion of independent 
directors on the board and the audit committee has a positive relation with 
forecast accuracy.  They employ 3, 6, 9 and 12 months consensus analyst forecast 
of earnings before the earnings announcement date.  Based on 3-year data from 
2000–2002, their findings support their predictions, suggesting that the quality of 
corporate governance system induces the accuracy of earnings forecast by the 
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analyst.  This implies that corporate governance system influences accounting 
information quality.  
 
Other than focusing on the analyst’s forecast, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
examine the effect of corporate governance on different aspects of management 
earnings forecasts, including the likelihood of a management earnings forecast, 
the precision of a management earnings forecast, the accuracy of a management 
earnings forecast, a conservatism of a management earnings forecast, and the 
market reaction to a management earnings forecast.  They employ several 
attributes of corporate governance systems for the analysis, including the 
proportion of outside directors on a board, board size, board meeting, insider 
ownership, institutional ownership, the proportion of audit committee outsiders, 
the proportion of audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee size, 
audit committee meeting, bad (good) news that the actual earnings for the period 
are less (higher) than the consensus forecast, a number of analysts making a 
forecast in the year within 30 days before the management earnings forecast, the 
standard deviation of all earnings forecasts made in the 90 days before the 
management earnings forecast, firm size, industry dummy, and the number of 
days from the management earnings forecast date to the end of period for which 
the forecast is made.  They examine 275 firms in the Fortune 500 survey that 
made 1,621 forecasts in 1,274 firm-years during the period 1995–2000.  For the 
likelihood of a management earnings forecast, they compare corporate governance 
systems between firms who issue at least one earnings forecast in the year and 
firms who do not.  Findings suggest that firms with strong governance systems are 
more likely to disclose information to outside parties.  For the precision of a 
management earnings forecast, they compare between firms who make point 
forecast and who give range, open-ended or qualitative forecasts.  Findings 
suggest that well-governed firms conveying negative news to outside parties are 
more likely to make less precision forecasts.  For the accuracy of a management 
earnings forecast, they employ: 1) the absolute value of the difference between 
actual earnings and the management forecast and 2) the sign difference between 
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actual earnings and the management forecast.  The use of sign difference is to 
measure forecast bias.  Findings suggest that strong corporate governance systems 
are related to forecast accuracy but not forecast bias.  The finding also reports 
more accuracy when conveying bad news regarding annual earnings, implying 
more conservatism.  For the market reaction to a management earnings forecast, 
they use the 3-day market adjusted return centered around the forecast 
announcement date and the change in the consensus analysts forecast from 90 
days before and after the management earnings forecast date as dependent 
variables.  Findings suggest that the market positively reacts to the forecast for 
firms with effective corporate governance systems.     
 
Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) investigate the market reaction on the appointment 
of financial expertise on audit committees.  After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires 
financial expertise on audit committee, it is of interest to determine whether the 
market values this information.  Based on the dataset during the period 1993–
2002, they find that the 3-day cumulative abnormal return is 1.3% around the 
appointment of financial expertise on audit committee and is 2% around the 
appointment of non-financial expertise on audit committee.  They further estimate 
whether the market reaction on the financial expertise on audit committee depends 
on an expert on the committee before the appointment of the new director.  They 
regress the 3-day cumulative abnormal return on the expert on the committee 
before the appointment of the new director.  Their findings suggest that before the 
appointment of the new director, the market reaction on the expert on audit 
committee is not insignificant, suggesting that the positive market reaction on the 
appointment of new audit committee with financial expertise does not depend on 
the expert on the committee before the appointment of the new director.  They 
also find that the 3-day cumulative abnormal return significantly relates to strong 
corporate governance.  Thus, they conclude that this positive market reaction is 
more likely to be observed in firms with strong rather than weak corporate 
governance systems.   
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Lobo and Zhou (2006) also investigate accounting conservatism post-Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  They estimate the conservatism by using discretionary accruals and 
earnings asymmetric timeliness.  A priori expectation is that more conservatism is 
observed post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  They regress discretionary accruals on 
several variables, i.e. size, auditor, cash flows, leverage, changes in income, 
outstanding shares and an indicator variable for pre- and post-Act.  Based on 4-
year and 2-year balanced panel data before and after the Act, they find that 
discretionary accruals decline post-Act.  Based on an unbalanced panel dataset, 
they incorporate an indicator variable for pre- and post-Act into Basu’s earnings 
asymmetric timeliness model, they find that the coefficient estimate for integrated 
variable between bad news and the post-Act is positive, suggesting that 
conservatism increases post-Act.  This study suggests that the corporate 
governance system induces earnings timeliness.     
 
Hovey, Li and Naughton (2003) investigate the ownership structure and firm’s 
valuation for Chinese firms during the period 1997–1999.  They define firm’s 
valuation as firm’s performance by using Tobin’s Q.  They classify the ownership 
structure according to the top five percentage of shareholding, the percentage of 
shareholding by the government and the percentage of shareholding by the legal 
person.  They attempt to discover whether there is an association between firm 
performance and ownership structure.  Their findings suggest that firm 
performance cannot be explained by the ownership structure for Chinese firms.  
However, the institution ownership plays an important role in terms of monitoring 
regarding to firm performance.             
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and a review of prior studies.  
Several issues are derived from the review of literature.  First, it appears that the 
literature has been searching for a theory to explain accounting quality.  Second, 
there is no concrete approach to explain the behaviour of accounting quality.  
Next, since the persistence of earnings is unobservable, a random walk model is 
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the most common method to search for the persistence.  In addition, the value 
relevance is widely employed in the literature to investigate the change in 
accounting quality after the change in accounting standards.  Fifth, it appears that 
accounting standards are not the only parameter influencing accounting quality 
but that there are other factors, i.e. the firm governance mechanism and the book-
tax difference impact on the quality of accounting information.  Sixth, other than 
the value relevance analysis, it is rare to find the existing research investigating 
earnings persistence and timeliness in the emerging market.  Seventh, the research 
study conducted in the emerging market has been silent on employing book-tax 
difference in investigating accounting quality, especially the timeliness of 
earnings.  Last, accounting quality is an important topic largely attracting 
researchers’ attentions around the world.            
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Chapter 4 
Earnings Persistence 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the first property of earnings to be investigated is the persistence 
of earnings.  As aforementioned, the persistence of earnings induces a 
predictability of earnings.  The higher persistence of earnings indicates the higher 
quality of earnings, encouraging the ability of current earnings information to 
predict future earnings information.  Because this analysis is to examine whether 
accounting quality has been enhanced after the adoption of IFRS, a priori 
expectation is that earnings are more persistent during IFRS post-adoption.  The 
improvement of earnings persistence during IFRS post-adoption indicates that 
earnings are of higher quality.  A time-series approach is used for the research 
methodology.  In addition, this analysis employs longitudinal data.  Even though 
the longitudinal data suffers from survivorship bias, the obtained result should be 
more powerful in terms of the persistence analysis.  This chapter is organised as 
follows.  First, this chapter begins with the development of hypotheses in section 
4.2.  Research methodology and dataset are presented in section 4.3 and 4.4, 
respectively.  The main results and robustness checks are presented in section 4.5 
the chapter summary is presented in section 4.6.   
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
In this chapter, I define accounting quality as earnings persistence. This is 
consistent with a large number of prior studies (i.e. Sloan 1996; Francis et al. 
2004; Hanlon 2005).  Earnings persistence in this study is a predictability test of 
earnings information.  Accounting information is a proxy to represent 
unobservable underlying economic constructs.  Information users demand 
economic constructs for their decision making.  Maines and Wahlen (2006) 
suggest that accounting information relevance stimulates measurement and 
reporting reliability.  However, they further argue that information reliability is an 
essential but not adequate characteristic for the efficient use of applicative 
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information.  Because of the different perspective of reliability and relevancy, it is 
controversial to differentiate as to whether reliability or relevancy is more 
important.  Prior studies have extensively evidenced accounting quality in these 
two areas (among others, Sloan 1996; Francis and Schipper 1999; Lev and 
Zarowin 1999; Francis et al. 2004; Richardson et al. 2005; Schmidt 2006).  For 
earnings persistence, prior studies find current earnings can explain future 
earnings and accruals information is more persistent than cash flow information 
(i.e. Sloan 1996; Hanlon 2005).  Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) 
highlight that less reliable accrual estimates result in lower earnings’ persistence.  
Schmidt (2006) finds that current pre-tax earnings can explain future earnings.  
Barth et al. (2008) argue whether IFRS brings a higher quality of earnings than 
domestic accounting standards due to country-specific factors.   
 
This thesis employs earnings persistence to compare accounting quality between 
pre- and post-adoption periods based on three reasons.  Firstly, the persistence of 
earnings is a statistical property of earnings (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2009).  
The persistence of earnings is the study of the prediction ability of earnings 
information.  The predictability of earnings is an important input for the 
estimation of usefulness of accounting information (value relevance), suggesting 
that the higher persistence of earnings induces the higher earnings 
informativeness.  A consequence of earnings persistence is expected to reflect on 
firms’ share prices.  Earnings can be decomposed to accrual and cash flows.  
According to the principle-based accounting system, firms are required to provide 
their forecasting information, i.e. growth and future of their business.  In addition, 
future cash flows must be predicted and performed (i.e. through asset valuations).  
The earnings persistence is one method that allows outsiders (i.e. analysts) to 
determine this classified forecasting information.  For example, Li (2008) finds 
that firms with readable financial statements have more persistence in earnings.  It 
implies that firms with more volatile in accounting information are less likely to 
provide useful guidance to users (Dechow et al. 2009).  In terms of the Thai 
accounting system, the old Thai accounting standard does not require firms to 
predict future cash flows.  When Thai firms are now required to predict future 
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cash flows according to new accounting starndards, it is more likely to observe the 
persistence of earnings reflected on financial statements.  The earnings persistence 
facilitates the usefulness of accounting incormaiton (value relevance).  The 
usefulness of accounting information is reflected on share prices, representing 
firm economic values.  Because the share price is the market’s expectation on 
firms’ net cash flows, relative to the accounting information prepared by the old 
accounting standard, the accounting information prepared by the new accounting 
standards should correspond to more true firm performance that is more useful for 
decision making.  Secondly, Dechow and Schrand (2004) suggest that the 
corporate governance system plays a significant role when the principle-based 
accounting system is employed.  In terms of the Thai accounting system, when the 
new accounting standard is in effective, it will force the corporate governance 
mechanism to have more role and involvement in financial statements 
preparation.  This mechanism, hence, should induce more predictability of 
accounting information.  Thirdly, ones could contend that the earnings in Thai 
firms based on old accounting standards are more persistent because the firms are 
not required to forecast future information and they employ historical cost 
method.  This thesis argues that although Thai firms are not required to provide 
expected future cash flows or they employ historical cost method, accounting 
information can be less persistent.  It is due to the fact that Thai firms can employ 
different accounting methods based only on their discretions.  For example, they 
can use different valuation methods for the same assets without concerning about 
the asset’s ability to generate cash flows that represents firm performances or use 
different accounting methods to smooth earnings the the smoothed earnings have 
low quality (Dechow et al. 2009).   
 
In addition to the above reasons, the persistence of earnings permits researchers to 
calculate the long run equilibrium earnings of the firm or the permanent earnings 
(Mueller 1990).  The persistence estimate signifies the adjustment of excess 
earnings to the equilibrium value of earnings.  The lower persistence indicates the 
faster adjustment whiles the higher persistence indicates the gradually adjustment.  
The calculation of earnings is related to the measurement method specified by 
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accounting standards (Dechow et al 2009).  Relative to the old accounting 
standard, the earnings calculated by the new accounting standard, the IFRS-based 
system, are more reliable as claimed by the Thai accounting standard setter.  
Therefore, the current earnings calculated by the new accounting standard are 
expected to be close to the long run equilibrium earnings comparing with the 
current earnings calculated by the old accounting standard.  As a result, the 
earnings calculated by the new accounting standard relative to the old accounting 
standard are of higher persistence, slow adjustment to the equilibrium value.40 I 
have a prediction that earnings quality is enhanced after the IFRS adoption in 
Thailand.  As a result, I propose the first hypothesis, stated in alternative forms:  
 
 H.4.1:  Earnings are of higher persistence after the adoption of IFRS in  
Thailand. 
 
Following Guenther et al. (1997), Mills (1998) and Hanlon (2005), book-tax 
differences (BT) reflect the management’s incentive but it is difficult for firms to 
increase book income without increasing taxable income or increase tax 
deductions without increasing book expenses.  This thesis considers that the cross-
section variation in using a tax strategy is lower than the cross-section variation in 
managing accruals because tax rules are more restrictive than accounting 
standards.  Based on Hanlon (2005), earnings are of lower persistence for firms 
with large book-tax differences relative to firms with small book-tax differences.  
In this study, I trace book-tax differences over 5-years before and 5-years after 
adopting the new accounting standards and partition firms to two groups.  Group 1 
includes firms whose book-tax differences during post-adoption periods are larger 
than those during pre-adoption periods (BT – Pre-adoption < BT – Post-adoption).  
Group 2 includes firms whose book-tax differences during post-adoption periods 
are smaller than those during pre-adoption periods (BT – Pre-adoption > BT – 
Post-adoption).  I use the two groupings of firms to track overall enhancement of 
earnings quality.  In addition, the book-tax difference in this analysis is used as a 
                                               
40 It should be noted that the reliability of earnings information is unobservable and it is considered 
as a latent variable (Mueller 1990). 
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proxy to differentiate firms’ incentives of using accruals and tax activities.  If we 
hold tax activity constant, the larger book-tax difference reflects over-reported 
earnings, resulting in lower accounting quality.  If we hold earnings management 
unchanged, the larger book-tax difference reflects high tax planning, resulting in 
lower accounting quality (Ayers et al. 2009).  On the other hand, if we hold tax 
activities constant, the large book-tax difference reflects high earnings 
manipulation, resulting in low accounting quality.   
 
Generally speaking, although the sample firms are partitioned according to book-
tax differences, the enhancement of earnings persistence should be observed for 
all firms after IFRS adoptions in Thailand. However, there are two potential 
explanations about the larger book-tax difference.  Firstly, the firm might engage 
in aggressive tax activities and use accruals for earnings manipulations.  
Secondly, Dechow and Schrand (2004) suggest that corporate governance is 
essential when using IFRS, principles-based accounting system.  Thus, the 
corporate governance for firms in group 1 might be weak and probably unable to 
detect the use of accruals for earnings manipulations, especially after IFRS 
adoptions.  It is possible to anticipate the improvement of earnings persistence for 
firms in group 2 because the smaller book-tax difference reflects lower 
manipulation in accounting numbers (Hanlon 2005).  Therefore, following the 
prior study (Hanlon 2005), the expectation is that earnings during pre-adoption 
periods are of higher persistence than earnings during post-adoption periods for 
firms with larger book-tax differences (group 1), whereas earnings during pre-
adoption periods are of lower persistence than earnings during post-adoption 
periods for firms with smaller book-tax differences (group 2).  However, this 
anticipation must be interpreted with caution because firms could manage their 
figures to obtain small book-tax differences.  In addition, Hanlon (2005) suggests 
that it is not clear that a large book-tax difference indicates low earnings 
persistence.  I propose the second hypothesis as follows, stated in the alternative 
form: 
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H.4.2:  When comparing between pre- and post-adoption periods, the 
earnings persistence is related to the book-tax difference. 
 
A number of research studies have investigated the association between corporate 
governance structure and earnings informativeness.  For example, Vafeas (2000) 
concludes that earnings-return relation is found in firms with 5-9 board members.  
Bushman et al. (2004) conclude that the relationship between earnings timeliness 
and ownership concentration, equity benefits to executives and reputation of 
outside directors varies inversely.  Fan and Wong (2002) examine ownership 
structure and earnings informativeness in East Asia and find that low earnings 
information value-relevance is found in concentrated ownership.  Defond et al. 
(2005) investigate the market reaction after appointing new financial experts as 
audit committee members and find that the market reacts positively to accounting 
financial experts but not to general financial experts.  Xie et al. (2003) report that 
the characteristics of audit committee and audit committee activity discourage the 
management to be involved in earnings management.  Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007) find a significant impact of new corporate governance rules, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, on firm values.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) report 
that higher firm value is observed in firms with stronger shareholder rights. Those 
studies suggest that corporate governance plays an important role in accounting 
information quality.  As stated by Dechow and Schrand (2004, pg.114), “Clearly, 
the quality of corporate governance and monitoring of financial reporting will 
have a significant impact on whether principles-based standards result in higher-
quality earnings.” Building from prior studies, I perform the analysis to determine 
whether there is a relationship between accounting quality and the firm 
governance system in Thailand.  If accounting quality relates to firm governance, 
I expect that accounting quality should be varied with the firm governance 
system.  I, thus, hypothesise in an alternative form as follows:  
 
 H.4.3:  Earnings persistence varies according to the firm governance  
system in Thailand. 
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4.3 Research Methodology 
Consistent with a large body of prior research,41 a time series analysis is employed 
to estimate the persistence of earnings by regressing future period earnings on 
current period earnings. The higher magnitude of coefficient estimates represents 
higher earnings persistence.  Based on prior research, book-tax differences 
indicate firms’ earnings persistence variation probably because of discretion in 
accruals (Hanlon 2005).  The persistence of cash flows and accruals provides 
more direct test of earnings persistence in firms with different book-tax gaps.  
Following Sloan (1996) and Hanlon (2005), I decompose earnings to cash flow 
from operation and accruals.  I operationalise the earnings persistence analysis in 
the following way: 
 
 EBITit+1 = β0 + β1EBITit + εit      (4.1) 
 
EBITit+1 = β0 + β2CFit + β3ACCit + εit     (4.2) 
 
where EBITit+1 (EBITit) is earnings before interest and tax in year t+1  (year t). 
CFit is cash flow from operation in year t and ACCit is accruals in year t.
42 All 
variables are deflated by the beginning of total assets to improve cross-section 
comparabilities.  Coefficients of interest include β1, β2 and β3.  Higher coefficient 
estimates reflect more persistence in earnings.  Equation (4.1) restricts the 
persistence coefficients on the accrual and cash components of earnings to be 
equal whilst equation (4.2) compares earnings persistence when earnings 
performance is attributable to the accrual and cash components of earnings (Sloan 
1996).43  Following prior studies (Sloan 1996; Hanlon 2005; Schmidt 2006), the 
                                               
41 Francis et al. (2004) investigate earnings attributes and cost of equity.  Freeman et al. (1982) and 
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) investigate the persistence of earnings by using changes in earnings 
this year as a function of changes in earnings last year.  Foster (1977) estimates a time series of 
quarterly earnings by defining that current year earnings are a function of previous year earnings in 
the same quarter.  Brown and Han (2000) investigate whether investors appreciate the current and 
future earnings by using a first order autoregressive process to determine earnings information. 
42 ACC = Annual changes in current assets – Annual changes in cash – Annual changes in current 
liabilities – Depreciation, and CF = Earnings before interest and tax – ACC 
43 This thesis uses the current earnings to estimate one-year future earnings.  It is possible to 
include higher order lags in the eqations.  However, those variables have sufficiently small effects 
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regressions are estimated by using OLS regressions.  However, bootstrap standard 
errors are applied for the statistics inference of coefficients (Athanasakou et al. 
2007).44 More details about the variables used in this analysis are explained in 
variable definitions.     
       
Firm governance 
Firm governance, i.e. company board structure or audit committee,45 may play a 
significant role in accounting quality.  Generally, agency theory suggests that the 
firm’s agent can affect accounting quality.  For example, when an agent’s 
remunerations and benefits are tied up with accounting numbers, the firm’s agent 
is more likely to manage financial reporting.  Firm governance should improve 
accounting quality and minimise agency costs.  The thesis examines the firm 
governance system by mainly focusing on executive board structure.  First, this 
thesis considers that board size (NBO) is one function that is important for firm 
governance and firm valuation (e.g. Yermack 1996).  I measure board size by a 
number of boards of directors.  Based on prior studies,46 I do not have a priori 
expectation about the relationship between the earnings quality and board size.   
 
Next, I investigate the relationship between board quality (NBB) and audit 
committee quality (NB).  For board quality, I determine board quality by a 
number of boards that directors serve as board of director or audit committee in 
other firms.  The higher the number of boards that they serve reflects higher board 
quality (i.e. reputation).  For audit quality, I employ a number of boards that the 
audit committee serves as board of directors or audit committee in other firms.  
                                                                                                                                
on the estimation process (Mueller 1990 pg.106-107). 
44 Some prior studies report the result obtained from OLS pooled-cross section estimation with 
robust standard error (Sloan 1996; Hanlon 2005). 
45 Audit committee (or independent director is used interchangeably) refers to audit committee and 
independent director throughout this thesis, and non-audit committee (or non-independent director 
is used interchangeably) refers to board directors except audit committee and independent director. 
46 It is problematic to predict the relationship between board size and earnings quality.  For 
example, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) argue that the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and board size is unclear.  Byard et al. (2006) expect board size are negatively 
related to the analyst’s accuracy. Bushman et al. (2004) find no relationship between earnings 
timeliness and board size. Vafeas (2000) expects a negative relation between the value relevance 
of information and board size for a firm’s board with a moderate to large number of members. 
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Following the measurement of board quality, the higher the number of boards that 
the audit committee serves should indicate higher audit committee quality.  
Nonetheless, an alternative explanation for the measurement of board and audit 
committee quality is that board and audit committee quality declines when 
directors or audit committee members serve on many boards because of time 
constraints (see Bushman et al. 2004).  Therefore, these proxies are expected to 
have either a positive or a negative relationship between earnings quality and 
board (audit committee) quality.  No a priori expectation is determined for these 
two variables.   
 
I include the proportion of audit committee on the board team (RCG) to evaluate 
firm governance quality.  The higher ratio reflects the higher quality of firm 
governance system.  Therefore, the positive relationship between earnings 
persistence and the proportion of audit committee on the board team is expected.  
Another explanation is related to the causal relationship, suggesting the 
relationship between the ratio of audit committee and board size is negative 
because firms with low-quality earnings are more likely to improve the 
governance quality.  Therefore, a higher ratio of audit committee on the board is 
observed in those low-quality earnings firms.  As a result, no prior prediction is 
set for this relationship.  I operationalise the model in the following way:   
 
PERi =    γ0 + γ1NBOi + γ2NBBi + γ3NBi + γ4RCGi + γ5YRi  
   + γ6YR*NBOi + γ7YR*NBBi + γ8YR*NBi + γ9YR*RCGi + εi 
         (4.3) 
 
where PER is the earnings persistence obtained from (β1) in the equation (4.1) by 
using OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; PER is 
estimated from five-year window before and after the accounting change.  NBO is 
a median number of boards of director.  NBB is a median number of boards that 
members of board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in 
other firms.  NB is a median number of boards that audit committee members 
serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms.  RCG is a mean 
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proportion of audit committee members on firms’ boards. YR is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for post-adoption periods (2000–2004), 0 otherwise (1995–
1999).  OLS estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are applied 
to estimate this model. 
 
Variable definitions 
Book-tax differences (BT) 
This section provides explanations of book-tax differences.  In addition, earnings 
smoothing measures are calculated to explain descriptive characteristics of the 
sample firm.  I construct firm portfolios by using the pattern of book-tax 
differences.  The book-tax difference is defined as the difference between book 
income and taxable income.  To calculate taxable income, I gross up annual 
income tax expenses47 with the actual income tax rate.  Annual tax expenses 
presented on financial statements are affected by temporary and permanent 
differences between accounting principles and tax rules. These may cause 
measurement error in tax expenses unless the differences are adjusted to 
determine accurate tax expenses in each year (Lev and Nissim 2004).  In this 
thesis, I do not separate the timing difference in firms’ portfolios because of 
limitations of tax data reported in Thai financial statements.48  In addition, I use 
annual income tax expenses rather than actual income tax paid by cash.  However, 
prior studies find that actual income tax expenses do not change the results 
obtained from annual income tax expenses (Lev and Nissim 2004).  Book-tax 
differences I use in this thesis are, therefore, not exhaustive.  In this study, book-
tax differences are not exhaustive proxy to determine firms’ incentives whether 
they have used new accounting standards for preparing financial statements in 
Thai settings.  Book income and taxable income are subject to the management’s 
discretion and tax management, resulting in the magnitude of book-tax 
differences.  Whether book-tax differences are large or small, book-tax 
                                               
47 Lev and Nissim (2004) set missing values of investment tax credit as zero.  Hanlon (2005) uses 
total deferred taxes to replace the missing values of federal and foreign deferred tax expenses.  In 
this thesis, to construct the balanced panel dataset, missing values of annual income tax expenses 
were set to zero.   
48 In addition, IAS12 Accounting for Income Tax is not currently adopted in Thailand. 
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differences of the two groups of firms can be driven by discrete reporting earnings 
or aggressive tax management.  In addition, IFRS, the principles-based accounting 
standard, has a twofold purpose; the management uses accruals to increase or 
decrease earnings quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004, pg.114).  Hanlon (2005) 
suggests that the negative (especially large negative) book-tax difference contains 
information about earnings persistence.  This study uses the average book-tax 
difference that this method should mitigate the potential problem arisen from 
negative book-tax differences. 
 
In this study, book-tax differences are calculated by the difference between 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and taxable income.49  Taxable income is 
calculated by dividing income tax expense by the percent of tax rate (the gross-up 
method) (Lev and Nissim 2004).  For the company tax rate in Thailand, all firms 
doing business in Thailand are subject to pay tax at a flat rate – 30 per cent of 
taxable income.  Special income tax rates are established for listed firms in the 
stock exchange to attract firms to raise business funds from the capital market in 
Thailand.  New firms entering the stock exchange during the period 2001–2005 
are subject to pay company income tax at 25 per cent of taxable income for five 
consecutive years, beginning from the year of its being listed on the stock 
exchange.  For example, the firms that entered to the stock exchange in 2001 
(2005) are subject to pay tax at 25 per cent of taxable income from 2001–2005 
(2005–2009) and a 30 per cent tax rate will be applied from 2006 (2010). For the 
existing firms which have traded their shares on the stock exchange before 2001, 
taxable income is separated into two parts.  The first part of taxable income – 200 
million Thai Baht (~ USD 6.30 million) – is subject to 25 per cent tax rate and the 
amount greater than 200 million Thai Baht is subject to 30 per cent tax rate. This 
rule is applied for the period 2001–2005.  The firm that has branches in foreign 
countries must include income generated from those countries for income tax 
                                               
49 The calculation of book-tax difference is based on company financial statements because taxable 
income for Thai firms is calculated from company financial statements.  This calculation method 
should obtain more precise book-tax differences and, in turn, reduce some measurement error. 
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t=1 
5 
calculation in Thailand whether or not the firm has to pay tax to those foreign 
countries.    
 
I calculate book-tax differences for the firm portfolios in the main analysis as 
follows: 
 
Annual taxable income = Annual income tax expenses/Tax rate  (4.4) 
 
 (Earnings before interest and tax – Annual taxable income) 
          5 
        (4.5) 
where BTi is book-tax differences for firm i and t is 1995–1999 and 2000–2004. 
 
This thesis uses the difference between book income and taxable income as a 
proxy for firm incentives.  In terms of earnings persistence, the large difference 
between book income and taxable income suggests that the earnings persistence 
tends to be low whilst the small difference between book income and taxable 
income suggests that the earnings persistence tends to be high.  It is due to the fact 
that if firms are more likely to use tax rules to calculate earnings, the difference 
between book income and taxable income is likely to be small.  The tax rules are 
more restricted than GAAP, leading to the small variation in earnings calculation 
methods.  Therefore, the high persistence of earnings is expected for firms with 
small book-tax differences.  Nevertheless, the difference between book income 
and taxable income can be either positive or negative differences.  The large 
positive and large negative book-tax difference should indicate the low 
persistence.  Hence, ones could argue that the absolute value of book-tax 
difference should be applied.  Nonetheless, this thesis argues that the negative 
book-tax difference firm includes firms with negative earnings.  Li (2008) reports 
that the earnings persistence of firms with negative earnings tends to be lower 
than the earnings persistence of firms with positive earnings.  Thus, if the absolute 
value of book-tax differences is applied, it probably causes a potential problem 
about information loss.  In addition to the information loss, the book income and 
Σ 
BTi = 
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taxable income in Thailand are calculated by the accrual basis.  The value of 
accrual tends to be reversed in the next period of time.  This thesis uses a balanced 
panel dataset.  For example, for firm A, this thesis calculates the average book 
income and taxable income over five years time.   This should reflect the 
reversion of accrual values.  If the absolute value of book-tax differences is 
applied, it probably cause a potential problem about the book income and taxable 
income are overvalued.  The other reason is that based on accounting 
conservatism, equity value distribution is likely to be going downward or decline.  
If a firm has tried to manage to increase equity value, resulting in the increasing 
earnings each year.  By using the average book income over many years should 
help to deal with this issue.  For taxable income, the prior literature suggests that 
tax strategies will be effective when firms exercise tax strategies over several 
years. Thus, if firms have very aggressive tax activities, taxable income is more 
likely to be decline over time.  By using the average taxable income over many 
years should help to deal with this issue.  If using the absolute value of book-tax 
difference, the sign is lost and the book-tax difference may be overvalued.      
 
Earnings smoothing measures (EM) 
Earnings smoothing measures are to determine whether insiders manage (smooth) 
their report earnings.  The smoothing of reported earnings does not represent the 
firms’ underlying economic performance.  On the other hand, it is argued that the 
lower variation of earnings does improve the predictability of earnings.  I 
calculate earnings smoothing measures to obtain more insightful descriptive 
information about firms’ characteristics.  Following Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
(2003), I calculate two earnings smoothing measures of the firm.  EM1 is a 
median ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of earnings divided by the firm-
level standard deviation of cash flows.  The lower standard deviation of earnings 
indicates the higher degree to which insiders smooth reported earnings by 
reducing the variability of reported earnings by accounting methods.  Leuz et al. 
(2003) suggest that the ratio is divided by cash flows from operations to mitigate 
the difference in the variability of economic performance across firms.  EM2 is 
the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in operating 
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cash flows.  Firms are able to either delay to report current performance or 
accelerate the reporting of future revenues because of the accrual accounting 
mechanism.  The large magnitude of the correlation indicates the smoothing of 
reported earnings.  
 
4.4 Data 
The initial sample population chosen is based on all non-financial firms with a 
31st December financial year-end.  They are listed on SET from 1995 to 2004.  
According to SET, I categorise sample firms into seven industries: agro-business, 
consumer products, industrial, property and construction, natural resources, 
services and technology.  I use two databases provided by SET to construct 
datasets.  Share prices and financial data from 1994 to 1996 are obtained from 
Integrated-SET Information Management System (I-SIMS) CD-ROMs while the 
data from 1997 to 2005 are collected from SETSMART (SET Market Analysis 
and Reporting Tool).   
 
I use longitudinal data, over a 10-year period from 1995 to 2004.  I gather a 
constant sample of firms that have financial data available from 1994 to 2005.  
Those sample firms have to govern themselves to respond to accounting changes; 
this raises a survivorship problem.  Even though the analysis of constant sample 
firms suffers a survivorship bias, reasons for using the constant sample of firms 
over a ten-year period are that: i) this allows the control of a firm’s characteristics 
in a similar range, i.e. operating cycle, reputation, performance (i.e. they should 
reach economies of scale) or firm size, ii) some firms entered the capital market 
after the accounting reform period, especially IPOs.  These firms are more likely 
to meet the market demands of reporting high quality financial data (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2008).  This attrition may induce biased results, iii) the change in 
firms’ incentives can influence accounting quality (Barth et al. 2008).  The use of 
constant samples possibly reduces the level of firms’ incentives problems to the 
same range.  For example, the constant sample firm has to maintain its 
performances to meet the stock listing rules, iv) survivorship problem may induce 
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upward bias.  Specifically, survival firms organise themselves to catch up with 
new accounting rules, i.e. generating transactions to meet the requirement of 
accounting principles and v) the use of constant sample firm is representing the 
dynamic change in accounting quality during the sampling period.  In this study, I 
focus on Thailand’s accounting system rather than comparing with firms in other 
countries. This tends to minimise the variation of economic environment and 
accounting regime that may influence the result (Ball and Shivakumar 2008).  
 
To compare the accounting information quality before and after the adoption of 
IFRS, I partition the data set according to time scales, 1995–1999 (pre-adoption) 
and 2000–2004 (post-adoption).  In subsamples, I divide the dataset by the 
magnitude of accumulated book-tax differences.  I split and compare accumulated 
book-tax differences by their mean of 5-years before and 5-years after the 
accounting change.  Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest that tax avoidance is observed in 
firms that have a low effective tax rate over many years.  The average of multiple-
year book-tax differences should reflect tax activity.  In firm portfolios, group 1 
includes firms with larger magnitude of book-tax differences during post-adoption 
periods (BT-Pre < BT-Post).  Group 2 includes firms with a smaller magnitude of 
book-tax differences during post-adoption periods (BT-Pre > BT-Post).   
 
4.5 Results 
The pattern of book-tax differences  
Figures 4.1–4.3 illustrate the pattern of book-tax differences during the period 
1992–2007.  According to SET, listed firms are grouped into seven industries, 
including agro-business, consumer products, industrial, natural resources, 
services, technology and financial sector.  After the 1997-financial crisis in 
Thailand, listed firms with very weak performances are transferred and supervised 
under the rehabilitation programme.  Thus, during the financial crisis, there is 
another group: rehabilitation.  Firms’ shares in the rehabilitation programme are 
not traded until they are removed from the programme.  Figure 4.1 shows the 
book-tax difference for all firm-years whilst Figure 4.2 depicts the book-tax 
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difference when the firms in the rehabilitation programme are excluded; the 
number of firms each year are shown in parentheses.50  These graphs have rather 
identical trends.  During the financial crisis, book income is much lower than 
taxable income as the book-tax difference becomes negative.  After 2000, the 
book-tax difference bounces back to positive and has an increasing trend until 
2007.  Kruskal-Wallis test is used to compare the book-tax difference over 16 
years.  It suggests that the book-tax difference in each year is statistically 
significantly different.  When partitioning the book-tax difference to pre- (1992–
1999) and post-IFRS adoption (2000–2007), Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that 
the book-tax difference between the two periods is statistically significantly 
different.   
 
Because of the special and complex characteristics of firms in the financial sector, 
Figure 4.3 depicts the pattern of book-tax differences for non-financial firms with 
December year-ended (and excluding the firm in the rehabilitation programme).  
The graph informs that the book-tax difference is positive on average and has an 
increasing trend from 1993 to 2007.  The book-tax difference in each year is 
statistically significantly different over 16 years according to Kruskal-Wallis test.  
In addition, Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that the book-tax difference between 
pre- (1992–1999) and post-adoption periods (2000–2007) is not significantly 
different.  However, the graph shows an increasing trend of book-tax differences 
during the 16-year period.  
 
Based on Figure 4.3, one potential explanation about the increasing trend of book-
tax differences is that new accounting standards as direct tools for book income 
calculations play an important role in inducing larger book-tax differences.  If this 
is the case, Thailand is likely to transfer from a tax-based accounting income to a 
GAAP-based accounting income system.51 
                                               
50 It should be noted that firms with missing values of taxable income are dropped for the 
calculation of book-tax differences presented on these graphs.  For the graphs, a number of 
observations are quite small during 1997–2004.   
51 Appendix 2 presents the graph of book-tax differences for each industry. 
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Figure 4.1 Book-Tax Differences (BT): All firm-years 
 Note: Kruskal-Wallis test: chi-squared  = 178.94, p-value  = 0.0001   
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z  = 7.58, p-value = 0.0000  
   
Figure 4.2 Book-Tax Differences (BT): Firm-years under rehabilitation 
programme are excluded. 
 
 
Note:  Kruskal-Wallis test: chi-squared  = 151.08, p-value  = 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z  = 5.897, p-value = 0.0000 
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Figure 4.3 Book-Tax Differences (BT): Non-financial firm-years with December 
year-ended. 
 
Note:  Kruskal-Wallis test: chi-squared  = 41.28 p-value  = 0.0003 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z   = -0.35, p-value  = 0.723 
 
 
Table 4.1 A distribution of sample firms during the period 1995–2004 based on 
model (1) 
 
Industry Groups Group 1 Group 2 
Total 
no. of 
observations 
(firms) 
Missing value 
of taxable 
income 
Negative 
taxable 
income 
Agro-Business 130  230  360 (36) 113 21 
Consumer Products 120  170  290 (29) 86 7 
Industrial 150  120  270 (27) 94 7 
Property and Construction 240  80  320 (32) 173 14 
Natural Resources 40  20  60 (6) 31 4 
Services 240  270  510 (51) 163 11 
Technology 80 110  190 (19) 91 4 
Total observations 1000 1000 2000 (200) 751 68 
 
Descriptive statistics 
According to the graph of book-tax differences, the book-tax difference is greatly 
influenced by firms in the financial sector and the rehabilitation programme.  It is 
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very common for empirical research to exclude firms in the financial sector 
because of its distinct regulations and accounting standards.  For firms in the 
rehabilitation programme, their trading shares are inactive and suspended until the 
firm can improve their performance.  Therefore, I exclude firms in these two 
groups for this empirical work.  Moreover, there are many factors influencing the 
quality of accounting numbers, i.e. economic environment, firm governance or 
regulations.  To minimise the variation of economic circumstances and to observe 
the dynamic change in accounting quality in Thai firms, I employ the constant 
dataset by using surviving firms for which datasets are available over ten years, 
1995–2004.   
 
Based on the dataset in 2004, Table 4.1 reports the total number of 200 firms 
(2000 firm-years) used in this analysis during the period 1995–2004.  All firms 
have remained in their industry during the whole sampling period except that one 
company has moved from property and construction in 2003 to service group in 
200452 and two companies have moved from service group in 2003 to consumer 
products group in 2004.53 There are 751 observations that taxable income is set to 
be zero.      
 
In Table 4.2, descriptive statistics report that future and current earnings do not 
vary among sample firms.  Cash flows from operation (13%) are higher than 
earnings (8.8%) and accruals are negative (-3.9%).  These results are consistent 
with prior studies (i.e. Dichev and Tang 2009).  Higher standard deviations 
indicate large differences in cash flows and accruals among firms.  For the firm 
governance, 17 firms are deleted because of missing data.  The persistence of 
earnings (PER) is on average .20 and largely differs among firms (SD of .757).  
Firms’ earnings are less persistent when the persistence (PER) is negative.  On 
average, there are 15 members on a firm’s board (mean of NBO = 15.208).  One-
third of the firms’ board is made up of independent members (mean of RCG = 
30.6%). Each member of the firm’s board serves as an executive member on 44 
                                               
52 Company code #120  
53 Company code #50 and #91 
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boards in the same year (mean of NBB = 44.39).  In addition, each independent 
member serves as an executive director on 16 boards in the same year (mean of 
NB = 16.82%). 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Median SD 25th Percentile 75th Percentile N 
EBITit+1 0.072 0.079 0.117 0.029 0.125 2000 
EBITit 0.088 0.088 0.107 0.033 0.141 2000 
CFit 0.130 0.128 0.185 0.050 0.212 1050 
ACCit -0.039 -0.045 0.169 -0.113 0.027 1050 
PER 0.204 0.167 0.757 -0.215 0.678 360 
NBO 15.208 14 4.870 12 18 360 
NBB 44.393 39 26.659 24 59 360 
NB 16.817 13 14.349 6 22 360 
RCG 0.306 0.296 0.116 0.214 0.379 360 
ROA 0.031 0.037 0.075 -0.007 0.078 360 
MKT1 52.2 88.8 171 35 303 360 
 
EBITit+1 (EBITit) is earnings before interest and tax year t+1 (t) scaled by the beginning of total assets; CFit is cash flow 
from operation in year t deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACCit is the accrual in year t deflated by the beginning of 
total asset; PER is persistence coefficient (β1) obtained from the equation: EBITit = β0 + β1EBITit-1 + εit by rolling five–year 
window estimations; NBO is number of boards of director; NBB is number of boards that members of board of directors 
serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms; NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve 
as board of directors or audit committee in other firms; MKT1 (00’000’000) is market capitalization. RCG is proportion of 
audit committee members in board of directors and ROA is return on assets.  SD is standard deviation.  N is number of 
observations. 
 
I further perform comparison tests between the two groups of firms to obtain 
overall characteristics of the sample firms.  As presented in Table 4.3, when 
considering the standard t-test together with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, in Panel A, 
at the conventional significant level (<5%), t-statistics report that the firms in both 
groups are not substantially different on average in terms of earnings (EBIT), 
performance (measured by ROA and ROE) and leverage.  But, firm size 
(measured by TA) for group 1 is larger than firm size for group 2.  The rank-sum 
test suggests that both groups are not different in accruals and ROE.   
 
In Panel B of Table 4.3, the persistence variable (PER) is significantly different 
between two groups; on average firms in group 1 have higher persistence 
coefficients than firms in group 2.  These two groups are also different in terms of 
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firm governance systems.  A number of boards that the board of directors (and 
audit committee) serves as a board of directors in other firms for firms in group 1 
are greater than a number of boards that the board of directors (and audit 
committee) serves as a board of directors in other firms for firms in group 2 
(measured by NBB and NB, respectively).  Board size (NBO) and the ratio of 
audit committee divided by board size (RCG) do not statistically differ between 
two groups.      
 
To obtain more information about firms’ characteristics, I further evaluate 
whether firms smooth their earnings by using EM1 and EM2.  Table 4.4 presents 
results of the smoothing of reported earnings.  EM1 is a median ratio of the firm-
level standard deviation of earnings scaled by lagged total assets divided by the 
firm-level standard deviation of cash flows scaled by lagged total assets.  EM2 is 
the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets and changes in cash flows scaled by lagged total assets.  For full samples, 
EM1 (higher) and EM2 (lower) suggest that sample firms are more likely to have 
lower earnings smoothing activity during IFRS post-adoption periods in Thailand. 
In subgroups, EM1 of both group 1 and group 2 increases after the IFRS adoption 
in Thailand, suggesting that earnings smoothing activity for both groups declines 
during post-adoption periods.  EM2 of group 1 increases from –0.907 to –0.910, 
suggesting that firms in group 1 are likely to have higher smoothed earnings 
during post-adoption periods in Thailand.  EM2 of group 2 declines from –0.910 
to –0.891, suggesting that firms in group 2 are likely to have lower smoothed 
earnings during post-adoption periods in Thailand.  The result also reports that 
EM1 of group 1 (0.422) is lower than EM1 of group 2 (0.584) during post-
adoption periods, suggesting that the earnings smoothing activity of group 1 is 
higher than the earnings smoothing activity of group 2.  In addition, EM2 of group 
1 (-0.910) is greater than EM2 of group 2 (-0.891) during post-adoption periods, 
suggesting that the earnings smoothing activity of group 1 is higher than the 
earnings smoothing activity of group 2. 
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Table 4.3 The mean comparisons of firm’s characteristics between two groups 
Panel A 
Variables Group Mean SE SD N t-test Wilcoxon Rank- 
sum test 
EBIT 1 0.084 0.004 0.111 1000 t = -1.597 z = -2.869 
 2 0.091 0.003 0.104 1000 p = 0.111 p = 0.004 
CF 1 0.120 0.008 0.180 540 t = -1.712 z = -1.995 
 2 0.140 0.008 0.190 510 p = 0.087 p = 0.046 
ACC 1 -0.033 0.007 0.167 540 t = 1.294 z = 1.631 
 2 -0.046 0.008 0.172 510 p = 0.196 p = 0.103 
ROA 1 0.025 0.004 0.119 1000 t = -0.951 z = -2.262 
 2 0.031 0.004 0.121 1000 p = 0.342 p = 0.024 
ROE 1 -0.484 0.340 10.747 1000 t = -0.858 z = -1.128 
 2 -0.155 0.179 5.672 1000 p = 0.391 p = 0.259 
LEV 1 1.701 1.496 47.319 1000 t = -0.750 z = 2.661 
 2 3.160 1.241 39.243 1000 p = 0.453 p = 0.008 
TA 1 1.060 0.009 0.275 1000 t = 5.566 z = 11.602 
 2 0.515 0.005 0.144 1000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
 
Panel B 
         
PER 1 0.321 0.056 0.761 182 t = 2.973 z = 3.182 
 2 0.088 0.054 0.738 178 p = 0.003 p = 0.002 
NBO 1 15.313 0.355 4.794 182 t = 0.412 z = 0.627 
 2 15.103 0.365 4.955 178 p = 0.681 p = 0.531 
NB 1 18.692 1.073 14.478 182 t = 2.505 z = 2.956 
 2 14.962 1.033 14.015 178 p = 0.013 p = 0.003 
NBB 1 47.819 1.903 25.666 182 t = 2.462 z = 3.194 
 2 41.005 2.009 27.253 178 p = 0.014 p = 0.001 
RCG 1 0.309 0.009 0.117 182 t = 0.596 z = 0.451 
 2 0.302 0.008 0.115 178 p = 0.552 p = 0.652 
 
EBITit is current earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; LEV is the ratio of total liability 
divided by the total equity; TA (00’000’000) is the total asset; CFit is current cash flow from operation deflated by the 
beginning of total asset; ACCit is current accruals deflated by the beginning of total asset; PER is persistence coefficient; 
NBO is number of boards of director; NBB is number of boards that members of board of directors serve as board of 
directors or audit committee in other firms; NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of 
directors or audit committee in other firms; RCG is a proportion of audit committee members in board of directors and 
ROA is return on assets.  SD is standard deviation; SE is standard error and N is number of observations.  
Group 1 (2) is firms whose book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods are smaller (larger) than those during post-
adoption periods (Group 1: BT-Pre < BT-Post, Group 2: BT-Pre> BT-Post)   
Null hypothesis (H0) defines as no difference in means between two groups.  Alternative hypothesis (Ha) is set as the mean 
of group 1is not equals to mean of group 2. 
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Table 4.4 Earnings smoothing measures 
 
Variables Period Full samples Group 1 Group 2 N 
EM1 Pre (1995–1999) 0.418 0.396 0.469 525 
 Post (2000–2004) 0.515 0.422 0.584 525 
 N 1050 540 510 1050 
EM2 Pre (1996–1999) -0.909 -0.907 -0.910 420 
 Post (2000–2004) -0.900 -0.910 -0.891 525 
 N 945 486 459 945 
 
EM1 is a median ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of earnings scaled by lagged total assets divided by the firm-
level standard deviation of cash flows scaled by lagged total asset.  The ratio of each firm is calculated.  Then the median of 
EM1 is computed.  The small figure of EM1 indicates that firms are more likely to smoothing theirs earnings. 
 
EM2 is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals scaled by lagged total assets and changes in cash flows 
scaled by lagged total asset.  The large figure of EM2 indicates that firms are more likely to smoothing theirs earnings.   
 
N is number of observations. Group 1 (2) is firms whose book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods are smaller 
(larger) than those during post-adoption periods (Group 1: BT-Pre < BT-Post, Group 2: BT-Pre> BT-Post). 
 
In conclusion, the earnings smoothing measures report that the earnings 
smoothing in Thai firms are more likely to decline after the IFRS adoption.  The 
earnings smoothing of group 2 is more likely to be lower than the earnings 
smoothing of group 1 after the IFRS adoption. 
 
In Table 4.5, I separate correlation analysis due to the difference in the number of 
observations and the regression models.  From Panel A, the correlation shows that 
future earnings are correlated with cash flows from operation and accruals. In 
Panel B, the persistence coefficient is relatively positively correlated with firm 
governance factors, except board size (NBO) and board quality (NBB).  Firm size 
(MKT) is positively correlated with all firm governance factors.   
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Table 4.5 Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient on the lower 
(upper) diagonal 
Panel A 
 N = 1050 EBITit+1 CF ACC 
EBITit+1   0.3096*** 0.0663** 
CF 0.3062***   -0.7632*** 
ACC -0.0278 -0.8681***    
Panel B 
N = 366 PER NBO NBB NB RCG ROA MKT1 
PER   -0.0418 0.0429 0.1182** 0.0986* 0.1031** 0.1316** 
NBO -0.0279   0.7000*** 0.4150*** -0.0525 0.0756 0.2855*** 
NBB 0.0239 0.6883***   0.6583*** -0.0019 0.0184 0.3623*** 
NB 0.052 0.3921*** 0.6941***   0.5627*** 0.2352*** 0.3236*** 
RCG 0.0999* -0.1120** -0.0217 0.4998***   0.3303*** 0.1022** 
ROA 0.1132** 0.0094 0.0054 0.1414*** 0.2656***   0.2478*** 
MKT1 0.1029** 0.1146** 0.2507*** 0.1688*** 0.0729 0.1121**   
 
EBITit+1 is future earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; CF is current cash flow from 
operation deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACC is current accruals deflated by the beginning of total asset. 
PER is persistence coefficient obtained from the equation (1) by rolling five–year window estimations; NBO is number of 
boards of director; NBB is number of boards that members of board of directors serve as board of directors or audit 
committee in other firms; NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of directors or audit 
committee in other firms; MKT1 is market capitalization. RCG is a proportion of audit committee members in board of 
directors and ROA is return on assets. N is number of observations. 
 ***,**, * Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
 
Results from univariate tests 
From Table 4.6, Panel A, I regress the information sets on years.  Book-tax 
differences for firms in group 1 (on average .7 percentage points increase each 
year) are greater than that for firms in group 2 (on average 1 percentage point 
decrease each year).  In Panel B, I regress earnings on 10-year periods by using 
indicator variables.  This is to determine whether earnings structure has changed 
during the IFRS adoption periods.  Without other information sources, results 
indicate that earnings structure for all firm-years significantly declines over time.  
Specially, earnings of firms in group 2 have substantially declined since 1998.  In 
Panel C, taxable income is regressed on years.  The results from panel B and C 
suggest that during pre-adoption periods, earnings and taxable income tend to 
decrease.  However, during post-adoption periods, the negative sign of coefficient 
estimates suggests that the decrease in earnings (significant) is greater than the 
decrease in taxable income (insignificant).  When comparing between group 1 and 
2, the pattern of earnings and taxable income for both groups follows the same 
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direction (decreasing) during pre-adoption periods.  However, during post-
adoption periods, the result reports the decrease in earnings but not the decrease in 
taxable income for group 2 (that the result in Panel C for group 2 is not 
statistically significant from year 2001).  On the other hand, the result reports the 
decrease in taxable income but not the decrease in earnings for group 1.   
 
In summary, it is rather difficult for firms to reduce taxable income without 
lowering earnings.  Therefore, it is more likely that earnings and taxable income 
follow a similar direction.  The result from univariate tests suggests that during 
post-adoption periods, on average earnings decline but taxable income does not 
significantly decline (group 2), implying that it is more restricting to engage in 
high tax activities to lower taxable income.   However, taxable income for group 1 
declines significantly whilst earnings are not considerably changed.  This implies 
that firms in group 1 are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation or tax 
activity relative to firms in group 2.  In addition, the result implies that firms in 
group 1 are more likely to use new accounting standards opportunistically or 
intentionally to manage earnings relative to firms in group 2.        
 
Results from multivariate regressions  
Table 4.7 presents the persistence coefficients of regressions of 1-year future 
earnings on current earnings.  Panel A of Table 4.7 reveals that the persistence 
coefficient (β1) is .616 for full samples.
54 Earnings persistence is .560 points 
during pre-adoption and increases to .684 points during post-adoption periods.  
Panel B presents the results for subgroups formed on the book-tax difference.  
Group 1 includes firms whose book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods 
are smaller than book-tax differences during post-adoption periods.  Group 2 
includes firms whose book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods are larger 
than book-tax differences during post-adoption periods.  An indicator variable for 
time (YR) is introduced in the analysis. 
                                               
54 Pincus et al. (2007) estimate accrual anomaly in 21 countries, including Thailand.  As a part of 
accrual anomaly analysis, they report the persistence of earnings for Thai firms during the period 
1994–2002 is .64.  The persistence of earnings for US firms ranges from .652 (Dichev and Tang 
2009) and .8 (Sloan 1996). 
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Table 4.6 Univariate analysis 
Panel A: OLS regressions, regressing effective tax rate, discretionary accruals and book-tax 
differences on time trend.  
 
Vit = λ0+ λ1YEARit + εit   
   
 Full samples Group 1 Group 2 
BT        
λ0 2.176 (1.62) -13.039 (-9.19)*** 17.39 (8.03)*** 
λ1 -0.001 (-1.59) 0.007 (9.22)*** -0.01 (-8.01)*** 
Adj.R2  0.001  0.045  0.066 
N  2000  1000  1000 
 
Panel B: OLS regression, regressing earnings before interest and tax on indicator variables. 
   
EBITit = θ0+ θ 1Y96it  + θ 2Y97it  +…+ θ9Y04it  + εit   
 
 Full samples Group 1 Group 2 
INT 0.130 (23.06)*** 0.113 (14.44)*** 0.147 (18.87)*** 
Y96 -0.028 (-3.61)*** -0.030 (-2.63)*** -0.026 (-2.63)*** 
Y97 -0.052 (-5.13)*** -0.066 (-4.41)*** -0.038 (-2.97)*** 
Y98 -0.040 (-3.43)*** -0.059 (-3.30)*** -0.020 (-1.48) 
Y99 -0.081 (-8.31)*** -0.082 (-5.74)*** -0.080 (-6.22)*** 
Y00 -0.060 (-6.11)*** -0.036 (-2.71)*** -0.084 (-5.87)*** 
Y01 -0.047 (-5.34)*** -0.028 (-2.37)** -0.065 (-5.18)*** 
Y02 -0.042 (-4.81)*** -0.009 (-0.77) -0.074 (-5.99)*** 
Y03 -0.035 (-4.00)*** 0.010 (0.91) -0.080 (-6.48)*** 
Y04 -0.037 (-3.68)*** 0.011 (0.87) -0.086 (-5.88)*** 
Adj.R2  0.031  0.070  0.075 
N  2000  1000  1000 
 
Panel C: OLS regression, regressing taxable income on indicator variables. 
 
TAXit = θ0+ θ 1Y96it  + θ 2Y97it  +…+ θ9Y04it  + εit   
 
 Full samples Group 1 Group 2 
INT 0.055 (13.83)*** 0.044 (8.39)*** 0.066 (11.36)*** 
Y96 -0.010 (-1.80)* -0.007 (-1.02) -0.012 (-1.55) 
Y97 -0.030 (-5.55)*** -0.023 (-3.11)*** -0.037 (-4.74)*** 
Y98 -0.028 (-5.12)*** -0.025 (-3.43)*** -0.031 (-3.89)*** 
Y99 -0.026 (-4.60)*** -0.021 (-2.89)*** -0.030 (-3.64)*** 
Y00 -0.022 (-3.96)*** -0.025 (-3.55)*** -0.020 (-2.33)** 
Y01 -0.012 (-1.95)* -0.020 (-2.67)*** -0.005 (-0.50) 
Y02 -0.015 (-2.62)*** -0.019 (-2.71)*** -0.012 (-1.30) 
Y03 -0.013 (-2.17)** -0.015 (-2.10)** -0.011 (-1.16) 
Y04 -0.008 (-1.36) -0.009 (-1.19) -0.008 (-0.83) 
Adj.R2  -0.0004  0.017  0.025 
N  2000  1000  1000 
 
EBIT is earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; TAX is taxable income deflated by total 
assets; BT is book-tax differences scaled by total assets; Y95 (Y96…Y04) is indicator variable equal to 1 for 1995 
(1996…2004) and 0 otherwise; YEAR = 1995, 1996,…, 2004 and N is number of observations. In parentheses, t-statistics 
are based on OLS firm fixed-effect estimations with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Group 1 (2) include firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences during post-adoption periods. 
***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Panel B of Table 4.7 reports that the persistence coefficient for group 1 (β1) is 
.541.  The persistence coefficient for group 2 (β1= .553) is slightly higher than for 
group 1.  The coefficient (β5) for group 1 is negative and insignificant, indicating 
that the persistence of earnings for group 1 tends to decrease but not significantly.  
On the other hand, the coefficient (β5) for group 2 is positive and significant, 
indicating that the persistence of earnings for group 2 increases by .245 point after 
the adoption of IFRS in Thailand. 
 
Panels C and D of Table 4.7 present the persistence coefficients of regressions of 
1-year future earnings on earnings performance attributable to cash flows from 
operation and accruals.  Panel C reports that the persistence coefficient of earnings 
performance attributable to cash flows from operation and accruals is (β2) .590 
and (β3) .543 points, respectively.  The Chi
2 value (7.18) suggests that the 
persistence coefficient for earnings performance attributable to cash flows from 
operation is significantly larger that that for earnings performance attributable to 
accruals. Prior research suggests that earnings management induces the lower 
persistence of earnings performance attributable to the accrual component of 
earnings (Sloan 1996).  The smaller coefficient on accruals relative to cash flows 
reflects the higher discretion in accruals, that these findings are consistent with 
US evidence (i.e. Sloan 1996; Hanlon 2005).  The finding from full samples in 
Panel C suggests that firms are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation.   
 
As compared to pre-adoption periods, the magnitude of coefficient on accruals 
and cash flows during post-adoption periods is higher (β2–Pre = .519 vs. β2–Post = 
.653 and β3–Pre = .462 vs. β3–Post = .615), reflecting the higher quality of 
earnings information prepared by new accounting standards.  The Chi2 value 
indicates that the persistence coefficient for earnings performance attributable to 
cash flows from operation is significantly larger than that for earnings 
performance attributable to accruals for both periods.  Panel D presents the results 
for subgroups.  The persistence coefficients of earnings performance attributable 
to cash and accrual components for group 1 during pre-adoption are (β2) .520 and 
(β3) .494, respectively.  The persistence coefficients of earnings performance 
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attributable to cash and accrual components for group 1 tend to improve but not 
significant as measured by the positive sign of β7 and β8.  On the other hand, the 
results suggest that the persistence coefficients of earnings performance 
attributable to cash and accrual component for group 2 during pre-adoption are 
(β2) .480 and (β3) .390, respectively and they improve by (β7) .207 and (β8) .273, 
respectively, during post-adoption periods.  The results are consistent with the 
regression of 1-year future earnings on current earnings reported in Panel B.  
Nevertheless, the persistence coefficients of earnings performance attributable to 
cash and accrual component during post-adoption periods are not significantly 
different for both subgroups (measured by the Chi2 (β7 = β8) = 0.67 for group 1 
and 1.64 for group 2 is not significant).55   
 
In conclusion, earnings are of higher quality in terms of persistence attribute after 
the change in accounting standards in Thailand.  The results support the 
hypothesis (H.4.1).  According to these results, earnings persistence is more 
pronounced for firms with small book-tax differences relative to firms with large 
book-tax differences.  This is consistent with the prior study (Hanlon 2005).  The 
improvement of earnings persistence during post-adoption periods in group 2 
supports the hypothesis (H.4.2).  Nevertheless, the persistence of earnings for 
firms in group 2 must be interpreted with caution because if firms engage in 
earnings smoothing, their smoothed earnings will not capture underlying 
economic performances.  The descriptive analysis suggests that it is less likely for 
firms in group 2 to engage in earnings smoothing relative to firms in group 1, and 
the earnings smoothing activity for firms in group 2 is declined during post-
adoption periods.  Nevertheless, it is essential for future research to explore 
whether the persistence of earnings for firms in group 2 involves earnings 
smoothing.        
                                               
55 Pincus et al. (2007) find that the persistence coefficients of earnings performance attributable to 
accrual component are not significantly different from the persistence of earnings performance 
attributable to cash component in Denmark, India, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Singapore and 
Thailand.  For Thailand, they report that the persistence coefficients of earnings attributable to 
cash flow and accrual component are .603 equally. 
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Table 4.7 OLS estimator with bootstrap standard error is employed for the 
estimation. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
EBITit+1 =  β0 + β1EBITit + β4YRit + β5YR*EBITit  + εit  
 
Panel A: Full samples 
  All Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
β0 0.018 (3.46)*** 0.019 (3.09)*** 0.017 (2.00)** 
β1 0.616 (13.8)*** 0.560 (11.68)*** 0.684 (8.98)*** 
 Adj.R2  0.321  0.296  0.353 
N  2000  1000  1000 
Model-Chi2  190.37  136.38  80.64 
 
Panel B  
                  Group 1               Group 2 
β0  0.013 (1.72)*  0.026 (2.56)** 
β1  0.541 (7.99)***  0.553 (7.43)*** 
β4  0.031 (3.60)**  0.025 (-1.51) 
β5  -0.031 (-0.40)  0.245 (1.65)* 
 Adj.R2   0.368   0.317 
N   1000   1000 
Model-Chi2   286.43   109.21 
 
EBITit+1 =  β0 + β2CFit + β3ACCit+ β6YRit + β7YR*CFit + β8YR*ACCit   + εit  
 
Panel C: Full Samples 
  All Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
β0 0.032 (7.00)*** 0.032 (5.56)*** 0.033 (4.79)*** 
β2 0.590 (13.69)*** 0.519 (10.62)*** 0.653 (9.55)*** 
β3 0.543 (13.11)*** 0.462 (9.40)*** 0.615 (9.47)*** 
 Adj.R2  0.322  0.232  0.414 
N  1050  525  525 
Model-Chi2  189.67  112.82  93.35 
Chi2 (β2 = β3)    7.18***  5.78**  2.64* 
 
Panel D 
   Group 1  Group 2 
β0  0.028 (4.13)***  0.040 (3.75)*** 
β2  0.520 (7.52)***  0.480 (6.36)*** 
β3  0.494 (7.24)***  0.390 (4.95)*** 
β6  0.020 (1.76)*  -0.018 (-1.21) 
β7  0.058 (-0.50)  0.207 (1.67)* 
β8  0.019 (0.17)  0.273 (2.15)** 
Adj. R2   0.331   0.339 
 N   540   510 
Model-Chi2   125.6   92.14 
Chi2 (β2 = β3)     1.05   4.63** 
Chi2 (β7 = β8)   0.67   1.64 
 
EBITit+1 (EBITit) is 1-year-future (current) earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; CFit is 
current year cash flow from operation deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACFit is current year accruals deflated by the 
beginning of total asset; YR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for post-adoption period (2000–2005), 0 otherwise (1992–
1999) and N is number of observations. Group 1 (2) include firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences during post-
adoption periods.  ***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). CF = Earnings before interest 
and tax + Depreciation – (Changes in current asset – Changes in cash – Changes in current liabilities); AC = Earnings 
before interest and tax – CF. Bootstrap estimation is repeated 1,000 times. 
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It should be noted that the results reported in Table 4.7 are qualitatively similar 
when the book-tax difference is calculated from consolidated financial 
statements.56  In terms of earnings persistence, this thesis considers that there are 
at least two potential explanations why earnings persistence for firms in group 1 
has not significantly improved during post-adoption periods.  Firstly, firms in 
group 1 possibly engage in tax and earnings management to a higher extent than 
do firms in group 2.  Secondly, because the sample firms do not considerably 
differ in earnings, leverage or performance, this thesis proposes that the 
differential earnings persistence between two groups should be induced by the 
variation in firm governance factors.  Therefore, I further explore the relationship 
between firm governance factors and earnings persistence. 
 
Earnings persistence and firm governance 
I compare the characteristics of firms in two groups and find that they do not 
differ in various financial proxies, including earnings, debt-equity ratio or 
performance.  I therefore analyse whether the earnings persistence is varied 
according to firm governance systems.  I regress earnings persistence on firm 
governance variables.  As reported in Table 4.8, YR in the model is year dummy 
variable, separating between pre- and post-adoption periods.  YR is also interacted 
with other firm governance variables.  Results show that during pre-adoption 
periods, the relationship between earnings persistence and firm governance 
variables is not observed for all groups of sample firms.  During post-adoption 
periods, the full sample analysis reveals that earnings persistence is significantly 
associated with firm governance variables, including NBB, NB and RCG, but 
there is no relationship between earnings persistence and board size (NBO).  The 
relationship between earnings persistence and NBB is significantly positive, 
suggesting that high board quality induces high earnings persistence.57 The 
                                               
56 See results in Appendix 3 
57 It should be noted that NBB (NB) in this analysis has twofold meanings.  One represents the 
reputation of the board (audit committee).  The board (audit committee) reputation should induce 
positive relationship between earnings quality and board quality. The other meaning can be 
interpreted as workloads of the board (audit committee) member.  If one board (audit committee) 
member serves on too many boards, the quality of work would be deteriorated, resulting in low 
earnings quality.  By this interpretation, the relationship between board (audit committee) quality 
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relationship between earnings persistence and NB is significantly negative, 
suggesting that earnings quality is deteriorated when audit committee members 
serve on too many boards.  The relationship between earnings persistence and 
RCG is significantly positive, suggesting that the higher proportion of audit 
committee in a board induces the higher earnings persistence.  
 
For subgroups, their results are rather consistent.  The relationship between 
earnings persistence and NBB is positive for both groups, but it is statistically 
significant for group 1 but not statistically significant for group 2.  It implies that 
the board reputation increases the persistence of earnings for firms in group 1 but 
not for firms in group 2.  The relationship between earnings persistence and NB is 
negative for both groups, but it is statistically significant for group 2 but not 
statistically significant for group 1.  It implies that the work quality of audit 
committee tends to be low, reducing the persistence of earnings for firms in group 
2.  The relationship between earnings persistence and RCG is statistically 
significantly positive for both groups, suggesting that the firm governance quality 
increases the persistence of earnings in the sample firms.        
 
In conclusion, during pre-adoption periods, the relationship between accounting 
quality and firm governance systems is not observed, whilst the relationship 
between them is more pronounced during post-adoption periods.  In addition, the 
finding suggests that the firm governance quality (RCG) is statistically 
significantly related to the earnings persistence, that the higher proportion of audit 
committee on a board induces the higher earnings persistence.  Overall, the 
obtained results suggest that earnings persistence is varied according to firm 
governance systems.  This thesis argues that the obtained relationship between the 
earnings persistence and firm governance variables probably is a factor 
influencing the difference in earnings persistence between firms in group 1 and 
firms in group 2.  Also, the firm governance plays an important role during IFRS 
post-adoption periods. 
                                                                                                                                
and earnings persistence should be negative.     
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Table 4.8 Firm governance and earnings persistence 
I regress persistence (PER) on firm governance proxies.  I compare the analysis between firms in 
group 1 and 2 during pre- and post-adoption periods.  Year indicator variables are employed for 
pre- and post-adoption periods.  I use median of NBO, NB and NBB and the mean of RCG and 
control variables for this analysis. OLS estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are employed for the regression analysis. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
PERi =  γ0 + γ1NBOi + γ2NBBi + γ3NBi + γ4RCGi + γ5YRi + γ 6YR*NBOi  
+ γ7YR*NBBi  + γ8YR*NBi + γ9YR*RCGi  + εi  
 
  All Group 1 Group 2 
INT. 0.643 (1.40) 0.839 (1.54) 0.471 (0.59) 
NBO -0.013 (-0.59) 0.003 (0.10) -0.016 (-0.41) 
NBB -0.002 (-0.58) -0.004 (-0.86) -0.004 (-0.64) 
NB 0.019 (1.41) 0.006 (0.42) 0.026 (1.29) 
RCG -1.701 (-1.49) -1.936 (-1.50) -1.623 (-0.84) 
YR -1.295 (-2.01)** -1.476 (-1.62) -1.395 (-1.43) 
YR*NBO 0.001 (0.03) -0.032 (-0.94) 0.027 (0.62) 
YR*NBB 0.013 (2.28)** 0.019 (2.24)** 0.010 (1.22) 
YR*NB -0.035 (-2.44)** -0.026 (-1.40) -0.042 (-2.00)** 
YR*RCG 4.266 (3.06)*** 4.727 (2.55)** 4.286 (2.00)** 
 Adj.R2  0.026  0.019  0.027 
 N   360   182   178 
 
PER is persistence (β1) obtained from the OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, rolling five-year 
window before and after the accounting change: EBITi,t  = β0 + β1EBITi,t-1 + εi, where EBITi,t and EBITi.t-1 are earnings 
before interest and tax in year t and t-1, respectively and ε is the residual.  All variables are deflated by the average of total 
assets. NBO is number of boards of director.  NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of 
directors or audit committee in other firms. RCG is a proportion audit committee members in board of directors. NBB is 
number of boards that members of board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms. YR is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for post-adoption periods (2000–2004), 0 otherwise (1995–1999). N are a number of 
observations. 
Group 1 (2) is firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption period.  
***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
Robustness checks 
Control variables, including revenue growth (GRW), revenue (REV) and firm size 
(SIZE) are included in the regression model to mitigate the potential problem of 
omitted variables (Kraft et al. 2007).58 In addition to those variables, this study 
includes industry-adjusted discretionary accruals (DA) in the analysis to control 
                                               
58 Kraft et al. (2007) use the growth of sales and sales in their analysis.  This study uses the growth 
of total revenue and total revenue to maintain a number of observations.    
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for the discretionary accrual.59  Nevertheless, the sample size is significantly 
reduced when including DA in the regression of future earnings on current 
earnings.  Therefore, the results are presented separately when DA is included and 
excluded.  As reported in Panels A and B of Table 4.9, the persistence coefficient 
of earnings (β5) enhances from pre- to post-adoption periods for full samples.  For 
subgroups, the results are consistent with the results obtained from the main 
analysis, indicating that the persistence of earnings for group 2 improves during 
post-adoption periods (β5 = .256).  Panel C and D report the results when earnings 
are attributable to cash and accrual components.  The results reveal the 
improvement of persistence of earnings performance attributable to cash and 
accrual components for full samples (measured by β7 and β8).  The persistence of 
earnings performance attributable to accrual components improves during post-
adoption periods for group 2 (β8 = .286).  Overall results are consistent with the 
results obtained from the regressions in the main analysis.  In addition, the 
discretionary accrual is not significantly related with future earnings. 
 
Next, the sample periods are expanded by using the balanced panel data from 
1992 to 2005, including 2,240 observations (160 constant firms over the periods).  
Table 4.10 presents the results by regressing 2-year future earnings on current 
earnings.60  Panel A–C of Table 4.10 reports the results when 2-year future 
                                               
59 Cross-section modified-Jones model is used for the calculation of discretionary accruals. I 
calculate accruals by the equation (Jones 1991): 
(1) Accruals (TA) = Annual changes in current assets – Annual changes in cash – Annual changes  
                                 in current liabilities – Depreciation                       
(2) Cash flow from operation  = Earnings before interest and tax – Accruals 
The industry cross-section modified-Jones model is calculated as follows: 
(3) TAi/At-1  =  a1(1/At-1) + a2(ΔREVi/At-1) + a3(PPEi/At-1) + εi   
And, discretionary accruals are obtained from the following equation: 
(4) ui  =  TAi/At-1 – [α1(1/At-1) + α2(ΔREVi–ΔRECi/At-1) + α3(PPEi/At-1)] 
where subscript i refers to six industry groups, including agro & food business, consumer 
products, industrials, property & construction, services and resources & technology.  TA is total 
accruals; u is the discretionary accruals (DA); ΔREV is revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
ΔREC is accounts receivable in year t less accounts receivable in year t-1; PPE is gross property 
plant and equipment; At-1 is total assets at the end of year t-1; ε is the residual and α1, α2, and α3 are 
cross-section industry-specific parameters obtained from OLS estimates a1, a2 and a3, respectively.  
a, a2 and a3 are estimated by employing entire firm-years listed on the stock exchange of Thailand.  
PPE and depreciation are obtained from Datastream. All other variables are obtained from 
SETSMART. 
60 See Table 4.7 for the comparison. 
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earnings are regressed on current earnings.  Panel D–F of Table 4.10 reports the 
results when current earnings information is decomposed to cash and accrual 
components.  From Panel A–C, the persistence coefficient during post-adoption 
periods is higher than that during pre-adoption periods.  The persistence 
coefficient for group 1 declines from pre- to post-adoption periods whilst the 
persistence coefficient for group 2 increases during those periods of time.  The 
magnitude of persistence coefficients when using 2-year future earnings is smaller 
than that of persistence coefficients when using 1-year future earnings.  Also, the 
adjusted R2 from 2-year future earnings regressions is smaller than that from 1-
year future earnings regressions.   
 
For the regression of 2-year future earnings on earnings performance attributable 
to cash and accrual components, the results reported in Panel D–F are consistent 
with the results obtained from 1-year future earnings regressions.  The persistence 
coefficients for full samples and group 2 increase from pre- to post-adoption 
periods whilst the persistence coefficients for group 1 decrease during those 
periods of time.  The magnitude of persistence coefficient of earnings 
performance attributable to cash component is higher than that of earnings 
performance attributable to accrual component for full samples and two 
subgroups.  Nevertheless, the smaller persistence coefficient of earnings 
performance attributable to accrual component is not statistically significant as 
revealed by the value of Chi2.   
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j = 1 j = 1 
4 4 
Table 4.9 OLS estimator with bootstrap standard error is employed for the 
estimation. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
   
EBITit+1 =  β0 + β1EBITit + β4YRit + β5YR*EBITit  + ΣφjKj, i ,t + ΣδjYR*Kj, i ,t + εit  
 
Panel A/a/ – DA excluded 
  All Group 1 Group 2 
β0 0.008 (0.22) -0.062 (-1.26) 0.069 (1.47) 
β1 0.506 (9.2)*** 0.489 (6.49)*** 0.506 (6.26)*** 
β4 -0.031 (-0.73) 0.078 (1.36) -0.079 (-1.16) 
β5 0.180 (1.99)** 0.019 (0.23) 0.293 (1.94)* 
GRW -0.017 (-0.97) -0.031 (-1.14) -0.008 (-0.38) 
REV 0.034 (6.22)*** 0.041 (4.63)*** 0.027 (3.97)*** 
SIZE -0.001 (-0.37) 0.003 (1.12) -0.004 (-1.45) 
YR*GRW 0.006 (0.26) 0.015 (0.49) 0.004 (0.09) 
YR*REV -0.033 (-4.51)*** -0.033 (-3.32)*** -0.027 (-2.45)** 
YR*SIZE 0.004 (1.31) -0.002 (-0.53) 0.005 (1.14) 
 Adj.R2  0.338  0.385  0.322 
N  2000  1000  1000 
Model-Chi2  424.89  359.28  161.61 
 
Panel B – DA included 
  All Group 1 Group 2 
β0 0.009 (0.2) -0.093 (-1.42) 0.099 (1.49) 
β1 0.381 (7.32)*** 0.349 (4.81)*** 0.362 (4.58)*** 
β4 -0.081 (-1.29) 0.094 (1.25) -0.246 (-2.33)** 
β5 0.198 (2.34)** 0.124 (1.36) 0.256 (1.93)* 
GRW -0.008 (-0.43) -0.008 (-0.25) -0.003 (-0.13) 
REV 0.028 (3.99)*** 0.042 (2.78)*** 0.019 (2.21)** 
SIZE 0.001 (0.23) 0.007 (1.63) -0.004 (-1.09) 
DA -0.062 (-0.58) 0.043 (0.28) -0.080 (-0.49) 
YR*GRW -0.003 (-0.11) 0.000 (0) -0.003 (-0.09) 
YR*REV -0.030 (-3.2)*** -0.041 (-2.46)** -0.014 (-0.99) 
YR*SIZE 0.006 (1.63) -0.004 (-0.78) 0.015 (2.46)** 
YR*DA -0.006 (-0.05) -0.119 (-0.66) 0.007 (0.03) 
 Adj.R2  0.255  0.290  0.244 
N  1040  510  530 
Model-Chi2  251.98  217.16  110.04 
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j = 1 j = 1 
4 4 
Table 4.9 (Cont.)  
 
EBITit+1 =  β0 + β3CFit + β4ACCit+ β6YRit + β7YR*CFit + β8YR*ACCit   
 
+ ΣφjKj, i ,t + ΣδjYR*Kj, i ,t + εit  
 
Panel C/a/– DA excluded 
  All Group 1 Group 2 
β0 -0.016 (-0.43) -0.061 (-1.25) 0.027 (0.42) 
β3 0.453 (7.8)*** 0.417 (5.78)*** 0.442 (4.92)*** 
β4 0.397 (7.13)*** 0.403 (5.86)*** 0.348 (3.67)*** 
β6 -0.028 (-0.55) 0.062 (0.96) -0.117 (-1.34) 
β7 0.190 (2.01)** 0.160 (1.37) 0.217 (1.61) 
β8 0.208 (2.31)** 0.110 (1.04) 0.286 (2.09)** 
GRW -0.009 (-0.49) -0.009 (-0.3) -0.005 (-0.19) 
REV 0.033 (4.79)*** 0.047 (3.76)*** 0.024 (2.59)*** 
SIZE 0.002 (0.76) 0.004 (1.4) 0.000 (-0.12) 
YR*GRW 0.005 (0.23) 0.001 (0.03) 0.024 (0.64) 
YR*REV -0.038 (-4.47)*** -0.046 (-3.24)*** -0.027 (-2.15)** 
YR*SIZE 0.004 (1.19) -0.001 (-0.29) 0.008 (1.57) 
 Adj.R2  0.348  0.355  0.350 
N  1050  540  510 
Model-Chi2  273.34  211.62  139.91 
 
Panel D – DA included 
  All Group 1 Group 2 
β0 -0.026 (-0.62) -0.111 (-1.76)* 0.032 (0.48) 
β3 0.438 (7.65)*** 0.374 (4.86)*** 0.442 (4.84)*** 
β4 0.381 (6.79)*** 0.359 (4.85)*** 0.348 (3.81)*** 
β6 -0.008 (-0.14) 0.126 (1.61) -0.126 (-1.39) 
β7 0.198 (2.14)** 0.189 (1.39) 0.208 (1.57) 
β8 0.223 (2.48)** 0.139 (1.12) 0.286 (2.13)** 
GRW -0.008 (-0.4) -0.005 (-0.17) -0.006 (-0.22) 
REV 0.035 (4.82)*** 0.061 (3.74)*** 0.024 (2.61)*** 
SIZE 0.002 (0.9) 0.007 (1.87)* -0.001 (-0.21) 
DA -0.079 (-0.66) -0.051 (-0.29) -0.041 (-0.22) 
YR*GRW 0.003 (0.11) -0.002 (-0.06) 0.020 (0.55) 
YR*REV -0.041 (-4.29)*** -0.059 (-3.25)*** -0.027 (-2.09)** 
YR*SIZE 0.002 (0.68) -0.005 (-1.04) 0.009 (1.62) 
YR*DA -0.010 (-0.07) -0.012 (-0.06) -0.056 (-0.24) 
 Adj.R2  0.343  0.344  0.352 
N  1000  500  500 
Model-Chi2  262.31  196.63  138.63 
 
EBITit+1 (EBITit) is 1-year future (current) earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; Kj,i,t is a 
vector of firm i’s j firm-specific factors, including GRW is the change in total revenue deflated by total asset, SIZE is the 
natural log of total assets, REV is the ratio of total revenue divided by total assets and DA is industry discretionary accrual; 
CFit is current cash flow from operation deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACCit is the current accrual deflated by the 
beginning of total asset; YR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for post-adoption period, 0 otherwise and N is number of 
observations. Group 1 (2) include firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences during post-adoption periods.  ***,**,* 
Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). Bootstrap estimation is repeated 1,000 times. 
 
/a/ Qualitatively similar results are obtained when the book-tax differences are calculated by using consolidated financial 
statements (see Appendix 4). 
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Table 4.10 Robustness checks of the regression of 2-year-future earnings on 
current earnings. 
EBITit+2 =  β0 + β1EBITit + εit  
Panel A: Full samples 
  All Pre-adoption (1992-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0  0.048 (10.24)***  0.047 (6.65)***  0.048 (8.56)*** 
β1  0.586 (16.02)***  0.581 (11.65)***  0.600 (11.01)*** 
Adj. R2   0.220   0.195   0.275 
N   2240   1280   960 
Model-Chi2   256.77   135.61   121.19 
 
Panel B: Group 1 
  All Pre-adoption (1992-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0  0.050 (7.48)***  0.041 (4.1)***  0.063 (9.55)*** 
β1  0.568 (10.31)***  0.587 (7.71)***  0.526 (7.89)*** 
Adj. R2   0.181   0.175   0.201 
N   1260   720   540 
Model-Chi2   106.24   59.5   62.18 
 
Panel C: Group 2 
  All Pre-adoption (1992-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0  0.045 (7.86)***  0.059 (6.54)***  0.034 (4.03)*** 
β1  0.609 (13.86)***  0.549 (9.51)***  0.658 (8.14)*** 
Adj. R2   0.287   0.212   0.351 
N   980   560   420 
Model-Chi2   192.03   90.42   66.25 
 
EBITit+2 =  β0 + β3CFit + β4ACCit  + εit  
Panel D: Full samples 
  All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0 0.042 (9.18)*** 0.047 (7.56)*** 0.038 (5.94)*** 
β2 0.573 (14.52)*** 0.530 (10.72)*** 0.626 (10.98)*** 
β3 0.540 (12.7)*** 0.523 (9.96)*** 0.553 (8.55)*** 
Adj. R2  0.248  0.213  0.298 
N  1066  574  492 
Model-Chi2  211.46  115.92  127.72 
Chi2 (β2 = β3)    3.16*  0.08  6.16** 
 
Panel E: Group 1 
  All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0 0.045 (9.26)*** 0.035 (5.3)*** 0.063 (7.52)*** 
β2 0.545 (13.14)*** 0.612 (10.64)*** 0.424 (6.49)*** 
β3 0.514 (10.81)*** 0.611 (9.62)*** 0.312 (4.13)*** 
Adj. R2  0.226  0.288  0.157 
N  559  301  258 
Model-Chi2  173.95  113.47  52.66 
Chi2 (β2 = β3)     1.71  0.00  9.62*** 
 
Panel F: Group 2 
  All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0 0.039 (5.34)*** 0.065 (5.91)*** 0.022 (2.4)** 
β2 0.594 (9.73)*** 0.432 (5.58)*** 0.750 (8.41)*** 
β3 0.560 (8.87)*** 0.423 (5.09)*** 0.707 (7.01)*** 
Adj. R2  0.261  0.130  0.404 
N  507  273  234 
Model-Chi2  94.69  31.23  73.54 
Chi2 (β2 = β3)    1.65  0.06  1.12 
 
EBITit+2 (EBITit) is 2-year-future (current) earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; CFit is 
current year cash flow from operation deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACFit is current year accruals deflated by the 
beginning of total asset; YR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for post-adoption period (2000 – 2005), 0 otherwise and N is 
a number of observations. Group 1 (2) include firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences during post-adoption 
periods.  ***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). CF = Earnings before interest and tax + 
Depreciation – (Changes in current asset – Changes in cash – Changes in current liabilities); AC = Earnings before interest 
and tax – CF. OLS estimator with bootstrap standard error is employed for the estimation repeated 1,000 times. z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
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Next, the robustness check is performed by analysing the persistence of earnings 
for all firm-years.  In addition, the samples are sub-grouped by using the book-tax 
difference.  Each year, the book-tax difference is divided into two groups – small 
(BT1) and large (BT2) book-tax differences.  Following prior research (Hanlon 
2005), the persistence of earnings for firms with small book-tax differences is 
expected to be higher than the persistence of earnings for firms with large book-
tax differences.  To form the subgroups, outliers, all missing data, the negative 
annual income tax and negative book-tax difference are excluded from the 
analysis.  2-year and 1-year future earnings are employed for the analysis.  Table 
4.11 presents the regression of 1-year (Panel A–C) and 2-year (Panel D–F) future 
earnings on current earnings.  By controlling for industry fixed effects, Panel A of 
Table 4.11 reports the regression of 1-year future earnings on current earnings, 
indicating that the persistence of earnings increases from pre- to post-adoption 
periods for full samples.  The enhancement of earnings persistence is also 
observed in two subgroups, indicating that the earnings persistence is higher after 
IFRS adoption in Thailand.  Panel B and C report that during post-adoption 
periods the magnitude of earnings persistence for small book-tax differences firms 
(BT1: β1 = .701) is higher than that of earnings persistence for large book-tax 
differences firms (BT2: β1 = .686).  The results are consistent when regressing 2-
year future earnings on current earnings as reported in Panel D – F of Table 4.11.  
The results reveal the improvement of earnings persistence and the magnitude of 
persistence coefficient for BT1 (β1 = .653) is slightly higher than that of 
persistence coefficient for BT2 (β1 = .644).  The adjusted R
2 is lower for 2-year 
future earnings regressions relative to 1-year earnings regressions.   
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Table 4.11 The regression of future earnings on current earnings for all firm-
years. 
EBITit+τ =  β0 + β1EBITit + εit  
 
Panel A: Full samples, τ = 1 
  All  Pre-adoption (1992-1999)  Post-adoption (2000-2006) 
β0  0.019 (9.51)***  0.016 (5.51)***  0.024 (8.3)*** 
β1  0.653 (41.71)***  0.632 (30.57)***  0.680 (28.09)*** 
Adj. R2   0.425   0.413   0.462 
N   4218   2342   1876 
F-stat   1739.45   934.60   789.00 
 
Panel B: BT1, τ = 1 
  All  Pre-adoption (1992-1999)  Post-adoption (2000-2006) 
β0  0.026 (8.54)***  0.024 (6.22)***  0.030 (6.05)*** 
β1  0.665 (28.7)***  0.641 (22.33)***  0.701 (18.85)*** 
Adj. R2   0.484   0.487   0.506 
N   1469   924   545 
F-stat   823.77   498.73   355.44 
 
Panel C: BT2, τ = 1 
  All  Pre-adoption (1992-1999)  Post-adoption (2000-2006) 
β0  0.018 (4.71)***  0.014 (3.03)***  0.027 (4.06)*** 
β1  0.681 (24.48)***  0.666 (19.96)***  0.686 (13.77)*** 
Adj. R2   0.374   0.375   0.387 
N   1461   919   542 
F-stat   599.37   398.42   189.48 
 
Panel D: Full samples, τ = 2 
  All  Pre-adoption (1992-1999)  Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0  0.031 (12.42)***  0.024 (7.29)***  0.043 (11.14)*** 
β1  0.593 (29.24)***  0.591 (22.96)***  0.587 (18.09)*** 
Adj. R2   0.274   0.284   0.304 
N   3791    2287    1504 
F-stat    855.12   527.27   327.36 
 
Panel E: BT1, τ = 2 
  All  Pre-adoption (1992-1999)  Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0  0.040 (9.02)***  0.039 (7.01)***  0.044 (6.79)*** 
β1  0.623 (18.77)***  0.595 (14.66)***  0.653 (13.44)*** 
Adj. R2   0.310   0.294   0.405 
N   1335   901   434 
F-stat   352.26   214.95   180.6 
 
Panel F: BT2, τ = 2 
  All  Pre-adoption (1992-1999)  Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0  0.027 (4.89)***  0.024 (3.29)***  0.040 (4.63)*** 
β1  0.645 (15.72)***  0.628 (11.74)***  0.644 (10.43)*** 
Adj. R2   0.210   0.215   0.254 
N   1328   897   431 
F-stat   246.99   137.78   108.74 
 
EBITit+τ is τ-year-future earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets and τ = 1 and 2; EBITit is 
current earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets and N is number of observations. BT 1 (2) 
include firms with small (large) book-tax-differences. Extreme values 1% from top and bottom percentiles are excluded.  
***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). OLS estimator with industry fixed effect and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is employed for the estimation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.12 presents the regression of future earnings on earnings performance 
attributable to cash and accrual components.  For full samples, Panel A reports 
that the persistence of earnings performance attributable to cash and accrual 
components declines during post-adoption in Thailand.  Also, the persistence of 
earnings attributable to accrual components is higher than that of earnings 
attributable to cash components for all sub-periods.  In Panel D, results report the 
improvement of the persistence of earnings attributable to cash components 
during post-adoption periods (β2 = .498 vs. .560) for full samples.  The persistence 
of earnings attributable to accrual components slightly declines during post-
adoption periods (β3 = .507 vs. .504) for full samples.          
 
For subgroups, Panel B reports that the persistence of earnings performance 
attributable to cash components increases (β2 = .597 vs. .652) but the persistence 
of earnings performance attributable to accrual components declines (β2 = .605 vs. 
.582) during post-adoption periods for firms with small book-tax differences 
(BT1).  Panel C reports that the persistence of earnings performance attributable 
to cash and accrual components declines during post-adoption periods for firms 
with large book-tax differences (BT2).  Nevertheless, for 2-year future earnings 
regressions presented in Panel E and F, the result reports that the persistence of 
earnings performance attributable to cash and accrual components increases for 
both subgroups.  In addition, the magnitude of coefficient estimates for BT1 
(small book-tax difference firms) is higher than the magnitude of coefficient 
estimates for BT2 (large book-tax difference firms).  In addition, the results report 
the deterioration of adjusted R2 when using 2-year future earnings compared with 
1-year future earnings.   
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Table 4.12 The regression of future earnings on earnings performance attributable 
to cash and accrual components for all firm-year. 
 
EBITit+τ =  β0 + β2CFit + β3ACCit  + εit  
 
Panel A: Full samples, τ = 1 
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2006) 
β0 0.032 (7.47)*** 0.027 (5.33)*** 0.034 (6.75)*** 
β2 0.551 (14.0)*** 0.560 (13.59)*** 0.542 (10.57)*** 
β3 0.567 (14.36)*** 0.577 (13.8)*** 0.552 (9.95)*** 
Adj. R2  0.355  0.341  0.370 
N  2989  1170  1819 
F-stat  106.48  98.1  57.04 
 
Panel B: BT1, τ = 1 
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2006) 
β0 0.032 (8.35)*** 0.033 (5.34)*** 0.034 (6.93)*** 
β2 0.638 (22.34)*** 0.597 (14.1)*** 0.652 (17.02)*** 
β3 0.610 (18.71)*** 0.605 (13.9)*** 0.582 (11.89)*** 
Adj. R2  0.470  0.470  0.485 
N  946  431  515 
F-stat  249.7  104.72  154.26 
 
Panel C: BT2, τ = 1 
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2006) 
β0 0.022 (4.8)*** 0.016 (2.65)***       0.032 (4.79)*** 
β2 0.679 (19.98)*** 0.666 (15.05)***       0.643 (12.75)*** 
β3 0.681 (18.82)*** 0.701 (15.42)***       0.615 (11.12)*** 
Adj. R2  0.403  0.438  0.379 
N  935  425  510 
F-stat  203.55  124.77  81.25 
 
Panel D: Full sample, τ = 2 
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0 0.040 (11.96)*** 0.040 (9.08)*** 0.043 (9.38)*** 
β2 0.547 (19.36)*** 0.498 (14.76)*** 0.560 (13.66)*** 
β3 0.527 (18.82)*** 0.507 (15.59)*** 0.504 (11.73)*** 
Adj. R2  0.283  0.272  0.327 
N  2499  1100  1399 
F-stat   192.2  124.04  94.89 
 
Panel E: BT1, τ = 2   
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0 0.044 (9.85)*** 0.052 (7.16)*** 0.040 (7.47)*** 
β2 0.594 (18.46)*** 0.496 (10.04)*** 0.659 (15.59)*** 
β3 0.554 (14.48)*** 0.485 (8.98)*** 0.584 (10.28)*** 
Adj. R2  0.360  0.297  0.463 
N  832  419  413 
F-stat   170.83  51.14  129.58 
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Table 4.12 (Cont.)  
 
Panel F: BT2, τ = 2 
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2005) 
β0 0.037 (6.39)*** 0.041 (4.52)*** 0.040 (5.18)*** 
β2 0.616 (15.06)*** 0.553 (8.69)*** 0.621 (10.79)*** 
β3 0.547 (12.19)*** 0.513 (8.62)*** 0.539 (7.43)*** 
Adj. R2  0.240  0.210  0.311 
N  824  414  410 
F-stat  114.74  39.99  69.28 
 
EBITit+τ is τ-year-future earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets and τ = 1 and 2; CFit is 
current year cash flow from operation deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACFit is current year accruals deflated by the 
beginning of total asset; BT 1 (2) include firms with small (large) book-tax-differences.  Extreme values 1% from top and 
bottom percentiles are excluded. ***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). CF = Earnings 
before interest and tax + Depreciation – (Changes in current asset – Changes in cash – Changes in current liabilities); AC = 
Earnings before interest and tax – CF. OLS estimator with industry fixed effect and standard error is employed for the 
estimation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
The next analysis partitions all firm-years according to firms’ industry groups.  
The industry is categorised in seven groups: agro-business, consumer products, 
industrial, property and construction, natural resource, service and technology.  
Depreciable assets are considered as a main channel for firms to manage accrual 
components (i.e. Jones 1991).  The industry is categorised into two main groups: 
high depreciable assets and low depreciable assets.  An indicator variable (IND) is 
introduced to capture the difference between two groups.  High depreciable assets 
(IND = 0) include property and construction, natural resources and technology 
whilst low depreciable assets (IND = 1) include agro business, consumer 
products, industrial and service.  Other variables are interacted with the indicator 
variable.  Panel A of Table 4.13 reports that during post-adoption periods, the 
persistence coefficient of earnings for low depreciable groups is higher than that 
for high depreciable groups (η2 = .14).  This result implies that firms with high 
depreciable assets are more likely to manage their earnings resulting in a high 
variation in earnings information relative to firms with low depreciable assets.  In 
other words, IFRS adoptions in Thailand allow firms with high depreciable assets 
to exercise more accounting discretion relative to firms with low depreciable 
assets.  When decomposing earnings information to cash and accrual components, 
Panel B of Table 4.13 reports that the persistence coefficients of earnings 
performance attributable to cash (η3 = .135) and accrual (η4 = .063) components 
are higher for firms with low depreciable assets relative to firms with high 
depreciable assets during post-adoption periods. 
 
 
Chapter IV                                                                                 Earnings Persistence 
 
 179
Table 4.13 All firm-year analysis partitioning by industry 
Panel A: EBITit+1 =  β0 + β1EBITit + η1INDit + η2IND*EBITit + εit 
 
 All Pre-adoption (1992-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2007) 
β0 0.038 (4.23)*** -0.031 (-1.25) 0.087 (7.83)*** 
β1 0.502 (15.21)*** 0.548 (12.98)*** 0.157 (2.84)*** 
η1 -0.001 (-0.11) 0.104 (2.87)*** -0.038 (-2.45)** 
η2 -0.051 (-1.27) -0.194 (-3.59)*** 0.140 (2.06)** 
Adj. R2  0.476  0.460  0.604 
N  4218  2342  1876 
F-stat  201.59  94.07  22.63 
 
Panel B/*/ : EBITit+1 =  β0 + β2CFit + β3ACCTit + η1INDit + η3IND*CFit + η4IND*ACCit + εit  
 
 All Pre-adoption (1993-1999) Post-adoption (2000-2007) 
β0 0.330 (7.91)*** 0.394 (6.12)*** 0.135 (2.44)** 
β2 0.341 (7.35)*** 0.454 (6.8)*** 0.106 (1.71)* 
β3 0.036 (0.64) -0.088 (-0.99) 0.115 (1.67)* 
η3 0.016 (0.26) -0.158 (-1.71)* 0.135 (1.71)* 
η4 0.049 (15.09)*** 0.050 (8.74)*** 0.063 (17.83)*** 
Adj. R2  0.481  0.426  0.570 
N  2989  1170  1819 
F-stat  35.81  17.88  11.46 
 
EBITit+1 (EBITit) is 1-year-future (current) earnings before interest and tax scaled by the beginning of total assets; CFit is 
current year cash flow from operation deflated by the beginning of total asset; ACFit is current year accruals deflated by the 
beginning of total asset; IND is an indicator variable equal to 1 for low depreciable assets firms, 0 otherwise and N is 
number of observations. Extreme values 1% from top and bottom percentiles are excluded.  ***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). CF = Earnings before interest and tax + Depreciation – (Changes in current 
asset – Changes in cash – Changes in current liabilities); AC = Earnings before interest and tax – CF. OLS estimator with 
firm fixed effect and standard error is employed for the estimation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
/*/It should be note that the indicator variable of industry (IND) is dropped from the analysis in Panel B because STATA 
drops this variable to avoid ambiguous results might be occurred (See STATA manual).  
 
Lastly, I examine an additional test for investigating the relationship between firm 
governance and earnings persistence.  In this sensitivity test, explanatory variables 
are divided into three factors, consisting of corporate governance factors (CF), 
fundamental factors (FF) and market activity factors (MF).  In addition to board 
structure (NBO and RCG) and board quality (NBB and NB), I include auditor 
indicator (AUD) to distinguish between big four auditing firms and non-big four 
auditing firms and foreigners’ shareholding indicator (FORE) to identify if firms’ 
shares are held by foreigners.  A priori expectation is that big four auditing firms 
should provide high accounting quality measured by the persistence of earnings 
and firms with high accounting information quality should attract foreigners to 
hold shares in those firms.   
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For fundamental factors, I add firm performance (COS, GRW and MARGIN) and 
size (MKT) into the investigation.  I include firm performance to detect whether 
the capacity to manage resources is varied among firms.  With reference to the 
political costs hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978),  wealth transfers 
between various groups can be affected by the power of the political sector.  
Firms use several means to reduce reported earnings and avoid political costs.  As 
suggested by the political costs hypothesis, firms with high political costs have 
high incentives to choose accounting standards which provide lower earnings due 
to tax.  I use the market capitalisation to detect this potential cost (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978).  However, a priori prediction for firm performance and size is 
not determined.   
 
The last factor is to control for market activity by including a number of 
outstanding shares (SHARE) and shares turnover volume (TURN).  Again, there 
is no a priori prediction for these two variables.  I evaluate the persistence and 
firm governance systems between firms in group 1 (BT – Pre < BT – Post) and 
group 2 (BT – Pre > BT – Post) from pre- to post-adoption periods.  As reported 
in Table 4.14, Panel A presents results from full samples.  Some firms have been 
dropped from the analysis because of missing data.  Findings show no relationship 
between the earnings persistence and all three factors.  When comparing between 
pre- and post-adoption periods, the corporate governance factor is related to the 
persistence of earnings during post-adoption periods.  In post-adoption periods, 
findings show that the ratio of audit committee to board size (RCG) becomes 
positive and significant, suggesting that audit committee induces a high quality of 
accounting quality in terms of earnings persistence.  In addition, NB is negative 
and significant, suggesting that earnings persistence is deterred when audit 
committee serves as executive boards in too many firms during the same year.      
 
Panel B of Table 4.14 reports results for firms in group 1 whose book-tax 
differences during pre-adoption periods are lower than those during post-adoption 
periods.  Findings are consistent with the results obtained from full samples.  In 
post-adoption periods, the persistence of earnings is positively related to the ratio 
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of audit committee to board size (RCG) whilst there is no relationship between the 
persistence of earnings and corporate governance factors during pre-adoption 
periods.  Panel C of Table 4.14 reports results for firms in group 2 whose book-
tax differences during pre-adoption periods are higher than those during post-
adoption periods.  Again, findings are consistent with the result obtained from full 
samples and group 1.  The corporate governance factor becomes important during 
post-adoption periods, as suggested by the statistically significant results.  The 
result shows that the persistence of earnings is positively related to the ratio of 
audit committee to board size (RCG).  Firms employing big-four auditing firms 
are more likely to have higher earnings persistence (measured by AUD).  In 
addition, NB is negative and significant, implying that the persistence of earnings 
declines when audit committee serves as executive boards in too many firms. 
 
In conclusion, these findings imply that board (NB) and corporate governance 
(RCG) quality play a significant role and impact accounting quality in terms of 
earnings persistence during post-adoption periods.  The higher numbers of boards 
that audit committee serves as board of directors in other firms during post-
adoption periods induce the lack of earnings persistence in the firm whilst the 
larger ratio of audit committee to board size induces the higher persistence of 
earnings.   
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Table 4.14 Robustness checks: Firm governance and earnings persistence 
 
PERi =      γ0 + Σ γjCFj, i  + ΣφjFFj, i + ΣδjMFj, i  + εi  
 
Panel A: Full samples 
  Pooled Pre-adoption (1995-1999) Post - adoption (2000-2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
γ0 -0.116 -0.36 0.717 0.443 0.76 0.446 -0.701 -1.42 0.159 
Governance factors        
NBO -0.005 -0.45 0.650 0.009 0.37 0.714 -0.014 -0.92 0.357 
NBB 0.002 0.75 0.451 -0.004 -1.02 0.309 0.007 1.52 0.131 
NB -0.003 -0.61 0.544 0.022 1.65 0.101 -0.014 -1.87 0.064 
RCG 0.852 1.64 0.101 -1.299 -1.04 0.301 2.336 2.88 0.005 
AUD 0.101 1.10 0.271 0.011 0.08 0.936 0.158 1.51 0.134 
FORE -0.105 -1.15 0.253 -0.149 -1.07 0.285 -0.032 -0.27 0.787 
Fundamental factors        
COS 0.053 0.19 0.853 -0.369 -0.88 0.380 0.402 1.26 0.211 
GRW -0.099 -0.29 0.774 0.323 0.63 0.529 -0.010 -0.02 0.981 
INV -0.099 -0.39 0.699 -0.426 -0.97 0.333 -0.164 -0.56 0.574 
MKT 0.000 1.54 0.125 0.000 -0.08 0.939 0.000 1.15 0.251 
MARGIN 0.020 0.12 0.906 0.108 0.47 0.640 0.339 0.81 0.417 
Market activity factors        
SHARE -0.024 -0.97 0.334 0.000 0.02 0.987 -0.128 -2.12 0.035 
TURN 0.000 1.23 0.220 0.004 2.29 0.024 0.000 -0.10 0.923 
 Adj. R2   0.009   -0.003   0.185 
 N     324     162     162 
 
Panel B: Group 1 
  Pooled Pre-adoption (1995 - 1999) Post - adoption (2000 - 2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
γ0 0.683 1.44 0.152 0.797 1.01 0.316 0.094 0.12 0.903 
Governance factors        
NBO -0.010 -0.73 0.468 0.021 0.65 0.519 -0.023 -1.12 0.266 
NBB 0.001 0.18 0.861 -0.006 -1.11 0.272 0.009 1.18 0.241 
NB -0.002 -0.32 0.753 0.012 0.67 0.503 -0.012 -1.06 0.291 
RCG 0.198 0.25 0.799 -1.369 -1.03 0.308 2.231 1.69 0.097 
AUD 0.038 0.27 0.787 0.144 0.61 0.547 -0.147 -0.85 0.400 
FORE -0.057 -0.48 0.631 -0.124 -0.73 0.470 0.055 0.32 0.751 
Fundamental factors        
COS -0.385 -1.11 0.269 -0.647 -1.21 0.232 -0.161 -0.35 0.727 
GRW 0.047 0.09 0.931 0.730 1.77 0.082 -0.475 -0.93 0.355 
INV 0.096 0.34 0.738 -0.211 -0.56 0.578 0.298 0.97 0.338 
MKT 0.000 2.77 0.006 0.000 -0.11 0.914 0.000 4.98 0.000 
MARGIN -0.126 -0.68 0.497 0.019 0.09 0.926 -0.927 -1.53 0.130 
Market activity factors        
SHARE -0.050 -1.41 0.161 -0.011 -0.66 0.509 -0.135 -1.88 0.065 
TURN 0.000 1.28 0.201 0.002 1.28 0.206 0.000 -0.03 0.974 
 Adj. R2   0.027   -0.091   0.282 
 N   156   78   78 
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Panel C: Group 2 
  Pooled Pre-adoption (1995 - 1999) Post - adoption (2000 - 2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
γ0 -0.791 -1.64 0.102 0.594 0.53 0.595 -1.444 -2.06 0.043 
Governance factors        
NBO 0.017 0.91 0.365 0.013 0.31 0.756 0.003 0.12 0.906 
NBB 0.000 -0.01 0.992 -0.010 -1.39 0.169 0.006 1.04 0.300 
NB -0.005 -0.59 0.554 0.029 1.26 0.213 -0.017 -2.05 0.044 
RCG 1.460 2.05 0.042 -2.452 -1.09 0.279 2.596 2.74 0.008 
AUD 0.037 0.29 0.770 -0.188 -0.97 0.336 0.292 1.88 0.064 
FORE -0.079 -0.54 0.592 -0.116 -0.53 0.599 -0.021 -0.14 0.888 
Fundamental factors        
COS 0.247 0.46 0.645 -0.306 -0.32 0.753 0.812 1.45 0.152 
GRW -0.026 -0.04 0.966 -0.055 -0.04 0.967 0.489 0.99 0.327 
INV -7.594 -2.55 0.012 -5.872 -1.79 0.078 -10.225 -1.39 0.169 
MKT 0.000 0.7 0.484 0.000 0.31 0.754 0.000 -0.17 0.868 
MARGIN 1.057 1.73 0.086 1.912 2.05 0.044 1.573 1.53 0.130 
Market activity factors        
SHARE 0.020 1.21 0.226 0.011 0.61 0.544 -0.105 -1.85 0.069 
TURN 0.000 0.63 0.530 0.006 1.78 0.080 0.000 -0.52 0.602 
 Adj. R2   0.019   0.014   0.096 
 N   168   84   84 
 
PER is persistence (β1) obtained from the OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, rolling five-year 
window before and after the accounting change: EBITi,t  = β0 + β1EBITi,t-1 + εi, where EBITi,t and EBITi.t-1 are earnings 
before interest and tax in year t and t-1, respectively and ε is the residual.  All variables are deflated by the beginning of 
total assets.  
 
CF = NBO is number of boards of director.  NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of 
directors or audit committee in other firms. RCG is a proportion audit committee members in board of directors. NBB is 
number of boards that members of board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms. AUD is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 for big four (five) auditing firms, 0 otherwise and FORE is an indicator variable equal to 1 
for firms whose shares are held by foreign shareholders, 0 otherwise. 
 
FF = COS is the ratio of cost of sales divided by sales. GRW is the change of total revenue divided by total assets. INV is 
the average inventory divided by sales. MKT is the market capitalization and MARGIN is the ratio of net earnings divided 
by sales. 
 
MF = SHARE is the ratio of a number of shares issued divided by number of listed shares and TURN is the ratio of share 
turnover volume. 
 
N is number of observations. OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are applied for the estimation. 
Group 1 (2) is firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption period.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the analysis of earnings persistence in Thailand.  In the 
analysis, earnings are also decomposed to cash flow and accrual components.  By 
using the longitudinal data, the results show that earnings persistence (estimated 
by both earnings and earnings performance attributable to cash flows and 
accruals) was enhanced after Thailand has adopted IFRS since 2000.  These 
findings support the hypothesis (H.4.1) that earnings persistence is enhanced after 
the IFRS adoption in Thailand.   
 
In addition, this analysis partitions the dataset into two groups according to their 
magnitudes of book-tax differences.  The data are categorised according to the 
change in book-tax difference between pre- and post- IFRS adoption periods in 
Thailand.  The findings show that earnings persistence for firms whose book-tax 
differences become larger during post-adoption periods (Group 1) is reduced 
whilst earnings persistence for firms whose book-tax differences become smaller 
during post-adoption periods (Group 2) is increased.  This finding supports the 
hypothesis (H.4.2).   
 
However, the results must be interpreted with caution.  Firstly, firms with high 
earnings persistence may engage in the earnings smoothing.  If firms are 
smoothing their earnings, the reported earnings will not reflect firms’ underlying 
economic performance.  From the descriptive analysis, the earnings smoothing 
activity is less likely for group 2 relative to group 1.  In addition, the smoothed 
earnings for firms in group 2 is more likely to decline from pre- to post-adoption 
periods.  This descriptive result should support the result that earnings persistence 
for firms in group 2 is higher during post-adoption periods.  Secondly, the 
improvement of earnings persistence can be varied according to industry.  The 
robustness check reveals that earnings persistence has not been enhanced for 
natural resource and high-tech firms.  One explanation is that intangible assets and 
research and development costs may influence reported earnings.  Thirdly, the 
persistence of earnings is a statistical property of earnings.  It is not a direct link 
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between accounting measurement methods and earnings quality.  It is more 
important for future research to search for indicators to directly link between 
measurement methods and earnings quality to determine more insight about 
earnings information.    
 
This thesis argues that firm governance factors may induce the variation in 
earnings persistence.  Thus, the relationship between earnings persistence and 
firm governance factors is examined.  The result shows that audit committee and 
corporate governance quality are related to the earnings persistence.  These 
findings support the hypothesis (H4.3) that earnings persistence varies according 
to firm governance system, especially during post-adoption periods in Thailand.  
However, this thesis does not detect the expertise of audit committee that may 
impact on accounting quality.  Future research may examine about the 
relationship between expertise of audit committee and earnings quality in 
Thailand. 
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  Chapter 5 
The Value Relevance of Earnings and Book Value 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reports the analysis of accounting quality in terms of 
earnings persistence.  Earnings persistence is to analyse the prediction ability of 
earnings information.  In particular, the previous chapter examines whether 
current earnings are able to predict future earnings at the aggregated level.  The 
findings from the previous chapter suggest that earnings are more persistent after 
the adoption of IFRS in Thailand.  This chapter will present another aspect of the 
accounting quality, namely the value relevance.  It studies the association between 
firm value and accounting summary measures, including book value and earnings.  
This area of study is to investigate firms’ performance (through contemporaneous 
share prices or returns) based on past measures (book value) or current 
performances (reported earnings).  The value relevance analysis attempts to 
explain whether accounting numbers have facilitated users’ decision making.  The 
consequence of the value-relevant study, hence, refers to the study of whether 
corporate financial information is useful.   
 
In accounting-based valuation study, the fundamental analysis and valuation 
study61 determines that “in an efficient market, firm value is defined as the present 
value of expected future net cash flows, discounted at the appropriate risk-
adjusted rate of return” (Kothari 2001, pg.109).  A firm’s current performance 
shown in its financial statements has become an important input to the market’s 
assessment of the firm’s future net cash flows and the firm’s market valuation.  
The fundamental study expects a temporal relation between current financial 
performance and future cash flows, as well as a contemporaneous relation 
between financial performance and share return or share price.  The major concern 
of the fundamental analysis and valuation is aimed at identifying share mispricing 
                                               
61 In the study of information content of the accounting number, the event study, a short-window 
study, is another widely-used method in empirical work. 
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for investment purposes.  Since valuation analysis focuses on forecasts of future 
revenues, expenses, earnings and cash flows, one contends that financial 
statements prepared by current accounting guidelines do not provide adequate 
summary statistics for the forecast number.  Kothari (2001, pg.172), however, 
argued that financial statements in themselves are likely to be useful and accurate 
indicators of market value when current accounting guidelines can capture 
economic outcome.   
 
In capital market research, Beaver (2002) argued that value-relevant accounting 
research is a promising application study.  The value relevance of accounting 
information ascertains whether the accounting data are useful for valuing the firm 
by studying the association between the accounting data and share prices 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001).  Lee (1999) argued that accounting information in 
the firm valuation process is presumed to be superior in a normative sense 
because the accounting data, appearing as independent variables, have provided 
value relevance to explain contemporaneous share return or share price 
determined as the dependent variable.  By these notions, a number of prior 
empirical studies (i.e. Barth et al. 2008) exploring accounting changes being 
occurred in many countries have employed the fundamental analysis.  This thesis 
also interprets value-relevant information in this sense by investigating whether 
value-relevant accounting information used to explain corporate share prices or 
returns has been improved after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.  The improvement 
of value-relevant accounting information should encourage the investment in Thai 
capital market.   
 
Thailand, as one of emerging market countries, has long been developing its stock 
exchange to support Thai business and economy.  However, as is common for 
emerging market countries, Thailand’s stock exchange can be considered as a less 
efficient stock market.  This reduces the ability of the share price to capturing 
news exposed to the market, according to the anticipation of efficient market 
hypothesis.  Even though the assumption of the value relevance analysis requires 
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that the market must be efficient, prior empirical studies of value relevance have 
been silent on this matter (Aboody, Hughes and Liu 2002).  As presented in 
Chapter 3, much of prior research examines the value relevance of accounting 
information in emerging market countries. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  The development of 
hypotheses is presented in section 5.2.  Research methodology, data and results are 
presented in section 5.3–5.5, respectively.  Section 5.6 presents chapter summary.  
 
5.2 Hypothesis Development 
In this thesis, I address whether value relevance is enhanced when converging the 
domestic accounting system to international accounting standards in Thailand.  
The hypothesis has been built from prior accounting research studies.  Graham et 
al. (2000) find that the value relevance of Thai book values and earnings declined 
during the financial crisis.  However, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) report that the 
value relevance of earnings declined but the value relevance of book values 
increased during the financial crisis.  Prior studies (Graham et al. 2000; Davis-
Friday et al. 2006) suggest that Thai accounting information is value-relevant and 
the value relevance of the Thai accounting summary measures reflects economic 
consequences.  It is controversial whether IFRS brings a higher quality of 
earnings than domestic accounting standards due to country-specific factors 
(Barth et al. 2008).  In terms of the Thai accounting system, previously Thai 
accounting standards had employed historical cost methods for preparing financial 
statements.  After the change in accounting system in Thailand, Thai firms are 
required to employ fair value accounting system.  For example, the firm is 
required to estimate expected future cash flows (i.e. asset valuations).  Based on 
this requirement, the new accounting system in Thailand should increase the 
usefulness of accounting information because it facilitates investors’ decision 
making.  In terms of the investment in capital market, share prices reflect the 
market’s expectation of net cash flows.  Thus, accounting information prepared by 
the new accounting standard is informative for investors (Dechow and Schrand 
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2004) because it contains information about future cash flows required by the 
market.  As a result, the new accounting standard improves accounting quality in 
terms of the value relevance of accounting information.  In addition, based on 
Barth et al. (2008) and the previous discussion in Chapter 4 about the 
improvement of earnings quality after the IFRS adoption in Thailand, I have a 
priori prediction that the value relevance of accounting numbers is enhanced after 
the accounting system change.  I propose the following hypothesis, stated in an 
alternative form.  
 
H.5.1:  The value relevance of accounting summary measures is enhanced 
after the adoption of IFRS in Thailand. 
 
Francis and Schipper (1999) suggest that strong contemporaneous association 
between accounting numbers and stock price performance or market value reflects 
higher value relevance of accounting information.  I measure the association of 
those variables by using the explanatory power (R2).62  In addition, following 
Francis and Schipper (1999) and Lev and Zarowin (1999), I interpret earnings 
response coefficients (ERC) for the firm’s valuation process.  Even though the 
value relevance of accounting numbers and earnings persistence views accounting 
quality in different ways, both are indicators of accounting quality.  Prior studies 
report the value relevance of accounting information in different countries.  For 
example, Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijewski (1993) find that the value 
relevance of accounting information for Belgium, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Japan, Norway, South Africa, and Switzerland is inconclusive, as compared to the 
value relevance of US accounting information.  Arce and Mora (2002) find that 
value relevance in the UK, a common law country, is lower than that in Belgium 
and France, code law countries.  Bartov et al. (2001a) find a superior value 
                                               
62 Harris et al. (1994) report the R2 to evaluate the value relevance of accounting numbers in 
German firms vs. US firms.  Graham et al. (2000) use the R2 to estimate the Thai value relevance.  
Dechow (1994) compares the association between returns and earnings and the association 
between returns and cash flows by using the R2.  Francis and Schipper (1999) indicate the use of 
R2 in the value relevance analysis but the adjusted R2 is reported in their results.  In this thesis, I 
will use the R2 to evaluate the value relevance in Thai firms (Van der Meulen et al. 2007), unless 
specified. 
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relevance of earnings over cash flow for the US, the UK and Canada but not for 
Germany and Japan.  Ali and Hwang (2000) find that the value relevance of 
accounting numbers is lower for bank-oriented countries and for countries when 
tax rules influence financial reporting.  When using tax rules for financial 
statement purposes, Hanlon et al. (2005) report a 50 per cent loss in the 
explanatory power of reported earnings.  Hanlon et al. (2008) find that the 
increase in book-tax conformity reduces earnings informativeness measured by 
earnings response coefficients.  The implication of these prior studies suggests 
that the value relevance of earnings is lower in the tax-based accounting income 
system.     
 
Consistent with the analysis of earnings persistence, the sample firms will be 
partitioned according to the pattern of book-tax differences (BT).  Group 1 
includes firms whose book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods are 
smaller than those during post-adoption periods (BT – Pre-adoption < BT – Post-
adoption).  Group 2 includes firms whose book-tax differences during pre-
adoption periods are larger than those during post-adoption periods (BT – Pre-
adoption > BT – Post-adoption).63  Based on Hanlon et al. (2008), ERC is 
influenced by both bias (ƒ) and noise (e).  In the absence of noise and bias, ERC is 
normalised equal to 1, an unbiased estimate.  I apply this structural model to 
develop the hypothesis.64   
 
Recall that IFRS adoption improves the value relevance of accounting summary 
measures (Barth et al. 2008; Dechow and Schrand 2004, pg.102).  Accordingly, in 
the absence of noise and bias, accounting changes introduce increasing ERC in 
post-adoption periods.  In subsamples, if the two groups of firms use new 
                                               
63 As previously discussed in Chapter 4 equation 4.5, this thesis calculates the book-tax difference 
by using the average value of book-tax differences over a 5-year period rather than the absolute 
value of book-tax differences.  Furthermore, because the negative book-tax difference firm 
contains the firm with negative earnings, Hayn (1995) reports that the value relevance for negative 
earnings firms is significantly lower than the value relevance of positive earnings firms.  Thus, if 
using the absolute value of book-tax differences, the problem of information loss may occur.  
64  Hanlon et al. (2008) summarise that  
   
   b = ERC, Xt = earnings,  e = noise, and ƒ = bias.  When e and ƒ = 0, then b = σx
2/σx
2 = 1. 
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accounting standards to convey firms’ performance (bias = 0), ERC in post-
adoption for both groups of firms increases (at noise = 0).  Nevertheless, if bias 
and noise in pre-adoption periods of the two groups of firms are held to be equal, 
in post-adoption periods at bias = 0 and noise > 0, noise in post-adoption periods 
for firms in group 1 (i.e. being of higher tax activity) is higher than noise in post-
adoption periods for firms in group 2 (i.e. being of lower tax activity).  As a result, 
the increase in earnings informativeness for firms in group 1 is lower than the 
increase in earnings informativeness for firms in group 2.  In addition, as it is 
difficult to reduce taxable income and simultaneously increase book income 
(Guenther et al. 1997), in post-adopton periods, noise is still lower for firms in 
group 2 even if the two groups of firms engage in earnings manipulation (either 
bias < 0 or > 0 results in noise (group 2) < noise (group 1)).  I propose the next 
hypothesis as follows, stated in the alternative form. 
 
H.5.2:  When comparing between pre- and post-adoption periods, the 
 value relevance is related to the book-tax difference. 
 
As previously discussed about the important role of firm governance systems and 
accounting quality in Chapter 4, I attempt to explore the relationship between 
value relevance and firm governance system.  Based on the hypothesis H.4.3 in 
Chapter 4, I hypothesise in the alternative form that: 
 
H.5.3:  The value relevance varies according to the firm governance 
system. 
 
5.3 Research Methodology 
In general, the method used to estimate the value relevance of accounting 
information is open-ended.  This thesis employs a long-window study for value 
relevance analysis.  Following Francis and Schipper (1999) and Lev and Zarowin 
(1999), I define value relevance as the association between accounting numbers 
and market values (and returns). I also interpret the earnings response coefficient 
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(ERC) for value relevance analysis.  I operationalise the ERC model in the 
following way.   
 
  Rit   = α0 + α1EPSit + α2∆EPSit + εit   (5.1) 
 
where R is 15-month returns65, 3-months after the financial year-end adjusted by 
the dividend at the end of financial year-end t;66 EPS is earnings per share deflated 
by the beginning of share price; ∆EPS is changes in earnings per share deflated by 
the beginning of share price.  I estimate equation (5.1) and obtain the association 
between share returns and the level and change of earnings.  The stronger 
association reflects higher investors’ responses to reported earnings.  The sum of 
(α1 + α2) reflects the average change in the stock price associated with a dollar 
change in earnings (Lev and Zarowin 1999).  Lev and Zarowin (1999) suggest 
that a low slope coefficient refers to a low response from the market to reported 
                                               
65 From the prior literature, the returns are calculated from the start of financial year to 6-months 
(Harris et al. 1994), 5-months (Gordon 2001 and Bartov et al. 2001a), 3-months (Francis and 
Shipper 1999) after the financial year.  15-month returns are calculated based on the notion that 
prices lead earnings.  Kothari and Sloan (1992) propose the calculation of returns by using the 
overlapping period. They calculate the returns from one year before the financial year to the end of 
the financial year.  For example, when a firm engages in a long term sales contract at the 
beginning of year t-2 and promises to deliver goods at the beginning of year t-1.  The market 
expects the future cash flows from this event at the time when the firm engages in the contract but 
earnings start to account this transaction from year t-1.  Therefore, the market expectation has been 
adjusted to this event in year t-2. See the below figure. 
 
Source: Kothari and Sloan (1992) Page 148. 
With 1-year overlapping period of return calculation, they report that estimated earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) is very close to the predicted ERC when using time-series, cross-section and 
panel data.  A potential problem by using this calculation is a serial correlation.  However, the 
results are qualitatively similar when using 1-year overlapping period adjusted by the Cochrane-
Orcutt method and the normal OLS. Kothari and Sloan (1992) conclude that the return calculation 
with overlapping periods provides more powerful results.  In addition to 15-month returns, 12-
month returns are applied and their results are presented in Appendix 5. 
66 Following prior studies, i.e. Harris et al. (1994) and Lev and Zarowin (1999), Rt denotes  
[(Pt – Pt – 1) + Dt]/Pt – 1.   
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earnings because the investor’s belief is that reported earnings are probably 
transitory or manipulated.  A large change in share price associated with reported 
earnings reflects investors’ belief that reported earnings are permanent.  
Accordingly, low (high) slope coefficient reflects low (high) informativeness of 
reported earnings.   
 
In addition, I employ a price model for the value relevance analysis.  Based on the 
prior research previously described in Chapter 3, I employ Ohlson’s price 
valuation model.  I operationalise the model in the following way: 
 
 Pit = γ0 + γ1EPSit + γ2BVPSit + εit    (5.2) 
 
where P is stock price 3 months after the financial year-end (Francis and Schipper 
1999); EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is book value per share.  All three 
variables are scaled by the beginning of share price.  Consistent with the 
estimation in equation (5.1), I run equation (5.2) to obtain the association between 
market value and accounting numbers.  I also compare the explanatory power by 
using the Cramer procedure (Cramer 1987, Lang, Raedy and Wilson 2006 and 
Lang, Raedy and Yetman 2003) as derived by Harris et al. (1994).67 OLS firm 
fixed effect estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are applied 
to estimate equation (5.1) and (5.2). 
 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 4, I regress the value relevance on firm 
governance variables to determine the relationship between firm governance 
systems the informativeness of accounting numbers.  The model is operationalised 
as follows: 
 
                                               
67 z-statistics are computed as (see footnote 38, Harris et al. 1994): 
 , where σ2 is obtained from the Cramer procedure (Cramer 1987).  I am 
grateful to Professor Mars (J.S) Cramer for providing the GAUSS syntax to run the Cramer 
procedure. 
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VRi =  β0 + β1NBOi + β2NBBi + β3NBi + β4RCGi + β5ROAi + β6MKTi + εi
 
          (5.3) 
 
where VR is value relevance obtained from the explanatory power (R2) obtained 
from equation (5.1) or earnings response coefficients (ERC); both are calculated 
by using 5-year window before and after the IFRS adoption.  NBO is a median of 
number of boards of directors.  NBB is a median of number of boards on which 
members of board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in 
other firms.  NB is a median of number of boards on which audit committee 
members serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms. RCG is a 
mean of a proportion of audit committee members in board of directors. Control 
variables include return on assets (ROA) and market capitalization (MKT).  OLS 
estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are applied to estimate 
the equation (5.3).  As already discussed in Chapter 4, a priori expectations about 
the relationship between value relevance and firm governance factors are not 
determined.   
 
5.4 Data 
I use non-financial firms listed on SET during the period 1995–2004.  All sample 
firms have December financial year-ended.  There are 120 constant firms (1200 
firm-years) for the analysis of earnings response coefficient and 97 constant firms 
(970 firm-years) for price model analysis.  Table 5.1 presents a distribution of 
firms classified by their industry.  Consistent with the data constructed in Chapter 
4, group 1 includes the sample firms whose book-tax differences during pre-
adoption periods are smaller than book-tax differences during post-adoption 
periods (BT-Pre-adoption:1995–1999 < BT-Post-adoption: 2000–2004), whilst 
group 2 includes the sample firms whose book-tax differences during pre-
adoption periods are larger than book-tax differences during post-adoption periods 
(BT-Pre-adoption: 1995–1999 > BT-Post-adoption: 2000–2004).  All firms in this 
analysis have been in the same industry group for the whole testing period.  To 
calculate the book-tax difference, the missing value of taxable income will be set 
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to zero. 
 
Table 5.1 A distribution of sample firms in each industry 
Panel A: ERC model 
 
Industry Group 1 Group 2 
No. of 
observations 
(firms) 
Missing value 
of taxable 
income 
Negative taxable 
income 
Agro-Business 80 140 220 (22) 67 1 
Consumer Products 70 80 150 (15) 41 1 
Industrial 70 60 130 (13) 38 0 
Property & Construction 140 60 200 (20) 117 6 
Natural Resources 20 20 40 (4) 16 3 
Services 180 150 330 (33) 89 4 
Technology 70 60 130 (13) 65 4 
Total observations 630 570 1200 (120) 433 19 
 
Panel B: Price model 
 
Industry Group 1 Group 2 
No. of 
observations 
(firms) 
Missing value 
of taxable 
income 
Negative taxable 
income 
Agro-Business 70 80 150 (15) 54 1 
Consumer Products 70 60 130 (13) 35 1 
Industrial 50 60 110 (11) 35 0 
Property & Construction 110 50 160 (16) 85 6 
Natural Resources 30 20 500 (50) 24 3 
Services 140 130 270 (27) 69 4 
Technology 50 50 100 (10) 43 3 
Total observations 520 450 970 (97) 345 18 
 
5.5 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
From Table 5.2, descriptive statistics report a high variation in stock returns, 
earnings per share, ROE and debt.  Compared to prior research (Bartov et al. 
2001a),68 the high variation in stock returns can be found in many countries, i.e. 
the USA, the UK, Canada, Germany and Japan.  High variation in earnings per 
                                               
68 See Table 2 in the article. 
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share and book value can be found in Germany, Belgium and Italy (Barniv and 
Myring 2006).69 On average, the sample firms have 15 members on their boards.  
On average, one director serves as executive committee on 48 boards during the 
testing periods.  In particular, one audit committee member serves as executive 
committee on 18 boards during the testing period.  This high figure represents a 
high reputation of board of directors, however the quality of work is more likely 
to decline according to time constraints.  Because standard deviations are smaller 
than means, on average it implies small variations of firm governance systems 
among sample firms.   
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics  
 
 Mean Median SD 25th Percentile 75th Percentile N 
Earnings response coefficients (ERC) model    
R 0.178 -0.006 0.933 -0.384 0.433 1200 
EPS 0.020 0.072 0.763 0.003 0.176 1200 
∆EPS 0.182 -0.001 1.847 -0.096 0.080 1200 
Price model      
P 1.140 0.953 0.944 0.586 1.364 970 
EPS 0.037 0.072 0.651 0.004 0.172 970 
BVPS 1.391 1.012 1.524 0.505 1.790 970 
Value relevance and firm governance    
VR_R2 0.674 0.761 0.286 0.450 0.926 238 
VR_ERC 2.666 1.305 4.992 0.024 3.860 238 
NBO 15.437 15 4.700 12 18 238 
NBB 48.521 45 27.774 27 64 238 
NB 18.374 14 14.818 7 25 238 
RCG 0.304 0.295 0.114 0.216 0.378 238 
ROA 0.034 0.039 0.065 -0.004 0.074 238 
MKT 69.3 129 207 43 424 238 
 
R is 15-month dividend adjusted returns, 3-month after the financial year-end deflated by the beginning of share price; EPS 
is earnings per share scaled by the beginning of share price; ∆EPS is the change in earnings per share scaled by the 
beginning of share price; P is stock price 3-month after the financial year-end deflated by the beginning of share price; 
BVPS is book value per share scaled by the beginning of share price. 
VR is value relevance – VR_ R2 is r-squared and VR_ERC is earnings response coefficient. NBO is number of boards of 
director.  NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of directors or audit committee in other 
firms. RCG is a proportion audit committee members in board of directors. NBB is number of boards that members of 
board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms.  ROA is return on assets; MKT 
(‘00,000,000) is market capitalization.  SD is standard deviation and N is number of observations.   
                                               
69 See Table 1 in the article. 
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To obtain more insightful information about firms’ characteristics, including size, 
firm performance, leverage and market activity, I use standard t-test and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test to compare the sample firms. From Table 5.3, t-statistics report 
indifference in means of firms’ size and leverage between both sample groups.  
Firm performance measured by ROA and ROE of group 1 is higher than firm 
performance of group 2 during post-adoption periods.  According to the rank-sum 
test, firms’ size measured by the market capitalization in group 2 is significantly 
larger than the size of firms in group 1 during post-adoption periods.  And, firms 
in group 1 are likely to have a higher debt (measured by leverage), relative to 
firms in group 2.  Both t-statistics and the rank-sum test reveal that ROA of group 
2 is lower than that of group 1 during post-adoption periods.  In addition, during 
post-adoption periods, the trading activity of firms’ shares (measured by share 
turnover volume) for group 1 is more active than that for group 2.   
 
Table 5.3 Mean comparisons based on 120 firms (1,200 observations) 
  Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
 Group 1 Group 2 t-test 
Rank-sum 
test Group 1 Group 2 t-test 
Rank-sum 
test 
   t (p-value) z (p-value)   t (p-value) z (p-value) 
         
Market Cap.  412 583 -1.35 0.60 880 883 -0.01 4.29 
(‘00,000,000)   (0.176) (0.549)   (0.990) (0.000) 
         
Leverage 2.82 2.49 0.23 3.32 1.77 1.75 0.04 2.88 
   (0.816) (0.001)   (0.965) (0.004) 
         
ROA -0.01 0.03 -4.43 -5.65 0.06 0.05 2.26 2.20 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.024) (0.0281) 
         
ROE -0.29 0.04 -2.26 -4.87 0.11 0.05 1.40 3.87 
   (0.024) (0.000)   (0.161) (0.000) 
         
Share  42.68 31.81 1.83 0.97 135.74 95.32 2.25 2.91 
Turnover 
Volume   
(0.068) (0.335)   (0.025) (0.004) 
 
Leverage is the ratio of total liability divided by total equity. ROA is return on asset. ROE is return on equity. Revenue 
growth is the change in total revenue. Group 1 (2) is firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption 
periods.  
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Table 5.4 presents results from Pearson and Spearman correlations.  Stock returns 
highly correlate with the level and change in earnings.  Stock price highly 
correlates with net earnings and book value.  The value relevance measured by R2 
and ERC is positively correlated with firm performance (ROA).  ERC is 
positively correlated with the quality of audit committee measured by NB and 
firm size measured by market capitalization.  
 
Main results 
Table 5.5 presents the association between stock returns and earnings measured 
by the explanatory power – R2 (Lang, Raedy and Wilson 2006; Van der Meulen et 
al. 2007).70  In Panel A, the value relevance for firms in group 1 (17.1%) is higher 
than the value relevance for firms in group 2 (13.9%).  However, ERC for firms in 
group 2 (.512) is greater than ERC for firms in group 1 (.247).  As reported in 
Panel B, results for full samples reveal that on average the association between 
stock returns and earnings information increases from 22.8% in pre-adoption 
periods to 30% in post-adoption periods, implying that earnings in post-adoption 
periods explain the variation in market returns better than do earnings in pre-
adoption periods, increasing by 31.58% [(.30 –.228)/.228] on average from pre-
adoption periods.  Earnings response coefficient (ERC) increases from .006 points 
in pre-adoption periods to .841 points in post-adoption periods.71  ERC between 
those periods increases by 139.16 times [(.841 – .006)/.006] on average.   
                                               
70 Qualitatively similar results are obtained when using the adjusted R2.  The adjusted R2 is also 
reported in the parenthesis.  However, the magnitude of the adjusted R2 (i.e. Table 5.5, 1.7%) is 
much smaller than R2 (i.e. Table 5.5, 11.6%).  This is consistent with prior studies that the adjusted 
R2 in returns-earnings model is low. For example, Chen and Wang (2004) report the adjusted R2 
about 4% – 12% for returns-earnings model and 8% – 45% for price model in Chinese firms (see 
Table 4 in the article).    
71 ERC in the Thai firm is smaller than ERC in the UK (see Table 2, Donnelly 2002) and USA (see 
Table 3, Francis and Schipper 1999). 
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Table 5.4 Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient on the lower (upper) diagonal 
 
Panel A: ERC model 
 
 R EPS ∆EPS 
R  0.4548*** 0.3102*** 
EPS 0.2108***  0.5298*** 
∆EPS 0.2499*** 0.5037***  
 
Panel B: Price model 
 
 P EPS BVPS 
P   0.4495*** 0.4297*** 
EPS 0.2763***   0.2461*** 
BVPS 0.3523*** 0.0018   
 
Panel C: The value relevance and firm governance systems 
 
 VR_R2 VR_ERC NBO NBB NB RCG ROA MKT 
VR_R2   0.3735*** -0.048 -0.0519 0.034 0.0231 0.2268*** -0.0457 
VR_ERC 0.2470***   0.1159* 0.0631 0.2504*** 0.2438*** 0.3932*** 0.2069*** 
NBO -0.0346 0.1084   0.6997*** 0.4342*** -0.0234 0.0916 0.3502*** 
NBB -0.0165 0.0603 0.7219***   0.6749*** 0.0280 0.0312 0.3595*** 
NB 0.0736 0.1765*** 0.4075*** 0.7032***   0.5677*** 0.2532*** 0.3053*** 
RCG 0.0134 0.1486 -0.0827 -0.0004 0.5164***   0.3623*** 0.1411 
ROA 0.1688*** 0.2590*** 0.0467 0.0342 0.2078*** 0.3283***   0.1960*** 
MKT 0.0324 0.1749*** 0.1288** 0.2568*** 0.1580** 0.0826 0.1211*   
 
R is 15-month dividend adjusted returns, 3-month after the financial year-end deflated by the beginning of share price; EPS is earnings per share scaled by the beginning of share price; ∆EPS is the change in 
earnings per share scaled by the beginning of share price; P is stock price 3-month after the financial year-end deflated by the beginning of share price; BVPS is book value per share scaled by the beginning of 
share price. 
VR is value relevance – VR_ R2 is r-squared and VR_ERC is earnings response coefficient. NBO is number of boards of director.  NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of directors 
or audit committee in other firms. RCG is a proportion audit committee members in board of directors. NBB is number of boards that members of board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in 
other firms.  ROA is return on assets; MKT (‘00,000,000) is market capitalization.     
***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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An average association between stock returns and earnings for firms with larger 
book-tax differences (group 1) decreases from 34.6% to 30.4%.  The value 
relevance for firms with larger book-tax differences decreases by 12.14% [(.304 – 
.346)/.346] on average.  For firms with smaller book-tax differences (group 2), 
earnings have a higher ability to explain market returns variation during post-
adoption periods that the coefficient of determination increases from 15.3% to 
30.6%.  The value relevance for firms with smaller book-tax differences improves 
by 1 [(.306 – .153)/.153] time on average.  z-statistics report the highly significant 
difference in R2 between pre- and post-adoption periods for pooled-data and 
group 2, suggesting that the implemented new accounting standard in Thailand 
substantially improves the value relevance of accounting information for firms in 
group 2.  Nevertheless, the value relevance of accounting numbers for firms in 
group 1 declines from pre- to post-adoption periods but it is not statistically 
significant as measured by z-stat (= -1.299).  ERC for firms in group 1 increases 
from .037 points72 in pre-adoption periods to 0.976 points in post-adoption 
periods.  The improvement of ERC increases by on average 25.38 [(0.976 – 
.037)/.037] times for firms in group 1.  ERC for firms in group 2 improves from 
.35 points from pre-adoption periods to .685 points in post-adoption periods.  The 
enhancement of ERC increases by on average 0.96 [(.685 – .35)/.35] times for 
firms in group 2.   
 
Overall results, the ability of earnings to explain market returns has increased 
during post-adoption periods.  In addition, a higher slope of ERC indicates that 
earnings are of higher informativeness to investors, irrespective of the effect of 
other information sources (Francis and Schipper 1999).  According to Lev and 
Zarowin (1999), ERC complements the inferences based on declining (increasing) 
the R2.  Other information, i.e. news about new accounting standards 
implemented, with no change in earnings informativeness may induce the decline 
(or increase) of the earnings ability to explain the variation in market returns.  
Based on Lev and Zarowin (1999), I interpret the results that the higher ERC is 
                                               
72 Very low ERC for group 1 during pre-adoption periods is due to the negative coefficient 
estimate of EPS and low value of coefficient estimate of ∆EPS. 
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driven by the investors’ belief that earnings prepared by old accounting standards 
are highly transitory compared to earnings prepared by new accounting standards, 
resulting in the ERC adjustment being made by the market.  The higher 
explanation power of earnings information on the variation in market returns is 
driven by the investors’ belief that earnings prepared by new accounting standards 
reflect performance of the firm more accurately.73 
 
Table 5.5 Earnings response coefficients (ERC): OLS estimation with firm-fixed 
effect and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors  
 
Rit = α0 + α1EPSit+ α2∆EPSit + εit 
 
Panel A 
 Pooled Group 1 Group 2 
ERC 0.229 0.247 0.512 
R2 0.116 0.171 0.139 
Adj. R2 (0.017) (0.077) (0.042) 
N 1200 630 570 
 
Panel B 
 Pooled Group 1 Group 2 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
ERC 0.006 0.841 0.037 0.976 0.350 0.685 
R2 0.228 0.300 0.346 0.304 0.153 0.306 
Adj. R2 (0.032) (0.123) (0.179) (0.126) (-0.065) (0.128) 
N 600 600 315 315 285 285 
z stat*  3.462  -1.299  5.487 
 
ERC is earnings response coefficients (α1 + α2); R is 15-month dividend adjusted returns, 3-month after financial year-end; 
EPS is earnings per share; ∆EPS is changes in earnings per share. All variables are deflated by the beginning of share price.  
N is a number of observations.     
Pre = 1995 – 1999 and Post = 2000 – 2004.  
Group 1 (2) is firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption periods. 
* z-statistics are reported to compare the difference of R2 between pre- and post-adoption periods.  
 
                                               
73 Table 5.5, Panel A reports that firms in group 1 have higher R2 but lower ERC compared to 
firms in group 2. This shows that the increase of R2 does not reflect the increase of ERC or vice 
versa.  (see Lev and Zarowin (1999) Table 1 and Goncharov et al. (2006) Table 4 and 7 for 
qualitatively similar findings).  In addition, qualitatively similar results are obtained when the 
returns are calculated over 12-months starting from 9-months before and 3-months after the 
financial year (see appendix 5). 
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Table 5.6 presents the result obtained from the price model.  Panel A reports that 
the value relevance for firms in group 1 (31.9%) is greater than the value 
relevance for firms in group 2 (21.5%).  This result is consistent with the 
explanatory power estimated by the ERC model.  For pooled-data, results indicate 
that $1 of earnings (book value) corresponds to $0.41 ($0.29) of market value.  In 
subsamples, $1 of earnings (book value) corresponds to $0.52 ($0.30) of market 
value for firms in group 1 and $1 of earnings (book value) corresponds to $0.20 
($0.29) of market value for firms in group 2.     
  
When evaluating the improvement of value relevance of accounting summary 
measures, the result as presented in Panel B of Table 5.6 reports that value 
relevance (R2) is enhanced from pre- to post-adoption periods, 29.5% to 47.6%, 
respectively.  The value relevance increases by 61.36% on average [(.476 – 
.295)/.295].  The coefficient of earnings and book value per share is larger from 
pre- to post-adoption periods. z-statistics suggest that the improvement of value 
relevance between two periods is statistically significant.  Panel C and Panel D 
report the value relevance for firms in group 1 and 2, respectively, during pre- and 
post-adoption periods.  The value relevance of accounting numbers for firms in 
group 1 improves from 34.2% to 52.2% between the two periods, increasing by 
52.63% [(.522 – .342)/.342] on average.  The value relevance of earnings and 
book value for firms in group 2 also improves from 22.8% to 43.4% between the 
two periods, increasing by 90.35% [(.434 – .228/.228)] on average.   
 
The higher coefficients of earnings and book value per share during IFRS post-
adoption periods suggest that earnings and book value information correspond to 
market values higher than that during IFRS pre-adoptions.  However, the 
coefficient estimate of book value information of group 1 declines during post-
adoption periods.  Additionally, z-statistics reveal that the improvement of value 
relevance of earnings and book values between the two periods for full samples 
and both subgroups is highly significant.  It should be noted that qualitatively 
similar results as reported in Table 5.5 and 5.6 are also obtained when book-tax 
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differences are calculated from consolidated financial statements.74  In conclusion, 
the results indicate that value relevance has enhanced after IFRS adoptions, 
supporting the hypothesis (H.5.1).  The improvement of value relevance for firms 
with larger book-tax differences (group 1) is lower than the improvement of value 
relevance for firms with smaller book-tax differences (group 2).  These findings 
support the hypothesis (H.5.2).   
 
The value relevance and firm governance 
As reported in Table 5.7, I regress the value relevance on firm governance proxies 
to determine whether the alteration of value relevance for firms in both subgroups 
is related to firm governance systems.  From Panel A, value relevance is estimated 
by the explanatory power obtained from the equation (1).  For pooled-data, 
findings report that the association between the value relevance of accounting 
summary measures and firm governance systems is more pronounced during post-
adoption periods, relative to pre-adoption periods.  Value relevance is positively 
related to NB but negatively related to RCG.   
 
From Panel B, findings report that for firms in group 1, the value relevance is 
significantly improved during post-adoption periods (measured by β0) without 
other information sources but not varied with firm governance factors both pre- 
and post-adoption years.  For firms in group 2 presented in Panel C, value 
relevance is significantly improved during post-adoption periods (measured by β0) 
without other information sources.  During post-adoption periods, value relevance 
for firms in group 2 relates to the quality of board (measured by NBB) and audit 
committee (measured by NB) and firm governance quality (measured by RCG).  
Findings report the negative relationship between the value relevance and board 
quality (NBB), suggesting that time constraint of board of director may deter the 
value relevance.  Besides, the negative relationship between the value relevance 
and the proportion of audit committee in board of director (RCG) suggests that 
higher proportion induces lower value relevance. 
                                               
74 See Appendix 5. 
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Table 5.6 Price model: OLS estimation with firm fixed effect and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
Pit = γ0 + γ1EPSit + γ2BVPSit + εit  
Panel A 
 Pooled Group 1 Group 2 
  Estimate t value p value Estimate t value p value Estimate t value p value 
Intercept 0.722 13.33 0.000 0.713 9.04 0.000 0.724 9.89 0.000 
EPS 0.409 2.83 0.005 0.515 2.59 0.010 0.199 1.73 0.085 
BVPS 0.289 7.91 0.000 0.303 6.04 0.000 0.287 5.08 0.000 
R2 0.273   0.319   0.215   
Adj. R2 (0.191)   (0.242)   (0.126)   
N 970   520   450   
 
Panel B 
  Pooled 
  Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Estimate t value p value Estimate t value p value 
Intercept 0.711 10.37 0.000 0.577 6.96 0.000 
EPS 0.264 1.38 0.167 0.466 2.91 0.004 
BVPS 0.248 6.48 0.000 0.537 7.57 0.000 
R2 0.295   0.476   
Adj. R2 (0.116)     (0.343)   
N 485   485        z-stat* = 6.875 
 
Panel C 
  Group 1 
  Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Estimate t value p value Estimate t value p value 
Intercept 0.360 1.37 0.173 0.884 4.11 0.000 
EPS 0.257 4.67 0.000 0.465 7.90 0.000 
BVPS 0.680 6.59 0.000 0.532 7.21 0.000 
R2 0.342   0.522   
Adj. R2 (0.172)   (0.399)   
N 260   260        z-stat = 4.845 
 
Panel D 
  Group 2 
  Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Estimate t value p value Estimate t value p value 
Intercept 0.735 9.87 0.000 0.529 3.33 0.001 
EPS 0.053 0.44 0.658 0.359 1.36 0.175 
BVPS 0.265 5.38 0.000 0.445 3.42 0.001 
R2 0.228   0.434   
Adj. R2 (0.028)   (0.288)   
N 225   225        z-stat = 4.581 
 
P is stock price 3-month after the financial year-end; EPS is earnings per share; BVPS is book value per share. All variables 
are deflated by the beginning of share price. N is number of observations.  Pre = 1995–1999 and Post = 2000–2004.  Group 
1 (2) is firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption periods.   
*z-statistics are reported to compare the difference of R2 between pre- and post-adoption periods. 
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Panel D–F present the results when the value relevance is measured by ERC.  In 
terms of NB, it is measured from the number of boards on which audit committees 
and independent directors serve as executive directors in other firms.  The higher 
number of boards on which they serve can deteriorate the quality of work due to 
time constraints.  However, an alternative explanation is that a large number of 
boards on which they serve reflect the reputation of audit committees and 
independent directors.  For this analysis, findings report a positive relationship 
between value relevance and NB.  I argue that this is due to the reputation of audit 
committee and independent directors inducing more value relevance in the firm.  
On the other hand, the relationship between value relevance and NBB is negative 
and significant.  It implies that the time constraint deters the value relevance of 
accounting numbers.  It should be noted that the coefficient sign of NB and NBB 
should be in the same direction.  However, the result reports different direction of 
NB and NBB.  Thus, it is difficult to provide an inference for these two variables 
relative to the association between value relevance and board (audit committee) 
quality.   
 
For RCG, value relevance is negatively related to the proportion of audit 
committee to board size (RCG).  The larger RCG indicates higher quality of 
corporate governance on a board.  The obtained negative relationship between 
value relevance and RCG suggests that value relevance of accounting information 
is less likely when the proportion is large.   
 
From these findings, the relationship between value relevance and firm 
governance systems is different from the relationship between earnings 
persistence and firm governance systems previously presented in Chapter 4.  
However, the obtained result suggests that in Thai settings, firm governance 
systems for firms in group 1 are clearly not related to theirs value relevance but 
firm governance systems for firms in group 2 are related to theirs value relevance.  
These findings, therefore, suggest that the firm governance system is related to the 
variation in value relevance of firms in group 1 and group 2.  It also implies that 
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the firm governance system encourages the improvement of value relevance in the 
firm and plays an important role when IFRS has been adopted in Thailand.    
 
Table 5.7 Value relevance and firm governance  
 
VRi =  β0 + β1NBOi + β2NBBi + β3NBi + β4RCGi + β5ROAi + β6MKTi + εi
 
VR = R2 
Panel A: Full samples 
 Pooled Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 0.838 8.57 0.000 0.585 2.35 0.021 0.880 3.48 0.001 
NBO -0.001 -0.21 0.836 0.006 0.46 0.645 0.000 -0.04 0.969 
NBB -0.003 -1.72 0.086 -0.002 -1.03 0.304 -0.003 -1.37 0.173 
NB 0.006 2.29 0.023 0.004 0.73 0.465 0.007 2.02 0.045 
RCG -0.548 -2.12 0.035 0.271 0.39 0.694 -0.751 -1.82 0.071 
ROA 0.779 2.55 0.012 0.660 1.70 0.092 0.990 1.82 0.072 
MKT 0.000 0.74 0.462 0.000 -1.34 0.183 0.000 1.78 0.078 
Adj.R2   0.033   0.012   0.038 
N   238   119   119 
 
Panel B: Group 1 
 Pooled Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 0.664 4.86 0.000 0.409 1.42 0.161 0.945 3.42 0.001 
NBO -0.003 -0.42 0.675 0.005 0.32 0.747 -0.013 -0.96 0.339 
NBB 0.002 0.86 0.393 0.001 0.38 0.702 0.003 0.89 0.379 
NB -0.004 -0.83 0.410 -0.004 -0.53 0.599 -0.005 -0.73 0.467 
RCG 0.204 0.59 0.558 1.020 1.22 0.228 -0.218 -0.47 0.643 
ROA 0.315 0.90 0.370 0.091 0.19 0.852 0.544 0.77 0.443 
MKT 0.000 0.85 0.395 0.000 -0.25 0.801 0.000 0.36 0.719 
Adj.R2   -0.031   -0.076   -0.045 
N   126   63   63 
 
Panel C: Group 2 
 Pooled Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 0.864 6.61 0.000 0.598 1.64 0.106 0.807 1.81 0.076 
NBO 0.004 0.5 0.617 0.012 0.62 0.540 0.010 0.61 0.545 
NBB -0.006 -2.92 0.004 -0.005 -1.64 0.108 -0.007 -2.57 0.013 
NB 0.013 4.50 0.000 0.011 1.38 0.174 0.015 4.43 0.000 
RCG -1.135 -3.71 0.000 -0.357 -0.41 0.684 -1.161 -1.68 0.100 
ROA 1.899 4.84 0.000 2.156 4.41 0.000 1.357 1.85 0.070 
MKT 0.000 0.51 0.610 0.000 -1.72 0.092 0.000 2.17 0.035 
Adj.R2   0.193   0.202   0.143 
N   112   56   56 
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Table 5.7 (Cont.)   
 
VR = ERC 
Panel D: Full samples  
 Pooled Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 0.835 0.52 0.601 1.853 0.51 0.609 9.706 2.02 0.046 
NBO 0.213 1.67 0.097 0.083 0.47 0.638 0.030 0.13 0.896 
NBB -0.065 -2.54 0.012 -0.050 -2.00 0.048 -0.071 -1.62 0.108 
NB 0.109 2.84 0.005 0.106 1.67 0.097 0.112 1.99 0.049 
RCG -3.631 -1.11 0.268 -3.076 -0.36 0.717 -17.015 -2.45 0.016 
ROA 15.410 3.61 0.000 11.474 2.15 0.034 14.649 1.75 0.082 
MKT 0.000 2.11 0.036 0.000 -0.43 0.670 0.000 3.94 0.000 
Adj.R2   0.105   0.031   0.079 
N   238   119   119 
 
Panel E: Group 1 
 Pooled Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 0.902 0.39 0.694 8.202 1.65 0.105 4.954 0.77 0.442 
NBO 0.137 0.76 0.449 -0.101 -0.53 0.600 -0.042 -0.11 0.913 
NBB -0.028 -0.74 0.458 -0.061 -2.25 0.028 0.048 0.60 0.549 
NB 0.031 0.54 0.589 0.022 0.28 0.779 -0.072 -0.67 0.507 
RCG -1.568 -0.36 0.716 -16.805 -1.44 0.154 -3.503 -0.47 0.641 
ROA 14.585 2.74 0.007 18.313 2.36 0.022 -4.263 -0.54 0.592 
MKT 0.000 3.15 0.002 0.000 1.48 0.146 0.000 2.32 0.024 
Adj.R2   0.112   0.135   0.054 
N   126   63   63 
 
Panel F: Group 2 
 Pooled Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2004) 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 -0.578 -0.24 0.809 -0.146 -0.02 0.984 13.193 1.99 0.053 
NBO 0.344 1.75 0.083 0.186 0.57 0.571 0.076 0.28 0.783 
NBB -0.097 -2.54 0.012 -0.057 -1.31 0.197 -0.139 -2.37 0.022 
NB 0.158 3.25 0.002 0.218 1.56 0.126 0.223 3.96 0.000 
RCG -3.986 -0.83 0.407 -1.942 -0.12 0.902 -28.516 -2.51 0.015 
ROA 21.495 2.67 0.009 3.718 0.42 0.677 43.325 2.86 0.006 
MKT 0.000 0.57 0.571 0.000 -1.78 0.081 0.000 2.55 0.014 
Adj.R2   0.124   0.029   0.218 
N   112   56   56 
 
VR is value relevance obtained from the explanatory power (R2) and ERC from the equation (1).  One firm is dropped 
because of the incomplete data.  The equation (1) is estimated by firm-specific OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, rolling five-year window before and after the accounting change. NBO is number of boards of 
director.  NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of directors or audit committee in other 
firms. RCG is a proportion audit committee members in board of directors. NBB is number of boards that members of 
board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms. Control variables are added, including 
return on assets (ROA), and market capitalization (MKT).  The median of NBO, NB and NBB and the mean of RCG, ROA 
and MKT are applied for the regressions analysis.  N are a number of observations. Group 1 (2) is firms with larger 
(smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption periods. OLS estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
employed to run the regression. 
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Robustness checks 
 
First, I exclude the sample firms that have negative annual income tax expenses.  
It results in dropping nine firms (90 observations)75 for ERC model and eight 
firms (80 observations)76 for price model.  I re-estimate both models by using 
these sample firms.  Results are qualitatively similar to the main findings reported 
in Table 5.5.  However, the price model reveals that the improvement of value 
relevance for group 1 is greater than that for group 2.77   
 
I estimate the value relevance of accounting information and compare it between 
pre- and post-adoption periods by each industry as presented in Table 5.8.  ERC 
model suggests that the value relevance of accounting information (Adj. R2) 
increases from pre- to post-adoption periods in 4 out of 7 industries, including 
agro-business, consumer products, industrial and services.  But ERC increases for 
all industries except the firm in the natural resources group.  The price model 
reveals that the value relevance of earnings and book values (Adj. R2) increases 
during the testing period but it declines for firms in the natural resources and 
technology groups.  Both models report that the value relevance declines for firms 
in natural resources and technology after IFRS adoptions.  I argue that it is 
because these firms have high value of depreciable and intangible assets that are 
subject to firms’ accounting discretions.  And, IFRS provides more room for 
firms’ discretions relative to the old accounting system in Thai settings.  The 
market, therefore, may interpret accounting information in these two industries as 
transitory.         
 
Next, I extend the sample period by using 70 constant firms for ERC model 
during the period 1993–2007 and 73 constant firms for price model during the 
period 1995–2007.78 The dataset is divided into two groups according to book-tax 
differences.  Non-deflated variables are employed for the analysis (Goncharov et 
                                               
75 BCP, BJC, CPF, CPH, CTW, LOXLEY, SCC, SCCC and UCOM 
76 BCP, BJC, CPF, CPH, CTW, LOXLEY, SCC and SCCC 
77 See details in Appendix 6.   
78 The book value per share is available in the database from 1995 onwards. 
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al. 2006; Van der Meulen et al. 2007).  Consistent with the main analysis, group 1 
(2) includes firms whose book-tax differences during post-adoption periods are 
larger (smaller) than book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods.  Fama-
MacBeth regressions are employed to obtain the average coefficient estimate and 
the explanatory power (R2).  Table 5.9 presents the result.  Findings in panel A are 
obtained from ERC model, suggesting that on average, the value relevance of 
accounting summary measures increases from pre- (R2 = 16.2%) to post-adoption 
periods (R2 = 25.8%).  On average, the value relevance for group 1 increases from 
25% in pre-adoption years to 32% in post-adoption years, increasing by 26% 
[(.315 – .250)/.250].  The value relevance for group 2 increases from 20% in pre-
adoption years to 31% in post-adoption years, increasing by 53.77% [(.306 – 
.199)/.199].   
 
In Panel B, the price model reports consistent results that the value relevance of 
accounting information measured by the R2 increases from 54.7% in pre-adoption 
years to 84.8% in post-adoption years. On average, from pre- to post-adoption 
periods, the value relevance for group 1 increases by 12.45% [(.831 – .739)/.739].  
The value relevance for group 2 increases from 31% in pre-adoption years to 83% 
in post-adoption years, increasing by 1.71 times [(.833 – .307)/.307].  It should be 
noted that when excluding firms with negative annual income tax expenses, 
qualitatively similar results are obtained.79  These findings suggest that the 
enhancement of value relevance from pre- to post-adoption years is higher for 
group 2 compared to group 1.  The additional tests support the hypotheses (H.5.1 
and H.5.2).  
                                               
79 See results in Appendix 8. 
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Table 5.8 Robustness checks: The value relevance of accounting summary 
measures when partitioning firms by industrya 
 
ERC model:   Rit = α0 + α1EPSit+ α2∆EPSit  + εt  
Price model:  Pit = γ0 + γ1EPSit + γ2BVPSit + εit   
 ERC model Price model 
  ERC Adj.R2 N EPS BVPS Adj.R2 N 
Agro- Pre 1.183 0.358 110 0.210 0.323 0.281 75 
business Post 3.121 0.570 110 0.805 0.291 0.391 75 
Consumer Pre 0.327 0.114 75 0.116 0.206 0.201 65 
Products Post 0.830 0.324 75 0.698 0.315 0.413 65 
Industrial Pre 0.079 0.043 60 0.074 0.083 0.076 55 
 Post 1.136 0.225 61 0.460 0.063 0.129 55 
Property &  Pre 0.091 0.402 105 0.301 0.194 0.228 80 
Construction Post 1.061 0.291 104 1.267 0.265 0.308 80 
Natural  Pre -0.088 0.435 20 -0.090 0.189 0.314 25 
resources Post -0.653 0.083 20 -0.452 -0.136 -0.041 25 
Service Pre -0.295 0.064 165 -0.211 0.002 0.017 135 
 Post 0.585 0.090 165 0.196 0.326 0.260 135 
Technology Pre -1.034 0.121 65 -1.411 0.094 0.208 50 
 Post 0.180 -0.012 65 -0.058 0.328 0.169 50 
 
a: Full details of the regression results are presented in Appendix 7. 
ERC is earnings response coefficients (α1 + α2); R is 15-month dividend adjusted returns, 3-month after financial year-end; 
EPS is earnings per share; ∆EPS is changes in earnings per share; and N is number of observations.  P is stock price 3-
month after the financial year-end; BVPS is book value per share and N is number of observations.  All variables are 
deflated by the beginning of share price.  Pre = 1995–1999 and Post = 2000–2004  
 
 
In Table 5.10, I perform additional tests to evaluate the value relevance of 
accounting information for all firm-years.  Extreme values of each variable are 
deleted.  The dataset is partitioned according to firms’ positive book-tax 
differences.80  Firm-years with negative book-tax differences are excluded.  The 
positive book-tax differences are classified into two groups every year.  BT1 
includes firm-years with small positive book-tax differences whilst BT2 includes 
firm-years with large positive book-tax differences.   
 
                                               
80 For the robust check, the annual income tax expense was not set to zero and the negative value 
of annual income tax expenses was excluded. 
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Table 5.9 Robustness checks: Panel data analysis by using Fama-MacBeth 
regressions 
 
Panel A: Rit = α0 + α1EPSit+ α2∆EPSit  + εt  
 
  Pre-adoption (1993–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
    α0 EPS ∆EPS  Avg.R
2 N  α0 EPS ∆EPS  Avg.R
2 N  
  Coef. -0.081 1.548 0.390 0.162 490 0.069 1.225 0.369 0.258 560 
Pooled t value -0.65 1.93 1.19   0.58 2.24 1.94   
  p value 0.538 0.101 0.278   0.578 0.06 0.093   
  Coef. -0.038 0.891 0.220 0.250 266 0.031 1.488 0.483 0.315 304 
Group 1 t value -0.24 1.57 0.49   0.22 3.45 2.20   
  p value 0.816 0.168 0.639   0.832 0.011 0.064   
  Coef. -0.147 2.438 1.082 0.199 224 0.080 1.382 0.396 0.306 256 
Group 2 t value -1.66 2.01 1.58   0.92 2.03 0.73   
  p value 0.147 0.091 0.165   0.388 0.082 0.49   
 
Panel B: Pit = γ0 + γ1EPSit + γ2BVPSit + εit  
 
  Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
    γ0 EPS BVPS  Avg.R
2 N  γ0 EPS BVPS  Avg.R
2 N  
  Coef. 13.425 5.720 0.321 0.547 365 -2.169 9.194 0.315 0.848 584 
Pooled t value 1.250 1.580 0.610    -1.170 5.180 2.300   
  p value 0.279 0.188 0.572     0.281 0.001 0.055     
  Coef. 10.821 7.334 -0.016 0.739 205 -4.436 8.943 0.262 0.831 328 
Group 1 t value 0.90 1.69 -0.02   -2.65 5.63 1.68   
  p value 0.421 0.166 0.983   0.033 0.001 0.137   
  Coef. 16.433 2.901 0.958 0.307 160 6.598 9.460 0.196 0.833 256 
Group 2 t value 3.88 2.14 6.56   2.99 4.14 1.30   
  p value 0.018 0.099 0.003   0.02 0.004 0.234   
 
R is 15-month dividend adjusted returns, 3-month after financial year-end; EPS is earnings per share scaled by the 
beginning of share price; ∆EPS is changes in earnings per share scaled by the beginning of share price.  P is stock price 3-
month after the financial year-end; BVPS is book value per share. N is a number of observations.  
Fama-MacBeth regressions are applied to determine average coefficient estimates and R2. 
Group 1 (2) includes firms whose book-tax differences during pre-adoption periods are smaller (larger) than book-tax 
differences during post-adoption periods. 
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The expectation is that firms with smaller book-tax differences are of higher-
quality accounting information than firms with large book-tax differences.  
Therefore, the higher value relevance of accounting summary measures is 
expected in BT1 relative to BT2.   
 
From the ERC model, results show that the value relevance of accounting 
summary measures (Adj. R2) improves from pre- (2.8%) to post-adoption periods 
(6.4%).  When partitioning firms with their book-tax differences (BT1 vs. BT2), 
the value relevance for BT1 (Adj. R2 = 47%) is greater than BT2 (Adj. R2 = 35%).  
The value relevance increases from pre- to post-adoption periods for firms in both 
BT1 and BT2.  The value relevance of accounting information for firms in BT1 
(Pre = 45.8%, Post = 46.7%) is higher than that for firms in BT2 (Pre = 25.9%, 
Post = 40%) in both periods.  Moreover, the magnitude of ERC supports the 
improvement of value relevance after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.  The ERC 
increases after the IFRS adoption for pooled-data (ERC – Pre = .183, ERC – Post 
= .546) and BT1 (ERC – Pre = 3.22, ERC – Post = 4.26) but slightly declines for 
BT2 (ERC – Pre = 3.37, ERC – Post = 2.83).  EERC for firms in BT1 is higher 
than ERC for firms in BT2 in both pre- and post-adoption periods, supporting the 
expectation that the value relevance for BT1 is higher than the value relevance for 
BT2.   
 
Consistent with the ERC model, the price model reports that the value relevance 
of earnings and book value information increases during post-adoption periods for 
pooled-data (Adj. R2 – Pre = 65.6%, Adj. R2 – Post = 82.4%).  The magnitude of 
earnings coefficients improves from pre- to post-adoption periods, suggesting that 
earnings information corresponds to share prices greater than in the past.   When 
partitioning the dataset according to small (BT1) and large (BT2) positive book-
tax differences, the value relevance of earnings and book value information is 
higher quality after IFRS adoptions for both subgroups.  The value relevance for 
firms in BT1 (Adj. R2 – Pre = 72.1%, Adj. R2 – Post = 84.1%) is greater than the 
value relevance for firms in BT2 (Adj. R2 – Pre = 55.6%, Adj. R2 – Post = 81.7%) 
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in both periods.  In addition, the higher coefficient estimate of earnings in BT1 
and BT2 during post-adoption periods suggests that earnings information can 
better explain share price relative to pre-adoption periods.  The results from 
subgroups are also consistent with the results obtained from the ERC model.  In 
summary, the findings from both models suggest that the value relevance of 
accounting information increases after the IFRS adoption in Thailand, and the 
value relevance of accounting information for firms with small positive book-tax 
differences is higher relative to firms with large positive book-tax differences. 
 
Table 5.10 Robustness checks: Pooled-cross section regression with firm fixed 
effect and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all firm-years (1993–2007) 
and partitioning the dataset by using positive book-tax differences  
 
Rit = α0 + α1EPSit+ α2∆EPSit  + εt   
 
Panel A: Full samples 
  All Pre-adoption (1993–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
INT. 0.020 1.91 0.056 -0.100 -6.52 0.000 0.098 6.49 0.000 
EPS 0.286 4.94 0.000 0.093 1.46 0.143 0.508 4.59 0.000 
∆EPS 0.068 2.07 0.038 0.090 2.48 0.013 0.038 0.63 0.530 
Adj. R2   0.050   0.028   0.064 
 N    3628     1624    2004 
 
Panel B: BT1 
  All Pre-adoption (1993–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
INT. -0.395 -16.05 0.000 -0.439 -14.61 0.000 -0.422 -6.83 0.000 
EPS 3.872 16.21 0.000 3.661 10.65 0.000 4.681 9.51 0.000 
∆EPS -0.470 -1.93 0.054 -0.582 -1.9 0.058 -0.672 -1.44 0.150 
Adj. R2   0.469   0.458   0.467 
 N   994   532   462 
 
Panel C: BT2 
  All Pre-adoption (1993–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
INT. -0.287 -8.47 0.000 -0.370 -7.95 0.000 -0.255 -4.21 0.000 
EPS 3.097 8.90 0.000 3.743 6.23 0.000 3.084 6.33 0.000 
∆EPS -0.336 -1.53 0.125 -0.646 -1.88 0.061 0.166 0.51 0.612 
Adj. R2   0.350   0.259   0.400 
 N   989   530   459 
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Table 5.10 (Cont.)  
 
Pit = γ0 + γ1EPSit + γ2BVPSit + εit  
 
Panel D: Full samples 
 
  All Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
INT. 3.813 2.99 0.003 9.347 2.12 0.034 5.522 4.61 0.000 
EPS 1.014 7.75 0.000 0.663 4.64 0.000 1.806 7.36 0.000 
BVPS 0.916 17.58 0.000 0.778 6.24 0.000 0.737 11.28 0.000 
Adj. R2   0.675   0.656   0.824 
 N   3056   1167   1889 
 
Panel E: BT1 
 
  All Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
INT. 7.222 2.30 0.022 33.293 1.60 0.112 2.627 0.83 0.407 
EPS 4.660 4.29 0.000 4.285 2.13 0.035 5.373 5.92 0.000 
BVPS 0.295 1.95 0.052 -0.207 -0.33 0.739 0.281 2.20 0.029 
Adj. R2   0.768   0.721   0.841 
 N   748   320   428 
 
Panel F: BT2 
 
  All Pre-adoption (1995–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
INT. 6.196 1.24 0.214 27.599 1.62 0.108 14.763 5.41 0.000 
EPS 2.986 4.09 0.000 1.965 1.75 0.083 3.876 3.36 0.001 
BVPS 0.928 5.46 0.000 0.703 1.78 0.076 0.354 1.71 0.088 
Adj. R2   0.623   0.556   0.817 
 N   740   318   422 
 
 
ERC is earnings response coefficients (α1 + α2); R is 15-month dividend adjusted returns, 3-month after financial year-end, 
t; EPS is earnings per share; ∆EPS is changes in earnings per share.  P is stock price 3-month after the financial year-end, t; 
BVPS is book value per share and N is number of observations.   
 
Observations of each variable in the top and bottom 1% of both models for full samples are deleted and the top and bottom 
0.5% of both models for subgroups (BT1 and BT2) are excluded.   
 
N is a number of observations. BT1 and BT2 include firm-years with small and large positive book-tax differences, 
respectively.  Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded.  
 
***,**,* Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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The last additional test presented in Table 5.11 is to estimate the relationship 
between the value relevance and firms’ governance systems.  The value relevance 
for the additional test is measured by the explanatory power (R2) estimated from 
the price model.  Control variables are included for the estimation.  Findings 
report that board size (NBO) and board quality (NBB) are significantly related to 
the value relevance for full samples in both sub-periods.  During pre-adoption 
periods, firms with a large board size tend to have high value relevance.  
However, this relationship becomes negative during post-adoption periods, 
indicating that firms with a small board size are more likely to have high value 
relevance of accounting numbers.  During pre-adoption periods, the relationship 
between the value relevance and board quality is negative, but the relationship 
becomes positive after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.   
 
Consistent with the main result, the value relevance is not associated with firm 
governance factors for firms whose book-tax differences become larger during 
post-adoption periods (Group 1).  For firms whose book-tax differences become 
smaller during post-adoption periods (Group 2), findings report that the 
association between the proportion of audit committee on a board (RCG) and the 
value relevance is significantly negative whilst number of audit committee (NAC) 
is positively related to value relevance.  These findings are quite contradicted.  
However, the result implies that the increase of a number of audit committee after 
July 1999 in Thailand is related to value relevance.  In addition, quality of board 
(NBB) is positively related to value relevance.  This implies that the reputation of 
board members is essential for the value relevance of accounting information. 
 
From main and sensitivity analyses of the relationship between firm governance 
systems and value relevance, it clearly appears that value relevance for firms in 
group 1 is not related to the firm governance system.  For firms in group 2, firms 
with low proportion of audit committee to board size (RCG) tend to have high 
value relevance.  However, a high number of audit committee members (NAC) 
induce value relevance.  Therefore, this thesis considers that it is rather difficult to 
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make an inference from these opposed results whether or not higher a number of 
audit committee on a board encourage higher value relevance for firms in group 2.  
In addition, this thesis considers that the relationship between board quality 
(NBB) and value relevance cannot be concluded because of their mixed results.  
This thesis views that the small sample size employed in the analysis probably is a 
potential reason causing inconsistent findings.  However, based on the overall 
finding, this thesis concludes that the value relevance is varied according to the 
firm governance and the corporate governance system becomes very important 
when IFRS has been adopted in Thailand.  
   
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the analysis of value relevance during IFRS pre- (1995–
1999) and post-adoption periods (2000–2004) in Thailand.  The study of value 
relevance has been widely used by existing research when examining the change 
in accounting system.  The value relevance is interpreted by using the association 
between firm values and accounting summary measures.  ERC is also used as a 
complement to interpret whether the value relevance has been improved in Thai 
firms.  Overall findings suggest that the value relevance of earnings and book 
values has been enhanced after the IFRS adoption in the Thailand.  At the firm 
level, the dataset is partitioned according to the book-tax difference.  The finding 
supports that the enhancement of value relevance is varied according to the 
magnitude of book-tax differences.  In addition, this thesis evidences that the 
variation in the improvement of value relevance among Thai firms is related to the 
corporate governance system.  These findings support the notion that the IFRS 
adoption in Thailand brings better quality of accounting information in terms of 
the value relevance conditioning on incentives of a firm’s insiders and the firm 
governance system is an essential monitoring mechanism to encourage value 
relevance.  
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Table 5.11 Robustness checks: The value relevance and firm governance  
I regress value relevance (VR) on various firm governance proxies.  I compare the analysis 
between firms in group 1 and 2 during pre- and post-adoption periods.  Year indicator variables are 
employed for pre- and post-adoption periods. One firm is dropped due to incomplete data.  I use 
median of NAC, NBO, NB and NBB and the mean of RCG and control variables for this analysis.  
OLS estimators with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are employed to run the regression.  
 
VRi =  β0 + β1NACi + β2NBOi + β3NBi + β4RCGi + β5NBBi + β6YRi + β7YR*NACi + β8YR*NBOi  
+ β9YR*NBi + β10YR*RCGi  + β11YR*NBBi + X + εi 
  Pooled Group 1 Group 2 
  Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value Coef. t value p value 
β0 0.336 1.13 0.260 0.568 1.36 0.176 -0.048 -0.11 0.913 
NAC -0.044 -0.82 0.411 -0.009 -0.13 0.897 -0.157 -1.56 0.122 
NBO 0.029 1.74 0.084 0.010 0.41 0.683 0.057 2.40 0.019 
NB 0.005 0.80 0.426 0.005 0.60 0.548 0.004 0.29 0.774 
RCG 0.632 0.69 0.492 0.290 0.22 0.824 1.919 1.40 0.166 
NBB -0.004 -2.32 0.022 -0.004 -1.42 0.160 -0.005 -1.72 0.090 
YR 0.939 1.90 0.059 0.062 0.08 0.935 1.624 2.86 0.006 
YR*NAC 0.113 1.44 0.153 -0.012 -0.11 0.914 0.274 2.27 0.026 
YR*NBO -0.068 -2.25 0.026 -0.027 -0.59 0.553 -0.109 -3.21 0.002 
YR*NB -0.011 -1.35 0.177 -0.012 -0.87 0.385 -0.007 -0.55 0.586 
YR*RCG -1.620 -1.23 0.219 0.440 0.23 0.822 -3.753 -2.15 0.035 
YR*NBB 0.009 2.54 0.012 0.011 1.58 0.119 0.008 2.19 0.032 
Control variables         
ROA 0.472 1.15 0.251 0.398 0.70 0.483 1.006 1.56 0.124 
GRW -0.078 -1.19 0.234 -0.019 -0.32 0.751 -0.407 -1.67 0.100 
LEV -4.523 -0.85 0.398 -2.921 -0.41 0.686 -6.375 -0.77 0.444 
MKT 0.000 -0.05 0.957 0.000 -0.84 0.405 0.000 0.80 0.428 
Adj.R2   0.066   -0.037   0.173 
N     192     104     88 
 
VR is value relevance estimated by the explanatory power (R2).  The explanatory variable is obtained from the price model: 
Pi  = a0 + a1EPSi + a2BVPSi + εi, where P is stock price 3-month after the financial year; EPS is earnings per share; BVPS is 
book value per share (total equity divided by a number of listed outstanding shares) and ε is the residual.  The price model 
is estimated by firm-specific OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, rolling five-year window 
before and after the accounting change. NAC is number of audit committee members. NBO is number of boards of director.  
NB is number of boards that audit committee members serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms. RCG 
is a proportion audit committee members in board of directors. NBB is number of boards that members of board of 
directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms. X is control variable, including return on assets 
(ROA), total revenues growth rate (GRW), the ratio of total liability divided by market capitalization (LEV), and market 
capitalization (MKT).  YR is year dummy equal to 1 for post-adoption period, 0 otherwise and N is number of 
observations.   
Group 1 (2) is firms with larger (smaller) book-tax-differences in post-adoption period. 
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Chapter 6 
Earnings Timeliness 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The two previous chapters present the analysis of earnings persistence and value 
relevance.  This chapter presents the other property of earnings information: the 
timeliness of earnings.  Earnings timeliness is substantially of interest in the 
literature.  There are at least two main streams of debates relating to earnings 
timeliness analysis.  First, research studies have attempted to investigate whether 
earnings capture economic consequences (Basu 1997; Ball et al. 2000; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2008; Barth et al. 2008).  Second, there are considerable debates about 
measures for conservatism (Givoly et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; 
Givoly and Hayn 2000).   
  
The majority of earnings timeliness studies are conducted in efficient market 
countries; the study of earnings timeliness in emerging market countries is scarce 
(i.e. Jindrichovska and Kuo 2003).  By applying to Thai datasets, this thesis 
investigates earnings timeliness in twofold: earnings asymmetric timeliness and 
unconditional accounting conservatism.  The analysis of earnings asymmetric 
timeliness in this study is based on Basu (1997) and unconditional accounting 
conservatism or firm-specific conservatism measures is based on Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007).  Consistent with the two 
properties of accounting numbers – earnings persistence and value relevance as 
presented in previous chapters – this study incorporates the book-tax difference in 
the analysis of earnings asymmetric timeliness in Thailand.  And, based on 
Ahmed and Duellman (2007), the relationship between firm-specific conservatism 
measures and book-tax differences in Thai settings will be estimated.   
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  In section 6.2, I discuss the 
hypothesis development.  The research methodology is presented in Section 6.3.  
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 present data and results, respectively.  Chapter summary is 
presented in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2 Hypothesis Development 
Timeliness is one attribute of accounting measures (Watts 2003a).  Timeliness of 
accounting income is defined as the ability of earnings to incorporate return 
occurred in the current period (Ball et al. 2000).  In the literature (i.e. Basu 1997; 
Ball et al. 2000; Givoly and Hayn 2000), conservatism is employed to investigate 
the timeliness in earnings information.  Accounting recognitions are viewed as 
‘conservative’ when firms recognise losses in a more timely fashion than gains.  
Givoly et al. (2007) define accounting conservatism as “the systematic 
undervaluation of the entity’s net assets (equity) relative to their economic value.” 
However, Basu (1997) defines conditional accounting conservatism as “capturing 
accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognising 
good news than bad news in financial statements.” Measuring accounting 
conservatism is controversial (i.e. Givoly et al. 2007).  A market-based measure of 
earnings asymmetric timeliness proposed by Basu (1997) is an influential 
procedure for reporting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ball et al. 
2003; Pope and Walker 1999; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).  In Basu’s work, 
reported earnings are a function of good and bad news.  Good and bad news is 
measured by positive and negative share returns, respectively. A primary 
expectation is that earnings recognise bad news (loss) in a more timely manner 
than good news (gain).  Basu’s results show that earnings sensitivity to bad news 
is two to six times larger than to good news. The author concludes that 
conservatism in US firms has increased over three decades.   
 
Furthermore, earnings timeliness has been extensively explored in an international 
context.  Ball et al. (2000) provide evidence about accounting income property in 
different international institutions.  They evaluate accounting income property in 
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terms of earnings timeliness in code law countries: France, Germany and Japan 
and common law countries, namely Australia, Canada, USA and the UK.  They 
argue that short-term dividend policy influences accounting income in code law 
countries because the government, as one of the stakeholders, shares its income in 
the form of firms’ tax payment from firms’ accounting income. They also propose 
the investigation of association between cash flow from operation and accounting 
income timeliness, hypothesising that accruals reflect economic income in a more 
timely manner than cash flow when there is no new information. Based on Basu’s 
model, they summarise that common law countries have better accounting income 
timeliness in terms of incorporating economic losses than code law countries.  
Payout policy influences accounting income property in code law countries 
compared to common law countries.  Thus, they conclude that the demand for 
accounting income influences the way to capture economic income in each 
country.  Pope and Walker (1999) compare the difference in earnings timeliness 
between US and UK financial reporting.  They augment Basu’s model by 
incorporating prior period shocks (3-year lags) in the model to estimate whether 
earnings are sensitive to them.  Their findings suggest that bad news is recognised 
in a more timely manner in UK firms compared to US firms whilst earnings 
timeliness in UK firms responding to good news is lower compared to US firms; 
earnings recognise good news with a one-year lag.  Barth et al. (2008) suggest that 
earnings timeliness has improved in the countries adopting international 
accounting standards.  Bushman and Piotroski (2006) investigate accounting 
conservatism in 38 countries by incorporating various institution factors.  They 
find many factors shaping accounting conservatism, i.e. legal systems and 
political costs.   
 
Some studies investigate the earnings timeliness in single countries probably to 
avoid the impact of cross-country variations.  For example, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) find that private company financial reporting is of low timely loss 
recognition relative to public company financial reporting in the UK.  Ding and 
Stolowy (2006) examine earnings timeliness and accounting conservatism in 
French firms.  As the French accounting system was substantially changed in 
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1996, they therefore investigate whether reported earnings become more timely 
and conservative over the test periods.  They also compare earnings timeliness 
and conservatism in the French firm according to size and audit quality, as well as 
international finance versus domestic finance firms.  Their findings estimated by 
Basu’s model show that earnings recognise bad news in a more timely manner 
than good news and accounting conservatism is likely to increase over time.  
Except for firm size, there is no difference in earnings timeliness between firms 
with different audit quality or international versus domestic finance firms.  
Jindrichovska and Mcleay (2005) report that profits are more persistent than 
losses and earnings conservatism is not found in the Czech market.   
 
Since accounting information is shaped by the information environment 
(Bushman and Piotroski 2006), prior studies have incorporated corporate 
governance information on the level of a company’s reporting conservatism to 
estimate their effects on asymmetric timeliness in earnings.  This is due to the fact 
that corporate governance is a monitoring mechanism to enhance the quality of 
financial reporting.  For instance, Beekes et al. (2004) find that earnings 
asymmetric timeliness for firms with small proportions of outside board directors 
are less conservative in capturing news than firms with a higher number of outside 
board directors in UK firms.  Ahmed and Duellman (2007) find a negative 
relationship between the percentage of inside directors and unconditional 
conservatism and the positive relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors’ shareholdings and unconditional conservatism.  Lafond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) find that the asymmetric timeliness in earnings declines 
with managerial ownership.  Lara et al. (2007) document that strong boards 
positively correlate with asymmetric timeliness of earnings in Spanish firms.  
Bushman et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between earnings quality and 
governance variables.  They find that high ownership concentrations, strong 
incentives to directors and executives and outside directors’ reputation vary 
inversely with earnings timeliness while board size and inside director percentage 
do not.   
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The literature also debates about the validity of conservatism measures (see 
Givoly et al. 2007).  Prior studies (Givoly and Hayn 2000; Givoly et al. 2007) 
document that firm-specific conservatism measures include the level and rate of 
accumulation over time of negative non-operating accruals, the skewness and 
variability of the earnings distributions relative to the cash flows distribution and 
changes in the market-to-book ratio.  They argue that Basu’s asymmetric 
timeliness is negatively correlated with other firm-specific conservatism 
measures, i.e. market-to-book.  However, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) find 
the positive relationship between the asymmetric timeliness and market-to-book 
ratio.  They employ cumulative earnings and returns to estimate the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings and incorporate market-to-book in the analysis.  They 
suggest that the asymmetric timeliness measure is of more power to capture 
conservatism when it is estimated over several years (Ahmed and Duellman 
2007).   
 
This thesis is motivated by the previous work performed by Ball et al. (2003).  
Ball et al. (2003) employ a time-series model to determine the persistence of 
transitory loss components in earnings in Asian countries, including Thailand.  
According to their samples during the period 1984–1996, Ball et al. (2003) 
suggest that Thailand, as a tax-based accounting income system, exhibits low 
earnings timeliness in loss recognition due to the influential tax accounting rules 
in the country.  Tax rules are stringent and do not reflect economic consequences. 
If firms’ accounting income is calculated by using tax rules, that accounting 
income is of low quality whereas if firms’ accounting income is calculated by 
following accounting principles, that accounting income is of high quality.  
Among four Asian countries, including Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, they find that Thailand exhibits the lowest earnings timeliness in loss 
recognitions.  Ball et al. (2003) argue that earnings timeliness is less likely in 
Thailand due to the fact that tax accounting influences firms’ financial reporting.  
Thus, it is of interest to investigate whether timeliness in earnings is observed 
when Thailand has adopted IFRS.   
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This thesis adds some evidence to the prior study by incorporating book-tax 
differences, the deviation between book income and taxable income,81 to examine 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings in Thailand.  The interpretation about book-
tax difference is twofold.  Prior studies suggest that a large deviation between 
book income and taxable income reflects the variation in quality of earnings (i.e. 
Lev and Nessim 2004 and Hanlon 2005).  Particularly, Hanlon (2005) concludes 
that firms with small (positive/negative) book-tax differences have more 
persistent earnings than firms with large (positive/negative) book-tax differences 
because tax rules are more restricted than GAAP.  Thus, financial reporting for 
small book-tax differences firms is higher quality relative to that for large book-
tax differences firms.  On the other hand, a large book-tax difference indicates the 
use of tax shelter (Desai and Dharmapala 2007).  This view implies that the large 
book-tax difference is caused by tax strategies rather than the management of 
financial reporting.   
 
Even though it is rather problematic to employ the book-tax difference as proxy 
for determining financial reporting quality, this thesis views that the book-tax 
difference is useful information to determine whether Thai listed firms prepare 
their financial reporting according to GAAP or tax rules.  It is possibility that 
under a tax-based accounting system environment, high costs incurred from tax 
filing preparations induce firms to use more the tax-based accounting but use less 
GAAP.  Therefore, one explanation is that large book-tax differences probably 
indicate the firm whose financial reporting is being prepared in line with GAAP 
when all else is held constant.  The large book-tax difference, then, reflects higher 
quality of financial reporting relative to the small book-tax difference.   
 
Moreover, earnings timeliness views persistence of earnings in different ways.  
Basu (1997) explains that earnings timeliness in loss recognition is less 
pronounced when earnings are more persistent.  In the literature, Hanlon (2005) 
                                               
81 As previously described about the absolute value of book-tax differences in Chapter 4, the actual 
book-tax difference has been employed for this empirical chapter. 
 
 
Chapter VI                                                                                 Earnings Timeliness 
 
 226
finds higher earnings persistence in small book-tax differences firms.  Based on 
the explanation and finding, this thesis considers that firms with large book-tax 
differences have higher earnings timeliness relative to firms with small book-tax 
differences.  Based on Basu (1997) and Hanlon (2005), a priori prediction is that 
the ability of earnings to capture economic losses for firms with large book-tax 
differences is higher than that for firms with small book-tax differences.  
According to above discussions, I establish a hypothesis as follows, stated in 
alternative form: 
 
H.6.1:  Earnings asymmetric timeliness is more pronounced when Thai  
listed firms exhibit larger book-tax differences. 
 
In addition to the earnings asymmetric timeliness analysis, I perform additional 
firm-specific conservatism analysis.  Following Ahmed and Duellman (2007), I 
employ the market-based and accrual-based conservatism as measured by book-
to-market and deflated accruals, respectively.  I estimate the relationship between 
the unconditional conservatism measures and book-tax differences.  I include 
related control variables consisting of firm size and corporate governance factors.  
The next hypothesis is as follows, stated in alternative form:    
 
H.6.2:  There is a positive association between firm-specific conservatism 
measures and book-tax differences in Thai settings. 
 
6.3 Research Methodology 
Asymmetric timeliness in earnings 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) suggest that cumulative earnings should be used 
in analysing the asymmetric timeliness.  Following Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2007) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007), other than annual earnings and returns, I 
use backward cumulative earnings and returns over the past two years (year -2 to 
0).  I analyse the effects of book-tax differences on asymmetric timeliness by 
using the following model (Basu 1997).  
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EPSt, t – j/Pt, t – j – 1  =  α0 + α1 Dt, t – j + γ0 Rt, t – j + γ1 Dt, t – j *Rt, t – j + ε it 
(6.1) 
 
where EPSt, t – j is per share earnings accumulated from year t – j to year t; when t 
= 1, earnings are not accumulated and j is equal to 0.  Pt, t – j – 1 is the market value 
of equity at the end of year t – j – 1.  Rt, t – j is equal to buy-and-hold security 
returns, beginning the 3rd month of fiscal year t – j and ending 3 months after 
fiscal year t (Basu 1997).  Dt, t – j is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if Rt, t – j is 
less than zero and zero otherwise.  The coefficient of primary interests is γ1 and 
expected to be positive.  Its positive sign indicates the incremental information of 
asymmetric timeliness, indicating that earnings are able to capture economic 
losses in a timely basis.  To observe the variation of asymmetric timeliness in 
earnings for sample firms, the dataset is partitioned according to small and large 
positive book-tax differences.  The positive sign of γ1 is expected in firm-years 
with large positive book-tax differences relative to firm-years with small positive 
book-tax differences. Following prior studies (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Basu 
1997; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007), pooled cross-section regressions with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are employed to estimate the regression 
model.82 
 
Firm-specific conservatism  
Following Ahmed and Duellman (2007), I use two measures of firm-specific 
conservatism, including book-to-market and 3-year accumulated accruals.  I 
attempt to estimate the variation of firm-specific conservatism in firms with 
                                               
82 It should be noted that the equation 5.1 in chapter 5 shows that share returns (R) are a function 
of earnings (E).  However, the equation 6.1 is a regression of earnings on share returns.  Beaver, 
Lambert and Ryan (1987) originally explain these two bivariate linear relations between share 
returns and earnings.  They suggest that “Each characterization is a reverse regression with 
respect to one another and is equally valid because a random variable can always be linearly 
projected onto another variable with a resulting disturbance term that is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variable and with an unconditional mean of zero.  The only difference between the 
two equations is the direction in which the disturbance terms are measured.” (Italics from 
originals)  The disturbance term in equation 5.1 is measured perpendicular to the E-axis, while the 
disturbance term in equation 6.1 is measured perpendicular to the R-axis. 
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difference degrees of positive book-tax differences.  A priori prediction is that the 
larger positive book-tax difference firm tends to have more accounting 
conservatism relative to the smaller positive book-tax difference firm.  The first 
firm-specific conservatism is the ratio of book-to-market (BTM).83  For BTM, the 
lower ratio indicates the higher conservatism.  To ease the interpretation, the ratio 
is multiplied by negative one.  For the second firm-specific conservatism measure, 
the accrual-based measure, I use the ratio of accruals divided by average total 
asset (ACC).84  Based on Ahmed and Duellman (2007), I add up the ratio over a 
3-year period centered on year t and divided by 3 to obtain the accumulated 
accruals-based conservatism measure.  The 3-year accumulated accruals are used 
as a proxy because it is to mitigate the problem of accruals reversion between the 
current and previous years.  Again, the ratio is multiplied by negative one.  The 
positive ACC indicates higher conservatism.  I include control variables to ensure 
that the analysis is well specified.  Also, I introduce firm governance factors in the 
analysis to investigate whether firms’ governance systems relate firms’ 
unconditional conservatism.   
 
For control variables, I include leverage, sales growth rate and firm size in the 
analysis.  Following prior studies, the higher leverage induces the higher 
conservatism because of the contractual demand from lenders or creditors.  Thus, 
the positive relationship between leverage and firm-specific conservatism 
measures is expected.  Following Ahmed and Duellman (2007), a negative 
relationship between the sales growth and ACC is expected because ACC is likely 
to be a poor measure when sales are declining.  The relationship between sales 
growth and BTM is predicted to be positive because firms’ future cash flows are 
expected according to the increase of sales growth.  The association between 
firms’ size and firm-specific conservatism measures is predicted to be positive 
because the high political cost in larger firms induces more conservatism.      
                                               
83 As previously described, the book-to-market ratio employed in this thesis does not represent 
growth of the firm. 
84Accruals are calculated as follows:  
CFO = Earnings before interest and tax + Depreciation – [(Changes in current assets – Changes in 
current liabilities)] 
ACC = Earnings before interest and tax – CFO 
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For firm governance factors, board quality, corporate governance quality, 
institutional ownership and board size are included.  Consistent with the previous 
chapters, I do not have a priori prediction on the relationship between firm-
specific measures and firm governance systems.  I use the number of boards that 
board of directors serve as board of directors or audit committee in other firms as 
a proxy for board quality.  Firms with complexity organization and relatively low 
earnings timeliness tend to use highly reputable board committees because of a 
demand for costly monitoring (Bushman et al. 2004).  However, in this setting, 
the constraint of time allocated to their work as board of directors in many firms 
can deter the quality of work, finally resulting in a lower quality of accounting 
information.    
 
The proportion of audit committee and independent directors in firms’ board is 
used to measure the quality of corporate governance systems.  The greater 
proportion induces higher quality of accounting numbers; therefore, the greater 
proportion indicates higher quality of corporate governance systems.  As a result, 
firms with high proportion should be of higher conservatism compared to firms 
with low proportion.  According to the monitoring cost approach, however, firms 
with low conservatism are likely to be demanded by their shareholders to have 
higher proportion of audit committee and independent directors in firms’ board 
compared to firms with high conservatism.  By this approach, I should find a 
negative relationship between firm-specific conservatism measures and the 
proportion of audit committee and independent directors on firms’ board. 
 
Institutional ownership induces firms to have more conservatism according to the 
monitoring approach.  The greater institutional ownership the more power to vote 
and secure the firm from private benefits taken by the manager. On the other 
hand, the institutional ownership is able to influence firms’ board and obtain 
private benefits at the expense of other investors.  Thus, no a priori prediction is 
set for this issue.  I operationalise the model in the following way: 
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j = 1 
3 
j = 1 
3 
 
 
Cit =     γ0 +  γ1RNK_BTit  + ΣφjCGj,it + ΣδjFFj, it  + εit  (6.2) 
 
where C is firm-specific conservatism measures (BTM: book-to-market or ACC: 
3-year accumulated accruals deflated by the average total asset). RANK_BT is the 
quintiles of positive book-tax differences every year (normalised to between 0 and 
1).  CG is firm-specific governance factors including: BOARD_SIZE is the 
natural log of total number of board of directors.  BOARD_QUALITY is the 
natural log of a number of boards that board of directors serve as audit committee 
or board of directors in other firms. CG_QUALITY is the sum of audit committee 
and independent directors divided by total number of directors in a board.  FF is 
firm-specific factors consisting of: LEV is the natural log of total liabilities. SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets. SALEGRW is the percentage of annual growth in 
total sales.  The coefficient of primary interests is γ1 and expected to be positive.  
OLS firm fixed effect estimator with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is 
employed for the estimation of coefficients. 
 
Variable definitions 
Book-tax differences 
Book-tax differences are calculated by the difference between earnings before 
interest and tax and annual taxable income.  Negative and missing values of 
annual income tax expenses are excluded. In addition, only positive book-tax 
differences are employed for this empirical chapter.  This analysis is not 
generalise to firms with negative book-tax differences.  However, based on the 
dataset employed in this chapter, a number of firms with negative book-tax 
differences are small.  Following Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008), I rank 
positive book-tax differences each year in 10 (5) groups from zero to nine (four) 
and then deflate the ranking by nine (four).  Then, the scaled deciles (quintiles) 
rank of positive book-tax differences (RANK_BT) are ranging from zero to one.  
It should be noted that all missing and negative values of annual income tax 
expenses are excluded for the calculation of book-tax differences.   
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6.4 Data 
The initial sample population chosen is based on all non-financial firms with a 
31st December financial year-end.  They are all public firms listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 1992 to 2007.  Based on the asymmetric 
analysis, there are 3,671 observations in total across seven industries during the 
period 1992–2007.  Industries, consisting of agro-business, consumer products, 
industrial, property and construction, natural resources, service and technology, 
are categorised according to SET.  Table 6.1 presents the distribution of the 
observations across industries and years. 
 
Table 6.1 Distribution of samples across years classified by industry 
Year/Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total  
1992 32 29 26 33 6 45 10 181 
1993 36 31 25 31 6 50 11 190 
1994 45 34 28 52 8 53 18 238 
1995 49 38 36 59 10 55 25 272 
1996 43 32 40 59 11 58 26 269 
1997 31 19 29 51 7 53 24 214 
1998 30 21 26 28 6 47 23 181 
1999 34 24 33 31 7 51 17 197 
2000 33 17 22 39 7 42 22 182 
2001 32 17 29 31 9 43 23 184 
2002 34 19 33 36 9 52 25 208 
2003 38 22 31 38 9 58 23 219 
2004 31 24 32 51 12 61 30 241 
2005 34 24 32 67 14 64 38 273 
2006 33 25 56 74 19 73 32 312 
2007 36 26 52 75 19 69 33 310 
Total 571 402 530 755 159 874 380 3671 
 
1 = Agro-business, 2 = Consumer products, 3 = Industrial, 4 = Property and construction, 5 = Natural resources,  
6 = Service and 7 = Technology 
 
6.5 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics for each variable.  To reduce the potential 
effect from extreme values, observations in the top and bottom 1% of annual 
earnings and returns (at j = 0), 3-year cumulative earnings and returns (at j = 2), 
and two firm-specific conservatism measures (BTM and ACC) are excluded.  
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Earnings and returns are considerably varied among observations because of large 
standard deviations compared to the mean; these seem to be general cases for 
emerging markets i.e. Czech Republic (Jindrichovska and McLeay 2005)85 and 
Finland (Kankaanpaa, no date).86  SET requires listed firms to constitute at least 
three independent directors in a firm.  CG_QUALITY indicates that on average 
three out of ten directors are independent directors or audit committee in a firm.  
 
Table 6.3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between conservatism 
measures and other variables.  Pearson and Spearman correlations provide very 
similar results.  The market-based measure of conservatism (BTM) and accrual– 
based measure of conservatism (ACC) are not correlated. At 5% level of 
confidence, the market–based measure of conservatism (BTM) is not correlated 
with board size but positively correlated with all other variables except firm’s 
leverage.  The accrual-based measure of conservatism (ACC) is negatively 
correlated with board quality at 10% level but not correlated with other variables.  
The rank of positive book-tax differences (BT) is correlated with all other variables 
except ACC and CG_QUALITY.   
                                               
85 see Table 1, 2A and 2B in the article. 
86 see Table 3 in the article 
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Table 6.2 Summary of Variables 
 
Variables Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max N 
EPS/P (j = 0) 0.007 0.392 0.009 0.059 0.127 -3.252 1.340 3671 
R (j = 0) -0.017 0.569 -0.379 -0.114 0.199 -0.907 3.435 3671 
EPS/P  (j = 2) 0.098 0.747 -0.018 0.145 0.359 -5.24 3.099 2484 
R (j = 2) -0.072 0.937 -0.701 -0.334 0.202 -0.974 6.461 2484 
BTM -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 0.000 2386 
ACC 0.657 9.484 -0.861 0.547 2.339 -64.179 68.667 1170 
LEV 0.454 0.196 0.311 0.474 0.604 0.004 0.922 2291 
SIZE 14.812 1.263 13.904 14.621 15.505 12.063 20.609 2291 
SALEGRW 0.269 2.000 0.013 0.115 0.257 -2.443 78.306 2291 
BOARD_SIZE 2.593 0.374 2.398 2.639 2.833 0.00 3.555 2046 
BOARD_ 
QUALITY 3.489 0.686 3.045 3.555 3.989 0.693 5.176 2046 
CG_QUALITY 0.306 0.136 0.188 0.30 0.40 0.05 1.00 2046 
 
EPSt, t – j is per share earnings accumulated from year t – j to year t; when t = 1, earnings are not accumulated and j is equal 
to 0.  Pt, t – j – 1 is the market value of equity at the end of year t – j – 1. Rt, t – j is equal to (12-month at j = 0 or 36-month at j = 
2) buy-and-hold security returns, beginning the 3rd month of fiscal year t – j and ending 3 months after fiscal year t. BTM is 
book-to-market. ACC is 3-year accumulated accruals deflated by the average total asset. LEV is the natural log of total 
liabilities. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. SALEGRW is the percentage of annual growth in total sales. 
BOARD_SIZE is the natural log of total number of board of directors.  BOARD_QUALITY is the natural log of a number 
of boards that board of directors serve in other firms. CG_QUALITY is the sum of audit committee and independent 
directors divided by board size. N is number of observations. 
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Table 6.3 Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients on the lower 
(upper) diagonal 
 
 BTM ACC RNK_BT LEV SIZE SALEGRW BOARD_ BOARD_ CG_ 
  (N= 1152)     SIZE QUALITY QUALITY 
BTM  -0.002 0.2552 0.0535 0.1904 0.2187 -0.0252 0.0347 0.1733 
(N= 2046)  0.947 0.0000 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000 0.2547 0.1164 0.0000 
         
ACC -0.033  -0.0037 0.0071 -0.0293 0.0068 -0.006 -0.0536 -0.0171 
(N= 1152) 0.2628  0.8999 0.8109 0.3209 0.8188 0.8386 0.0690 0.5623 
          
RNK_BT 0.1187 -0.008  0.2918 0.7326 0.1909 0.0706 0.1658 -0.0038 
(N= 2046) 0.0000 0.798  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.8638 
         
LEV -0.0718 0.025 0.2864  0.3858 0.199 -0.1642 -0.1109 -0.235 
(N= 2046) 0.0012 0.400 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         
SIZE 0.0589 -0.003 0.7155 0.3636  0.1668 0.1762 0.3004 -0.0192 
(N= 2046) 0.0077 0.922 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3861 
          
SALEGRW 0.045 -0.003 0.0704 -0.0095 0.0948  -0.0924 -0.0551 -0.036 
(N= 2046) 0.0420 0.909 0.0014 0.6674 0.0000  0.0000 0.0126 0.1032 
          
BOARD_ 
SIZE 0.0247 0.047 0.0643 -0.1469 0.1884 -0.0083  0.7495 0.0672 
(N= 2046) 0.2643 0.110 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.7092  0.0000 0.0023 
          
BOARD_ 
QUALITY 0.0433 0.023 0.1489 -0.1082 0.3204 0.0044 0.7748  0.1311 
(N= 2046) 0.0503 0.436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8440 0.0000  0.0000 
          
CG_QUALITY 0.2051 -0.004 0.0053 -0.2278 0.0073 -0.0492 -0.0245 0.093  
(N= 2046) 0.0000 0.895 0.8110 0.0000 0.7428 0.0259 0.2685 0.0000  
 
BTM is book-to-market. ACC is 3-year accumulated accruals deflated by the average total asset. RNK_BT is the quintiles 
of positive book-tax differences every year (normalised to between 0 and 1). LEV is the natural log of total liabilities. SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets. SALEGRW is the percentage of annual growth in total sales. BOARD_SIZE is the natural 
log of total number of board of directors.  BOARD_QUALITY is the natural log of a number of boards that board of 
directors serve in other firms. CG_QUALITY is the sum of audit committee and independent directors divided by board 
size. N is number of observations. Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded. 
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Results from earnings asymmetric timeliness 
Table 6.4 presents the asymmetric timeliness of earnings at j = 0 and 2.  In Panel 
A, annual earnings-return regressions report that asymmetric timeliness in 
earnings is observed in Thai firms during the period 1993–2007.  The coefficient 
estimate, γ1, is positive and significant.  The adjusted R
2 is 3.9%.87 When using 
cumulative earnings and returns, the result is consistent with that using annual 
earnings and returns.  Earnings in Thai firms are able to capture economic losses 
during the period 1994–2007.  The adjusted R2 is 6.9% and higher than the result 
reported from annual earnings and returns regressions.88 
 
I further compare the asymmetric timeliness in earnings between pre- and post-
adoption periods in Thailand.  This is to investigate whether earnings are of higher 
quality in terms of timeliness after IFRS adoptions in Thailand.  Results from 
annual and cumulative earnings and returns indicate that earnings timeliness is 
declined or unobserved after IFRS adoptions.  It indicates that the ability to 
capture economic circumstances is less likely in Thailand after 1999.  A potential 
explanation that earnings timeliness is less likely during post-adoption periods is 
because earnings are more persistent during post-adoption periods.  The finding 
about earnings persistence is reported in Chapter 4.  Thus, this thesis argues that it 
is possibility that the persistence of earnings deteriorates the ability to capture 
economic consequences in a timely fashion after IFRS adoptions in Thailand.    
 
                                               
87 Basu (1997 Table 1) reports the adjusted R2 is 10.09% in US firms.  The asymmetric timeliness 
in earnings is not observed in many countries, i.e. Czech Republic (Jindrichovska and McLeay 
2005), Finland (Kankaanpaa, no date, see Tables 5 and 6 in the article) and other European 
countries (see Grudnitski and Aubert 2008). 
88 Based on Basu (1997), an alternative procedure to evaluate the asymmetric timeliness in 
earnings is by comparing the explanatory power when firms are partitioned according to gains 
(positive returns) and losses (negative returns).  The explanatory power for firms with negative 
returns is expected to be higher than that for firms with positive returns, indicating that economic 
losses are captured by earnings in a more timely fashion.  Appendix 9 reports more results of 
asymmetric timeliness in earnings by partitioning the dataset according to positive (economic 
gains) and negative (economic losses) returns.  The adjusted R2 is compared between two groups.  
Consistent with the result presented in Table 6.4, Panel A, findings suggest that the adjusted R2 for 
the sample firm with negative returns is greater than that for the sample firm with positive returns.  
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Table 6.4  Asymmetric timeliness in earnings: Earnings-returns regressions (j = 0) 
and cumulative earnings-returns regressions (j = 2) 
 
EPSt, t – j/Pt, t – j – 1  =  α0 + α1 Dt, t – j + γ0 Rt, t – j + γ1 Dt, t – j *Rt, t – j + ε i,t   
 
Panel A 
 j = 0 (1992–2007) j = 2 (1994–2007) 
 Estimate t-value p-value  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.070 5.75 0.000  0.211 5.07 0.000 
Dit -0.028 -1.55 0.121  -0.025 -0.46 0.642 
Rit 0.033 1.33 0.184  0.131 2.96 0.003 
Rit*Dit  (+) 0.214 4.85 0.000  0.232 3.45 0.001 
Adj. R2   0.039    0.069 
N   3671    2484 
 
 
Panel B: j = 0 
 Pre-adoption (1992–1999)  Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Estimate t-value p-value  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.009 0.37 0.710  0.102 8.25 0.000 
Dit 0.053 1.64 0.102  -0.079 -3.96 0.000 
Rit 0.007 0.16 0.873  0.064 2.26 0.024 
Rit*Dit  (+) 0.335 4.59 0.000  0.061 1.36 0.174 
Adj. R2   0.025    0.062 
N   1742    1929 
 
 
Panel C: j = 2 
 Pre-adoption (1992–1999)  Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Estimate t-value p-value  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.006 -0.08 0.933  0.265 5.52 0.000 
Dit 0.230 2.86 0.004  -0.123 -1.76 0.079 
Rit 0.248 3.82 0.000  0.106 2.11 0.035 
Rit*Dit  (+) 0.266 3.01 0.003  0.064 0.72 0.473 
Adj. R2   0.100    0.042 
N     1007      1477 
 
EPSt, t – j is equal to cumulative earnings per share from year t – j to year t; Pt, t – j – 1 is the market value of equity at the end 
of year t – j – 1; Rt, t – j is equal to (12-month at j = 0 or 36-month at j = 2) buy-and-hold security returns, beginning the 3
rd 
month of fiscal year t – j and ending 3 months after fiscal year t; Dt, t – j is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if Rt, t – j is less 
than zero and zero otherwise and N is the number of observations. Observations in the top and bottom 1% of price-deflated 
earnings and returns are truncated. Predicted signs are shown in the parentheses.  t-values are two-tailed values computed 
by adjusting with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  Test variables and their statistics are presented in bold 
typeface. 
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Table 6.5 reports whether the institutional factor, book-tax differences, plays an 
important role to determine the asymmetric timeliness in earnings.  The positive 
book-tax difference is ranked in ten groups every year from low to high book-tax 
differences.  Then, the ranking is scaled to zero (least positive) and one (most 
positive).  The scaled rank of book-tax differences is integrated with all other 
variables.  A priori prediction is that earnings timeliness is more likely for firms 
with large book-tax differences.  Therefore, the predicted sign of γ3 is positive.  
Results in Panel A suggest that asymmetric timeliness in earnings are more likely 
for Thai listed firms with larger positive book-tax differences (γ3 = .091 with 
positive sign).   
 
In Panel B of Table 6.5, the data are partitioned according to the level of book-tax 
differences.  Low (high) threshold includes firms with low (high) scale of book-
tax differences.  An indicator variable (YR) for pre- and post-adoption periods is 
integrated to bad news and good news variables to estimate whether earnings 
timeliness is improved after the IFRS adoption.  The α7 with positive sign is 
expected for firms in both low and high thresholds.   
 
At j = 0 in Panel B, results show that α7 (.139) is positive and significant for firms 
in high threshold, suggesting that conditional conservatism is more likely for 
firms with large book-tax differences.  It infers that even though new accounting 
standards have been adopted in Thailand, earnings quality in terms of conditional 
conservatism is still less likely when firms are more likely to use more tax rules 
for financial statement preparations.  At j = 2, untabulated findings are not 
significant.  Thus, I perform additional tests to support these main findings in 
robustness checks.  
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Table 6.5 Asymmetric timeliness in earnings (1992–2007) – Positive book-tax 
differences. Predicted signs are shown in parentheses.  t-values are two-tailed 
values computed by adjusting with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Test 
variables and their statistics are presented in bold typeface. Positive book-tax 
differences are ranked in ten groups every year from small (group 1) to large 
(group 10) book-tax differences.   
 
 
Panel A: j = 0 
 
EPSt, t – j/Pt, t – j – 1  = α0 + α1 Dit + α2 BTit + α3 Dit * BTit + γ0 Rit-j + γ1 Dit *Rit + γ2 BTit *Rit-j  
  + γ3 Dit * BTit * Rit-j + εit 
 
  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept  0.068 6.02 0.000 
Dit  -0.019 -1.71 0.087 
BTit  0.086 4.09 0.000 
Dit *BTit  0.000 0.00 0.998 
Rit   0.137 6.31 0.000 
Dit*Rit (+)  -0.067 -2.30 0.022 
BTit*Rit  -0.104 -2.97 0.003 
BTit*Rit*Dit (+)  0.091 1.82 0.070 
Adj. R2    0.332 
N    2051 
 
 
 
Panel B: j = 0 
 
EPSt, t – j/Pt, t – j – 1  = α0 + α1 Dit + α2YRit+ α3 Dit *YRit+ α4 Rit + α5 Dit*Rit + α6YRit*Rit 
  + α7 Dit*YRit*Rit + εit 
 
 Low threshold (1-8) High threshold (9-10) 
  Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.094 10.29 0.000 0.077 4.46 0.000 
Dit -0.009 -0.87 0.384 -0.010 -0.37 0.713 
YRit 0.032 2.46 0.014 0.081 2.72 0.007 
Dit *YRit -0.019 -1.24 0.215 -0.031 -0.93 0.351 
Rit  0.082 3.40 0.001 0.041 1.17 0.243 
Dit*Rit (+) -0.024 -0.82 0.413 -0.049 -0.99 0.322 
YRit*Rit 0.030 1.02 0.306 -0.059 -1.23 0.218 
Dit*YRit*Rit (+) 0.010 0.26 0.793 0.139 1.66 0.099 
Adj. R2   0.367   0.282 
N     1647     404 
 
EPSt, t – j is equal to cumulative earnings per share from year t – j to year t; Pt, t – j – 1 is the market value of equity at the end 
of year t – j – 1; Rt, t – j is equal to (12-month at j = 0 and 36-month at j = 2) buy-and-hold security returns, beginning the 3
rd 
month of fiscal year t – j and ending 3 months after fiscal year t and ending 3 months after fiscal year t; BTit is the scaled 
deciles rank of positive book-tax difference, normalised between 0 and 1; Dtt is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if Rt, t – j 
is less than zero and zero otherwise and N is number of observations. YRit is an indicator variable set equal to 0 for pre-
adoption periods (1992–999) and 0 otherwise (2000–2007). Observations in the top and bottom 1% of price-deflated 
earnings and returns are deleted. Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded. OLS regressions with firm fixed-
effect and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are applied for the estimation.  
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Results from firm specific conservatism 
Table 6.6 reports the result obtained from the market-based firm specific 
conservatism measure (BTM).  I regress BTM on the quintiles of positive book-
tax difference.  Consistent with the scaled deciles rank of positive book-tax 
differences, positive book-tax differences are ranked in five groups each year and 
normalised between 0 and 1.  Without control variables, results highlighted with 
bold typeface indicate that the conservatism varies according to the scale of book-
tax differences.  The significantly positive relationship between the ratio of book-
to-market (BTM) and the rank of book-tax difference (RNK_BT) indicates that 
the larger book-tax difference induces more unconditional accounting 
conservatism.  This result is consistent when including control variables.  
Inconsistent with a priori predictions, results suggest that the market-based 
conservatism is negatively associated with leverage and firm size.   
 
When adding firm governance systems into the analysis, the relationship between 
BTM and book-tax differences remains positive.  Accounting conservatism is 
more likely to improve according to larger board size.  The higher ratio of 
independent directors and audit committee in firms’ board induces more 
accounting conservatism, indicating that corporate governance systems in terms of 
independence induce accounting conservatism.  
 
Results report negative relationship between BTM and board quality measured by 
the number of boards that board of directors serve as executive directors in other 
firms.  A potential explanation for this negative relationship is that the quality of 
work is more likely to decline when one director works on too many boards.89 For 
control variables, only the relationship between BTM and sales growth follows 
the predicted sign but is insignificant.  In addition, the adjusted R2 and F-statistics 
are improved when including control and corporate governance factors.        
                                               
89 It should be noted that the coefficient estimates are relatively small.  This is rather consistent 
with the prior study.  Ahmed and Duellman (2007) report the coefficient (quoted in absolute 
values) of BTM and board size (ranging from 0.028 to 0.129), BTM and sales growth (ranging 
from 0.003 to 0.007) and ACC and board size (ranging from 0.008 – 0.010), ACC and sales 
growth (ranging from 0.005 – 0.008).   
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Table 6.7 reports the relationship between accrual-based conservatism (ACC) and 
positive book-tax differences.  Findings reports no relationship between ACC and 
the scaled quintiles rank of positive book-tax differences.  The findings are 
consistent when including control variables and firm governance proxies.  The 
adjusted R2 is not considerably altered when including fundamental and corporate 
governance factors.  F-statistics are not significant.  These results when using 
ACC are contradicted with the results reported in Table 6.6.  One potential 
explanation is that accrual-based conservatism may involve earnings 
management.  Thus, these two regressions are re-estimated by controlling for 
earnings management as presented in the robust test.90   
 
Robustness checks 
In terms of earnings timeliness, I compare the explanatory power when 
partitioning the dataset according to good news and bad news (Basu 1997).  As 
reported in Table 6.8, the explanatory power for bad news is higher than that for 
good news at j = 0 and j = 2, suggesting that bad news can explain earnings better 
than good news.  This implies that earnings asymmetric timeliness is more likely 
in Thai firms.  
 
 
                                               
90 Appendix 10 presents results when calculating the book-tax difference from consolidated 
financial statements.  It should be noted that the result is consistent when using the mean-reverting 
model to estimate the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, and estimating the relationship between 
firm-specific accounting conservatism and the scaled quintiles rank of book-tax differences. 
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j = 1 
3 
j = 1 
3 
Table 6.6 Firm-specific conservatism (BTM): OLS regressions with firm fixed-effect (1993–2007) 
 
 Cit =     γ0 +  γ1RNK_BTit  + ΣφjCGj,it + ΣδjFFj, it  + εit   
 
C = BTM Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept (?) -0.0015 -17.14 0.000 0.0075 6.82 0.000 0.0041 2.96 0.003 0.0032 2.39 0.017 
RNK_BT (+) 0.0004 2.28 0.023 0.0007 4.01 0.000 0.0005 2.84 0.005    
Firm governance 
variables (CG)             
BOARD_SIZE (?)       0.0007 2.33 0.020 0.0007 2.32 0.020 
BOARD_QUALITY (?)       -0.0007 -4.10 0.000 -0.0007 -4.14 0.000 
CG_QUALITY (?)       0.0025 6.49 0.000 0.0025 6.57 0.000 
Control variables(FF)             
LEV (+)    -0.0011 -3.92 0.000 -0.0011 -3.78 0.000 -0.0012 -3.97 0.000 
SIZE (+)    -0.0006 -7.69 0.000 -0.0004 -3.35 0.001 -0.0003 -2.71 0.007 
SALEGRW (+)    0.0000 0.91 0.365 0.0000 0.85 0.397 0.0000 0.90 0.367 
Adj. R2   0.176   0.208   0.308   0.305 
N   2386   2291   2046   2046 
F-stat   5.21   18.52   12.60    13.88 
 
C is firm-specific conservatism measure (BTM: book-to-market or ACC: 3-year accumulated accruals deflated by the average total asset); RANK_BT is the quintiles of positive book-tax differences every year 
(normalised to between 0 and 1). LEV is the natural log of total liabilities. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. SALEGRW is the percentage of annual growth in total sales. BOARD_SIZE is the natural log of 
total number of board of directors.  BOARD_QUALITY is the natural log of a number of boards that board of directors serve in other firms. C CG_QUALITY is the sum of audit committee and independent 
directors divided by board size. N is number of observations. 
Observations in the top or bottom 1% of BTM and ACC are truncated. Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded. Predicted sign is shown in the parentheses.  t-values are two-tailed values computed 
by using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
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Table 6.7 Firm-specific conservatism (ACC): OLS regressions with firm fixed-effect (1994–2006) 
  
Cit =     γ0 +  γ1RNK_BTit  + ΣφjCGj,it + ΣδjFFj, it  + εit   
 
C = ACC Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept (?) 0.306 0.37 0.712 13.656 0.89 0.373 11.343 0.63 0.527 8.500 0.48 0.628 
RNK_BT (+) 0.711 0.44 0.661 1.432 0.84 0.404 1.549 0.92 0.360    
Firm governance 
variables (CG)             
BOARD_SIZE (?)       -1.955 -0.61 0.542 -1.891 -0.59 0.555 
BOARD_QUALITY (?)       0.092 0.04 0.964 0.087 0.04 0.966 
CG_QUALITY (?)       0.237 0.05 0.960 0.470 0.10 0.921 
Control variables (FF)             
LEV (+)    4.449 1.10 0.274 3.657 0.84 0.400 3.412 0.79 0.427 
SIZE (+)    -1.046 -1.00 0.316 -0.548 -0.41 0.685 -0.315 -0.24 0.810 
SALEGRW (-)    -0.274 -0.34 0.733 -0.260 -0.33 0.741 -0.179 -0.23 0.820 
Adj. R2   0.2071   0.2074   0.206   0.206 
N   1170   1170   1168   1168 
F- stat   0.21   0.21   0.59   0.51 
 
C is firm-specific conservatism measure (BTM: book-to-market or ACC: 3-year accumulated accruals deflated by the average total asset); RANK_BT is the quintiles of positive book-tax differences every year 
(normalised to between 0 and 1). LEV is the natural log of total liabilities. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. SALEGRW is the percentage of annual growth in total sales. BOARD_SIZE is the natural log of 
total number of board of directors.  BOARD_QUALITY is the natural log of a number of boards that board of directors serve in other firms. C CG_QUALITY is the sum of audit committee and independent 
directors divided by board size. N is number of observations. 
Observations in the top or bottom 1% of BTM and ACC are truncated. Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded.  Predicted sign is shown in the parentheses.  t-values are two-tailed values computed 
by using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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Table 6.8 Robustness checks: Partitioning data by good news and bad news 
 
EPSt, t – j/Pt, t – j – 1  =  α0 + + γ0 Rt, t – j + ε i,t   
j = 0 
     
  Intercept γ0  Adj. R
2  N 
Good news 0.066 0.040 0.003 1343 
       (4.92)*** (1.57)     
Bad news 0.031 0.240 0.017 2114 
      (2.16)**          (6.22)***     
 
j = 2 
     
  Intercept γ0 Adj. R
2   N 
Good news 0.211 0.131 0.021 811 
       (5.07)***      (2.96)***     
Bad news 0.186 0.363 0.025 1673 
        (5.39)***      (7.17)***     
 
EPSt, t – j is equal to cumulative earnings per share from year t – j to year t; Pt, t – j – 1 is the market value of equity at the end 
of year  t – j – 1; Rt, t – j is equal to (12-month at j = 0 or 36-month at j = 2) buy-and-hold security returns, beginning the 3
rd 
month of fiscal year t – j and ending 3 months after fiscal year t and ending 3 months after fiscal year t and N is number of 
observations. Predicted signs are shown in the parentheses. t-values are two-tailed values computed by adjusting with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***,** Significant at 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
I further investigate the conditional accounting conservatism by analysing the 
persistence of negative earnings changes.  Basu (1997) suggests that negative 
earnings are transitory and they are mean reverting, suggesting that negative 
earnings tend to reverse in next periods of time.  Following Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), I regress changes in current year net earnings on changes in previous year 
net earnings (∆NI).  The negative relation between those two variables is 
expected.  An indicator variable (Dit) is set to capture the difference between 
positive and negative earnings changes.  Net earnings changes are scaled by the 
total asset at the end of year t – 1.  The model is performed as follows:   
 
∆NIit/TAit-1  =  α0 + α1 Dit+ γ0 ∆NI it-1/TA it-2 + γ1 Dit * ∆NI it-1/TA it-2 + εit        (6.6) 
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 As presented in Table 6.9, Panel A, the coefficient γ1 is negative as expected, 
suggesting that earnings timeliness is more likely in Thai firms.  The explanatory 
power for negative earnings changes is higher than that for positive earnings 
changes, as reported in Panel B.  This supports the result reported in Panel A.  
When comparing between pre- and post-adoption periods reported in Panel C, 
findings suggest that earnings timeliness is not observed during post-adoption 
periods.  These results are consistent with the result obtained from the market-
based regressions91 that earnings timeliness has not been improved during post-
adoption periods.  In Panel D, I estimate whether the persistence of negative 
earnings changes varies according to positive book-tax differences.  The scaled 
deciles rank of book-tax differences is integrated with all variables.  The predicted 
sign of γ3 is negative.  As predicted, γ3 is negative and significant.  The result is 
consistent with the finding obtained from the market-based model at j = 0 
presented in Table. 6.5. According to the analysis of negative earnings 
persistence, earnings timeliness is more likely in Thai firms and is higher for firms 
with large book-tax differences relative to small book-tax differences.   
 
In addition to the market-based earnings asymmetric timeliness, I employ the 
accrual-based earnings timeliness as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2005).  
Although accruals and cash flows have negative relationship according to their 
nature, the accrual-based earnings asymmetric timeliness suggests that the 
negative cash flows should reflect in negative accruals.  Therefore, the positive 
relationship between accruals and cash flows should be observed when cash flows 
are negative.  This positive relationship indicates that earnings are able to capture 
economic losses in a timely fashion.  Thus, the accrual-based earnings asymmetric 
timeliness is derived as follows. 
 
   ACit =  α0 + α1 Dit +γ0 CFOit + γ1 Dit *CFOit + εit   (6.7) 
 
                                               
91 See Table 6.4 – Panel B and C. 
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Table 6.9 Robustness checks: The persistence of negative earnings changes (1993 
–2007) 
 
∆NIit/TAit-1  =  α0 + α1 Dit+ γ0 ∆NI it-1/TA it-2 + γ1 Dit * ∆NI it-1/TA it-2 + εit        
 
Panel A 
  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept  0.004 1.62 0.106 
Dit  -0.034 -8.72 0.000 
∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  -0.201 -5.76 0.000 
Dit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  (-)  -0.381 -6.10 0.000 
Adj. R2    0.106 
N    4195 
 
 
Panel B 
  Intercept γ0  Adj. R
2  N 
Positive changes  0.004 -0.201 0.035 2285 
  1.62          (-5.76)***   
Negative changes -0.030 -0.582 0.145 1910 
           (-9.54)***           (-11.24)***   
 
 
Panel C 
 Pre-adoption (1993–1999) Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Estimate t-value p-value  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.006 -1.78 0.075  0.013 3.85 0.000 
Dit -0.055 -9.56 0.000  -0.009 -1.83 0.067 
∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 -0.176 -4.73 0.000  -0.229 -3.39 0.001 
Dit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  (-) -0.699 -9.48 0.000  0.042 0.45 0.656 
Adj. R2   0.192    0.039 
N   2064    2131 
 
Panel D: ∆NIit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1 Dit + α2 BTit + α3 Dit* BTit + γ0 ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 + γ1 Dit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  
             + γ2 BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 + γ3Dit * BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 + εit 
 
  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept  -0.015 -3.13 0.002 
Dit  0.000 -0.03 0.979 
BTit  0.042 4.53 0.000 
Dit* BTit  -0.004 -0.43 0.670 
∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  -0.120 -1.47 0.142 
Dit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  (-)  -0.114 -0.77 0.441 
BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  0.106 0.76 0.446 
Dit * BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 (-)  -0.734 -2.86 0.004 
Adj. R2    0.150 
N    2219 
 
∆NIit-j is the difference in net earnings between year t and t-j; TAit-j is the total asset at the end of year t-j; D is indicator 
variable set equal to 1 if ∆NIit-1 is less than zero and zero otherwise. Observations in the top and bottom 1% of ∆NIit and 
∆NIit-1 are truncated.  Predicted sign is shown in the parentheses. N is the number of observations. BTit is the scaled deciles 
rank of positive book-tax difference, normalised between 0 and 1.  Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded. t-
values are two-tailed values computed by adjusting heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Test variables and their 
statistics are presented in bold typeface. Firm-fixed effect estimation is applied for the analysis in panel D. 
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where AC is the accrual deflated by the total asset; D is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 when CFO is negative, or 0 otherwise; CFO is cash flows from operation 
scaled by the total asset; and ε is error term.  γ1 is a primary coefficient of interest 
and expected to be positive.  Following the prior study, the pooled cross-section 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is applied to obtain coefficient 
estimates. 
 
After excluding extreme values of both AC and CFO, results from the accrual-
based earnings asymmetric timeliness are presented in Table 6.10.  From Panel A, 
the predicted sign of γ1 is positive, but the result reports the negative sign.  This 
suggests that the earnings timeliness is less likely in terms of accrual-based 
analysis.  When partitioning the dataset according to pre- and post-adoption 
periods as reported in Panel B, the coefficient γ1 remains negative and significant.  
Consistent with the market-based earnings timeliness analysis (see Table 6.4), the 
ability of earnings in capturing economic consequences is less likely after IFRS 
adoptions.  Panel C reports the analysis of earnings timeliness when incorporating 
the information of positive book-tax differences.  I construct the scaled deciles 
rank of the positive book-tax difference each year.  Then, the scaled rank is 
integrated with all variables.  Results report that the coefficient γ3 is positive but 
insignificant.92   
 
                                               
92 When partitioning sample firms with positive and negative cash flow, the adjusted R2 for both 
groups are not different (equal to 42.14% vs. 42.12%, respectively).  The result is not tabulated.   
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Table 6.10 Robustness checks: Accrual-based timeliness (1993–2007) 
 
ACit =   α0 + α1 Dit +γ0 CFOit + γ1 Dit *CFOit + εit   
 
 
Panel A 
 Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.037 12.92 0.000 
Dit 0.020 2.28 0.022 
CFOit (-) -0.638 -38.02 0.000 
Dit*CFOit (+) -0.196 -2.91 0.004 
Adj. R2   0.615 
N   3180 
 
 
Panel B 
 Pre-adoption (1993–1999)  Post-adoption (2000–2007) 
 Estimate t-value p-value  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.060 11.46 0.000 0.024 7.24 0.000 
Dit 0.009 0.71 0.479 0.026 2.26 0.024 
CFOit (-) -0.782 -30.52 0.000 -0.545 -25.72 0.000 
Dit*CFOit (+) -0.214 -3.54 0.000 -0.202 -2.19 0.029 
Adj. R2   0.723   0.549 
N   1059   2121 
 
ACi,t =  α0 + α1 Dit + α2 BTit + α3 Dit * BTit + γ0 CFOit + γ1 Dit *CFOit + γ2 BTit * CFOit  
+ γ3 Dit * BTit * CFOit + εit  
 
Panel C 
 Estimates t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.039 5.18 0.000 
Dit 0.036 1.35 0.178 
BTit 0.095 6.54 0.000 
Dit *BTit 0.004 0.10 0.917 
CFOit (-) -0.706 -20.87 0.000 
Dit*CFOit (+) -0.505 -2.50 0.012 
BTit*CFOit -0.139 -2.15 0.031 
BTit*CFOit*Dit (+) 0.420 1.39 0.165 
Adj. R2   0.815 
N   1632 
 
AC is the accrual divided by the beginning of total asset; CFO is cash flows from operation divided by the beginning of 
total asset; D is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if CFO is less than zero and zero otherwise. Observations in the top and 
bottom 1% of AC and CFO are truncated.  Predicted sign is shown in the parentheses.  
CFO = Earnings before interest and tax + Depreciation – (Changes in current asset – Changes in current liabilities).  AC = 
Earnings before interest and tax - CFO 
BT is the scaled deciles of positive book-tax differences at every the end of year t and normalised from 0 to 1and N is the 
number of observations.  Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded. t-values are two-tailed values computed by 
adjusting heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Test variables and their statistics are presented in bold typeface. Firm-
fixed effect estimation is applied for the analysis in panel C. 
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Based on the market-based model and the persistence of negative earnings 
changes model, these findings suggest that the ability of earnings in capturing 
economic losses is varied according to positive book-tax differences in Thai 
settings.  Relative to firms with small positive book-tax differences, the ability of 
earnings in firms with large positive book-tax differences is more likely to capture 
economic outcomes in a timely basis.   
 
I further estimate earnings timeliness conditional to the scaled deciles rank of 
positive book-tax differences during post-adoption periods in Thailand.  As 
presented in Table 6.11, I estimate by using all three models during post-adoption 
periods.  Results shown in the bold typeface suggest that earnings timeliness 
varies according to the scale of book-tax differences, that firms with larger book-
tax difference tend to have higher earnings timeliness.  However, the market-
based model in Panel A reports positive sign of the coefficient γ3 but insignificant.      
 
As the analysis of firm-specific accounting conservatism measured by 
accumulated accruals (ACC) provides insignificant results, this thesis argues that 
earnings management is an important candidate to be used as an alternative 
explanation.  It is due to the fact that accruals are subject to the management’s 
discretion.  Thus, I partition sample firms according to the degree of discretionary 
accruals.  By using the industry modified Jones’ discretionary accruals93 and 
excluding extreme values, I divide the sample firm each year into three thresholds 
from low to high discretionary accruals.  The higher discretionary accruals reflect 
more activity for earnings management.  Therefore, firm-specific conservatism is 
more likely to be observed in firms with low discretionary accruals relative to 
firms with high discretionary accruals.   
 
                                               
93 See footnote 54.  However, the constant term is included to estimate the modified Jones model 
in equation (3) for this sensitivity analysis (see Ayer et al. 2009). 
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Table 6.11 Robustness checks: 2000–2007 
 
Panel A: EPSi,t = α0 + α1 Dit + α2 BTit + α3 Dit * BTit + γ0 Rit + γ1 Dit *Rit + γ2 BTit *Rit  
+ γ3 Dit * BTit * Rit-j + εit  
  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept  0.080 3.95 0.000 
Dit  -0.022 -1.21 0.228 
BTit  0.097 2.86 0.004 
Dit *BTit  0.024 0.69 0.493 
Rit   0.174 4.67 0.000 
Dit*Rit (+)  -0.106 -1.97 0.049 
BTit*Rit  -0.122 -2.27 0.023 
BTit*Rit*Dit (+)  0.165 1.55 0.121 
Adj. R2    0.392 
N    891 
 
Panel B: ∆NIit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1 Dit + α2 BTit + α3 Dit* BTit + γ0 ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 + γ1 Dit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  
        + γ2 BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 + γ3Dit * BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 + εit 
 
  Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept  -0.028 -3.58 0.000 
Dit  0.008 1.06 0.290 
BTit  0.070 4.54 0.000 
Dit* BTit  0.001 0.05 0.960 
∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  -0.381 -3.18 0.002 
Dit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  (-)  0.319 1.31 0.189 
BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2  0.581 2.64 0.008 
Dit * BTit * ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2 (-)  -0.975 -2.41 0.016 
Adj. R2    0.208 
N    936 
 
Panel C: ACi,t =  α0 + α1 Dit + α2 BTit + α3 Dit * BTit + γ0 CFOit + γ1 Dit *CFOit + γ2 BTit * CFOit  
+ γ3 Dit * BTit * CFOit + εit  
  Estimates t-value p-value 
Intercept  0.048 4.93 0.000 
Dit  -0.018 -0.83 0.409 
BTit  0.079 4.44 0.000 
Dit *BTit  0.089 2.94 0.003 
CFOit (-)  -0.748 -16.18 0.000 
Dit*CFOit (+)  -0.670 -3.21 0.001 
BTit*CFOit  -0.031 -0.38 0.705 
BTit*CFOit*Dit (+)  0.651 1.77 0.077 
Adj. R2    0.806 
N    959 
 
BT is the scaled deciles of positive book-tax differences at every the end of year t and normalised from 0 to 1and N is 
number of observations. Negative annual income tax expenses are excluded. Observations in the top and bottom 0.5% of 
EPS, R, ∆NIit /TAit, ∆NIit-1 /TAit-2, AC and CFO are excluded. OLS with firm-fixed effect estimator is applied for the 
analysis and t-values are two-tailed values computed by adjusting heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Test variables 
and their statistics are presented in bold typeface. All variables are as defined previously. OLS firm fixed-effect method 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is applied for the analysis. 
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Table 6.12 presents the relationship between accounting conservatism measures 
(BTM and ACC) and book-tax differences (RNK_BT).  Findings report that the 
coefficient of RNK_BT is positive and significant in threshold 2 for BTM and 
threshold 1 for ACC.  The significant results indicate that accounting 
conservatism measured by the ratio of book-to-market is more pronounced for 
firms with large positive book-tax differences and low discretionary accruals 
relative to firms with small positive book-tax differences and high discretionary 
accruals.   
 
When investigating the relationship between accounting conservatism and firm 
governance, CG_QUALITY is positively significantly related to BTM for firms in 
threshold 2 (= 0.0019) but to ACC for firms in threshold 1 (= 28.354).  This 
finding suggests that higher proportion of audit committee on firm’s board 
induces more accounting conservatism.  The result reports a negative relationship 
between BOARD_QUALITY and accounting conservatism (BTM in threshold 2 
= -0.0008 and ACC in threshold 1 but insignificant = -8.312).  Additionally, f-
statistics become significant for ACC in threshold 1 (f-stat = 2.51).  In summary, 
overall results are consistent with the main findings, suggesting that more 
accounting conservatism in the firm is induced by the larger book-tax difference 
and the higher proportion of audit committee and independent directors on the 
board.  
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
According to all analyses in Thai settings, findings suggest that earnings 
asymmetric timeliness is more likely in Thailand for pooled-samples.  However, 
when comparing between pre- and post-adoption periods, it appears that earnings 
asymmetric timeliness declines.  It should be noted that the decrease of earnings 
asymmetric timeliness during post-adoption periods is consistent with the increase 
of earnings persistence during post-adoption periods as reported in Table 4.7.  In 
addition, accounting conservatism positively varies with the magnitude of positive 
book-tax differences.  With control variables including firm governance and firm 
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size, firm-specific conservatism analysis reveals that the unconditional 
conservatism measures are more likely for firms with a large scale of positive 
book-tax differences.  Also, the result suggests that the corporate governance 
system relates unconditional accounting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman 
2007).  However, earnings management is an important issue when using accruals 
to measure firm-specific accounting conservatism.  The finding suggests that 
accounting conservatism measured by accruals is more likely for firms with large 
scale of positive book tax differences when those firms have a low level of 
discretionary accruals.   
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j = 1 
3 
j = 1 
3 
Table 6.12 Firm-specific conservatism (BTM): OLS regressions with firm fixed-
effect and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors  
 
  
Cit   =   γ0 +  γ1RNK_BTit  + ΣφjCGj,it + ΣδjFFj, it  + εit   
 
Panel A: C = BTM (1993 – 2007) 
 Threshold 1 (Low DA) Threshold 2 Threshold 3 (High DA) 
 Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept (?) -0.0004 -0.22 0.830 -0.0001 -0.06 0.951 0.0018 0.51 0.609 
RNK_BT (+) 0.0001 0.43 0.665 0.0008 2.42 0.016 0.0001 0.31 0.754 
Firm governance 
variables (CG)          
BOARD_SIZE (?) -0.0001 -0.16 0.869 0.0011 2.25 0.025 -0.0003 -0.42 0.673 
BOARD_QUALITY (?) -0.0004 -1.50 0.136 -0.0008 -2.94 0.004 0.0000 -0.02 0.987 
CG_QUALITY (?) 0.0006 1.01 0.312 0.0019 2.60 0.010 0.0021 2.41 0.017 
Control variables (FF)          
LEV (+) -0.0007 -2.21 0.028 -0.0008 -1.44 0.150 -0.0011 -1.31 0.190 
SIZE (+) 0.0001 0.48 0.629 -0.0001 -0.64 0.520 -0.0002 -0.71 0.481 
SALEGRW (+) 0.0000 -0.64 0.523 0.0000 3.84 0.000 0.0000 0.21 0.837 
Adj. R2   0.600   0.4299   0.251 
N   474   468   464 
F-stat   1.86   6.30   1.79 
 
 
Panel B: C = ACC (1994–2007) 
 Threshold 1 (Low DA) Threshold 2 Threshold 3 (High DA) 
 Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept (?) 34.741 0.73 0.466 61.702 1.75 0.082 -10.474 -0.17 0.864 
RNK_BT (+) 7.283 1.71 0.089 1.117 0.33 0.739 0.515 0.13 0.895 
Firm governance 
variables (CG)          
BOARD_SIZE (?) -4.052 -0.53 0.599 -3.520 -0.49 0.627 5.724 0.67 0.506 
BOARD_QUALITY (?) -8.312 -1.61 0.109 1.624 0.35 0.730 14.786 1.05 0.974 
CG_QUALITY (?) 28.354 2.88 0.004 1.015 0.10 0.921 -6.950 -0.65 0.519 
Control variables (FF)          
LEV (+) 5.299 0.37 0.713 -2.115 -0.21 0.830 -0.644 -0.09 0.931 
SIZE (+) -0.656 -0.16 0.877 -3.816 -1.57 0.118 -0.043 -0.01 0.992 
SALEGRW (-) -2.387 -0.74 0.460 0.570 0.20 0.839 -0.263 -0.23 0.820 
Adj. R2   0.155   0.150   0.323 
N   358   355   348 
F-stat   2.51   0.55   0.17 
 
C is firm-specific conservatism measure (BTM: book-to-market or ACC: 3-year accumulated accruals deflated by the 
average total asset); RANK_BT is the quintiles of positive book-tax differences every year (normalised to between 0 and 
1). LEV is the natural log of total liabilities. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. SALEGRW is the percentage of annual 
growth in total sales. BOARD_SIZE is the natural log of total number of board of directors.  BOARD_QUALITY is the 
natural log of a number of boards that board of directors serve in other firms. C CG_QUALITY is the sum of audit 
committee and independent directors divided by board size. N is number of observations.  Negative annual income tax 
expenses are excluded. Observations in the top or bottom 1% of BTM and ACC are excluded. Predicted sign is shown in 
the parentheses.  t-values are two-tailed values computed by using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. DA is the 
industry cross-section modified Jones discretionary accrual.  DA is ranked in three groups every year from low to high 
discretionary accruals. 
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  Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Discussions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Thailand has officially constituted accounting and auditing organisations for more 
than forty years.  The accounting and auditing setter was under government 
supervision from 1962.  In 2005, a self-regulated accounting and auditing 
organisation – the Federation of Accounting Professions (FAP) – was established.  
The Thai accounting and auditing setter has been independent of government 
since then.  It is irrefutable that the preparation of Thai financial statements has 
been influenced by tax rules because of the government’s supervision on Thai 
accounting standards.  It is also possible to believe that Thai accounting principles 
are more likely to serve the government’s interests rather than public investment. 
The Thai accounting system, therefore, has been categorised as a tax-based 
accounting income system.  However, since 2000, Thailand has adopted and 
converged domestic accounting standards to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS).  IFRS harmonisation is obviously aimed to stimulate the quality 
of accounting information in Thailand.     
 
Even though IFRS harmonisation aims to bring a better quality of accounting 
information for the IFRS-adopted country, many potential factors can influence 
the improvement of accounting information quality during IFRS post-adoptions.  
The adoption of IFRS in domestic countries has fascinated accounting 
researchers, who have explored whether or not the quality of accounting 
information has actually been enhanced during IFRS post-adoptions.  The existing 
research has attempted to compare the variation of accounting quality by either 
comparing between pre- and post-adoption in a single country or comparing these 
two periods among different countries.  By comparing between pre- and post-
adoption periods, researchers can explain the enhancement of accounting 
information quality after the change in accounting standards.  By comparing 
between those two periods in different countries, researchers can explain the 
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effect of institutional factors, i.e. legal systems, influencing the improvement of 
accounting information quality when IFRS has been adopted.  This thesis argues 
that it also should be more useful to incorporate institutional factors when 
investigating the improvement of accounting information quality after IFRS 
adoptions in a single country, raising more understanding about accounting 
quality in such country.  
 
Incentives of a firm’s insiders are a major issue and can derive the variation in 
accounting quality.  This thesis argues that the improvement of accounting 
information quality is varied according to a firm’s incentives, especially when the 
principles-based accounting system (IFRS) is employed.  This thesis employs 
book-tax differences (BT) to proxy insiders’ incentives.  The use of book-tax 
differences provides at least two advantages: i) it can be used to observe the 
pattern of the accounting system in Thailand between pre- and post-adoption 
periods and ii) it is employed to differentiate the firm’s discretion.  However, this 
proxy is not exhaustive and must be interpreted with caution because either large 
or small scale of book-tax differences is subject to firms’ discretions. This thesis 
investigates whether there is an improvement of accounting information quality 
between IFRS pre- and post-adoption in Thailand by expanding conditioning to 
include the magnitude of book-tax differences.     
 
If the variation in accounting quality among firms is found, this thesis considers 
that it is of interest to search for factors influencing such difference.  After 
examining the variation in the improvement of accounting quality in Thailand, 
this thesis investigates whether the accounting quality is varied according to the 
firm governance system in Thailand.  This thesis views that the firm governance 
system is an influential factor driving the difference in accounting information 
quality in each firm.  To support this conjecture, this thesis further estimates the 
relationship between accounting quality and the firm governance system.  As a 
result, this thesis performs two analyses: i) the investigation of the improvement 
of accounting information quality between IFRS pre- and post-adoption periods in 
Thailand and ii) the investigation of the relationship between accounting 
 
 
Chapter VII                                                                  Conclusions and Discussions 
 
 256
information quality and firm governance systems in Thailand.  For both 
investigations, firms are divided into subgroups according to the scale of book-tax 
differences.  This chapter summarises important aspects obtained from the 
analysis.  The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections.  Summary 
of the thesis and implementation is presented in section 7.2 and sections 7.3 and 
7.4 present research limitations and concluding remarks, contributions and future 
research, respectively.      
 
7.2 Summary of the Thesis and Implementation 
This study divides investigations into two parts.  First, the improvement of 
accounting information quality between IFRS pre- and post-adoption periods in 
Thailand is analysed.  Second, the relationship between accounting information 
quality and firm governance factors in Thai settings is examined.   
 
This thesis defines accounting information quality according to three properties of 
earnings information.  First, earnings quality is determined by the persistence of 
earnings.  Second, accounting information quality is examined by the usefulness 
of earnings and book value (the value relevance analysis). And, third, earnings 
quality is determined by the ability of earnings to capture economic outcome on a 
timely basis (earnings timeliness). 
 
For the analysis of earnings persistence and value relevance, this thesis employs 
10-year longitudinal data for both analyses.  This study views that these 
longitudinal data should provide more powerful inferences although they suffer 
from survivorship bias.  The dataset for both analyses is also divided into two 
subgroups.  The first subgroup includes firms whose 5-year accumulated book-tax 
differences during pre-adoption periods are smaller than the 5-year accumulated 
book-tax differences during post-adoption periods (Group 1: BT-Pre < BT-Post).  
The second subgroup includes firms whose 5-year accumulated book-tax 
differences during pre-adoption periods are larger than the 5-year accumulated 
book-tax differences during post-adoption periods (Group 2: BT-Pre > BT-Post).  
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After examining the earnings persistence and value relevance during pre- and 
post-adoption peirods, accounting quality is regressed on firm governance 
proxies.  Accounting quality is measured by two proxies from earnings 
persistence–the coefficient estimate of each firm from earnings persistence and 
value relevance–the explanatory power and earnings response coefficients of each 
firm.  The relationship between accounting quality and firm governance factors is 
examined by comparing between IFRS pre- and post-adoption periods in 
Thailand.  
 
The last property of earnings to be examined is earnings timeliness.  As suggested 
by prior studies, incorporating additional information into the model facilitates 
more powerful to explain the timeliness of earnings.  Based on different models of 
asymmetric timeliness, the magnitude of book-tax difference is incorporated to 
the model.  In addition to the asymmetric timeliness model, this thesis employs 
firm-specific accounting conservatism for the investigation.  Prior studies suggest 
that the asymmetric timeliness is negatively related to firm-specific accounting 
conservatism.  Therefore, it is more powerful if consistent results are observed 
when using different methodologies.    
 
Earnings persistence 
Consistent with prior research, a random walk model is employed to determine 
whether earnings are more persistent during IFRS post-adoptions in Thailand.  
Earnings information is also decomposed to cash flows from operation and 
accruals information.  For analysing balanced-panel data, this thesis employs OLS 
estimation and standard errors corrected by bootstrap methodology.  The future 
earnings are regressed on current earnings (cash flows and accruals component of 
earnings).  The obtained result is consistent and suggests that earnings are more 
persistent during IFRS post-adoptions in Thailand.  However, when estimating the 
persistence of earnings by industry, the finding reveals that the persistence of 
earnings information is sensitive to the industry.  The result supports the a priori 
prediction that the persistence of earnings declines for firms in group 1 (BT–Pre < 
BT–Post) but increases for firms in group 2 (BT–Pre > BT–Post) during post-
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adoption periods. Consistent with prior research, the persistence of earnings is 
more persistent for firms with small-scale book-tax differences when using all 
firm-years in the analysis.  In addition, when including additional explanatory 
variables, the robustness check supports the result obtained from the main 
analysis.   
 
For the second part of the analysis, the persistence coefficient of each firm is 
estimated.  Each firm is divided into two periods, pre- and post-adoption, 5-years 
each.  Then, the persistence coefficient is regressed on firm governance factors.  
Overall results suggest that earnings persistence is related to firm governance.  
The finding in this setting implies that the decline of earnings persistence for 
firms in group 1 is likely to be induced by the governance system. 
       
The value relevance 
This study employs the earnings response coefficient model (ERC) and price 
model for the analysis of value relevance.  This study mainly interprets the value 
relevance from the association between the market value (returns) and accounting 
summary measures (R2).  The earnings response coefficient is also interpreted to 
support the main interpretation.  Based on balanced-panel data, the result suggests 
that value relevance improves during IFRS post-adoption periods in Thailand.  
The obtained result also supports the hypothesis that between pre- and post-
adoption periods in Thailand, the improvement of value relevance of accounting 
summary measures for firms in group 2 (BT–Pre > BT–Post) is greater than the 
improvement of value relevance of accounting summary measures for firms in 
group 1 (BT–Pre < BT–Post).  The additional test by using all-firm years suggests 
that the value relevance for firms with large scale of book-tax differences is lower 
than that for firms with small scale of book-tax differences.      
 
For part two, the value relevance of each firm is estimated.  Then value relevance 
(ERC and the explanatory power – R2) is regressed on the firm governance 
factors.  Again, the result suggests that value relevance is related to the 
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governance factors.  Overall results suggest that the variation in value relevance 
between firms in two groups is likely to be induced by firm governance factors. 
 
Earnings timeliness 
The third property of earnings being investigated in this thesis is earnings 
timeliness in Thailand.  Three asymmetric piece-wise models are employed for 
the analysis of earning asymmetric timeliness, including the market-based 
asymmetric model, the accrual-based asymmetric model and the negative earnings 
change model.  The result suggests that the Thai accounting information exhibits 
the timeliness in terms of the ability of earnings to capture negative events in the 
same period that they occur.  Although it is not the main objective of this thesis, 
by using all firm-years, two out of three models suggest that earnings timeliness is 
less likely in Thailand during post-adoption periods.  This finding does not 
deviate from expectations because a prior study (Basu 1997) explains that as 
earnings persistence increases, earnings asymmetric timeliness would decline.  In 
this setting, this thesis finds that the persistence of earnings improves during IFRS 
post-adoption, thus it is possibility that the decline in earnings asymmetric 
timeliness should be observed.   
 
Earnings persistence predicts that firms with a large scale of book-tax differences 
have lower persistence in earnings relative to firms with a small scale of book-tax 
differences.  However, because the notion of earnings asymmetric timeliness and 
earnings persistence is different, earnings asymmetric timeliness should be more 
likely for firms with a large scale of book-tax differences relative to firms with a 
small scale of book-tax differences.  Therefore, this thesis conjectures that 
earnings asymmetric timeliness varies positively according to the scale of book-
tax differences: the larger scale the differences, the greater the earnings 
asymmetric timeliness.  The obtained result supports this conjecture.  It should be 
noted that this thesis includes only positive book-tax differences in the analysis.   
 
In addition to the earnings asymmetric timeliness, unconditional accounting 
conservatism in Thailand is examined.  This thesis employs two firm-specific 
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earnings conservatism (unconditional conservatism) measures, book-to-market 
and 3-year accumulated accruals.  Then this thesis investigates the relationship 
between unconditional conservatism measures and book-tax differences and firm 
governance factors.  The finding suggests that book-to-market is positively related 
to the scaled rank of book-tax differences.  This finding is consistent with the 
result obtained from the earnings asymmetric timeliness models.  It is due to the 
fact that the earnings timeliness obtained from the market-based asymmetric 
model (i.e. Basu 1997) is negatively correlated with book-to-market (Givoly et al. 
2007).  However, the result in this setting reveals that the magnitude of book-tax 
differences is positively related to both the earnings asymmetric timeliness and 
unconditional conservatism measure (book-to-market).  Thus, this consistent 
finding suggests that the scale of book-tax differences contains significant 
information about accounting conservatism.   
 
Nevertheless, the 3-year accumulated accrual is not related to the scale of book-
tax differences.  This study argues that accruals information is potentially caused 
by earnings manipulation.  Therefore, the sample firm is divided into three 
thresholds according to the level of discretionary accruals to control for earnings 
management.  The finding supports the argument and reports a positive 
relationship between 3-year accumulated accruals and the scaled rank of book-tax 
differences.  Overall results confirm that the scale of book-tax differences 
contains information about accounting conservatism. 
 
The study of three properties of accounting information, in particular earnings and 
book value, provides accounting policy implication for the Thai standard setter 
and accounting standard setters in the country employing a tax-based accounting 
income system.  This study suggests that IFRS adoption brings higher quality of 
accounting information.  However, the enhancement of accounting quality is not 
only subject to accounting standards but also the environment of accounting, i.e. 
the firm governance system.  From the overall finding, this thesis argues that 
accounting environment as indirect parameter is perhaps more important than 
accounting standards as direct parameter.  IFRS tends to provide a good quality of 
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accounting principles, i.e. reflecting the true value of the firm.  However, it is 
more likely to depend on incentives of the firm whether or not a firm’s insiders 
intend to use accounting standards as a proper means to reflect the true value of 
the firm.  In addition, this study suggests that the book-tax difference contains 
information about earnings quality, especially for the country using a tax-based 
accounting income system.     
 
7.3 Research Limitations 
From all investigations in this thesis, some research limitations must be raised.  
The first limitation for this study is about the calculation of book-tax differences.  
Permanent and temporary differences should be identified to construct the book-
tax difference.  Annual tax expenses presented on financial statements are affected 
by temporary and permanent differences between accounting principles and tax 
rules. These may cause measurement errors in tax expenses unless the differences 
are adjusted to determine accurate tax expenses in each year (Lev and Nissim 
2004).  In this study, the timing difference in firms’ portfolios is not identified 
because of limitations of tax data reported in financial statements.  In addition, 
missing value of taxable income used to construct panel dataset is set to zero.  
Table 7.1 presets a number of missing values across years.     
 
Table 7.1 Missing value of taxable income across years 
Year Earnings persistence ERC model Price model 
1997 108 67 54 
1998 111 63 48 
1999 100 55 44 
2000 97 56 45 
2001 87 50 40 
2002 86 50 41 
2003 89 49 40 
2004 73 43 33 
Total observations 751 433 345 
 
Second, annual income tax expenses are employed rather than actual income tax 
paid by cash because income tax payment by cash is not sufficient for the 
analysis.  Cash flow statements have been compulsory reports by the Stock 
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Exchange of Thailand since 1999.  However, prior studies find that actual income 
tax expenses do not change the results obtained from annual income tax expenses 
(Lev and Nissim 2004).  In addition, it must be noted that for firms operating in 
Thailand, tax income must be calculated from individual financial statements 
rather than consolidated financial statements.  The book-tax difference in this 
study, therefore, is mainly calculated from companies’ financial statements to 
obtain more accurate figures.  Nevertheless, this thesis compares the main 
investigation by using the book-tax difference calculated from consolidated 
financial statements.  The results obtained from the comparison are presented in 
appendices and they are reasonably consistent with the result obtained from the 
main investigation.  As a result, book-tax differences in this study are not 
exhaustive. Although the book-tax difference is employed to proxy a firm’s 
incentive, the scale of book-tax differences can be influenced by other factors, i.e. 
earnings manipulation.  Therefore, the interpretation about the use of book-tax 
differences must be performed with care.  
 
Next, the industry cross-section modified-Jones’ model is employed for the 
calculation of discretionary accruals.  The data limitation does not allow this study 
to calculate the discretionary accrual by using a time series model.  Accruals are 
calculated based on prior study rather than obtained from financial statements 
because accruals reported in financial statements are not available during pre-
adoption periods.   
 
In addition, accounting quality is unobservable.  This study uses the measurement 
of accounting quality through earnings persistence and value relevance, and then 
regresses accounting quality on the firm governance.  These proxies contain 
measurement errors. 
 
Last, the proxy for quality of firm governance system, board and audit committee 
quality, in this study is measured by a number of sitting boards.  This proxy is 
twofold: i) a high number of sitting boards indicate the reputation of board 
members, inducing a high quality of governance system and ii) a high number of 
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sitting boards indicate a large workload, inducing a low quality of governance 
system because of time constraints.  Therefore, non-linear relationship between 
accounting quality and this proxy should be addressed and further performed by 
future research.     
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks, Contributions and Future Research 
This thesis investigates accounting quality in Thailand when IFRS has been 
adopted since 2000.  Accounting quality in this thesis refers to three properties of 
earnings, consisting of the persistence of earnings, the value relevance of earnings 
and book value and the timeliness of earnings.  This thesis aims to investigate 
whether accounting quality in Thailand has been enhanced after the IFRS 
adoption.  The overall finding suggests that the earnings persistence and value 
relevance have been improved after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.  The 
timeliness of earnings is less likely after the IFRS adoption in Thailand.   
 
This thesis views that a firm’s incentives play important roles in accounting 
quality.  This thesis employs book-tax differences a proxy for the firm’s incentive 
in Thai settings.  By incorporating the book-tax difference into the analysis, the 
finding suggests that accounting quality in Thai settings is varied according to the 
scale of book-tax differences.  The result suggests that the earnings persistence 
and value relevance has been enhanced for firms with a small scale of book tax 
differences relative to firms with a large scale of book-tax differences.  In addition 
to the firm’s incentive, this thesis views that firm governance systems induce the 
variation in accounting quality in firms with different scale of book-tax 
differences.  And, the finding suggests that the firm governance system is related 
to accounting quality, implying that the firm governance system is a significant 
factor for the improvement of accounting quality in Thai settings. 
 
This research adds to the literature in many aspects.  Firstly, it is an analysis of 
accounting quality in emerging market countries that use a tax-based accounting 
income system.  Secondly, this thesis employs the book-tax difference to control 
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for a firm’s incentive in the Thai setting.  The published research has been silent 
on using the book-tax difference for the investigation of accounting quality in 
emerging market countries.  Thirdly, this thesis employs panel data for the 
analysis.  This should provide a relatively strong inference.  And, this thesis 
should facilitate Thai accounting regulators about accounting policy implications 
in Thailand, suggesting that accounting standards are not the only factor to 
improve accounting quality but such other factors as incentives and discretions do 
affect the improvement of accounting quality in Thailand.     
 
This study suggests that future research should explore accounting quality in other 
dimensions.  For example, i) future analysis can investigate earnings persistence, 
value relevance and earnings timeliness by focusing on a specific industry, i.e. 
high technology, or specific accounting standards, i.e. relevant accounting 
standards for tangible and intangible assets.  This should provide more insightful 
information about the property of accounting quality; ii) future research should 
search for institutional or firm-specific factors containing richer information that 
can be used to identify variation in accounting quality among firms; iii) more 
comprehensive variables for firm governance systems should be used for the 
analysis, i.e. audit committee expertise – education and background, that 
accounting quality is positively varied with expertise or board compensation, that 
high compensation may induce high quality of accounting information; iv) the 
non-linear relationship and causation issue for firm governance analysis should be 
addressed and/or identified in future research; v) the model for value relevance 
analysis is open-ended. This thesis employs standard models existed in prior 
literature rather than construct models for the analysis.  The future research may 
develop methodologies to fit the dataset and obtain more powerful results; and vi) 
the future research may investigate the association between costs of the firms and 
IFRS adoptions. 
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Appendix 1 
Thai Accounting Standards and International Accounting Standards Comparison 
 
Index TAS Title TAS 
No.  
IAS and 
AICPA 
Effective Date 
1 Accounting Basic Assumptions 1 - 1 Feb. 1979  
Superseded by Framework 
2 Accounting Policy 2 - 1 Sep. 1979 
Superseded by TAS 35 
3 Extraordinary Items 3 - 1 Sep. 1979 
Superseded by TAS 39 
4 Accounting Changes 4 - 1 Sep. 1979 
Superseded by TAS 39 
5 Earnings Per Share 5 - 1 Sep. 1979 
Superseded by TAS 38 
6 Revenue Recognitions 6 - 1 Sep. 1979 
Superseded by TAS 39 
7 Leases 7 IAS 17 28 Feb. 1987 
 
8 Construction Contracts 8 - 31 Dec. 1988 
Superseded by TAS 49 
9 Property, Plant and Equipment 9 - 1 Jan. 1989 
Superseded by TAS 32 
10 Depreciation Accounting 10 - 1 Jan. 1988 
Superseded by TAS 32 
11 Doubtful Accounts and Bad Debt 
 
11 - 1 Jul. 1989 
12 Accounting for Marketable Securities 12 - 1 Jul. 1989 
Superseded by TAS 40 
13 Related Party Disclosures 13 - 1 Jul. 1989 
Superseded by TAS 47 
14 Accounting for Research and 
Development Activities 
14 IAS 9 1 Jan. 1990 
15 Borrowing Costs 15 - 1 Jan. 1990 
Superseded by TAS 33 
16 Current Assets and Current Liabilities 16 - 1 Jan. 1990 
Superseded by TAS 35 
17 Accounting for Investments 17 - 31 Dec. 1991 
Superseded by TAS 40 
18 Accounting for Investments in 
Associates 
18 - 31 Dec. 1991 
Superseded by TAS 46 
19 Consolidated Financial Statements 19 - 31 Dec. 1991 
Superseded by TAS 44 
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Thai Accounting Standards and International Accounting Standards Comparison 
(Cont.) 
Index TAS Title TAS 
No.  
IAS and 
AICPA 
Effective Date 
20 Business Combinations 20 - 31 Dec. 1991 
Superseded by TAS 44 
21 Events After the Balance Sheet Date 21 - 31 Dec. 1991 
Superseded by TAS 52  
22 Inventories 22 - 31 Dec. 1991 
Superseded by TAS 31 
23 Information to be Disclosed in 
Financial Statements 
23 - 1 Jan. 1992 
Superseded by TAS 35 
24 Segment Reporting 24 IAS 14 1 Jan. 1994 
 
25 Cash flow statements 25 IAS 7 1 Jan. 1994 
(Revised in 2007) 
26 Revenue Recognition for Real Estate 
 
26 - 1 Jan. 1994 
27 Disclosures in the Financial 
Statements of Banks and Similar 
Financial Institutions  
27 IAS 30 1 Jan. 1995 
(Revised in 2006) 
28 Accounting for Convertible Debt and 
Debt Issued with Stock Purchase 
Warrants 
28 - 29 Aug. 1994 
Superseded by TAS 48 
29 Accounting for Long Term Lease 
Agreements 
29 - 1 Jan. 1996 
30 The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates 
30 IAS 21 1 Jan. 1996 
31 Inventories 31 IAS 2 1 Jan. 1997 
 
Amended TAS after 1997 
32 Property, Plant and Equipment 32 IAS 16 1 Jan. 1999 
 
33 Borrowing Costs 33 IAS 23 1 Jan. 1999  
(Revised in 2007) 
34 Accounting by Debtors and Creditors 
for Troubled Debt Restructurings 
34 SFAS 15, 
114 
30 Sep.1998 
35 Presentation of Financial Statements 
 
35 IAS 1 1 Jan. 1999 
36 Impairment of Assets 
 
36 IAS 36 1 Jan. 1999 
37 Revenue 
 
37 IAS 18 1 Jan. 1999 
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Thai Accounting Standards and International Accounting Standards Comparison 
(Cont.) 
Index TAS Title TAS 
No. 
IAS and 
AICPA 
Effective Date 
38 Earnings Per Share  
 
38 IAS 33 1 Jan. 1999 
39 Net Profit or Loss for the Period, 
Fundamental Errors and Changes in 
Accounting Policies 
39 IAS 8 1 Jan. 1999 
40 Accounting for Investments in Debt 
and Equity Securities 
40 IAS 25, IAS 
39, 
SFAS115 
1 Jan. 1999 
41 Interim Financial Reporting 
 
41 IAS 34 1 Jan. 2000 
42 Accounting Guide for Investment 
Companies 
42 AICPA 1 Jan. 2000 
43 Business Combinations 
 
43 IAS 22 1 Jan. 2000 
44 Consolidated and Separate Financial 
Statements  
44 IAS 27,         
IAS 39 
1 Jan. 2000 
(Revised in 2007) 
45 Investments in Associates 45 IAS 28 1 Jan. 2000 
(Revised in 2007) 
46 Interests in Joint Ventures 46 IAS 31 1 Jan. 2000 
(Revised in 2007) 
47 Related Party Disclosures 
 
47 IAS 24 1 Jan. 2000 
48 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation 
48 IAS 32,           
IAS 39 
1 Jan. 2000 
49 Construction Contracts 49 IAS 11 1 Jan. 2000 
(Revised in 2007) 
50 Events After the Balance Sheet Date 
 
52 IAS 10 1 Jan. 2005 
51 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets  
53 IAS 37 1 Jan. 2005 
52 Discontinuing Operations  
 
54 IAS 35 1 Jan. 2005 
53 Accounting Framework  IAS 
Framework 
1997 
 
Source: The table is amended from the information given by BSAP.94  
                                               
94 Department of Business Development (2002), Thai Accounting Standards and International 
Accounting Standards by Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand. [online] 
Available from: http://www.dbd.go.th/thai/account/standard.phtml?head=061 [accessed 18th 
October 2007] 
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Appendix 2 
The pattern of book-tax differences by industry 
1. Agro-business 
 
 
2. Consumer products 
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3. Industrial 
 
 
4. Property and construction 
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5. Natural resources 
 
 
 
6. Services 
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7. Technology 
 
 
 
 
8. Financial firms 
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Appendix 3 
Supplements for Table 4.7 
The book-tax differences are calculated by using consolidated financial 
statements. 
 
Panel B 
Group 1 
. bootstrap, reps (1000): areg  lead_ebitast ebitast dy dyebitast if groupcon==1,  
a(i_industry) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs      =       850 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    229.43 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3939 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3874 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.0852 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ebitast |   .5157199   .0693966     7.43   0.000      .379705    .6517348 
          dy |   .0341788   .0092613     3.69   0.000      .016027    .0523305 
   dyebitast |  -.0277275   .0779023    -0.36   0.722    -.1804132    .1249582 
       _cons |   .0122919   .0081583     1.51   0.132     -.003698    .0282818 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  i_industry |   absorbed                                       (7 categories) 
 
 
Group 2 
. bootstrap, reps (1000): areg  lead_ebitast ebitast dy dyebitast if groupcon==2,  
a(i_industry) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs      =      1150 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    102.82 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3239 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3186 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.1010 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ebitast |   .5397459   .0668968     8.07   0.000     .4086307    .6708611 
          dy |  -.0220532   .0146925    -1.50   0.133    -.0508501    .0067436 
   dyebitast |   .2228033   .1332309     1.67   0.094    -.0383244    .4839311 
       _cons |   .0275709   .0088927     3.10   0.002     .0101415    .0450003 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  i_industry |   absorbed                                       (7 categories) 
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Panel D 
 
Group 1 
. bootstrap, reps (1000): reg  lead_ebitast cfoast accast dy dycfoast dyaccast if 
groupcon==1, r 
Linear regression                               Number of obs      =       450 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(5)       =     95.30 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3355 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3280 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.0774 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cfoast |   .5152017   .0768261     6.71   0.000     .3646254    .6657781 
      accast |   .4969438   .0764998     6.50   0.000      .347007    .6468806 
          dy |   .0195975   .0126682     1.55   0.122    -.0052316    .0444267 
    dycfoast |   .0616591   .1323295     0.47   0.641    -.1977019    .3210201 
    dyaccast |   .0072589   .1195613     0.06   0.952     -.227077    .2415948 
       _cons |   .0302392   .0078782     3.84   0.000     .0147981    .0456802 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. test cfoast=accast 
 
 ( 1)  cfoast - accast = 0 
           chi2(1) =    0.38 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.5392 
 
. test dycfoast=dyaccast 
 
 ( 1)  dycfoast - dyaccast = 0 
           chi2(1) =    0.99 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3207 
 
. 
Group 2 
. bootstrap, reps (1000): reg  lead_ebitast cfoast accast dy dycfoast dyaccast if 
groupcon==2, r 
Linear regression                               Number of obs      =       600 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(5)       =    114.65 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3435 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3380 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.0781 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cfoast |   .5048576   .0665287     7.59   0.000     .3744638    .6352513 
      accast |   .4133136   .0686272     6.02   0.000     .2788067    .5478206 
          dy |  -.0100195   .0125043    -0.80   0.423    -.0345275    .0144884 
    dycfoast |   .1703924   .1096522     1.55   0.120    -.0445219    .3853067 
    dyaccast |   .2400617   .1105714     2.17   0.030     .0233457    .4567777 
       _cons |   .0344505   .0084636     4.07   0.000     .0178621    .0510389 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test cfoast=accast 
  
( 1)  cfoast - accast = 0 
           chi2(1) =    6.00 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0143 
 
. test dycfoast=dyaccast 
 
 ( 1)  dycfoast - dyaccast = 0 
           chi2(1) =    2.04 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1536 
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Appendix 4 
 
Supplements for Table 4.9 
The book-tax differences are calculated by using consolidated financial 
statements. 
 
Panel A 
Group 1 
. bootstrap, reps(1000): reg lead_ebitast ebitast dy dyebitast grwrev rev lnast 
dygrwrev dyrev dylnast if groupcon==1, r 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs      =       850 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =    352.27 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.4020 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3956 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.0846 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ebitast |   .4823838   .0768307     6.28   0.000     .3317984    .6329693 
          dy |   .0936004     .06277     1.49   0.136    -.0294265    .2166274 
   dyebitast |   .0291128   .0881111     0.33   0.741    -.1435817    .2018074 
      grwrev |    -.02849   .0287178    -0.99   0.321    -.0847759    .0277958 
         rev |   .0473405   .0105671     4.48   0.000     .0266294    .0680517 
       lnast |   .0047871    .003364     1.42   0.155    -.0018062    .0113804 
    dygrwrev |   .0114958   .0321682     0.36   0.721    -.0515528    .0745443 
       dyrev |  -.0380683   .0116563    -3.27   0.001    -.0609143   -.0152223 
     dylnast |  -.0026057   .0039572    -0.66   0.510    -.0103617    .0051503 
       _cons |  -.0890413   .0540042    -1.65   0.099    -.1948877     .016805 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                 
 
 
Group 2 
. bootstrap, reps(1000): reg lead_ebitast ebitast dy dyebitast grwrev rev lnast 
dygrwrev dyrev dylnast if groupcon==2, r 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs      =      1150 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =    169.71 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3228 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3175 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.1010 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     ebitast |   .4990958   .0796158     6.27   0.000     .3430518    .6551399 
          dy |  -.0782488   .0566686    -1.38   0.167    -.1893171    .0328196 
   dyebitast |    .287046   .1429264     2.01   0.045     .0069154    .5671767 
      grwrev |  -.0098636   .0211256    -0.47   0.641     -.051269    .0315417 
         rev |   .0252042   .0058998     4.27   0.000     .0136407    .0367676 
       lnast |  -.0040141   .0025846    -1.55   0.120    -.0090798    .0010515 
    dygrwrev |   .0047864   .0383515     0.12   0.901    -.0703811     .079954 
       dyrev |  -.0257681   .0099942    -2.58   0.010    -.0453564   -.0061798 
     dylnast |   .0051041   .0036327     1.41   0.160    -.0020159    .0122242 
       _cons |    .067133    .040842     1.64   0.100    -.0129158    .1471817 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Panel C 
 
Group 1 
. bootstrap, reps(1000): reg lead_ebitast cfoast accast dy dycfoast dyaccast 
grwrev rev lnast dygrwrev dyrev dylnast if groupcon==1, r 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs      =       450 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =    174.71 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3755 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3598 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.0755 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cfoast |   .3777486   .0785734     4.81   0.000     .2237475    .5317496 
      accast |   .3723784   .0767963     4.85   0.000     .2218604    .5228963 
          dy |   .0762557   .0709861     1.07   0.283    -.0628744    .2153859 
    dycfoast |   .1964606   .1422659     1.38   0.167    -.0823755    .4752967 
    dyaccast |   .1306296   .1277035     1.02   0.306    -.1196648    .3809239 
      grwrev |   .0042014   .0346064     0.12   0.903     -.063626    .0720287 
         rev |   .0548643   .0146027     3.76   0.000     .0262435    .0834852 
       lnast |   .0056405   .0033045     1.71   0.088    -.0008362    .0121172 
    dygrwrev |  -.0133556   .0394923    -0.34   0.735    -.0907591    .0640479 
       dyrev |  -.0520115   .0165122    -3.15   0.002    -.0843748   -.0196482 
     dylnast |  -.0019768   .0043926    -0.45   0.653    -.0105861    .0066326 
       _cons |  -.0842907     .05464    -1.54   0.123    -.1913831    .0228018 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Group 2 
. bootstrap, reps(1000): reg lead_ebitast cfoast accast dy dycfoast dyaccast 
grwrev rev lnast dygrwrev dyrev dylnast if groupcon==2, r 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs      =       600 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =    171.55 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                                R-squared          =    0.3606 
                                                Adj R-squared      =    0.3486 
                                                Root MSE           =    0.0775 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
lead_ebitast |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cfoast |   .4761535    .080063     5.95   0.000     .3192328    .6330742 
      accast |   .3815817   .0796432     4.79   0.000     .2254839    .5376795 
          dy |  -.0768992   .0694088    -1.11   0.268    -.2129379    .0591396 
    dycfoast |   .1761865   .1232959     1.43   0.153     -.065469     .417842 
    dyaccast |   .2468741   .1245887     1.98   0.048     .0026848    .4910633 
      grwrev |   -.017446   .0241731    -0.72   0.470    -.0648243    .0299324 
         rev |   .0238322   .0077122     3.09   0.002     .0087166    .0389479 
       lnast |   .0001748   .0033475     0.05   0.958    -.0063861    .0067357 
    dygrwrev |   .0382497   .0364803     1.05   0.294    -.0332503    .1097497 
       dyrev |  -.0305034   .0103275    -2.95   0.003     -.050745   -.0102618 
     dylnast |   .0062482    .004299     1.45   0.146    -.0021778    .0146741 
       _cons |   .0126979   .0531064     0.24   0.811    -.0913888    .1167847 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 277
Appendix 5 
 
Supplements for Table 5.5 
The book-tax differences are calculated by using consolidated financial 
statements. 
 
Grouip 1 
. by groupcon,sort: areg  r15dpd epspd chgepspd , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     530 
                                                       F(  2,   475) =    5.66 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0037 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1916 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0997 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.0093 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .0841577    .136581     0.62   0.538    -.1842199    .3525352 
    chgepspd |     .20232     .06785     2.98   0.003     .0689968    .3356433 
       _cons |   .1541905   .0442321     3.49   0.001     .0672757    .2411053 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (53 categories) 
 
 
Group 2 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     670 
                                                       F(  2,   601) =    2.86 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0578 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0942 
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0083 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .81842 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .3169734   .2519904     1.26   0.209    -.1779153    .8118621 
    chgepspd |  -.0294021   .0568434    -0.52   0.605    -.1410381    .0822338 
       _cons |    .148939   .0333934     4.46   0.000      .083357    .2145211 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (67 categories) 
 
Group 1: Pre-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     265 
                                                       F(  2,   210) =    4.25 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0156 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3614 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1972 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .99087 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.1313616   .1121481    -1.17   0.243    -.3524419    .0897187 
    chgepspd |   .2257781   .0776602     2.91   0.004     .0726846    .3788716 
       _cons |   .0051619   .0635009     0.08   0.935     -.120019    .1303427 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (53 categories) 
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Group 1: Post-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     265 
                                                       F(  2,   210) =    8.37 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0003 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2778 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0921 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .96532 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .7549263   .3042066     2.48   0.014     .1552362    1.354616 
    chgepspd |   .1765003   .2321965     0.76   0.448    -.2812345    .6342351 
       _cons |   .1711677   .0644888     2.65   0.009     .0440392    .2982961 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (53 categories) 
 
 
 
Group 2: Pre-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F(  2,   266) =    1.52 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.2212 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1283 
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0945 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .81707 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.0882927   .2439734    -0.36   0.718    -.5686573    .3920719 
    chgepspd |   .0529327   .0555659     0.95   0.342    -.0564723    .1623378 
       _cons |   .1067897   .0457474     2.33   0.020     .0167166    .1968627 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (67 categories) 
 
 
Group 2: Post-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F(  2,   266) =    4.98 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0075 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3408 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1723 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .76965 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |    .959183   .3058705     3.14   0.002     .3569478    1.561418 
    chgepspd |  -.1877339   .1306529    -1.44   0.152    -.4449792    .0695114 
       _cons |   .1369523    .039734     3.45   0.001     .0587192    .2151854 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (67 categories) 
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Returns are calculated from 9 months before and 3 months after the financial year-
end. 
 
. by group dum_yr, sort: reg ret12m_9 epspd chgepspd, r 
-> group = 1, dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     300 
                                                       F(  2,   297) =    2.55 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0801 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0439 
   Adj R-squared =  0.0374 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .86673 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    ret12m_9 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .0105885   .0683828     0.15   0.877    -.1239878    .1451647 
    chgepspd |    .071734   .0352862     2.03   0.043     .0022915    .1411766 
       _cons |   .0065023   .0489522     0.13   0.894    -.0898348    .1028394 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-> group = 1, dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     300 
                                                       F(  2,   297) =   13.72 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2178 
          Adj R-squared =  0.2125 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .81346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    ret12m_9 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .4656219   .2564972     1.82   0.070    -.0391605    .9704042 
    chgepspd |    .454327   .1627769     2.79   0.006     .1339847    .7746693 
       _cons |   .0915692   .0511056     1.79   0.074    -.0090058    .1921442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-> group = 2, dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     300 
                                                       F(  2,   297) =    3.62 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0279 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0197 
          Adj R-squared =  0.0131 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .74027 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    ret12m_9 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .2258545   .1451733     1.56   0.121    -.0598442    .5115532 
    chgepspd |    -.06759   .0273018    -2.48   0.014    -.1213194   -.0138606 
       _cons |   .0225524   .0450202     0.50   0.617    -.0660467    .1111514 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-> group = 2, dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     300 
                                                       F(  2,   297) =    4.63 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0105 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1021 
          Adj R-squared =  0.0961 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .68264 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    ret12m_9 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .5493884   .1888145     2.91   0.004     .1778046    .9209722 
    chgepspd |   .0338676   .0907185     0.37   0.709    -.1446648    .2124001 
       _cons |   .0744171   .0359792     2.07   0.039     .0036107    .1452236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Supplements for Table 5.6 
The book-tax differences are calculated by using consolidated financial 
statements. 
 
. by groupcon,sort: areg  p_pdec eps_pdec bvps_pdec, a(i_company) r 
 
Group 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     420 
                                                       F(  2,   376) =   26.95 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3265 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2495 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .92766 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .5911132   .2218558     2.66   0.008     .1548797    1.027347 
   bvps_pdec |   .3236232   .0446071     7.25   0.000     .2359127    .4113338 
       _cons |    .706648   .0792402     8.92   0.000     .5508387    .8624574 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (42 categories) 
 
 
Group 2 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     550 
                                                       F(  2,   493) =   15.58 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2458 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1601 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .7639 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .1868264    .106592     1.75   0.080    -.0226043    .3962571 
   bvps_pdec |    .273772   .0490632     5.58   0.000     .1773733    .3701707 
       _cons |   .7286081    .066555    10.95   0.000     .5978417    .8593746 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (55 categories) 
 
 
 
Group 1: Pre-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     210 
                                                       F(  2,   166) =   10.57 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3407 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1699 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.0433 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .4578554   .2942712     1.56   0.122    -.1231413    1.038852 
   bvps_pdec |   .2696577    .062092     4.34   0.000     .1470658    .3922496 
       _cons |   .6993424   .1185252     5.90   0.000     .4653312    .9333535 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (42 categories) 
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Group 1: Post-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     210 
                                                       F(  2,   166) =   49.19 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4994 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3697 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .78062 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .8520888   .2273379     3.75   0.000     .4032424    1.300935 
   bvps_pdec |   .5012801   .0675469     7.42   0.000     .3679185    .6346418 
       _cons |   .5238389   .0837472     6.25   0.000     .3584919    .6891859 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (42 categories) 
 
 
Group 2: Pre-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     275 
                                                       F(  2,   218) =   20.17 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2978 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1174 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .74174 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .0072723   .1018214     0.07   0.943    -.1934081    .2079527 
   bvps_pdec |   .2496526   .0395962     6.30   0.000     .1716122     .327693 
       _cons |   .7130727   .0656566    10.86   0.000     .5836698    .8424756 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (55 categories) 
 
 
Group 2: Post-adoption 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     275 
                                                       F(  2,   218) =   10.25 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0001 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4701 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3339 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .71273 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .4154636   .2587589     1.61   0.110    -.0945257    .9254529 
   bvps_pdec |   .4298099   .1037811     4.14   0.000     .2252671    .6343528 
       _cons |   .5463008   .1301529     4.20   0.000     .2897818    .8028199 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (55 categories) 
 
. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Supplements of the robustness checks 
 
. areg  r15dpd epspd chgepspd , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    1110 
                                                       F(  2,   997) =    3.78 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0232 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1314 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0338 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .92016 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .1303244   .1141883     1.14   0.254    -.0937525    .3544013 
    chgepspd |   .1134042   .0589003     1.93   0.054    -.0021787     .228987 
       _cons |   .1603587   .0273029     5.87   0.000      .106781    .2139365 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (111 categories) 
 
 
. by dum_yr, sort: areg  r15dpd epspd chgepspd , a (i_company) r 
-> dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     555 
                                                       F(  2,   442) =    3.48 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0318 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2523 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0628 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .91105 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.1263577   .0882173    -1.43   0.153    -.2997351    .0470197 
    chgepspd |   .1529628   .0595735     2.57   0.011     .0358802    .2700453 
       _cons |   .0628875   .0382718     1.64   0.101    -.0123299    .1381048 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (111 categories) 
 
 
-> dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     555 
                                                       F(  2,   442) =    9.31 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0001 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3067 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1310 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .86378 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .8574388   .2325465     3.69   0.000     .4004045    1.314473 
    chgepspd |   .0037913   .1496193     0.03   0.980    -.2902623    .2978449 
       _cons |   .1599641   .0373414     4.28   0.000     .0865754    .2333528 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (111 categories) 
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. by btgrp_co, sort: areg  r15dpd epspd chgepspd , a (i_company) r 
 
-> btgrp_co = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     570 
                                                       F(  2,   511) =    5.18 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0059 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1827 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0899 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .99773 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .0526968   .1274598     0.41   0.679    -.1977128    .3031065 
    chgepspd |   .1914234   .0655154     2.92   0.004     .0627107    .3201361 
       _cons |   .1609218   .0417872     3.85   0.000      .078826    .2430177 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (57 categories) 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 2 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     540 
                                                       F(  2,   484) =    6.40 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0018 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1603 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0648 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .77812 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .6843574   .1959287     3.49   0.001     .2993814    1.069333 
    chgepspd |  -.1163827   .0427358    -2.72   0.007    -.2003532   -.0324122 
       _cons |    .120785   .0313271     3.86   0.000     .0592312    .1823388 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (54 categories) 
 
. by btgrp_co dum_yr, sort: areg  r15dpd epspd chgepspd , a (i_company) r 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 1, dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     285 
                                                       F(  2,   226) =    4.79 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0092 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3565 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1914 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .98517 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.1812051   .1014655    -1.79   0.075    -.3811446    .0187344 
    chgepspd |   .2163341   .0731871     2.96   0.003     .0721176    .3605506 
       _cons |  -.0095255   .0599336    -0.16   0.874    -.1276257    .1085746 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (57 categories) 
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-> btgrp_co = 1, dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     285 
                                                       F(  2,   226) =    9.12 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0002 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3260 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1530 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .90669 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .8166589   .3150776     2.59   0.010     .1957934    1.437524 
    chgepspd |   .1881135   .2226176     0.85   0.399    -.2505581    .6267852 
       _cons |    .163116   .0616391     2.65   0.009      .041655    .2845769 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (57 categories) 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 2, dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     270 
                                                       F(  2,   214) =    4.29 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0149 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1872 
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0217 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .75401 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |    .496118    .186186     2.66   0.008     .1291246    .8631114 
    chgepspd |  -.0756753    .043066    -1.76   0.080    -.1605632    .0092125 
       _cons |   .0954626    .046169     2.07   0.040     .0044584    .1864668 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (54 categories) 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 2, dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     270 
                                                       F(  2,   214) =    3.07 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0486 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2984 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1181 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .80672 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .8697283   .3512104     2.48   0.014     .1774535    1.562003 
    chgepspd |  -.1699108   .1623866    -1.05   0.297    -.4899929    .1501713 
       _cons |   .1433293   .0441431     3.25   0.001     .0563184    .2303402 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (54 categories) 
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. areg  p_pdec eps_pdec bvps_pdec , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     890 
                                                       F(  2,   799) =   30.88 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2960 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2167 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .83991 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .4394236   .1524832     2.88   0.004     .1401086    .7387387 
   bvps_pdec |   .2964236   .0384171     7.72   0.000     .2210133    .3718339 
       _cons |   .7069991   .0558957    12.65   0.000     .5972793    .8167188 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (89 categories) 
 
 
 
. by dum_yr,sort: areg  p_pdec eps_pdec bvps_pdec , a (i_company) r 
 
-> dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     445 
                                                       F(  2,   354) =   20.22 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3196 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1466 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .88798 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .2901164   .2014651     1.44   0.151    -.1061025    .6863354 
   bvps_pdec |   .2531834   .0398114     6.36   0.000     .1748867    .3314801 
       _cons |   .6922645   .0722674     9.58   0.000     .5501372    .8343919 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (89 categories) 
 
 
-> dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     445 
                                                       F(  2,   354) =   33.69 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4882 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3581 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .74568 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .6144765   .2164605     2.84   0.005     .1887661    1.040187 
   bvps_pdec |   .4720252    .064768     7.29   0.000     .3446468    .5994037 
       _cons |   .5267287   .0804001     6.55   0.000     .3686068    .6848507 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (89 categories) 
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. by btgrp_co,sort: areg  p_pdec eps_pdec bvps_pdec , a (i_company) r 
 
-> btgrp_co = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     470 
                                                       F(  2,   421) =   16.63 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3239 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2468 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .90865 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .5179383   .2053799     2.52   0.012     .1142405     .921636 
   bvps_pdec |   .3025413   .0528006     5.73   0.000     .1987557     .406327 
       _cons |   .7147797   .0834059     8.57   0.000     .5508359    .8787235 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (47 categories) 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 2 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     420 
                                                       F(  2,   376) =   15.57 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2604 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1758 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .74908 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .2457477   .1122535     2.19   0.029     .0250244    .4664711 
   bvps_pdec |   .3132999   .0561571     5.58   0.000     .2028786    .4237212 
       _cons |   .6758467   .0687901     9.82   0.000     .5405852    .8111082 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (42 categories) 
 
 
. by btgrp_co dum_yr,sort: areg  p_pdec eps_pdec bvps_pdec , a (i_company) r 
-> btgrp_co = 1, dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     235 
                                                       F(  2,   186) =   10.46 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3396 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1691 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.0276 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .3509273   .2682813     1.31   0.192     -.178338    .8801927 
   bvps_pdec |   .2561798   .0568905     4.50   0.000     .1439462    .3684134 
       _cons |   .6780099   .1113045     6.09   0.000     .4584284    .8975913 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (47 categories) 
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-> btgrp_co = 1, dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     235 
                                                       F(  2,   186) =   56.73 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5489 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4325 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .71571 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .9697943   .2355446     4.12   0.000     .5051119    1.434477 
   bvps_pdec |   .4545966   .0595101     7.64   0.000      .337195    .5719982 
       _cons |   .5351587   .0695148     7.70   0.000     .3980198    .6722976 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (47 categories) 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 2, dum_yr = 0 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     210 
                                                       F(  2,   166) =   19.36 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2907 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1069 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .69441 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |   .1054519   .0827469     1.27   0.204    -.0579202    .2688239 
   bvps_pdec |   .2834541   .0461619     6.14   0.000      .192314    .3745941 
       _cons |   .6820849   .0668603    10.20   0.000     .5500787     .814091 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (42 categories) 
 
 
-> btgrp_co = 2, dum_yr = 1 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     210 
                                                       F(  2,   166) =    6.47 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0020 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4366 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2907 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .76262 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      p_pdec |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    eps_pdec |    .364684   .2848491     1.28   0.202    -.1977099     .927078 
   bvps_pdec |   .4725883   .1401412     3.37   0.001     .1958994    .7492772 
       _cons |   .4928653   .1757772     2.80   0.006     .1458181    .8399124 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                      (42 categories) 
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Appendix 7 
 
Supplement for Table 5.8 
 
. by i_industry dum_yr, sort: reg r15dpd epspd chgepspd 
 
i_industry = 1, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     110 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   107) =   31.42 
       Model |  41.7636029     2  20.8818015           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  71.1027864   107  .664512023           R-squared     =  0.3700 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3583 
       Total |  112.866389   109  1.03547146           Root MSE      =  .81518 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.608953   .2146275     7.50   0.000     1.183479    2.034426 
    chgepspd |  -.4260896   .1069463    -3.98   0.000    -.6380982    -.214081 
       _cons |   .0237286    .085675     0.28   0.782     -.146112    .1935693 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
i_industry = 1, dum_yr = 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     110 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   107) =   73.35 
       Model |  46.4654111     2  23.2327056           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  33.8913413   107  .316741508           R-squared     =  0.5782 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5704 
       Total |  80.3567524   109  .737217912           Root MSE      =   .5628 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.434717   .2193743     6.54   0.000     .9998332    1.869601 
    chgepspd |   1.686012   .2774001     6.08   0.000     1.136099    2.235926 
       _cons |    -.02823    .061196    -0.46   0.646    -.1495439     .093084 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
i_industry = 2, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      75 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    72) =    5.75 
       Model |   3.5154771     2  1.75773855           Prob > F      =  0.0048 
    Residual |   21.996013    72  .305500181           R-squared     =  0.1378 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1138 
       Total |  25.5114901    74  .344749867           Root MSE      =  .55272 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .2701863   .1056412     2.56   0.013     .0595945    .4807781 
    chgepspd |    .056317   .0636206     0.89   0.379    -.0705083    .1831423 
       _cons |   .0326302   .0641861     0.51   0.613    -.0953225    .1605828 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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i_industry = 2, dum_yr = 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      75 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    72) =   18.73 
       Model |  19.2852932     2  9.64264658           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  37.0735799    72  .514910831           R-squared     =  0.3422 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3239 
       Total |   56.358873    74  .761606392           Root MSE      =  .71757 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.132919   .1980402     5.72   0.000     .7381326    1.527704 
    chgepspd |  -.3033679   .2136445    -1.42   0.160    -.7292605    .1225246 
       _cons |    .188567   .0886442     2.13   0.037     .0118581    .3652759 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
i_industry = 4, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      60 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    57) =    2.33 
       Model |  1.59673953     2  .798369767           Prob > F      =  0.1060 
    Residual |  19.4924245    57   .34197236           R-squared     =  0.0757 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0433 
       Total |   21.089164    59  .357443458           Root MSE      =  .58478 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .0351969   .1204689     0.29   0.771    -.2060379    .2764318 
    chgepspd |    .043521   .0342219     1.27   0.209    -.0250072    .1120492 
       _cons |  -.0632379   .0800449    -0.79   0.433     -.223525    .0970493 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
i_industry = 4, dum_yr = 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      61 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    58) =    9.68 
       Model |  7.40589919     2  3.70294959           Prob > F      =  0.0002 
    Residual |   22.176632    58  .382355724           R-squared     =  0.2503 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2245 
       Total |  29.5825312    60  .493042186           Root MSE      =  .61835 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.149749   .2774793     4.14   0.000     .5943137    1.705184 
    chgepspd |  -.0142182   .1658304    -0.09   0.932    -.3461639    .3177275 
       _cons |   .1101577   .0877017     1.26   0.214    -.0653963    .2857116 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
i_industry = 5, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   102) =   35.90 
       Model |   71.439066     2   35.719533           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  101.492293   102  .995022482           R-squared     =  0.4131 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4016 
       Total |  172.931359   104  1.66280153           Root MSE      =  .99751 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.1049312   .0648534    -1.62   0.109    -.2335676    .0237053 
    chgepspd |   .1959053   .0245061     7.99   0.000     .1472976    .2445131 
       _cons |  -.1880015   .1057033    -1.78   0.078    -.3976635    .0216604 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 290
i_industry = 5, dum_yr = 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     104 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   101) =   22.16 
       Model |  53.4344768     2  26.7172384           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  121.785696   101  1.20579897           R-squared     =  0.3050 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2912 
       Total |  175.220173   103  1.70116672           Root MSE      =  1.0981 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .3375156   .1757735     1.92   0.058    -.0111717     .686203 
    chgepspd |   .7236795   .1572356     4.60   0.000     .4117664    1.035593 
       _cons |   .1594432   .1140515     1.40   0.165    -.0668044    .3856907 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
i_industry = 6, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    17) =    8.31 
       Model |  1.75564823     2  .877824115           Prob > F      =  0.0030 
    Residual |  1.79604145    17  .105649497           R-squared     =  0.4943 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4348 
       Total |  3.55168968    19  .186931036           Root MSE      =  .32504 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.2978414   .1193117    -2.50   0.023    -.5495672   -.0461157 
    chgepspd |   .2093932   .1288777     1.62   0.123    -.0625149    .4813014 
       _cons |   -.169255   .0769591    -2.20   0.042    -.3316245   -.0068856 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
i_industry = 6, dum_yr = 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    17) =    1.86 
       Model |  2.21613146     2  1.10806573           Prob > F      =  0.1857 
    Residual |  10.1166678    17  .595098104           R-squared     =  0.1797 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0832 
       Total |  12.3327992    19  .649094696           Root MSE      =  .77143 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .2944594   .5825619     0.51   0.620    -.9346387    1.523557 
    chgepspd |  -.9473653    .534489    -1.77   0.094    -2.075038     .180308 
       _cons |   .2049269   .1759995     1.16   0.260    -.1663995    .5762533 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
i_industry = 7, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     165 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   162) =    6.59 
       Model |  6.09255228     2  3.04627614           Prob > F      =  0.0018 
    Residual |  74.8395411   162  .461972476           R-squared     =  0.0753 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0639 
       Total |  80.9320934   164  .493488374           Root MSE      =  .67969 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -.3859608   .1065976    -3.62   0.000    -.5964608   -.1754608 
    chgepspd |   .0908716   .0385275     2.36   0.020     .0147907    .1669525 
       _cons |   .0898388    .053127     1.69   0.093     -.015072    .1947495 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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i_industry = 7, dum_yr = 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     165 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   162) =    9.15 
       Model |  11.6826695     2  5.84133473           Prob > F      =  0.0002 
    Residual |  103.443833   162  .638542177           R-squared     =  0.1015 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0904 
       Total |  115.126502   164  .701990867           Root MSE      =  .79909 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .9237158   .2166485     4.26   0.000     .4958966    1.351535 
    chgepspd |  -.3386609   .1337815    -2.53   0.012    -.6028413   -.0744804 
       _cons |   .1750899    .066232     2.64   0.009     .0443005    .3058793 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
i_industry = 8, dum_yr = 0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      65 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    62) =    5.40 
       Model |  14.8659766     2   7.4329883           Prob > F      =  0.0069 
    Residual |  85.3588757    62  1.37675606           R-squared     =  0.1483 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1209 
       Total |  100.224852    64  1.56601332           Root MSE      =  1.1734 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |  -1.165802   .3600456    -3.24   0.002    -1.885523   -.4460809 
    chgepspd |   .1314879   .1101931     1.19   0.237     -.088785    .3517608 
       _cons |   .1347125   .1525465     0.88   0.381    -.1702236    .4396486 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
i_industry = 8, dum_yr = 1 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      65 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    62) =    0.62 
       Model |  .688436453     2  .344218227           Prob > F      =  0.5426 
    Residual |  34.5649863    62  .557499779           R-squared     =  0.0195 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0121 
       Total |  35.2534228    64  .550834731           Root MSE      =  .74666 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      r15dpd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   .3070482   .3056888     1.00   0.319     -.304015    .9181114 
    chgepspd |  -.1272807   .1458305    -0.87   0.386    -.4187918    .1642303 
       _cons |   .0187662   .0938773     0.20   0.842    -.1688919    .2064243 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
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Appendix 8 
 
Supplements of Table 5.9 
Negative income tax expenses are excluded. 
 
. xtfmb  r15dp epspd chgepspd if btgrp_co==1&dy==0 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       245 
                                                 Num. time periods =         7 
                                                 F(  2,     6)     =      4.02 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0782 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.2774 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
       r15dp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.133283   .5418964     2.09   0.081      -.19269    2.459256 
    chgepspd |  -.0912215   .5481347    -0.17   0.873    -1.432459    1.250016 
       _cons |  -.0490987   .1622325    -0.30   0.772    -.4460674      .34787 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtfmb  r15dp epspd chgepspd if btgrp_co==1&dy==1 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       280 
                                                 Num. time periods =         8 
                                                 F(  2,     7)     =      6.32 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0270 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.3226 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
       r15dp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.483342   .4391751     3.38   0.012     .4448577    2.521826 
    chgepspd |   .4422784   .2552547     1.73   0.127    -.1613031     1.04586 
       _cons |   .0514022   .1470424     0.35   0.737    -.2962977    .3991022 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtfmb  r15dp epspd chgepspd if btgrp_co==2&dy==0 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       203 
                                                 Num. time periods =         7 
                                                 F(  2,     6)     =      9.83 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0128 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.1746 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
       r15dp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |     1.8412   .7453743     2.47   0.048     .0173347    3.665065 
    chgepspd |   .0799081   .9589447     0.08   0.936    -2.266545    2.426361 
       _cons |  -.1372857   .0729171    -1.88   0.109    -.3157073     .041136 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtfmb  r15dp epspd chgepspd if btgrp_co==2&dy==1 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       232 
                                                 Num. time periods =         8 
                                                 F(  2,     7)     =      1.96 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.2114 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.3016 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
       r15dp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       epspd |   1.364532   .6903953     1.98   0.089    -.2679936    2.997057 
    chgepspd |   .4212242   .5512716     0.76   0.470     -.882326    1.724774 
       _cons |   .0867522   .0915878     0.95   0.375    -.1298185    .3033228 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtfmb  pavgmar r_acc_eps bvps if btgrp_co==1&dy==0 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       180 
                                                 Num. time periods =         5 
                                                 F(  2,     4)     =     28.67 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0043 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.4480 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
     pavgmar |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   r_acc_eps |   5.239455   2.343105     2.24   0.089    -1.266048    11.74496 
        bvps |   .1006767    .331238     0.30   0.776    -.8189875    1.020341 
       _cons |   19.13175   7.814802     2.45   0.071     -2.56562    40.82912 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfmb  pavgmar r_acc_eps bvps if btgrp_co==1&dy==1 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       288 
                                                 Num. time periods =         8 
                                                 F(  2,     7)     =    254.13 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.7262 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
     pavgmar |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   r_acc_eps |   10.50471   2.723294     3.86   0.006     4.065139    16.94427 
        bvps |   .0098099    .221182     0.04   0.966    -.5132023    .5328222 
       _cons |  -1.204026   1.413501    -0.85   0.423    -4.546424    2.138372 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfmb  pavgmar r_acc_eps bvps if btgrp_co==2&dy==0 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       145 
                                                 Num. time periods =         5 
                                                 F(  2,     4)     =     26.39 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0050 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.3131 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
     pavgmar |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   r_acc_eps |   4.585113   2.499786     1.83   0.141    -2.355405    11.52563 
        bvps |   .3761158   .4938016     0.76   0.489    -.9948972    1.747129 
       _cons |   29.46225   14.38937     2.05   0.110    -10.48903    69.41353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfmb  pavgmar r_acc_eps bvps if btgrp_co==2&dy==1 
 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Two-Step procedure           Number of obs     =       232 
                                                 Num. time periods =         8 
                                                 F(  2,     7)     =     46.47 
                                                 Prob > F          =    0.0001 
                                                 avg. R-squared    =    0.8692 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Fama-MacBeth 
     pavgmar |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   r_acc_eps |   9.231548   2.130903     4.33   0.003     4.192763    14.27033 
        bvps |   .2066416   .1300785     1.59   0.156    -.1009451    .5142283 
       _cons |   5.486903   1.951051     2.81   0.026        .8734    10.10041 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. 
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Appendix 9 
 
Supplements for Table 6.4 
 
j = 0: 
 
. reg epsp bhr12month_9, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3457 
                                                       F(  1,  3455) =   61.89 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0300 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .40952 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        epsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
bhr12month_9 |   .1234522   .0156918     7.87   0.000      .092686    .1542184 
       _cons |   .0030896   .0069887     0.44   0.658    -.0106127    .0167919 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg epsp bhr12month_9, 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3457 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,  3455) =  106.80 
       Model |  17.9119193     1  17.9119193           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  579.434367  3455  .167708934           R-squared     =  0.0300 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0297 
       Total |  597.346287  3456  .172843254           Root MSE      =  .40952 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        epsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
bhr12month_9 |   .1234522   .0119455    10.33   0.000     .1000312    .1468732 
       _cons |   .0030896   .0069682     0.44   0.658    -.0105727    .0167519 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg epsp bhr12month_9 if z==0, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1343 
                                                       F(  1,  1341) =    2.45 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1175 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0035 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .39065 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        epsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
bhr12month_9 |   .0399635   .0255161     1.57   0.118    -.0100924    .0900193 
       _cons |   .0661171   .0134356     4.92   0.000       .03976    .0924742 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg epsp bhr12month_9 if z==0, 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1343 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,  1341) =    4.67 
       Model |  .713235111     1  .713235111           Prob > F      =  0.0308 
    Residual |  204.643229  1341  .152604944           R-squared     =  0.0035 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0027 
       Total |  205.356465  1342  .153022701           Root MSE      =  .39065 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        epsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
bhr12month_9 |   .0399635   .0184855     2.16   0.031     .0036998    .0762271 
       _cons |   .0661171    .014237     4.64   0.000     .0381878    .0940464 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg epsp bhr12month_9 if z==1, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2114 
                                                       F(  1,  2112) =   38.75 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0179 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41809 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        epsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
bhr12month_9 |   .2403937   .0386184     6.22   0.000     .1646598    .3161277 
       _cons |   .0313897   .0145305     2.16   0.031     .0028941    .0598852 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. reg epsp bhr12month_9 if z==1, 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2114 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,  2112) =   38.52 
       Model |  6.73355103     1  6.73355103           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  369.170461  2112   .17479662           R-squared     =  0.0179 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0174 
       Total |  375.904012  2113  .177900621           Root MSE      =  .41809 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        epsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
bhr12month_9 |   .2403937   .0387318     6.21   0.000     .1644373    .3163502 
       _cons |   .0313897   .0164152     1.91   0.056    -.0008019    .0635812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Positive returns samples Negative returns samples 
Adjusted R2   0.0027       <  0.0174 
 
The higher R2 indicates a better performance in capturing economic consequences 
when returns are negative (Basu 1997). 
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j = 2: 
 
. reg eps3p z bhr3mar zr, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2484 
                                                       F(  3,  2480) =   54.75 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0702 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .72097 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           z |  -.0251027    .054022    -0.46   0.642    -.1310356    .0808303 
     bhr3mar |    .130956   .0442957     2.96   0.003     .0440956    .2178163 
          zr |   .2324754   .0673401     3.45   0.001     .1004268    .3645239 
       _cons |   .2107883   .0415925     5.07   0.000     .1292288    .2923479 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg eps3p bhr3mar, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2484 
                                                       F(  1,  2482) =   63.07 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0637 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .72318 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     bhr3mar |   .2013883    .025358     7.94   0.000     .1516634    .2511133 
       _cons |      .1122   .0152814     7.34   0.000     .0822344    .1421655 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg eps3p bhr3mar, 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2484 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,  2482) =  168.99 
       Model |  88.3775351     1  88.3775351           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1298.04983  2482  .522985426           R-squared     =  0.0637 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0634 
       Total |  1386.42736  2483  .558367846           Root MSE      =  .72318 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     bhr3mar |   .2013883    .015492    13.00   0.000     .1710097    .2317669 
       _cons |      .1122    .014553     7.71   0.000     .0836628    .1407372 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. reg eps3p bhr3mar if z==0, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     811 
                                                       F(  1,   809) =    8.73 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0032 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0223 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .89551 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     bhr3mar |    .130956   .0443147     2.96   0.003     .0439707    .2179412 
       _cons |   .2107883   .0416103     5.07   0.000     .1291114    .2924652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg eps3p bhr3mar if z==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     811 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   809) =   18.44 
       Model |  14.7868987     1  14.7868987           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  648.766608   809  .801936474           R-squared     =  0.0223 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0211 
       Total |  663.553507   810   .81920186           Root MSE      =  .89551 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     bhr3mar |    .130956    .030497     4.29   0.000     .0710934    .1908185 
       _cons |   .2107883    .042189     5.00   0.000     .1279755    .2936012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg eps3p bhr3mar if z==1, r 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1673 
                                                       F(  1,  1671) =   51.36 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0254 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .61903 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     bhr3mar |   .3634313   .0507101     7.17   0.000     .2639694    .4628932 
       _cons |   .1856856   .0344667     5.39   0.000     .1180832    .2532881 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg eps3p bhr3mar if z==1, 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1673 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,  1671) =   43.52 
       Model |  16.6785721     1  16.6785721           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  640.328276  1671  .383200644           R-squared     =  0.0254 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0248 
       Total |  657.006848  1672  .392946679           Root MSE      =  .61903 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       eps3p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     bhr3mar |   .3634313   .0550879     6.60   0.000     .2553828    .4714798 
       _cons |   .1856856   .0340703     5.45   0.000     .1188606    .2525106 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Positive returns samples Negative returns samples 
Adjusted R2   0.0211       <  0.0248 
 
The higher R2 indicates a better performance in capturing economic consequences 
when returns are negative (Basu 1997). 
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Appendix 10 
The book-tax difference is calculated from consolidated financial statements. It 
is ranked and scaled into five groups (scrnkbt) for all analyses. 
 
. areg chgepsp z scrnkbt zbt l_chgepsp zlchg btlchg zbtlchg, a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    2108 
                                                       F(  7,  1714) =   27.58 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3852 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2442 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .18541 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     chgepsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           z |   .0233564   .0156597     1.49   0.136    -.0073578    .0540706 
     scrnkbt |   .1177496   .0274471     4.29   0.000     .0639162    .1715831 
         zbt |  -.0563354   .0272459    -2.07   0.039    -.1097741   -.0028968 
   l_chgepsp |   .0497309   .0918472     0.54   0.588    -.1304135    .2298753 
       zlchg |  -.4259983   .2122827    -2.01   0.045    -.8423587   -.0096379 
      btlchg |  -.1558419   .1334193    -1.17   0.243    -.4175236    .1058399 
     zbtlchg |  -.5065355   .2972502    -1.70   0.089    -1.089547    .0764759 
       _cons |  -.0701638    .014376    -4.88   0.000    -.0983601   -.0419675 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (387 categories) 
 
 
 
. areg absbtm scrnkbt, a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    2422 
                                                       F(  1,  1975) =    8.77 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0031 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3369 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1871 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .0013 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      absbtm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     scrnkbt |   .0005148   .0001738     2.96   0.003     .0001739    .0008557 
       _cons |  -.0015626   .0000908   -17.21   0.000    -.0017407   -.0013845 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (446 categories) 
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. areg absbtm scrnkbt lev lnast salegrw , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    2328 
                                                       F(  4,  1895) =   21.68 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3689 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2251 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .00128 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      absbtm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     scrnkbt |   .0010166   .0001961     5.19   0.000     .0006321    .0014011 
         lev |  -.0012993   .0002761    -4.71   0.000    -.0018408   -.0007577 
       lnast |  -.0006123   .0000746    -8.21   0.000    -.0007586    -.000466 
     salegrw |   .0000123   .0000151     0.81   0.416    -.0000174     .000042 
       _cons |   .0078399   .0010742     7.30   0.000     .0057332    .0099466 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (429 categories) 
 
. areg absbtm scrnkbt lnnbo lnnbb cgratio sh lev lnast salegrw , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    1991 
                                                       F(  8,  1568) =   12.55 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4928 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3563 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .00119 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      absbtm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     scrnkbt |   .0005825   .0001902     3.06   0.002     .0002094    .0009556 
       lnnbo |   .0005296   .0003176     1.67   0.096    -.0000933    .0011526 
       lnnbb |  -.0006458   .0001836    -3.52   0.000    -.0010059   -.0002858 
     cgratio |   .0027235   .0004339     6.28   0.000     .0018725    .0035745 
          sh |   -.000431   .0002408    -1.79   0.074    -.0009034    .0000413 
         lev |     -.0011   .0003077    -3.58   0.000    -.0017035   -.0004965 
       lnast |  -.0003612    .000109    -3.31   0.001    -.0005751   -.0001474 
     salegrw |   .0001817   .0000753     2.41   0.016     .0000341    .0003293 
       _cons |   .0044444   .0014437     3.08   0.002     .0016126    .0072762 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (415 categories) 
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. areg absacc3 scrnkbt, a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    1206 
                                                       F(  1,   942) =    0.10 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.7519 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3640 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1865 
                                                       Root MSE      =  8.4162 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     absacc3 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     scrnkbt |  -.5103442   1.613564    -0.32   0.752     -3.67694    2.656251 
       _cons |   .8367225   .8264547     1.01   0.312    -.7851828    2.458628 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (263 categories) 
 
. areg absacc3 scrnkbt lev lnast salegrw , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    1206 
                                                       F(  4,   939) =    0.32 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.8619 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3654 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1856 
                                                       Root MSE      =  8.4205 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     absacc3 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     scrnkbt |  -.1503079    1.75989    -0.09   0.932    -3.604081    3.303465 
         lev |   3.533483   3.776081     0.94   0.350    -3.877052    10.94402 
       lnast |   -.552705   .9909231    -0.56   0.577    -2.497385    1.391975 
     salegrw |  -.2272331   .7864011    -0.29   0.773     -1.77054    1.316074 
       _cons |   7.405721   14.55676     0.51   0.611    -21.16182    35.97326 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (263 categories) 
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. areg absacc3 scrnkbt lnnbo lnnbb cgratio sh lev lnast salegrw , a (i_company) r 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =    1165 
                                                       F(  8,   899) =    0.80 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.6024 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3739 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1894 
                                                       Root MSE      =  8.1143 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     absacc3 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     scrnkbt |  -.4377216    1.76492    -0.25   0.804    -3.901564     3.02612 
       lnnbo |  -.5438646    3.01935    -0.18   0.857    -6.469659     5.38193 
       lnnbb |  -.6919294   1.883157    -0.37   0.713    -4.387825    3.003966 
     cgratio |  -1.868891    4.22338    -0.44   0.658    -10.15772    6.419942 
          sh |  -2.245795   2.291469    -0.98   0.327    -6.743046    2.251456 
         lev |  -.2413433   3.576336    -0.07   0.946    -7.260283    6.777597 
       lnast |   .1803912    1.34459     0.13   0.893     -2.45851    2.819292 
     salegrw |  -.1447199   .7823225    -0.18   0.853    -1.680111    1.390671 
       _cons |   4.222232   17.75261     0.24   0.812    -30.61915    39.06362 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   i_company |   absorbed                                     (258 categories) 
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